Good morning, Michi,

Thank you for the quick and detailed answer.
Your comment about peace of mind being more of a psychological issue is correct, and the emphasis on it in what I wrote is more mine and not necessarily the emphasis of the course. Still, I think there is sometimes something philosophical about it as well, for example in Stoic or Buddhist philosophy.
As for the exam method—the lecturer did say that she tried to make it a take-home paper, but it wasn’t approved. Apparently there’s some criterion for undergraduate courses that requires an in-class exam. As far as I’m concerned, that’s fine. Better than a regular exam where you have to remember and be precise in your wording.
As for the questions—I think she means to use these questions as a springboard for something broader and more personal, but while relying on thinkers and philosophers, including those we studied but also others.
I’ll write in a few sentences what I think about my answers to the questions, even before developing it too much.
The first and third questions are a bit similar, so I’ll write what I think about both:
A. For me, faith is a basic, axiomatic core that does not rely on proof. It can change over the course of life because of a significant event or even because of logical arguments and “apparent” proofs (as with Uri Zohar, for example), but that happens only rarely.
From that basic core, and on the basis of the decision to believe or not believe, a broad and more comprehensive worldview is built. The larger picture of the world rests on the basic faith, and every phenomenon is explained, integrated, and even strengthens that working assumption.
Even the ontological proof or others, in my opinion, fall into that category, and I’m aware that here I’m on the borderline of psychology.
(I think it’s similar with political opinions and opinions on moral matters as well.)
From what I understood, this is Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s view, and on this I agree with him. It seems to me that you disagree with this, but I’m not sure.
B. On the subject of providence, I agree with you (and, I think, with Yeshayahu Leibowitz as well) that this kind of individual providence over every person and act does not exist. I know a bit of your arguments for why this is indeed the case, but here too I think I’m relying more on an inner axiom of my own.
C. As I also wrote in my first email, the issue that in my eyes is the most central in my faith-commitment is the social and human moral issue. For me, “common decency precedes Torah” is the foundational statement.
On this issue I think that in a certain sense both Kierkegaard and Leibowitz saw it as central, even though it doesn’t look that way. For Kierkegaard, the passion of faith ultimately expresses itself in an extremely radical command of “love your neighbor”—which is why I don’t even write “as yourself,” because he sacrifices himself.
And with Leibowitz too, even though he does not connect religious commitment to morality, the very fact that human morality was such a central essence in his life shows that it stems from his faith (perhaps).

As for the question about Job: I thought of taking it in the direction of asking what kind of faith he had, and whether that is a desirable kind of faith. Is simple faith desirable, and should one accept everything with “this too is for the good”? But I don’t yet have a clear direction, and I agree that it’s a somewhat strange question.
By the way—your joke reminded me that we always say that secular Israelis are Orthodox secularists, because when they do engage in religious practices like a bar mitzvah or a wedding, it will usually be in the Orthodox way. Even though it would be more logical to go in a Conservative or Reform direction.

I’d be happy to continue the correspondence and talk later on, and maybe we’ll also manage to meet.

In any case, thank you very much and have a good day,

Good morning

A. I think the difference between simple faith and philosophical faith is not well defined. Suppose there is an argument that convinced me to believe in God. Clearly the faith is already contained in its premises. But if so, then I am basically a simple believer, since I adopted the axioms not by force of arguments.
As for the effects of psychology and events, there is no doubt that they exist, but that is true of every human activity. I often use the example of someone who leaves religion and someone who returns to religion. A person leaves religion, and his religious friends explain that he wanted to permit sexual prohibitions to himself—that is, they are psychologists. His new secular friends explain that he understood he had been living in error—that is, they are philosophers. Now look at a person who returns to religion. You understand that the picture reverses. So who is right? Everyone. Every step a person takes is done out of motives and factors on the psychological plane, and in parallel he has justifications on the philosophical plane. In my opinion there is no way to examine which comes first or which prevails. It is appropriate to focus on the philosophical discussion, because only that is relevant to a substantive discussion. A person’s psychological motives are his own business.
Of course, this analysis is true of every conclusion and every position—religious, political, philosophical. It is a logical analysis that assumes nothing about the field being discussed.
I’ll only note that Leibowitz treated the starting point (the basic assumption) as something arbitrary. In his view, as a positivist, anything not theoretically reasoned or derived from observation is arbitrary. But he is of course mistaken. Intuition is what underlies our assumptions (in faith as well as in science or any other field), and the root of faith lies in intuition. I could say much more about this.

