The costs are only a trigger and are not directly connected to the commandment of tekhelet, of course.
From conversations I’ve had with friends, none of them buys murex tekhelet thread because of the price. As the Rabbi pointed out in his book Walking Among the Standing, sometimes we need something that will stir us to think about a halakhic solution, and the money issue, as mentioned above, is the trigger for reexamining the commandment.
The cost of the sacrifice was also the trigger that moved Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to enact the ordinance regarding the bird-pairs.
As for the question itself: since Maimonides’ view is unique (to the best of my knowledge there is no other halakhic decisor who links biblical tekhelet to its resistance to fading [the tekhelet from murex lasts over time, unlike indigo]), I am relying on a lone opinion somewhat like a pressing situation. Is it halakhically correct to do that (to rely only on Maimonides’ view)?

Regarding Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, I explained the difference between an ordinance of the Sanhedrin and a decision of yours or of a halakhic decisor.
Regarding the trigger for reexamination, anything can be a trigger for reexamination, but the decision in the end has to be based on reasons, not on the triggers. That’s why I answered as I did.
As far as I remember, this is not Maimonides’ view. At most, you perhaps think that this is what he held. It could also be a reason for the verse—that is, tekhelet is only from a snail, but the reason is that it does not fade.
But if you think that this is his position, and you have no position of your own, then there is room for such a decision. The question is whether according to the other views this is not indigo, and then according to the other medieval authorities you do not fulfill the obligation of tekhelet and may even be committing a prohibition (unless the prohibition of indigo applies only to someone who sells indigo under the laws of commercial deception).

Tekhelet thread including tying costs around 250 shekels, and these are things that last for years. That’s the price of a pair of jeans. If someone truly doesn’t have the money, then they don’t, but for an average person that’s a completely normal price for a garment.

At one point I heard that you can buy Raavad-style tekhelet that costs the same as Rambam-style,
and if you hold like Maimonides, then cut it in half and tie half of it as white. Then you got two for the price of one.

So that way you cut the cost in half.

The question, of course, is how many tzitzit garments you need; I think 2 is enough.

Hello again to the honored Rabbi, and thank you again for the answer.
To tell the truth, your answer has not let me rest for days, and I will try to clarify. It is very possible that my limited understanding does not grasp the breadth of the Rabbi’s understanding, and if so, I apologize in advance for the trouble.

First I will write Maimonides’ words, which are the source of my question.
Jewish law 1:
The tekhelet mentioned in the Torah everywhere is wool dyed like the deep blue of the sky, and this is the appearance of the sky as seen opposite the sun in the purity of the heavens. The tekhelet mentioned regarding tzitzit must be dyed with a known dyeing process that remains beautiful and does not change. Anything not dyed with that dyeing process is invalid for tzitzit, even if it resembles the sky, such as if it was dyed with indigo, or black, or other darkening dyes—this is invalid for tzitzit. The wool of a sheep born from a goat is invalid for tzitzit.

Jewish law 2:
How does one dye the tekhelet of tzitzit? One takes the wool and soaks it in lime, and afterward washes it until it is clean, and boils it with alum or the like, as dyers do, so that it will absorb the color. Then one brings the blood of the chilazon, which is a fish whose color resembles the color of tekhelet, and whose blood is black like ink, and it is found in the Salt Sea. They put the blood in a pot and add spices like cumin and the like, as dyers do, and boil it, and then put the wool into it until it becomes like the sky. This is the tekhelet of tzitzit.

Jewish law 3:
Not relevant to our matter.

Jewish law 4:
Tekhelet is purchased only from an expert, because we are concerned that perhaps it was dyed not for its own sake. Even if it was purchased from an expert, if it was tested and found to have been dyed with one of the other darkening dyes that do not last, it is invalid.

Jewish law 5:
How is it tested until one knows whether it was dyed properly or not? One takes straw, saliva of a snail, and urine that has fermented for forty days, and soaks the tekhelet in all of them for twenty-four hours. If it remained as it was and did not become dull, it is valid. If it did become dull, one takes barley dough that has been spoiled into fish-brine, and puts that altered tekhelet into it, and bakes the dough in an oven, and removes the tekhelet from the bread and examines it. If it became duller than it originally was, it is invalid; if its color intensified and became darker than before baking, it is valid.

