How can one talk so much about morality without knowing what one is talking about?
After all, Rabbi Kook and Kant apparently defined morality differently.
So how can morality nevertheless be defined?
Because there are people who say that the entire Torah is moral, and there are those who say that it also contains matters that do not belong to morality.
So can the Rabbi say what he means when he says morality?

I’d be happy to join the question and perhaps sharpen it based on my understanding.
The Rabbi speaks about the distinction between Jewish law and morality, and that these are two parallel axes.
If there is no dependence between Jewish law and morality,
then on the axis of morality the question arises: what is moral, or what is the criterion for a moral act.
A great deal has been written about this in issues of moral philosophy, and there are different approaches on the matter; likewise in the religious world, which tries to argue that Jewish law is morality, and by doing so frames morality in certain ways and then shows that the Torah is identical with the definition of morality (according to its approach).

I would be glad to understand from Rabbi Michi what morality is, or how the Rabbi determines the question, “is this act morally proper?”
Given that we understand this is not a halakhic command, it is not what was received at Sinai, and I assume (though I do not know) that the Rabbi also does not go in the direction of intuitionist approaches in the style of G. E. Moore, who speaks about “good because I see that it is good, just as I see yellow” (as I understand it, this touches very much on arbitrariness, and in any case leaves a vacuum regarding the question of moral action).

To sum up with an example: the Rabbi states that Jewish law says that one should not save a gentile on the Sabbath, and this is a contradiction between Jewish law and morality.
If so, not saving a gentile on the Sabbath is not moral, and the question is how the Rabbi determines what is moral, and likewise what morality is (these are, of course, questions that are intertwined).

If the Rabbi can refer me to columns he wrote on the subject, where I assume he lays out the matter more broadly, I would be glad.
Thank you

You didn’t manage to sharpen it. I can tell you what is moral according to my view, but of course there are different opinions about this. Each person should act according to his understanding of morality. Exactly as there are disputes in Jewish law. So how do you determine what Jewish law is? Each person acts according to his understanding of Jewish law.
What does all this have to do with the question of the relationship between Jewish law and morality? However you understand it, everything remains as it was.
And by the way, I absolutely do follow an intuitionist approach, and I also advocate moral realism. In my view, anyone who holds otherwise is simply confused. But that too is not connected in any way to the discussion.

Jewish law has principles according to which we operate. We try to understand and arrive at the truth, according to what is written in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) or the Talmud, regarding the divine command. When there are disputes, we rely on the principles and try to decide.

Is there a similar mechanism in morality? A set of principles that one follows? Or is it subject to each person’s full interpretation and method? Is there a consistent method that can be formulated in principles, so that if we encounter a new situation, even a robot would know how to rule on it?

There is an article you wrote about Jewish identity and whether there is any definition at all for the concept of Judaism.
The same question is being asked here: what is the definition of morality.

You’re invited to read the article and replace the word Judaism with the word morality. And that is our question.

מבט על יהדות וזהות יהודית: חלק ב (טור 337)

In my articles on what Judaism is, I dealt with difficulties, not questions. Even if you do not have a sharp definition for some concept, that does not mean it does not exist. On the contrary, for all our fundamental concepts we do not have definitions (that is why they are fundamental concepts: they define the other concepts). Regarding Judaism, non-religious definitions are empty—not that I lack a sharp and formulated definition. That is the problem there. Regarding morality, there is no sweeping definition that includes everything, and there are arguments about its boundaries. So what? That does not touch our discussion in any way. Why does there need to be a set of formulated principles for the field to exist? There isn’t one in Jewish law either, and in Jewish law too there are disputes.
But my feeling is that we’ve exhausted this.