B. Every argument is based on an inner axiom, and likewise here.
C. Here we disagree greatly. In my view there is indeed no morality without belief in God (in theory; of course there are moral atheists). I elaborated on this in column 456 on my site. But that has nothing whatsoever to do with halakhic and religious commitment. Jewish law and morality are independent categories. Here I am completely with Leibowitz (although, consistent with his approach, he claims that morality is atheistic, and probably also arbitrary. Again, his positivism misleads him). Religious commitment is not connected to morality and contributes nothing to it. It exists because it exists. I am committed because that is what seems proper and correct to me, and not as something instrumental that serves morality or society, etc. (again, Leibowitz).

As for Kierkegaard, in my opinion you are mistaken. After all, the main thrust of his thought is the dialectical relation between the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. You are describing the ethical, which indeed overcomes the aesthetic (that is the next level of development), but in the end the religious comes and overcomes the ethical and certainly does not serve it.
As for Leibowitz’s moral commitment, people have already pointed out these contradictions in his thought (see, for example, the book Negation for Its Own Sake—On Yeshayahu Leibowitz). I remember an article by Eliezer Goldman that explains this. Morality is not connected to Jewish law or faith, but it obligates every person, and in particular a religious person as well. The fact that it is an atheistic category does not mean that it is not binding. In any case, it is clear that he did not see faith as the basis of morality. On the contrary, all his life he worked to separate the two.

As for Job’s faith, it’s hard for me to comment. I don’t deal with the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) or its interpretation. The field seems to me rather unbounded and full of nice homiletic flourishes, where everyone says whatever occurs to his heart. We aren’t studying Job; we are putting ourselves into Job.
As for Orthodox secularists, you reminded me of a conversation with Michael Biton when Dalach and Revital returned to Yeruham. They wanted to establish a Conservative minyan, and Michael and Ilana were completely in favor. But it turned out that Yeruham’s traditionalists are Orthodox traditionalists, and they had no chance. Really amusing.

Hi Michi,

Sorry it’s taking me time to reply. I’m simply trying to think through the things, and I feel like I’m staying at the more superficial level of the arguments, so I’m taking time to think.
And that’s besides the pressure at work..

In any case, regarding the arguments:
I see morality as something that depends closely on faith and also precedes faith (in the sense that common decency precedes Torah).
Since, as I said, I do not believe in individual providence, and also don’t think God needs my faith or my religious worship, I’m left mainly with the social/moral aspect.
For me, the world is built in such a way that the ethical side makes social and human existence possible, and in fact human morality is the divine essence within the world.
And therefore morality also proves the existence of God, and it is also the central meaningful thing that can be done in this world from the standpoint of faith.
I hope I managed to explain myself on this point..
And regarding what I wrote about Leibowitz and Kierkegaard—you are of course right that they did not see it that way.. though I was trying to point out that on this matter they somewhat contradict themselves.
The fact that although Kierkegaard saw the religious dimension as something beyond morality, he still remained with an extreme commitment to other people—that calls for explanation.
And also the fact that Leibowitz is famous mainly because of his moral outlook, while his religious practice is basically something technical—that too says something.

On the issue of the connection between faith and morality, I’m reminded of what Abraham Joshua Heschel said after he marched together with Martin Luther King: “I felt my legs were praying.”

Thanks again,

Apparently we’ll remain in disagreement. In my view, your conception leaves us without Jewish law (only morality), and therefore basically without Judaism. Morality is universal and also binding on all human beings. So if Judaism is nothing but morality, how is the believing Jew different from the secular person or the gentile? That is exactly what led Leibowitz to say that morality is an atheistic category.
All the best and good luck,