Q&A: Why Did the Torah Forbid Eating Certain Foods?
Why Did the Torah Forbid Eating Certain Foods?
Question
A few days ago I had a discussion with my son about why the Torah forbade eating certain foods. We saw that some say it is a decree without a reason, while others say it is for health reasons and the like.
Now my son showed me a post written by Rabbi Sagi Mazuz (by the way, is he your student? In quite a few of his posts he really mentions the Rabbi) in which he wrote an original explanation. I’d be glad to know what the Rabbi thinks about the explanation. I’m copying the post:
In this week’s Torah portion we read about the prohibition of forbidden foods. The Torah forbade eating animals that do not have split hooves and do not chew the cud. It also forbade a long list of birds that may not be eaten, and fish that do not have fins and scales.
The question is: why? Why is pork forbidden to eat while beef is permitted? Why is chicken permitted while a raven is forbidden?
There are two principal approaches to how to address this question.
One approach, whose famous representatives are Maimonides (Guide for the Perplexed 3:48), Nachmanides (here and in Iggeret HaKodesh, 4), Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, and others, holds that there is a real reason why the Torah permitted or forbade eating a particular thing. Let us read a bit from Maimonides’ language:
“Now I say that everything that the Torah prohibited us from among foods is harmful nourishment. Among all that was forbidden to us there is nothing about which there is any doubt that it is injurious, except pork and fat. But that is not so, for pork is more moist than necessary and has much superfluous matter and waste. Most of what the Torah rejected is because of its filth and because it feeds on disgusting things. You already know the Torah’s insistence regarding the sight of filth even in the fields of the camp, all the more so within the city. If eating pork had been permitted, the markets and even the houses would be filthier than a toilet, as you can see in the lands of the French today. You already know their saying: ‘The mouth of a pig is like passing excrement.’ Likewise, the fat of the innards satiates, impairs digestion, and produces cold, thick blood; burning it would have been more fitting than eating it. So too blood and carrion are difficult to digest and their nourishment is bad; and it is known that a tereifah is the beginning of a carcass. Know that these signs—namely chewing the cud and split hoof among animals, and fins and scales among fish—their existence is not the cause of permission, nor is their absence the cause of prohibition; rather they are signs by which one recognizes the superior species from the inferior species.”
Pork is forbidden because it is filthy. The signs among animals and fish are signs that the animal
is “superior” and not inferior.
Nachmanides goes in a similar direction—the Torah forbade predatory animals because eating a predatory animal will influence the soul to become “predatory.” And creeping creatures cause diseases, etc.
Within this school one can also include Abarbanel, who was not willing to accept that forbidden foods derive from natural medicine, but thought they cause spiritual illnesses.
A second approach is brought in the Talmud in Yoma 67b:
“The Rabbis taught: ‘You shall perform My ordinances’—these are matters that, even had they not been written, it would be proper that they be written, and these are they: idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, bloodshed, robbery, and blasphemy. ‘And you shall keep My statutes’—these are matters that Satan and the nations of the world challenge, and these are they: eating pork, wearing wool and linen together, the halitzah of a yevamah, the purification of the metzora, and the scapegoat. And lest you say these are meaningless acts, Scripture says: ‘I am the Lord’—I am the Lord; I enacted it, and you have no permission to question them.”
In the midrash (Sifra, Kedoshim, 9:10):
“Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said: From where do we know that a person should not say, ‘I do not desire to eat pork; I do not desire to wear mixed fibers; I do not desire to engage in forbidden relations’? Rather, he should say: ‘I do desire it, but what can I do? My Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me.’”
That implies that it is a decree without a reason.
I don’t accept that there is a decree without a reason. The Holy One, blessed be He, isn’t bored and just forbidding things for no reason. On the other hand, the reasons for the prohibitions don’t seem very strong. Not to eat animals because they are predatory? So what?! The assumption that someone who eats a predatory bird will become predatory seems far-fetched to me. Not to eat pork because it is dirty? Then raise it outside and wash it before eating.