From Jewish laws 4 and 5 one can understand that the color needs to endure and not necessarily come from a chilazon, except that in their time that possibility was achieved through a chilazon. But in our day one can use any other dye that lasts.)

I did not understand the last part of the Rabbi’s answer at all, and I’ll explain.
There is almost no Jewish law that has no dispute among the medieval authorities, and we encounter this many times. An excellent example is one the Rabbi brought in his book Walking Among the Standing regarding one’s attitude toward a non-Jew: the Meiri’s opinion is a lone opinion, yet we rely on it to save a non-Jew on the Sabbath, against all the other medieval authorities.
Since that is so, I do not understand the distinction between a non-Jew and a tekhelet thread.
Sorry for the length,
Thank you in advance.
By the way, I very much enjoyed reading the trilogy; more power to you.

It can be understood that way, and it can also be understood otherwise. He does indeed speak about a lasting dye, but he also notes that they make it from a chilazon. So one must discuss whether the chilazon is a binding legal requirement and the demand that it be a lasting dye is only an explanation, a reason for the verse. Or whether the requirement is only that it be a lasting dye, not necessarily from a chilazon.
I didn’t understand what was unclear in my words. If you have a position of your own regarding what tekhelet is, then you should act according to your understanding. In that case, it doesn’t matter what Maimonides’ view is or isn’t.
If you do not have a position of your own, then there are laws of doubt. If you think this is Maimonides’ view (as I said, I’m really not sure of that), then perhaps one can rely on him. But if you yourself do not think like him (the assumption is that you have no view of your own), then I don’t see why you should specifically go with him. Beyond that, I remarked that there is also reason to be stringent and not go like him, because according to the other medieval authorities, in such a situation you are committing a prohibition (indigo).
None of this has any connection to the dispute surrounding the Meiri. There, in my opinion, he is correct, and therefore I follow him. Even if there were no Meiri saying this, I would rule the same way. When I have a position of my own, that is what I must do, and it doesn’t matter whether it is the minority or majority view.

Following up on the discussion whether one specifically needs a chilazon, I wrote about this in the past and would be happy to hear the Rabbi’s response.

Part 3:
"A market-shattering innovation regarding tekhelet"

All the pamphlets and books that discuss tekhelet deal with whether there is a chilazon or not, which chilazon, the identifying signs of the chilazon, some of the signs, and so on—why Maimonides did not bring this sign, etc.—as though chilazon were written explicitly in the Torah. But Rabbi Eliyahu Binyamin Madar told me that Maimonides, Laws of Tzitzit chapter 2, did not rule at all that one needs a chilazon; rather the matter is something else, namely stable tekhelet, as we will explain below. (At first he told me that Maimonides simply did not rule in accordance with the Tosefta that “tekhelet comes only from the chilazon,” since it is not mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud. See Jerusalem Talmud Peah 2:4: “We do not derive from halakhot, nor from aggadot, nor from Toseftas, but only from the Gemara,” unless it does not conflict with the Babylonian Talmud, as brought in Noda B'Yehuda, Tinyana, Yoreh De'ah 161, and in Sdei Chemed, Kelalim, system Aleph, letter 95. And like many Toseftas not mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud, which Maimonides did not rule by. Since he ruled some of them and not others, that teaches that here he did not hold that way, because according to the Babylonian Talmud it is not so. But according to what we will explain below, even the Tosefta fits Maimonides’ approach, as will be explained later. He agreed with me, and consequently this would also be the meaning in the son of Nachmanides.) He only mentioned chilazon as the only way they had then to produce such tekhelet. At first this seemed innovative to me, because we are so used to all the pamphlets and books etc. mentioned above, but in fact anyone who examines Maimonides will see this from several places.

