Q&A: Kant and the Trolley Problem
Kant and the Trolley Problem
Question
Hello and blessings. I know your position that in the classic trolley problem we should not divert the trolley toward the one person, since murdering one person is more severe than not touching the train and letting 5 die. I also tend in that direction (as a supporter of Kant’s approach). But I still have 3 open questions:
- Where is the line drawn? It seems obvious to me that if there were a million people there, everyone would prefer to murder the one. Is that subjective? And the more interesting question is: is there an objective answer to a clash between moral values in general? If we take Sartre’s dilemma as an example—whether to save his mother or go fight—is there an objective answer in reality itself, in the Idea of the Good? Or is this already left to subjective judgment, with no right or wrong answer, no moral or immoral answer?
- If among the 5 people there were someone I know and love, would you still think that the moral thing to do is not to divert the trolley toward the one? And more than that: if the trolley were moving toward one member of my family, and my diverting it would make it kill 5 people instead (exactly the reverse of the first case), would it be moral to divert the trolley and murder 5, or would the moral thing be (as in the initial intuition without the family member) not to divert it and let the one die?
- The trolley problem is especially interesting in the following formulation: the train track is curved, and if I do nothing, the trolley will hit the five and then continue on to kill the one as well. On the other hand, if I divert the trolley, it will first hit the one person, and he is very fat, so he will stop the trolley. On the face of it, the sensible thing to do is to divert the train, because in any case the one person will die. The question is whether I should save the 5 and murder the one, or save no one and not touch the trolley. The intuition here really goes in the utilitarian direction, and on the face of it it is hard to go with a Kantian consideration here (not even a little—it seems that the entire consideration here is simply how many will die, because in any case the one will die, so for the sake of utility I will murder the one, instead of not murdering him and gaining no benefit at all). Maybe this can still be explained in terms of Kant’s theory and I’m missing something?
Thanks in advance, Itai
Answer
I’m not at all sure about this. I have a slight inclination in that direction, but I’m not certain. It may be that here I would say passive omission is preferable—not as a solution to the problem, but in relation to the debate over the trolley dilemma itself.
1. This is the kind of question to which I have no answer, and I assume no one else does either. Are you expecting a number? This is the vague term “proportionality,” which is used so much in law. That doesn’t mean there is no correct answer, only that I do not know a way to arrive at it.
2. My feeling is no. In legal terminology, one could say that these are human rights, not citizens’ rights, and in that realm there is no possibility of preferring those close to you. Citizens’ rights are rights that a citizen has from his state, and they are granted to him by virtue of his being a citizen of it. Human rights are rights granted to you insofar as you are a human being, regardless of whose side you are on and in which country. Providing education is a duty of a state to its own citizens, not to the whole world. But killing is forbidden even with respect to other people as well (unless they are threatening my citizens). So, for example, if my son is threatened unless I kill So-and-so, then of course I may not kill So-and-so. True, my obligation to my son comes first, but that applies only to citizens’ rights, not to human rights. In short, wherever the line may be, it does not depend on how close I am to the people in question.
3. I wrote a whole article about this: “The Separation of Siamese Twins.” See there: https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=f18e4f052adde49eb&q=https://mikyab.net/%25D7%259B%25D7%25AA%25D7%2591%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%259E%25D7%2590%25D7%259E%25D7%25A8%25D7%2599%25D7%259D/%25D7%2594%25D7%25A4%25D7%25A8%25D7%2593%25D7%25AA-%25D7%25AA%25D7%2590%25D7%2595%25D7%259E%25D7%2599-%25D7%25A1%25D7%2599%25D7%2590%25D7%259D&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwjQ7pG2za7_AhWVdKQEHWzEDuQQFnoECAQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3WAys8O0xYOzArai_TfgHV
See also columns 437–8, 358, 253, and others.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t know whether there is or is not an answer. What I do know is that I don’t know the answer. Either way, there is no basis for judging the person, because he doesn’t know either. See column 372 on judging a person according to his own position.
My closeness to any person has no moral weight at all. Therefore, when it comes to harming people, it should not be taken into account. When I speak about helping or giving to someone—there there is room (and in my opinion it is even proper) to prefer those close to you. Also when someone wants to harm a person, I cannot prefer one over another. But of course my protective resources can certainly be directed to my relative before to another person. If two people are walking in the desert and I have one canteen of water, enough for one of them, in my opinion I may give it to my relative first. Likewise, if two people are drowning and I can save one, I am entitled (and perhaps obligated) to save my relative first. But in the case at hand, we are talking about performing an act that harms, and not merely an act that saves, and that is forbidden in my opinion.
This question was mentioned and discussed at the end of column 570, which has just been posted: https://mikyab.net/posts/81320
I’ll read the article regarding section 3, thanks.
Regarding the first section, if I understand correctly, then there is no answer from an epistemological standpoint. But would you say that there is an ontological answer? That there is an answer to every moral dilemma, only we do not know it? Because if there is no answer, then there really is no room for judging dilemmas between moral values, and that is a problem, because clearly many of the actions we judge in everyday life are actually dilemmas between different moral values. It feels to me that there has to be an ontological solution, even if it cannot be known (or perhaps it can be known inwardly, in experience, without knowing how to ground it and explain it—say, like seeing red).
Regarding the second section, if I understood correctly, your claim is that my closeness to a person (in your analogy, citizens’ rights) has a lower status relative to the moral transgression (human rights), and only when someone wants to harm a person close to me may I defend him and harm someone else? If so, then even if a member of my family were among the 5 whom the trolley is about to run over, it still would not be proper to move the trolley toward the one?