So I think the answer is something in between the approaches. The Holy One, blessed be He, wants there to be forbidden foods. Why? So that we feel servitude in all areas of life. Even while eating, we remember that there are things we may not eat. Why? Because we are Jews. Which foods will He forbid? It doesn’t matter all that much; the main thing is to preserve the principle that there are forbidden foods. So any food for which there is some reason—even if it is a weak reason that by itself would not forbid the animal for eating—is enough to place it in the category of forbidden foods. Domesticated animals were permitted because they are easiest to slaughter and eat, and since they have hooves and chew the cud, that became a sign of kashrut.
Answer
You’re pushing at an open door. These reasons strike me as ridiculous, like reasons for the commandments in general among all those who engage in them. But the alternative is not that these are commands without a reason; rather, there is a reason, just not the one they think of. So what is it? Some think it is meant to create discipline and fear of Heaven in us, very similar to your suggestion (that is what Rabbi Professor Eliezer Berkovits writes, among others). In principle that is possible, but I am very doubtful about it, because it basically means one could have forbidden and permitted exactly the opposite, and the pilpulim we hang on this are completely empty. Therefore, in my opinion, it is more reasonable that there is an essential reason, and if something was forbidden then it is probably problematic. The attempts of the medieval and later authorities to explain what is problematic about it are ridiculous, as I said. That only means there is some problematic element that we do not understand (in spiritual realms, in the depths of our psyche, or something of that sort). In any case, all these explanations are baseless speculations, so I prefer to assume there is an explanation I do not understand and have no way to understand, and therefore I do not deal with it. That is better than someone who understands that there is an explanation and has no way to understand it, and nevertheless offers nonsensical explanations.
Discussion on Answer
I’d also suggest Rabbi Kook’s possibility in Vegetarianism,
and there, in the course of some poetic language, he manages to explain almost all the commandments that aren’t understood along that line—
shaatnez, carrion, meat and milk, covering the blood, etc.
The emphasis is on “manages.” I would correct it to “tries.” In that he joins Maimonides and others who failed in these attempts.
One could have forbidden and permitted the exact opposite, but the pilpulim aren’t completely empty. The reasons are weak and not enough as an independent reason, but since some kind of classification is needed, weak reasons are enough for classification.
Why is that needed? You can just not engage in these reasons, and nothing will happen.
Moreover, if they are weak, then apparently those are not the Holy One’s original reasons. So what does it help you to raise such weak reasons? Isn’t it better to leave it as an unresolved difficulty?
Similarly, I’ve often commented on the common view regarding dubious derashot from verses, which are justified by saying that this is an asmakhta and not a source that creates the law. But even if the halakhah is known to us, the suggestion that this derashah is its source is not correct if the derashah is dubious. It is possible and more proper to accept the halakhah without pointing to a source. Pointing to a dubious source just because one knows the result is true is neither helpful nor correct.
The question of whether to engage in this or not is a personal matter.
I didn’t say that I or we need classification, but that the Torah “needs” to classify (since it is not going to forbid eating everything). For classification, weak reasons are enough, because the alternative is a completely random division.
The question whether to engage in it or not is not a personal matter. I wasn’t talking about fields of interest, but about the fact that in any case you won’t be able to make progress in understanding, so why invest time in it and write and say weak things.
The reasons are weak not only on the level of logic (what harm does this bring), but also because they do not fit the details of the laws themselves, and therefore it is clear these are not the correct reasons. And Maimonides’ well-known words about the arbitrariness of the details are not plausible for several reasons.
What you suggested here perhaps fits the words of the thread opener. The Torah forbids in order to forbid something regardless of what it is, and therefore one can also rely on weak reasons (why not with no reasons at all?).
The thread opener quoted what I wrote (including the paragraph of “I don’t accept etc.”—that too is part of a quotation from my post), so it makes sense that what I suggested fits the words of the thread opener 🙂
The reason itself for why pork was forbidden and lamb was not doesn’t interest me (in an essential sense). What interests me is that there is a reason why the Torah has a principle that there are forbidden foods (to refine people, to educate them that not everything is permitted, to remember that we are servants of the Holy One, blessed be He, etc. etc.), and that there are reasons—weak ones—in the classification of what is forbidden and permitted.