1. In Jewish law 1 he opens and says: “The tekhelet mentioned in the Torah everywhere is wool dyed like the blue mixture, and this is the appearance of the sky seen opposite the sun in the purity of the heavens. The tekhelet mentioned regarding tzitzit must be dyed with a known dyeing process that remains beautiful and does not change, and anything not dyed with that dyeing process is invalid for tzitzit, such as if it was dyed with indigo or black etc.” That is, Maimonides is coming to say what condition is needed for tekhelet. We would expect that first of all he would write the condition of chilazon, or at least second or third, etc. But Maimonides does not mention at all that one specifically needs chilazon; rather the main thing is that the dyeing remain beautiful and not change. Only afterward, in the next Jewish law, does he explain how, and says by means of chilazon, because again that was the only thing available then that would not fade, almost until our own times, as will be explained.

2. This stands out even more there in Jewish law 1 in his wording: “Anything not dyed with that dyeing process is invalid for tzitzit, such as if it was dyed with indigo or black or other darkening dyes.” If chilazon were indispensable, what room would there be to say “such as if it was dyed with indigo or black or other darkening dyes”? If there is one general rule—anything not made with chilazon is invalid—there would be no reason to list types of invalid dyes. He should simply have said that anything not made with that is invalid (Ir HaKodesh VeHaMikdash, vol. 5, p. 44).

3. At the end of Jewish law 4: “If it was tested and found to have been dyed from other darkening dyes that do not last, it is invalid.” That is, he did not write: if it became known that it is not from chilazon, but rather that it does not last. For that is what we actually need and what matters to us. Maimonides’ wording is clear, and one can infer precisely from it that if it comes from other darkening dyes that do remain beautiful, it is valid, even if it is not from chilazon.

4. From Jewish law 5 as well: Maimonides changes the wording of the Talmud regarding testing the tekhelet (by means of ingredients) whether it is from chilazon or from indigo, and adopts this wording: “How is it tested until one knows whether it was dyed properly or not?” That is what matters to us: whether the dyeing was done as required, namely that it endures and does not fade by means of the ingredients mentioned there. And this matches the language of the Sefat Emet on Menachot 43a regarding this Maimonides: “It implies that this is to test whether the color adhered properly.” He concludes: “That does not seem to follow from the plain wording of the Gemara,” but according to what we are saying this is resolved, because that is exactly what Maimonides wanted to teach us, so that we would not mistakenly think from the Gemara that one specifically needs chilazon. In fact one could say this is Maimonides’ source for the above, because this test only clarifies whether the dye fades or not, not whether it is from chilazon or not—at least this is how Maimonides understood it. For it could be that it does not fade, yet is not from chilazon, but from some other substance that causes it not to fade, etc. etc.

5. “That itself proves that the chilazon is not indispensable, because if chilazon were indispensable, then once taste invalidates it, all the more so the admixture of ingredients should invalidate it… Tosafot already wondered how one can mix anything else with the tekhelet, and wrote that perhaps with the ingredients it is still called tekhelet. But even if so, that tekhelet consists of the combination with the other ingredients, since the ingredients are only enabling agents, how strange it is that a mere trace of foreign taste invalidates it, while an excess of ingredients, which are mixed in not necessarily in exact proportion, would not invalidate it. Rather it must be that both the chilazon and the ingredients merely enable the appearance. And certainly one cannot say that those added ingredients are also a law given to Moses at Sinai, because that might have been possible only if the ingredients had been specified and itemized. But in the Gemara it merely says ‘ingredients’ without naming them, and moreover in Maimonides, Laws of Tzitzit chapter 2, it explicitly says: ‘like cumin and the like.’ So the ingredients are not specified exactly. Since it is clear that the ingredients were not specified by a law given to Moses at Sinai, how can we say that the blood of chilazon was such a law, and that the Sinaitic law was that it could be combined with other unspecified ingredients, without even specifying the quantity of the mixture… It is proven that the blood of chilazon is not specifically required, from the fact that other mixtures are added to it” (Ir HaKodesh, ibid.).

