Q&A: The Tension Between Intention and Outcome — Bibi as a Test Case
The Tension Between Intention and Outcome — Bibi as a Test Case
Question
Hello Michi,
Quite a few people argue against Bibi that the only thing driving him is his political survival, and that a person for whom those are the only driving considerations is unfit to be a leader; therefore, Bibi is unfit for the seat of power. In my view, this argument assumes that we have the ability to know a person’s intentions. I want to argue that we have no way of knowing that, and therefore what remains is to judge only on the plane that concerns the potential outcomes of his actions. It is important to note that this discussion is principled and does not relate specifically to Bibi. I am bringing him only as a test case.
As I see it, intentions in the context of leadership can be proper—that is, directed toward serving the interests of the state—or improper, meaning intended to serve the leader’s personal goals. In addition, the potential outcomes of those moves can be beneficial or not beneficial to the interests of the state. If so, as you argued in another context, the number of groups that could be formed in the population is four: proper intention and beneficial outcome; improper intention and beneficial outcome; proper intention and non-beneficial outcome; improper intention and non-beneficial outcome. In practice, of course, there are only two groups: those who think Bibi’s intentions are aimed at realizing his personal motives also think his statesmanlike moves are wrong (anti-Bibism). By contrast, those who think his intentions are directed first and foremost toward the interests of the state also think his choices may be beneficial (Bibism). But it is quite clear that identifying these two planes with each other is a blatant fallacy.
In my opinion, Bibi’s intentions have no real significance, just like those of any leader. In the first case, where the intention is proper and the outcome may be beneficial, there is not much to discuss, since this is a normal situation. In the second case, where the intention is improper but the outcome serves the interests of the state, then what difference does it make if it also benefits Bibi on the political level? It is pretty clear that for a person operating in the public sphere, personal interests will be part of his considerations. One might say, however, that when his intentions are aimed first and foremost at realizing his personal motives—that is, the good of the state is of secondary importance—that has moral weight. But in my opinion, even if that is true, it does not matter. As a state, what should concern us is the interests of the state, and judgment should be made accordingly—that is, based on a consideration of the possible benefits. Here there is room to ask whether we prefer a leader with pure intentions who harms the state on the consequential level, or a leader with selfish intentions whose moves advance the interests of the state. In my opinion, it is quite clear that the second answer is the intuitive one for most of us. Of course, one can say that we prefer a leader both with good intentions and who benefits the state, but I am trying to be realistic.
I want to sharpen the point and say that the focus of my remarks lies in the tension between intention and outcome. That is, one can say that an immoral intention may lead to other destructive outcomes—for example, educational effects. But one should note that this is a discussion between different possible outcomes, not between intention and outcome. One can certainly argue that constructing a social framework that is morally flawed, or setting a bad educational example, and the like—these are graver outcomes than one or another security-related outcome. But again, that is a dispute between different potential policy consequences, not about the tension between intention and outcome. Therefore it is not relevant to what I am arguing.
So with regard to the third option—proper intention and non-beneficial outcome—here too the intention has no significance. In this case the choice may cause harm, so why on earth should I care that his intentions are pure? Should a leader’s good intention as such motivate people to keep him in power? So he has good intentions. He may deserve a certain kind of moral praise, but his choices are harming the state, and on that basis he will be judged. One can say that in such a case I might judge him less harshly, but I still would not want him to remain in power, since he is causing harm. By the way, it is not entirely clear here what it means to judge him less severely. A politician is judged at the ballot box. Either he remains in power or he does not. There is no real meaning here to levels of judgment. The same applies when the intention is selfish and the outcome may harm the interests of the state. True, one can argue here that flawed moral judgment may lead to destructive outcomes. But again we return to the discussion of the outcomes and whether they may be beneficial or not. There is no way around that. Improper intentions can at most provide additional justification for removing a person from power, but not a central justification.
Up to this point I have argued why it is right to focus on the consequential plane and not on the deontological plane. Now I want to make a stronger argument and say that even if intention has weight, we have no way of knowing it. David Enoch argues in one of his articles in the book “Targeted,” in which there is a debate between him and Iddo Porat and Ram Segev about the moral status of targeted killing, that intention is a mental state. We have no way of knowing what a person’s true intentions are. Bibi, for that matter, may claim that his intentions are pure and are meant first and foremost to serve the interests of the state, but inwardly he may not really mean that. Is there any way to verify this? There is no way at all, and therefore the question is meaningless.
In conclusion, my argument is not only that it is right to focus on the consequential plane when judging a leader, but that we have no choice but to do so, since the discussion about intentions, besides being irrelevant, is also impossible. The whole uproar around the question of whether Bibi is deliberately doing everything in order to preserve his political standing does not seem very relevant to me.
Answer
Although conceptually there is no necessary connection, the correlation here is not accidental. People infer from the fact that the outcomes are not good that he is probably acting from improper motives as well (otherwise he would act in a way that produced good outcomes). I think that even if by chance the outcomes are good, if in my assessment his motives are not good—and one can bring various indications for this, since outcomes are never entirely good. For example, if the good outcomes are achieved only when that fits his interests and there is no conflict between him and the state, while in areas where there is a conflict the outcomes are bad—then there is concern that later on there will be bad outcomes, and therefore it makes sense to oppose the tenure of such a person. Of course there is also an educational argument about political norms: it is not proper to appoint a leader biased by personal interests. Both because this will affect the public and its trust in government, and because in the future there may come a leader with improper motives whose outcomes will also be bad.
By the way, the public discussion on this subject is itself, of course, also biased. It is clear that he is also acting from improper motives, but that does not mean that all his actions are of that kind. At least when there is no contradiction with his interests, he acts correctly in many cases. The accusations are biased as well (they too are based on interests and therefore tainted by fallacies).