Q&A: Hello Rabbi Michi, a few days ago I asked you about the possibility of grounding conservatism in the principle of a decree that something accepted by the public becomes obligatory to accept (which is, for example, why it is absolutely forbidden to disagree with the Talmud), and you wrote that you had not heard of such a decree. I found Maimonides in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah writing that the reason the Amoraim did not disagree with the Tannaim is because “at its sealing there were the overwhelming majority of the sages of Israel,” and the Rivash explains the matter in the name of Nachmanides (no. 399): “Any acceptance by the many to make a fence and boundary for the Torah is like acceptance of the Torah, and it applies to them and to their descendants after them, even if they did not accept it by formal agreement but simply practiced it on their own as a fence for the Torah.” Other medieval authorities also touch on this issue. So I am trying to propose this principle as an obligating foundation for conservatism: that anything accepted by the public should be practiced that way, and this is also true in current matters of outlook—if most of the public accepts a certain custom, it should be preserved.
Hello Rabbi Michi, a few days ago I asked you about the possibility of grounding conservatism in the principle of a decree that something accepted by the public becomes obligatory to accept (which is, for example, why it is absolutely forbidden to disagree with the Talmud), and you wrote that you had not heard of such a decree. I found Maimonides in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah writing that the reason the Amoraim did not disagree with the Tannaim is because “at its sealing there were the overwhelming majority of the sages of Israel,” and the Rivash explains the matter in the name of Nachmanides (no. 399): “Any acceptance by the many to make a fence and boundary for the Torah is like acceptance of the Torah, and it applies to them and to their descendants after them, even if they did not accept it by formal agreement but simply practiced it on their own as a fence for the Torah.” Other medieval authorities also touch on this issue. So I am trying to propose this principle as an obligating foundation for conservatism: that anything accepted by the public should be practiced that way, and this is also true in current matters of outlook—if most of the public accepts a certain custom, it should be preserved.
Question
Answer
First, it would be better to put the wording of the question in the place for the question and not in the title. This is a complete mess.
Second, acceptance by the public is binding, as at Sinai and as with the Talmud. Beit Yishai, Derashot no. 15, discusses this at length. But that is when the public accepted upon itself some authority or some text. If the public simply behaves in a certain way without there having been any formal acceptance, that is binding only by force of custom. Otherwise even the color of shoelaces would be a Torah-level obligation and not a custom.
By the way, Maimonides himself departed from what was accepted in quite a few matters: his count of the commandments, the status of laws derived from expositions and of laws given to Moses at Sinai, his attitude toward demons and mysticism, and more. So from the very source you bring…
I do not know what you mean by questions of outlook, but there there is no possibility at all of speaking about obligation. My outlook is what I believe. There is no such thing as an “obligatory outlook.” That is an oxymoron.
Very nice, thank you very much.