6. Likewise in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah, Menachot 4:1: “And it is not found in our possession today because we do not know how to dye it, for not every kind of blue in wool is called tekhelet; rather a specific tekhelet, which it is impossible to produce today.” What more could Maimonides have said than: it is not found in our possession today because we do not have the chilazon? Is that not striking and crying out? (This inference was also brought in Kelilat Yofi, note 22.) Rather, as stated, that is not what matters, but only the issue of the dye, that we do not know how to dye it—namely, as above in Jewish laws 1 and 5, a proper dyeing that remains beautiful, etc. Because, as said, all they had was indigo and the like, which is false tekhelet that fades. The writers of the leaflet “The Commandment of Tekhelet in Our Time” wrote that they performed the Gemara’s ingredient test on an ancient garment dyed with indigo, and indeed its color came off, while on their murex it did not. They noted that they also tested modern indigo and it likewise did not come off, and wrote that this is because it is made artificially. But according to our approach, why should that matter? (And on their words, see what was written in Loops of Tekhelet, p. 123.)

7. And now we will prove this from the Torah: the Torah said to bring tekhelet for the Tabernacle, which they already had from before, and did not require specifically chilazon. For there is no reason that if there were one type of tekhelet for ordinary use and another for sacred use, they would use ordinary-use tekhelet for holy use. Rather, evidently the Torah does not care what the source of the tekhelet is, whether from this or from that, only that it be tekhelet—meaning, according to Maimonides, a color that remains beautiful, and that is what the Torah said and what it required. Granted, if we explained that tekhelet means specifically wool dyed with chilazon blood, as some understood in Rashi, then indeed the Torah said that whoever has tekhelet—that is, wool specifically from chilazon—should bring it. But according to Maimonides, for whom one cannot explain it that way, it emerges that the Torah said to bring for the Tabernacle any wool dyed with a color that remains beautiful, regardless of the source. And if you say the Torah spoke this way because that was what existed then—that is exactly what we are explaining here, that according to Maimonides, when the Gemara mentioned chilazon, it was only for that reason: in those days, the knowledge of how to perform the reduction process for indigo was not sufficiently professional, and therefore indigo was a weaker dye that did not bond well to wool like the purple dye.

And this is explicit in the responsa of the Radbaz (part 2, siman 685), that the method of dyeing indigo improved over time. His language is: “Even though they do not need it [the chilazon], for a color similar to tekhelet is very common, namely istis, called in Arabic nil, and they dye it in a skilled way so that it does not come off even by pressing.” It is still not clear whether it also would not come off under the Gemara’s test, for Radbaz himself did not wear tekhelet, or whether he could actually obtain such a production method, since one also needs it not to be invalidated by a taste test—or perhaps he simply did not enter into all that. But as is known, that is not a real difficulty, as we brought earlier from Hullin 6–7. In any case, today it certainly does not come off. And these are exactly the things we wrote above: had istis (indigo) in their time been a dye that did not come off, they would have used it instead of chilazon. The reason they did not dye with indigo was simply that they did not yet know how to dye it “in a skilled manner.”

Continuation of the above:

This has already been written by the Tiferet Yisrael in his introduction to Seder Moed, “General Principles of the Sacred Garments,” and by the Radzyn Rabbi (except that we proved it also from several places in Maimonides, following the comment of Rabbi Eliyahu Madar). The language of Tiferet Yisrael is: “The conclusion is that both in tzitzit and in the priestly garments one does not specifically require chilazon, but in both one does require an appearance that does not change from its beauty under the test mentioned in the Talmud.” According to him, the Tosefta is as we explained above. And so too in Kelilat Tekhelet, p. 54. This was not hidden from him, contrary to the Radzyn Rabbi’s words, and his difficulty from the Jerusalem Talmud he explained in a way that is not difficult against him, as we brought later. Likewise in the book Sefunei Temunei Chol by the Radzyn Rabbi, in refuting the second claim, he writes that the Torah did not require chilazon, nor did the Sages have any tradition as a law given to Moses at Sinai that one needs it, nor any derivation from a verse. He also discusses our second question: from where did the Sages know that the color has to last? See there in his words. He concludes that “the requirement of chilazon for tekhelet is not an unexplained halakhah, not a scriptural decree and not a formal law, but rather based on reason and logic, in order that the dye remain beautiful and not change.” He continues that if after searching we were to discover the blood of some creature that would endure in wool, even if it were not what they had then, we would be able to fulfill the commandment of tekhelet without any doubt. That is, he too understood that the Tosefta does not contradict what we are saying; rather, why does the Tosefta require “chilazon”? Not because of a scriptural decree or a law given to Moses at Sinai, but simply, technically, so that it will bond and not fade. (Though he himself argues that the fish he found is indeed a chilazon.)

