Q&A: The Authority of the Talmud
The Authority of the Talmud
Question
Rabbi, you wrote somewhere that the authority of the Talmud is because the entire House of Israel accepted it. But is that the only reason? Because if, say, the House of Israel had accepted idol worship, or I don’t know, bowing to Baal, or instead of “do not murder” they said that from now on it’s “do murder” — would that still make it binding? And if the Sages had spoken nonsense and the whole Talmud were full of that, would we still accept it?
Answer
There was indeed an issue here of upholding what the public accepted, but set against that would be the value of not doing nonsense or evil things, and that would presumably prevail. Just like a law that instructs me to act against my conscience — it is overridden, not permitted.
Incidentally, that is also not the only reason; that is, it does not stand on its own. There is also some logic behind it (closeness to the source at Mount Sinai gives the Sages a better standing than ours for understanding the will of the Torah). But that reasoning by itself would not create formal authority, only substantive authority. That is why acceptance is also needed. It is like the commandments of the Torah: each one has a rationale for why it was said, but the binding force comes from the fact that we were commanded.
Discussion on Answer
What splits?
I saw in Rabbi Kook, and seemingly that’s also what the Talmud in Megillah implies,
that the whole obligation to obey the Torah is more because of “they accepted”
and less because it is the word of God.
That’s Torah-level law.
All the more so given what is well known from the period of the Letter of Rabbi Sherira Gaon —
and who knows who wrote it.
If it is only because they accepted it, what religious force does that have?
I saw on the Karaite Heritage site a nice explanation of their distinction on these matters. What do you think of them? (The main point is in the second paragraph):
”
The days of Purim
All the Jewish people observe the days of Purim, which are days of rejoicing. In Karaite Judaism, two days of Purim are observed in every town and town, as it is written: “that they should observe the fourteenth day of the month of Adar, and the fifteenth day of it, every year and year.” In addition, we always celebrate the days of Purim in the twelfth month, which is the month of Adar, every year, whether it is a regular year or a leap year — in which case the twelfth month is specifically Adar I and not Adar II — as it is written: “the twelfth month, which is the month of Adar,” and not Adar II in a leap year, which is the thirteenth month.
Another important difference is that we do not recite a blessing over the reading of the Megillah as a commandment. We do not see the days of Purim, or the reading of the Megillah, as a commandment from God, may He be blessed, but rather as an obligation arising from the decision of the Jewish people, as it says: “the Jews ordained and took upon themselves and upon their descendants and upon all who joined them, so that it should not fail, that they would observe these two days according to their writing and according to their appointed time, every year and year.””
See Beit Yishai, Homilies, sec. 15.
In general, in any legal system, determinations made by the public bind the individual.
The Karaite approach is possible. Our tradition decided otherwise. I don’t see any problem with that.
So basically it splits into formal authority and value-based authority, right? Did I understand correctly?