Q&A: A Moral Lesson from Quantum Theory
A Moral Lesson from Quantum Theory.
Question
Hello Rabbi,
A.
After the lecture I thought to myself that you can really learn a message from quantum theory.
About the wonderful and bizarre matter of a particle that behaves contradictorily, in reality—I basically would never in my life have agreed to accept it as true, and I wouldn’t have believed anyone who told me it could be so. But the fact is, it simply happens; it’s a fact; it has been proven.
So I have no choice but to understand that it really is true.
There is a common human failing to dismiss things before examining them seriously, like demons, prophecies, charms, divine inspiration—and in truth there is also a lot of nonsense there, which is understandable,
but the main principle we have to take is that everything is measured in terms of evidence and plausibility, and if there is a good and strong reason to think that some force or strange thing exists, then a strange thing exists.
There is such a thing as dismissing something because it doesn’t seem rational to me.
In my opinion, for that reason many people dismiss the need to examine the question of God’s existence and the plausibility of the revelation at Mount Sinai.
You have to examine it, and if there is good evidence that hopping on one foot revives chickens, then it probably works.
B.
On another matter, the draft:
I’ve read a lot lately, including what you wrote several times, and I noticed that there is a point that isn’t being discussed.
All those who argue that Torah students are obligated to enlist explain and claim that there is an obligation to enlist because the law of the state is binding, that you don’t need a king or a Sanhedrin, and that Torah students have no exemption in an obligatory war.
But I haven’t seen anyone raise the point that we live in partnership with people, most of whom do not live according to Jewish law, and this requires different behavior, halakhically.
Suppose, in principle, that there is a blanket exemption for students:
If the Haredi public and its rabbis who argue for an exemption from enlistment were living in Sweden, and they lived happily and harmoniously with the non-Jews, and then a hard war were to break out there with Denmark,
would the halakhic authorities nicely explain to the government and to the Swedish citizens—the Swedes being the majority in the country—that it says in the Talmud that Joab did not go out to war unless David was studying Torah?!
Even assuming there is an exemption according to the Torah, it is fairly clear that when there is a civic and practical partnership with people who do not live according to the Torah, a different approach is required.
We have already seen in Jewish law, for example, that it is forbidden to assist in giving birth to a child for idolatry, but for the sake of peaceful relations it is permitted.
Simply put, in the State of Israel too, if most Jews do not believe in living according to Jewish law, then from a halakhic standpoint a different ruling is required regarding the participation of believing Jews when they are part of a public whose rules of life and conduct are human and straightforward.
Isn’t that so?
Answer
First, if questions like this are raised here, it is proper to link to the lecture or indicate what is being referred to. The reading public has no idea what this is about. That lecture is not recorded for the public because it was given to the university for payment, so it should not be linked here. But you can look at columns 322–327. Second, if these are two questions on different topics, it is better to split them up, both for the convenience of readers and so that if discussions develop they won’t get mixed together.
A.
There is such a thing as dismissing something because it doesn’t seem rational to me. But one must remain open to the possibility that I am mistaken. I addressed this in column 601 when I dealt with the question of how to relate to paradoxes. We should examine the quality of the evidence and weigh the claim accordingly. When the evidence is not good enough, I will not set aside my intuition because of it, even if in principle the conclusions that arise from it may be correct.
B.
I completely agree, and I think I wrote this as well. The halakhic exemption for students does not obligate someone who is not committed to Jewish law, and in a state whose society includes such people (and they are the majority), even if there were a blanket exemption, it would not be right to make use of it. This is not an exemption that one takes, but an exemption that is given. As people say regarding right of way. Suppose you have the right of way on the road, and someone did not give it to you and an accident occurred. There are cases in which you would be found responsible and at fault, because right of way is received, not taken. The same applies here. Even if the state is acting wrongfully by not granting an exemption to students, so long as the exemption was not given, there is no exemption. The Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with the wicked Zionists for not having granted the exemption. The same applies to saving oneself with another person’s money. Even according to the views that hold that the other person is obligated to give his money for my rescue, that does not mean I am permitted to take it myself (Rashi holds that it is forbidden. And Rashba implies that if the other person is obligated to give it to me, then I am also permitted to take it). And I have already written about this here in the past.
By the way, I also think there is no connection to an obligatory war. This is just confused and confusing discourse. It is a matter of saving life, nothing more. The obligation to enlist in such a situation exists also in Belgium or Kazakhstan.
This is not a different ruling, but different conduct. The Jewish law of the exemption remains in place, but morality requires enlisting.
Thank you very much,
Okay, next time I’ll pay attention.
B.
Yes, regarding danger to life, I read what you wrote.
I wrote it as a general description.