And Maimonides also did not rule in accordance with the continuation there, “scarlet worm only from the mountain worm,” as is proven from Laws of the Red Heifer 3:13. And there what will we explain? Seemingly it would appear that indeed he does not rule like the Tosefta. Though see below—we brought the explanation of the Pnei Moshe from which it emerges that even scarlet worm, though written explicitly in the Torah, is not necessarily literal; and also see Rashi on Isaiah 1:18. Consequently, also in Rashi who wrote regarding tekhelet “wool dyed with the blood of a chilazon,” that means that if it is not with chilazon blood, it fades, and then it is called indigo, not tekhelet. Even though indigo is a specific plant, still for our purposes one sees from Maimonides that it need not mean literal indigo. It is not that there is specifically some intrinsic issue with chilazon; rather, he simply cited the Gemara, and however we explain the Gemara—whether specifically or not—we will explain him. Not as though there is a dispute between Rashi and Maimonides, but according to both of them, “tekhelet” means wool dyed a certain shade that does not fade, and in their time until quite recently that was only chilazon. And by the way, even according to their own approach, Rashi did not say in the blood “the chilazon” but “a chilazon,” meaning any chilazon that would pass the Gemara’s ingredient test and not fade would be valid, even if it were not that particular chilazon.

Only, the Radzyn Rabbi according to his own approach understood that a dye cannot bond unless it is of the same level, living from living, etc., and therefore it specifically needs to come from a living chilazon—this one or another one, or some other creature altogether. But if something not from a living source could bond well, there would be no objection. Accordingly, until our generation this made no practical difference, because indeed there was no non-living dye that bonded well to wool, as appears from the words of the Rebbe in his time. But in our day, when that is possible, then it is certainly acceptable. The Radzyn Rabbi already wrote in Sefunei Temunei Chol: “If after searching we manage to find the blood of any kind of chilazon with which we can dye the tekhelet color, a color that remains beautiful and does not change, then certainly one can fulfill the commandment of tekhelet without any doubt.” Rabbi Herzog also agreed to this. I also saw in Rabbi Bornstein’s book on tekhelet that he brought from Rabbi Soloveitchik that if one could make enduring tekhelet even artificially, that would be fine. He also brought there from the book Har Kodesh by Rabbi Moshe Nachum Shapira in the name of Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer, that according to Maimonides any blue dye resembling the sky whose appearance does not change in any way is valid for tekhelet, and there is no need for chilazon blood. I also saw this in the book Tekhelet and Purple, pp. 5–6, and in the leaflet “The Commandment of Tekhelet in Our Time,” at the end of note 7, where they quote Rabbi Yitzchak Zev HaLevi, though they wrote that this is difficult in light of the Tosefta. According to what we are saying, it is straightforward. And similarly in the book Loops of Tekhelet, p. 122, last paragraph.

Some have brought the Jerusalem Talmud, Kilayim 9:5: “Just as scarlet worm comes from a living thing, so too every matter [that is, wool—see Pnei Moshe and Rabbi Heller on the Sifrei] comes from a living thing.” But some versions read there: “so too tekhelet comes from a living thing,” and they wanted to say that Maimonides did not rule this way because it does not fit the Babylonian Talmud. (Incidentally, from this version itself there is proof that chilazon is not a tradition or a law given to Moses at Sinai, for if there were such a tradition that tekhelet comes from chilazon, then all the more so it comes from a living thing, and there would be no need for an analogy. More than that: from there there is proof that one does not need chilazon specifically, but that it is enough if it comes from a living creature, as the Radzyn view holds. For why would the Jerusalem Talmud dislike saying: just as scarlet worm is a worm, so too tekhelet is a worm? After all, they defined chilazon as a worm with a shell. Surely that proves that even if one needs chilazon, it is not necessarily that one specific species that our ancestors used, but any species that would meet the rules, from the fact that no condition at all was specified concerning chilazon, unlike scarlet worm where one specifically needs it from the mountains. And even regarding the Tosefta above, I saw that people inferred from it—even those who understood it to mean specifically chilazon—that one does not need specifically the particular chilazon our ancestors used, but anything that will produce tekhelet. Their proof is that in the very next line, regarding “scarlet worm,” the Tosefta emphasizes that it specifically must be from the mountains, whereas regarding chilazon no details are limited. See Levush HaAron, p. 11, and Kelilat Yofi, pp. 53 and 58.)

