Q&A: Punishment for a Piece of Meat That Was Not Properly Slaughtered
Punishment for a Piece of Meat That Was Not Properly Slaughtered
Question
Hello Rabbi, in the Talmud, Ketubot 15a, it says: “There are nine stores, all of them selling properly slaughtered meat, and one selling carrion meat; if he bought from one of them and does not know from which he bought, the doubt is forbidden. But if it was found, follow the majority.”
What happens if after I eat it (let’s say we’re talking about forbidden fat and not meat that was slaughtered according to Jewish law) I discover that it really was forbidden fat? Do I become liable to bring a sin-offering?
It seems obvious to me that not, because I did the act permissibly, and so there is nothing for me to “atone” for or repent over. But from a discussion with my rabbi I didn’t really understand what the Jewish law is on this issue.
Answer
In such a situation, simply speaking, you are under compulsion. However, this should be considered in light of the Talmudic discussion about a Jewish law ruling and a woman who remarried based on the ruling of a religious court. One should also consider the difference between remarriage based on two witnesses and remarriage based on one witness and a religious court. You can look here: https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/41086
Discussion on Answer
With forbidden fat too there is the question whether it is in fact forbidden fat. I don’t see a difference.
You yourself brought up this distinction in your lectures. And with forbidden fat, the whole abstention from it is only because of the prohibition. In marriage, besides the prohibition of a married woman, there is also her legal status—whether she is married or not. For example, the fact that her child is a mamzer is not a punishment for what she did; it simply depends on the question of whether she is married. I don’t know of anything like that with forbidden fat, and therefore compulsion cancels the punishments associated with eating it.
You’re mixing things up. The distinction you’re quoting relates to the question whether there is legal effect or not. I’m talking about reality. There’s no connection.
I understood that because there is still legal effect here, then even though she did not sin (and therefore does not bring a sacrifice), she would need a bill of divorce from both men because there is marital legal effect here. So the fact that it happened under compulsion does not help here, unlike forbidden fat, where there is no legal effect resting on you by virtue of the fact that you ate forbidden fat.
Why does it matter whether there is or isn’t legal effect? He ate forbidden fat.
And therefore? Why should I *punish* him—emphasis on the word punishment—by requiring him to bring a sacrifice? What have I accomplished by that?
In the case of a married woman, she has to leave both men and receive a bill of divorce from both men, and her children are mamzerim, because at the end of the day she is still married, since the husband is alive. And despite all that, she really does not bring a sacrifice (in the case of a religious court and one witness).
The discussion was about repentance. A sin-offering is for an unwitting transgression.
If I remember correctly, you said that even in an unwitting transgression there is an element of blame, because otherwise they would not obligate him in anything at all. You called it negligence.
And therefore?
I was only suggesting an explanation for the stringency and leniency in the case of a religious court and one witness as opposed to two witnesses, based on the distinction between the prohibition of a married woman and the legal status of a married woman: that in the case of a religious court and one witness, they require her to leave both men and get a bill of divorce from both men, etc., because the marriage has validity since it was done under the authority of the court. Whereas with two witnesses she can return to him, and that is because the matter was not done under the authority of the court. But precisely because of that, in the case of two witnesses they obligate a sacrifice, while in the case of a religious court and one witness they do not obligate a sacrifice, because there it was done relying on the court, so the woman herself has nothing to atone for; as opposed to two witnesses, where there is still an element of prohibition but less validity to the second marriage, if any. I hope I’m being clear.
It seems to me that there is a fundamental distinction between marriage and forbidden fat, because with marriage, beyond the prohibition, there is also the question whether she is in fact married or not—is that not so? Basically, maybe one could say that in the case of a religious court and one witness, the marriage takes effect based on the authority of the court, and then one could explain the various stringencies in the Mishnah: that the Mishnah was stringent with her to bring a sacrifice דווקא in the case of two witnesses, whereas in the case of a religious court and one witness she is exempt; but they were stringent in exactly the opposite way regarding having to leave both men, and so on, because specifically when it was done through a religious court and one witness there is no prohibition here, but there is still the bad halakhic result, since it was done by authority of the court. Whereas with two witnesses, maybe one could say they were not stringent with her in all those ways, because in any case those marriages were apparently not done by authority of the court—but precisely because of that they are stringent with her to bring a sacrifice.
I don’t really know whether this works as an explanation of the distinction between two witnesses and one witness plus a religious court, but in any case it seems to me that in the case of marriage the matter gets complicated because it does not depend only on whether I transgressed a prohibition here, but on whether the woman is in reality married or not.