Question

Hello Rabbi,
As I study tractate Bava Kamma, from time to time more questions come up for me about the legal rulings there, which seem at odds with logic or with the way reality is understood today.
 
Here are two questions:
 
1. Chapter 4, Mishnah, page 45b:
An ox that was guarded with inadequate guarding—there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda. According to Rabbi Yehuda, whose view is the accepted Jewish law, in the case of a tam ox one is liable (for half-damages), because it required superior guarding; whereas specifically in the more severe case of a mu’ad ox, one is exempt from paying full damages because inadequate guarding is sufficient for it (although its tam aspect remains in place, and so he pays half-damages). Their dispute revolves around the question whether oxen are ordinarily presumed to be guarded or not. As a result, Rabbi Yehuda interprets the verse regarding a mu’ad ox, “and its owner did not guard it,” in a way that is lenient toward the owner (the opposite of Rabbi Meir).
And seemingly, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this exposition departs from reasonable logic, which would call for being stricter with a mu’ad ox that has already done this three times, and now its owner was negligent and guarded it only inadequately! Should he not have aligned the exposition with logic, as you explained in several places that expositions are first grounded in a logical framework?
 
2. Chapter 5, Mishnah, page 48b:
Here we are dealing with the Torah law in Parashat Mishpatim—if a person intended to strike his fellow and by mistake struck a pregnant woman, causing her fetuses to come out, he must pay compensation for the fetuses to the husband. And if she has no husband, he gives it to his heirs. This is explicit in the Torah: “he shall surely be punished, as the husband of the woman shall impose upon him.” Of course, the woman here is outside the whole story and receives nothing, even if the husband died, because she is not defined as an heir. And this is very difficult, since the pregnancy belongs to both of them, so why should she not have, from the outset, half a share in the payment for the fetuses? (It should be noted that according to Maimonides, in a case where the husband died before the blow, payment is made to the woman herself, and the Raavad disagrees.) What is the Rabbi’s opinion regarding this law today? Can some rationale be found for it, or nowadays would judges need to rule differently in accordance with the prevailing conception?
 
Thank you