Q&A: Doesn't Fit?
Doesn't Fit?
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Yesterday in the Jewish law and modernity class you spoke about the principle of “it doesn’t fit,” and I also read the relevant columns when they were published. Still, I’m having trouble understanding the rationale here. A few questions/comments:
- How is this different from a “regular” clash between Jewish law and morality? Preventing a child from marrying because of his parents’ actions is also something that “doesn’t fit,” and so is separating a priest from his wife who was raped. But the Holy One, blessed be He, told us that there are considerations here that override morality. What is the philosophical justification for violating the instruction of the Holy One, blessed be He?
- If there really is a philosophical justification, then what distinguishes the cases in which it applies? In other words, doesn’t this amount to a de facto cancellation of all laws that conflict with morality? To be clear, I’m not talking about a slippery slope here (though that exists too), but rather that even on the definitional and intuitive levels, the difference is not clear to me.
- I don’t think all this is necessary regarding the prohibition on going to secular courts. First, some do try to avoid it, as is known. Second, it seems to me that what you wrote in the article about the police is intuitively clear to everyone — this is a matter of public life-saving. Third, this is a temporary situation that people want to change.
- What is so monstrous about the prohibition on building churches? If they were to build idolatrous temples in which murder or rape were carried out as part of the ritual, you would obviously support prohibiting their construction, and also demolishing them if they were built. The Torah teaches us that idolatry is something terrible that we should not make peace with, just like murder or rape. Of course there are justifications based on the reasons counted today, such as influence on Jews around the world, etc. But those are technical considerations. Suppose those did not exist — wouldn’t we want the non-Jewish citizens of the State of Israel not to worship idols?
Answer
1. You are talking about an essential clash, whereas I am talking about an incidental one. The situation of secular courts is a state of affairs that arose and is not necessary, and it was not always so. Therefore one can say: it doesn’t fit.
2. See 1. In truly essential clashes, Jewish law does in fact prevail. Beyond that, not every moral problem overrides Jewish law. It has to be an acute problem, in the category of a transgression for the sake of Heaven.
3. The argument about the police can indeed be applied here too. My claim is that even without it, one can be lenient here. And perhaps that itself is also the basis for the argument regarding the police.
4. If that is what you think, then indeed there is no “it doesn’t fit” here. I disagree with you. There are people for whom this is their faith, and the Torah does not teach us that it is all that terrible, but rather that it is very mistaken. Moreover, here there is no consensus like there is regarding immoral or cruel acts. That is why I brought the thought experiment: what would you say if they did this to you? I would very much want them not to worship idols, neither in the Land of Israel nor abroad. So what? I would want many things. The question is whether that desire justifies immoral acts. In my view, it does not.
Discussion on Answer
In the current era this is a dramatic moral problem, and therefore only now is such an act in the category of “it doesn’t fit.” Whether to call this an inherent or incidental clash is a matter of definition.
I didn’t understand your second question/comment.
Our understanding of morality progresses in one direction (and a positive one), meaning that if it is immoral today, it probably will not be moral tomorrow either. That implies that the commandment is de facto nullified forever, meaning that the Torah is not eternal. That is a conclusion I don’t think can be accepted.
As for the comment, what I meant was that if I wouldn’t want them to do it to me, that does not automatically imply that it is not right. But I don’t think that is very crucial to the discussion.
1. The fact is that no halakhic decisor really instructs people to do this. The excuses that our power is not strong enough, hostility, and so on, in my opinion cover for a moral outlook.
2. I don’t agree that there is a problem here. Just as the laws of slaves, in my view, will not return. Here it is even better, because the Torah says that from a religious standpoint this is what should be done. If morality prevents it, that is fine, and the law itself remains eternally correct. Like the wayward and rebellious son or “an eye for an eye,” which tell us what is correct from a halakhic perspective even though in practice it is not implemented.
As for your comment on the thought experiment, that is exactly the indication of morality: what you would not want to be a general law. And in Rabbi Akiva’s language: What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.
Thank you very much.
I’m not sure I agree (a Canaanite slave is not an obligation but an option, so there is no transgression when one refrains from it because it is immoral, whereas here there is a transgression), but now I understand the rationale better.
Thank you.
Regarding 4: according to your view that this is immoral, we have an essential clash here and not an incidental one (no?). If so, what I wrote in points 1 and 2 becomes relevant again — how can one set aside a specific instruction of the Holy One, blessed be He, which by its very nature conflicts with morality?
The thought experiment only shows that this is not a value that can be tested from behind a veil of ignorance, but something that depends on content. There is an assumption here that we are right and they are wrong. The next step (that this error is not legitimate) is given to us by the Torah.