You asked: why not with no reasons at all? I answered that. Weak reasons are preferable to a completely random choice.
Oh, so I didn’t understand who was speaking. I thought the last section was his.
In any case, I already addressed this position above—that one needs to refine people through obedience to the Holy One, blessed be He. In my opinion it is not plausible.
The central reason among the reasons for prohibitions in the area of food according to Maimonides is restraint (not everything is permitted).
As he wrote in the chapter classifying the groups of commandments: “The purpose of all this is to curb desire and indulgence
in seeking delicacies, and to prevent making the craving for food and drink an end in itself” (3:35:13). This reason was already discussed at length in the introductory chapters to the reasons for the commandments, in Maimonides’ words: “Among the purposes of the perfect Torah is also to abandon desires, to hold them in contempt, and to minimize them as much as possible, and to direct oneself only to what is necessary among them. And it is known to you that most of the masses’ yearning and abandon is only with regard to the desire for eating, drinking, and sexual relations” (3:33:1). And there he listed the damages that result from following desires. The principle of “curbing desire” requires limiting the eating of foods, and the question of which foods the Torah will place restrictions on in order to teach a person self-restraint is a secondary question, which Maimonides discusses in chapter 3:49. This is not the primary reason.
As for the medical reasons presented in the chapter and their validity today, it is worth noting that Maimonides’ words, as one of the greatest physicians of his time, reflect the medical knowledge of his day. The subject has been much discussed scientifically over the generations, and we have not gone into every detail on this matter. The main principle to take is the fact that Maimonides explained commandments in light of observation of nature and reflection on science and medicine.
Nice, I didn’t remember what you brought from Maimonides in chapter 35, thanks. So it turns out that the approach I wrote is Maimonides’ approach. The main reason is diminishing desire, and for the classification there are the reasons of chapter 48, which are classificatory reasons and not independent ones. More power to you!
Thank you very much.
We did major work clarifying Maimonides’ words on the reasons for the commandments.
Everything is available on the site here for free! In Digital Maimonides:
https://mishnetorah.co.il/
And also here https://rambam.plus/ where part is free
With God’s help, 1 Nisan 5784
It is worth noting that a “reason” is not necessarily a cause. Just as one spreads butter or chocolate on a slice of bread, so too there is room for adding lessons of faith or morality that accompany the foundation of “accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven.”
Best regards, Fish”l
By the way, if the commandments are arbitrary and are intended only to provide a framework and discipline, then there is no justification for establishing commandments that contradict morality. After all, they could have been established differently.
Of course one can always answer that the Holy One, blessed be He, also wants to educate us that Jewish law is superior to morality (why?), but there is no logic to that. Jewish law and morality are both grounded in Him and in His commands, and it makes no sense that He would arbitrarily establish one command that contradicts another of His commands.
Hello Rabbi Michael.
There is a flaw in the inference you made.
According to Maimonides, the commandments are not arbitrary; they have a principle, but they *indeed could have been otherwise*.
That is, there are mistaken abstract ideas (of idolatry), which in a certain background and culture come to practical expression in some particular way (say, not shaving the whole head).
The Torah fights the idea in that same cultural field by opposing that act (the prohibition of shaving).
After time passes, the culture changes, and it seems that the Torah’s practical battle loses some of its force,
but the Torah still does not lose its force, because the polemic is primarily against ideas that are still alive and present, through their (ancient) mode of expression.
I wrote my remarks to the questioner, and that was his position. Whether or not this is Maimonides’ opinion is another question. So whether there is or isn’t a logical flaw in what I wrote should be examined against his position, not against Maimonides.
As for Maimonides’ reasons for the commandments themselves, I wrote above that in my opinion they are extremely weak, and it would have been better not to offer such weak suggestions. Better to remain with the question unresolved, or to assume that the reasons are on other planes (spiritual, metaphysical).
I don’t know Rabbi Sagi Mazuz, though I’ve seen that he appears here on the site from time to time, and we’ve corresponded a bit.