Q&A: An Agent More Trustworthy Than the Husband
An Agent More Trustworthy Than the Husband
Question
Hello Honorable Rabbi, in the Talmud in Gittin 2b-3a it says: “It was the Rabbis who required this, and here, because of the risk of a woman being left unable to remarry, the Rabbis were lenient with her. Is this a leniency? It is actually a stringency, because if you require two, the husband will not come and challenge it and disqualify it; with one, the husband may come and challenge it and disqualify it. Since the Master said: In the presence of how many does he give it? Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Hanina—one said in the presence of two, and one said in the presence of three—initially he examines it carefully and will not come to undermine himself.”
That is, they explain that since he says, “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence,” and he was also careful to do this in the presence of two or three witnesses, he carefully verifies that the bill of divorce was done according to Jewish law and that the husband wants it, and therefore he will not come to harm himself. Rashi explains there: “The agent, when he receives it from the husband and knows that he divorces her willingly, will not later come and challenge it; and even if he does challenge it, he is not believed, for certainly he examined the matter well.”
Essentially, in the second explanation that Rashi offers, he says that because the agent was careful to check that the bill of divorce was done properly and given willingly, we do not believe the husband when he comes and objects. And I ask myself: how can it be that we accept the testimony of the agent over that of the husband? After all, just a moment earlier the Talmud brought the rule, “A matter of sexual status requires no fewer than two witnesses,” and now that the husband has objected, this is no longer only a rabbinic-level doubt (which is the reason they were lenient with one witness—that is, the agent—to validate the bill of divorce if he says, “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence”). In other words, even if the reasoning says we should believe the agent, we still have a rule learned from an exegesis that matters of sexual status require two witnesses.
Thanks in advance, and have a good week!
Answer
First of all, in a case of a woman being left unable to remarry, they were lenient even in Torah-level matters, as with one witness in testimony about a woman. And indeed, an agent who says, “It was written in my presence and signed in my presence,” has the status of two witnesses, and therefore the husband's objection is like an objection against two witnesses.
Discussion on Answer
There is no condition that every leniency must have a corresponding stringency. Here that’s just how it comes out.
Right, Honorable Rabbi, and we also talked about this in another post. There it really seems that the stringency happens on its own from the very fact that they are lenient with one witness, which leaves room for the husband to appear and cancel the widowhood. Here you’re telling me that the exact opposite happens: the Sages were lenient to allow her to marry based on one witness, and the stringency that follows from that by force of reality (since she marries based on the testimony of one witness), namely the husband’s objection, the Sages cancel. Also, you didn’t really answer my second question: I understood that the need for two witnesses is like the need for two witnesses in monetary matters or capital cases—that is, it’s a formal requirement—so how can one say that the agent is like two witnesses?
Thank you very much for the answers!
You lost me. Each case depends on what they enacted. I don’t see any comparison.
The Sages enacted that the agent is like two witnesses. What’s the problem? Is there not also a formal requirement for two witnesses in testimony about a woman? And there too they enacted that one witness is believed.
Can they really change a Torah requirement like that? If the Torah establishes that betrothal can be effected by a document, money, or intercourse, can they enact becoming betrothed through some fourth thing that doesn’t resemble them? How can they make such a move?
Yes. That is the authority of the Sages. They canceled the blowing of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on the Sabbath, forbade poultry cooked with milk even though the Torah permitted it, and permitted a woman based on one witness.
Thank you very much, Rabbi!
They were indeed lenient in a case of a woman being left unable to remarry, but from what I saw they bore the consequences of that leniency later on out of stringency (that is, they were stringent at the end). Here you seem to be saying that apparently they were not stringent at the end either, since the husband cannot challenge it at all.
In addition, from what I understand, maybe one could say that the testimony of the agent is like that of two witnesses by force of the reasoning alone (that is, as credible as two witnesses, or alternatively more credible than the husband), but the requirement for two witnesses in a matter of sexual status is learned from the verbal analogy of “matter” “matter,” so how can that include even one very trustworthy witness? Isn’t that a formal requirement?
And one last thing: from the plain wording of the Talmud (not that I’m a great expert), it seems that the Talmud means to say like Rashi’s first explanation, and not to explain that really there is no stringency here at all.