Q&A: Knowledge and Free Will
Knowledge and Free Will
Question
I heard in one of the Rabbi’s lectures about free will that the Rabbi argues that God does not know, because there is no way to know something that has not yet happened. And you addressed the possibility that the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time, and you said that this does not seem plausible to you. I didn’t understand why. Because granted, if there is a contradiction with things we know due to His knowledge, that justifies concluding that He does not know. But if He is above time, and we really have no idea what “above time” even means, how can one conclude—just from the fact that there is no way to know something that has not happened—that He does not know?
2. Regarding the very question of knowledge and free will, I don’t quite understand why this is a contradiction. For if I am now standing at an intersection and can choose to continue straight, left, or right, and I choose to go right, then even if the Holy One, blessed be He, already knew this, and now I can no longer go straight or left, that does not contradict the fact that I am the one who chose to go right and not in another direction. Even if now I cannot choose otherwise because of His knowledge, in the end God knows what I choose. Admittedly this greatly narrows my freedom of choice, but it does not completely eliminate it, and God’s knowledge does not necessarily contradict my choice.
Answer
There is a series of columns on the site here about knowledge and free will, and you should read them, and also the talkbacks there, where a very lively discussion took place.
In short, the claim that the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time can at most be relevant to the question of how He obtains information about the future. He “reaches forward” in time and draws it out. But once that information is in His possession, the question is no longer about Him but about us. How can I freely choose between two options when one of them is already fixed and known? I brought up Newcomb’s paradox there, which sharpens the argument considerably.
Put differently: when you say that the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time, that means temporal matters should not be attributed to Him, and one should not speak about Him in temporal terms. But then you also cannot say that He knows something “now,” or at any other moment. Time and temporal properties cannot be attributed to Him. Once you say that He knows now, you have inserted Him into the framework of the timeline, and that framework has rules. This is just another formulation of the claim that these arguments are not about Him, but about what we say and know about Him—and we are indeed subject to the constraints of time and its logical framework.
2. I did not understand why you say that this narrows free choice. On your view, it does not narrow it in any way. But see my above discussion of Newcomb’s paradox. What you presented here is the “movie theory,” which originates with the Raavad and which I discuss there at length.
Discussion on Answer
It does negate it, as Maimonides himself says. But that was not the original question.
I read the columns. I didn’t quite understand the argument against the view of the Rivash (I think Saadia Gaon says this too), or what you called “the movie.”
Newcomb’s paradox only proves that there is a contradiction if the information comes into contact with human behavior in certain situations. What contradicts the possibility, in general, that God knows and yet I still have full freedom of choice?
Thanks.
It was explained there in detail. If the Holy One, blessed be He, has the information, He can always play the prophet game.
I’m asking: the fact that the prophet game creates contradictions in the examples you gave is only in certain situations—why does that contradict it in general? I couldn’t understand. You explained about modal logic, and then said you disagreed and moved straight to examples.
I’ll say it again. If the information exists with Him, can He or can He not play the prophet game? This is not some particular situation. He can always play it with the information He has.
So the contradiction is in the situation?
And what if He chooses not to play? That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, knows and doesn’t tell anyone.
I’m trying to understand whether there is an essential contradiction here. What do we see because of the prophet game?
I don’t understand what is unclear. I’ll say it again. It does not matter whether He decides to play or not. The fact that He can initiate such a game creates a contradiction with the assumption.
Sorry, but I still didn’t understand 😬
So God “cannot” play the game. Why does that mean He does not know?
He can play it. Why shouldn’t He be able to?
Because there is a logical contradiction in the game.
But there is no logical contradiction in His knowing.
So He cannot play it, just as He cannot violate all the laws of logic.
He has all the information. Why shouldn’t He be able to play? There is no reason. That’s it, I’m done.
You wrote, “But then you also cannot say that He knows something ‘now,’ or at any other moment.”
Well, exactly—you also cannot say “that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows,” according to Maimonides. Just as you cannot say that He is wise, existent, one, or any of the other attributes.
So if the Holy One, blessed be He, conveyed this information to a prophet, then that would negate free will because “the information already exists.” And that is why in the Laws of Repentance he asks about “your offspring shall be strangers” and “this people will rise up…” — why doesn’t that negate free will? He does not merely refer us to the question of knowledge and free will.