But aside from the fact that the versions differ, as stated above, the Vilna Gaon deletes this whole text entirely, and it is known that many external additions entered the Jerusalem Talmud. And moreover, there see the explanation of Pnei Moshe from which it emerges that even scarlet worm, which is explicitly written in the Torah, the Jerusalem Talmud says is not necessarily literal.

One point only should be noted about what we said—namely, “Is chilazon written in the verse? Tekhelet is what is written.” Seemingly, one could ask similarly even about the condition that the color not fade: is “lasting tekhelet” written? It just says tekhelet. In any case, one clearly sees from Maimonides that he understood chilazon as not specifically required, whereas that it not fade is compelled by the Gemara as specifically required, and as brought above, this is how he understood the Gemara. Apparently, a color that fades is obviously not considered a color by the Gemara, or fading tekhelet is not considered full tekhelet. But if so, why regarding the priestly garments does it seem from Maimonides in Jewish law 1 that this is not required? If we say that indeed this condition—that tekhelet must endure—applies only to tzitzit, we would have to say that Maimonides understood this as a tradition or a law given to Moses at Sinai that this is required only for tzitzit. But if so, what stopped him from saying the same also about the condition of chilazon? In any case, whether regarding chilazon or regarding the condition that the color last, it does not sound from the Gemara as if this is a law given to Moses at Sinai. (By the way, this is another explanation I saw people bring, that there is no difficulty from the Tosefta—even if one understands it to mean specifically chilazon—because it spoke only about the priestly garments, as is clear from its context there. But the problem is that while perhaps the Tosefta suggests that, Maimonides on the contrary, as above, did not mention it regarding the priestly garments, so to say that specifically there it is required is hard.)

Apparently, Maimonides does not mean to exclude the priestly garments and the Tabernacle—for indeed it would be odd for him to intend that and not emphasize it explicitly in the laws of priestly garments; see below our comments on Maimonides’ words there. Rather, “the tekhelet mentioned in the Torah everywhere” means the tekhelet that appears in the Hebrew Bible in descriptions of all sorts of matters, what one might call “ordinary tekhelet,” tekhelet used for mundane purposes, which indeed they dyed with istis, that is, indigo and the like. This does seem to fit his wording in Laws of Temple Vessels 8:13: “the tekhelet mentioned everywhere.” What does “everywhere” mean? Aside from tzitzit, it is only priestly garments and the Tabernacle. This wording does not sit well, especially given Maimonides’ precision of language. He should have written “the tekhelet mentioned in the priestly garments and the Tabernacle.” And although Maimonides used the phrase “in the Torah,” his intent is all of the Oral Torah, and therefore he added “everywhere.” Moreover, in Laws of Temple Vessels 8:13 he omitted “in the Torah” and wrote simply “the tekhelet mentioned everywhere.” See also Laws of Prayer 5:13: “Bowing mentioned everywhere means on the knees,” meaning everywhere in the Hebrew Bible. And the reason Maimonides did not write “the tekhelet mentioned in tzitzit and in the priestly garments and the Tabernacle” is that he is dealing here in Laws of Tzitzit. And in fact, the Gemara itself mentioned this detail only in the context of the tekhelet of tzitzit, and therefore Maimonides in the laws of priestly garments and the Tabernacle did not mention it, following the Gemara’s presentation. This is obvious, because in the time of the Gemara, and already 500 years before that, it no longer had practical relevance for the priestly garments and the Tabernacle, for the Temple had been destroyed because of our sins and the service had ceased. And indeed, the Mishneh LaMelekh there understood simply that the same law applies to priestly garments as well, to the point that he raised this difficulty on Maimonides’ wording. Only what is puzzling in his words is that he asked why Maimonides did not also state for priestly garments the requirement of chilazon as for tzitzit, which is puzzling, because there Maimonides’ quotation makes it sound as though regarding tzitzit he did mention a condition of chilazon, but that is not so, as we have noted.

