Q&A: I understand that it is forbidden to disagree with the Talmud, because there is a scriptural decree that anything accepted by the entire public without objection must be accepted. And aside from the closing of the Talmud, nothing else was accepted by the public in such an absolute way, so it is permitted to disagree with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) — perhaps not advisable, but permitted. So my question is: is this the basis for the conservatism common in Haredi circles, from the Hatam Sofer to Rabbi Shach, who would say that things accepted by the public — even if not by absolutely everyone, but by most of the public — there is a strong reason to preserve, even if not an absolute obligation, still a strong reason? So is this really a good foundation for that principle? What do you think?
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I understand that it is forbidden to disagree with the Talmud, because there is a scriptural decree that anything accepted by the entire public without objection must be accepted. And aside from the closing of the Talmud, nothing else was accepted by the public in such an absolute way, so it is permitted to disagree with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) — perhaps not advisable, but permitted. So my question is: is this the basis for the conservatism common in Haredi circles, from the Hatam Sofer to Rabbi Shach, who would say that things accepted by the public — even if not by absolutely everyone, but by most of the public — there is a strong reason to preserve, even if not an absolute obligation, still a strong reason? So is this really a good foundation for that principle? What do you think?
Question
Answer
I’m not sure I understood the question. Religious conservatism is based on the assumption that the earlier generations were wiser than we are (the decline of the generations). The formalism of the prohibition against disagreeing is also based on that assumption. In my opinion, only the second is correct — the formalism — and it does not depend on comparative levels of wisdom.
Discussion on Answer
What scriptural decree? I haven’t seen any such decree. This is plain conservatism, with no connection to decrees.
They once asked Rabbi Shach whether it is possible to recite lamentations for the Holocaust. First of all, they asked him: why not? Second, they said to him that in the Friday evening service, all the text is chapters of Psalms, and in the middle there is the poem “Lekhah Dodi” by Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz, who lived about 400 years ago. If so, by the same token they could say lamentations for the Holocaust. Rabbi Shach told them that Rabbi Shlomo Alkabetz did not demand that the poem be publicized and recited by the entire public; rather, it was something that became rooted among the public. There is no problem with saying lamentations for the Holocaust, but turning it into something public is something that happens only if the public accepts it upon itself. In my view, this is the foundation of Haredi conservatism. I’m not referring to that specific question there; rather, I’m asking whether this idea is true, and suggesting that perhaps it is based on that same scriptural decree — the formalism — and whether you think that is correct.