Q&A: Morality and Jewish Law
Morality and Jewish Law
Question
Rabbi, for some reason I didn’t receive a notification about the link where I asked my previous question regarding your approach that there is a separation between morality and Jewish law, and that there is no connection between them except in pressing circumstances, where morality has to be brought into Jewish law when the interpretation is evenly balanced. I would like to ask a few things about this approach:
A. If you claim that these are two different categories—and your only support for using a moral interpretation within the world of religious values is Rabbi Shimon and pressing circumstances—isn’t that rather forced and standing on very shaky ground? Is that, in your opinion, the only Torah source? In my humble opinion, the Rabbi’s interpretation is also not the plain meaning of Rabbi Shimon’s words, and in any case it is only a single source.
B. You argued that interpretation can enter in only when the choice is between two equally plausible interpretations, and reason then tips the scale toward the moral interpretation. It seems to me that there are no such cases where two interpretations are truly equal, and it also sounds to me as though what you are saying leaves no room for morality at all, only for interpretation. If morality arranges for the more correct interpretation to be chosen—fine, but that is not really taking morality into account.
I would appreciate some clarification on this matter.
Answer
A. That is not my only support. First of all, I rely on logic. If you are in doubt, there is no reason not to choose the option that better fits morality. That is no different from considerations of pressing circumstances and distress. The comparison to Rabbi Shimon is in that respect—that we see a ruling being made on the basis of pressing circumstances and not interpretation. So morality too is a pressing circumstance. Not that this is the interpretation of his words. Beyond that, Rabbi Shimon is one example out of thousands, and definitely not my main basis. Halakhic decisors rule all the time on the basis of moral considerations, already in the Talmud and afterward.
B. When there are two interpretations and you do not know how to decide between them, that means they are evenly balanced. We have no quantitative measure for the logic of each interpretation. So it is not correct to say this is rare. It is very common. In many cases there are equally balanced interpretations. Think of every analytic Talmud lecture you have heard, and you will see that they explain the dispute between the Rashbam and the Rashba, or Rashi and Tosafot, by saying that one holds X and the other holds Y. How would you decide? Usually there is no one preferable way. Beyond that, even when one interpretation is slightly preferable, it is still possible that the moral distress justifies relying on the less plausible interpretation. Exactly like pressing circumstances.