Likewise, the whole matter of the identifying signs and their allusions was not brought in this baraita by Maimonides (nor by the Rif and the Rosh, though they did mention the matter of tekhelet). Again this is because, as above, these are not indispensable if another method is available. The signs serve only to make it easier to find something that definitely meets the required condition. But indeed, anything that meets the condition would be valid even without its specific signs. We find something like this regarding the reed pen, where the Gemara explains why the reed merited to be written with and gives symbolic reasons, and nevertheless it is permitted even initially to write with something lacking those signs. (And if there is some preference for a reed, then we may say here too that it is only a preference in an item that carries those allusions. Let us just note that according to our approach there may also be an advantage of “from what is permitted to your mouth,” since the decisors discussed how chilazon was permitted for tekhelet.) Also see below what we wrote regarding Zebulun. Therefore, all kinds of articles in which hints are found, or obligations of chilazon or the blood are found, we will understand the intent of those statements according to Maimonides—what exactly is meant by chilazon—because chilazon is not written in the verse, nor is it a law given to Moses at Sinai, as above. Rather, technically that is what existed, and therefore allusions and ideas were given about it. (Likewise, supporters of tekhelet know how to explain various sayings of the Sages that seemingly do not fit their chilazon, etc. And I saw in the responsa Vayeshev HaYam, part 8, that he wrote similarly regarding various mystical teachings that the Arizal explains concerning practices—that it is not always necessary that things specifically had to be that way; rather, even had it been otherwise, he would have given a different kabbalistic explanation, unlike where he writes that this is how one must act.) For example, the Gemara says that its price is high. But again, as stated, because that was the only thing then from which one could make something enduring, and it was not easy to obtain or produce and its blood was limited. Just imagine: if now they were to breed and cultivate this chilazon in such a way that it became freely available and cheap, and they also found a simple way to dye with it, and its price became low—would it suddenly become invalid? Certainly not. And similarly, because today the tribe of Zebulun does not make its living from this, despite the Torah’s promise that it would, nobody imagines that this invalidates it.

And while writing this passage, I was reminded of a much more severe issue, one that touches on blessings in vain every day and the neglect of the commandments of tefillin, mezuzah, Torah scroll, and megillah. Namely, the processing of parchment with gallnuts, as mentioned in the Gemara without dispute. Yet only in a later period, among some of the medieval authorities (see Tosafot, Megillah 19a), and already from the Geonim, because they did not know how to process with gallnuts, or did not know what they were, or they were unavailable, they began to process with lime, because they understood that gallnuts are not specifically required, since gallnuts are not written in the verse. There the matter is far less simple, as is known. In any case, anyone who enters that topic will understand that it is much easier to say that chilazon is not specifically required than to say that gallnuts are not specifically required. Especially since, as said, there is no real problem if tekhelet turns out not to be tekhelet (as explained in the previous article). And similarly regarding ink, see Sabbath 23a about how it is made from oil soot and the like, and in Sotah 20 it permits adding copper sulfate. Yet Maimonides, Laws of Tefillin 1:4–5, ruled that even with copper sulfate alone, without oil soot, it is valid, because the essential thing is that it have the appearance of black ink that lasts, and we do not care what it is made from.

And the Torah has concern for the money of the Jewish people, so why buy tekhelet for 200 shekels—tekhelet from the chilazon of the Sages—if it can be had for less? From here a call goes out to all those publicizing and spreading merit through tekhelet, whose true intention surely was for the sake of Heaven, to restore observance of this positive commandment and to save the Jewish people from the above prohibitions at every moment they wear white without tekhelet. Therefore they should carefully examine these words of ours, without bias as much as human beings can manage, they and the other Torah scholars, and if they indeed agree to this, then that self-sacrifice—giving up financial profit—would be worth everything to them. And certainly if tekhelet were sold cheaply, there would be no one who would not wear it, for surely many who do not wear it refrain because of the very high price, and perhaps even some of the objections to tekhelet are influenced by that.