Thank you very much for the answer!

I asked that same question there at the time, but I wasn't so convinced by the answer, because I was looking for primary sources from the Talmud and not from the words of later halakhic decisors, insofar as they have no explicit and evident basis in the Talmud or are not derived from it by necessary inference. Therefore I wanted to know your opinion on the matter, since, in your usual holy way, you have independent thinking and first-order halakhic ruling based on the binding sources, namely the Talmud.

Regarding your answer: sexually prohibited relations are, as is well known, more severe than an ordinary prohibition, so if the Sages prohibited hugging and kissing in the case of sexual prohibitions (according to Maimonides, by Torah law, and according to Nachmanides, rabbinically), that does not mean that it would also be prohibited in the case of an ordinary prohibition. So the distinction is called for, and if the Sages prohibited it in the case of sexual prohibitions, that ruling may go no further than its own novelty; from where do we derive that it should also be prohibited in ordinary prohibitions.

Regarding your remark about the prohibition of their wine and bread, one could bring another proof in this vein from the law of seclusion, which was also stated regarding an unmarried Jewish woman who is ritually pure and regarding a non-Jewish woman, and this would also serve as a source for prohibiting hugging and kissing with an unmarried woman who is ritually pure. However, proofs of this type are valid, perhaps, within a halakhic conception that generates new laws in light of the spirit of the existing law. But there are other, more positivist conceptions that hold that this power to generate laws belonged only to the Talmudic sages, whereas after the Talmud we have only what was prohibited in the Talmud itself; and if the Talmud did not explicitly legislate a prohibition of hugging and kissing a non-Jewish woman, we do not have the authority to say that this is binding law. Especially since the doors of analogy and distinction have never been closed, and one could say that seclusion is not comparable to hugging without seclusion, and so on.

So I want to take this opportunity to ask you about your approach to halakhic ruling: in your view, is everything that follows from the spirit of Talmudic law, even if it was not explicitly legislated, prohibited as a matter of law because of the similarity between cases that we draw? Or perhaps do you also agree with the positivist approach above, except that you think that from the fact that they prohibited their wine and bread there is proof that the Sages also actually legislated a prohibition of hugging and kissing? That seems a bit forced. Or perhaps your view is that even without actual legislation of their own in the days of the Talmudic sages, there is still a prohibition by virtue of that a fortiori inference from their bread and wine, and the prohibition of hugging and kissing is inherently included within the decree about their bread and wine?

With appreciation and many thanks

That is not called creating a new law. An a fortiori inference or analogy are methods of interpretation, and therefore their result is binding. If I were to make today an a fortiori inference or an analogy from verses of the Torah, it would bind me. So just as one makes an a fortiori inference from the Torah, one can also do so from the Sages.

Thank you very much for the answer!

According to this method of halakhic ruling, would it be correct to say that from the fact that it is forbidden to eat the bread of a gentile, it is all the more so forbidden for a Jew to be a close friend of a gentile—to go to his house every week to chat and joke around, play soccer together, watch movies together, and the like? After all, if even the bread of a gentile, where the Jew is not eating together with the gentile, is forbidden, then all the more so it should be forbidden to be his friend in the above manner. In terms of practical Jewish law, that would be a major innovation.

I also wanted to ask your opinion regarding an unmarried woman who is ritually pure, although this is not practical, since unmarried women nowadays do not go to the ritual bath. Does your honor prohibit this by an a fortiori inference from the prohibition of seclusion? Or can a litigant argue and say that seclusion involves concern for intercourse in the same private setting where they are secluded, whereas hugging in a place where there is no issue of seclusion does not involve such a concern? Or does your honor prohibit hugging and kissing with an unmarried woman who is ritually pure for some other reason?

Again, thank you very much, and Sabbath peace and blessings!

There is a distinction between interpreting a decree and formulating a new decree based on the reason for the text. Touching appears in Jewish law as a prohibition, and by reasoning it is extended to a non-Jewish woman. A prohibition on social closeness does not exist in Jewish law.
Beyond that, there is logic to prohibit it, but there are also human reasons to permit it that could override the prohibition, especially since it is not written explicitly in Jewish law.
For the same reason, it is appropriate to prohibit closeness to an unmarried woman who is ritually pure. This is an application of an existing halakhic category.

Thank you very much for the answer! Very thought-provoking.