As for deterrence and future prevention, from what I understand it works exactly the other way around. That is, releasing a large number of terrorists in exchange for hostages will not only endanger, in expected value, more people than it saves, it will also encourage additional future hostage-taking incidents, because Hamas understands that it can get a big reward if it succeeds.

I thought you were talking about risking soldiers in a rescue operation. Releasing terrorists obviously works in the opposite direction in that respect.

But doubt versus certainty is true here as well.

Okay, but if the broader considerations you mentioned, like deterrence and future prevention, actually point toward avoiding a deal, do you think the consideration that a doubt does not override a certainty outweighs those broader considerations?

In my estimation, definitely yes. The future risk depends on us (if there are no blunders like October 7). Beyond that, even if you don’t release terrorists, they have enough others anyway.
But I’m writing this from the armchair, on the basis of assessments not grounded in data.

Do you really think that “a doubt does not override a certainty” is the consideration that should decide the issue? If we take as an example the case presented by Rabbi Amichai Gordin, with my own embellishment, of releasing hostages in exchange for thirty nuclear bombs with launchers and so on—even here it’s still only a doubt, and freeing the hostages is certain. Yet it’s obvious to any reasonable person that it’s forbidden to do such a thing, and that it would be a mistake. If we phrase this in halakhic language, then there is a presumption on the side of the doubtful outcome.
In short, the consideration that a doubt does not override a certainty doesn’t really exist when there is risk.

Are you asking this seriously?! I’ll leave it to you to think on your own why this is nonsense.

What I mean is that “a doubt does not override a certainty” applies only when there is a real doubt about the future and data is lacking—which doesn’t really exist in the case of releasing terrorists. Given that this is what I mean, perhaps you could explain to me why this is nonsense?

Indeed, a doubt does not override a certainty only on the assumption that it is a doubt and not a certainty. Was that your question?
As for releasing terrorists, there absolutely is doubt. There is no doubt about their motivations, but there is great doubt about their success, especially when comparing that to the lives of many dozens of hostages who are definitely done for. Does that really seem similar to releasing five nuclear bombs to you? Do you live among us? Don’t you think this discussion is absurd? So there, I explained it.

Obviously I didn’t mean that five nuclear bombs are the same thing as releasing terrorists. I just wanted to convey the principle that “a doubt does not override a certainty” is a consideration you apply after clarifying the reality that there is in fact a doubt, and it is not a rule that overrides forecasts and concerns about the future.
In our case, we have already seen in previous deals that they also have major success, and therefore the consideration that a doubt does not override a certainty should not decide the issue here (at least not in the current format of thousands of terrorists, including key figures).