Q&A: The Metaphysical Status of Sex and Gender
The Metaphysical Status of Sex and Gender
Question
Hello Rabbi. I read Column 504 and another column whose number I don’t remember, regarding the distinction between sex and gender (and attraction, but that isn’t relevant to my question). To sharpen the question, I’ll say what I’m not asking: I have no dispute with the claim that there are people who experience gender dysphoria. I also have no dispute with the claim that they should be allowed (after some diagnosis and serious thought, and not just casually) to undergo sex reassignment surgery. As you yourself noted in that column, if they feel like members of the other gender, and they have behavioral tendencies of that sort, it is appropriate to relate to them as members of the other sex (unless I have some value-based objection to that, but that is already a different discussion). So I’ll sum up this part by saying that it is possible to relate to people of a certain sex as those whose gender is different from their sex, and the conclusion that they are indeed such is based on their feelings and tendencies.
Now I would like to ask about the metaphysical status of sex and gender. The question “What is a woman?” comes up a lot in current discussions. One camp relies only on sex (XX chromosomes), and the other camp relies only on gender (the person’s feelings and tendencies). Just to emphasize: I am conducting the discussion here between sex and gender as I have defined them—sex is the genetic makeup, and gender is feelings and behavioral tendencies (that is, I reject the extreme position that says there is no such thing as man or woman, as extreme progressivism claims when it says that a woman is whoever produces from their mouth the collection of sounds “wo-man”). In other words, there is a feminine essence and a masculine essence.
If so, the question that arises is: which of them is correct metaphysically? Or perhaps both are correct? To be precise: my question assumes that there is such a thing as a feminine type and a masculine type on the metaphysical level. The question is what that femininity or masculinity is—sex or gender? Of course, one could argue that there are two metaphysical things: female/male sex, and also feminine/masculine gender.
I’ll illustrate the distinction with the concept of democracy: if one assumes that there is such a thing as democracy as some metaphysical object or type, then the question arises: what is democracy in terms of its properties? A country with 35 mango trees and 47 orange trees, or a country that has separation of powers (and other things of course). In this case, the second option is the correct one. In the same way, I ask: if one assumes that there is such a thing as femininity or masculinity as some metaphysical object or type, then the question arises: what is femininity, for example, in terms of its properties? A human entity with XX chromosomes, or a human entity with behavioral tendencies XYZ and mental states (including sensations, emotions, thoughts, desires, etc.) ABC? (The “or” here, as stated, is not exclusive; that is, both may be correct and there may be two different metaphysical kinds—sex and gender.)
I hope my question is clear. Thank you.
Answer
I don’t see a question here. As you wrote, sex and gender are apparently things that exist, and in a Platonic sense they also represent ideas that exist. Therefore, the question of what a woman is in the metaphysical (ideal) sense is simply a matter of definition. There is woman in the sense of sex, and woman in the sense of gender. There is no single metaphysical idea of “woman,” full stop.
In response to a question that came up here not long ago, I wrote that even in Jewish law there are issues in which the relevant definition of a woman will follow sex, and issues in which it will follow gender.
Discussion on Answer
So if I understand correctly, there are two separate Platonic ideas of woman, one of which is sex and one of which is gender. And in practice, we use the same term (“woman”) even though it is ambiguous (like the term “mouse,” which refers both to an animal and to a computer device).
And if so, then it is definitely possible to say about someone that he is both a woman and a man—a man sexually and a woman in terms of gender. Correct?
And do you agree with the definition I gave for man/woman in terms of gender—a woman is a person who feels such-and-such feelings and has such-and-such behavioral tendencies (without getting into the details of what the feelings are or what the behavioral tendencies are).
Yes and yes.
I wasn’t able to understand what indication there is that the feeling “I am a man” in a biological woman is based on a real idea or some external thing of any kind. At best, how is this different from an old person who feels young? He senses certain things associated with young age (say, vitality, playfulness), but that does not change the fact that he is old. He also would not expect to be treated as young—for example, to be admitted to high school—but rather as an old person who is especially energetic.
That is, at best, in the case of a completely normal person who simply feels younger than his age but is fully aware of reality (he is just not “Platonic,” ideal old). At worst, there is a considerable set of disorders (for example, lycanthropy or delusional disorders) in which a person truly feels he is x while he is y. In such cases too, would you say that he is biologically y (say, a human) and gender-wise x (say, a tiger)?
Thank you. The column you sent is exactly the one I said I had read and didn’t know the number of.
One question that remained open for me is that some people say there are masculine roles and feminine roles. And so one could argue that beyond a person’s feeling that he is a woman, there is another indication that he is a woman—namely, that he is psychologically driven to perform certain behaviors that we usually attribute to women, for example emotional openness, beautifying oneself (makeup, clothing, etc.), yielding, and all sorts of other such traits/tendencies.
And if so, the definition of gender is admittedly not objective, but it is not based only on the feeling that the person is a woman or a man; it is also based on his feelings that he has tendencies to perform such-and-such behaviors which, in his view and feeling (and in the view of a certain segment of people in society), belong to the feminine/masculine gender. In other words, an additional criterion is added here beyond mere feeling, as you presented in the discussion in that column you attached about morality (where, if I understood you correctly, there is only a feeling that the act is immoral, without any tendency to act one way or another).
Avi, you are begging the question. You assume that man or woman is determined by sex, and then you relate to someone who feels otherwise as someone who does not correctly perceive reality. The claim you need to deal with is: 1. There is a feminine mentality as opposed to a masculine one. 2. It does not necessarily come together with female sex. Just as the feeling regarding democracy indicates to us that there is such a concept and that it has definite content, the same applies to the feeling of femininity. I do not see why the existence of an idea like democracy or horsiness seems clearer to you.
Itai, I didn’t understand your message. Is there a question here?
With so many explanations, I forgot to put a question mark somewhere 🙂
I’ll ask it this way: is someone’s identification of himself as a woman or a man (in gender terms of course, not sexual terms) based only on an undefined feeling, or also on behavioral tendencies that he identifies in himself (like sensitivity, willingness to yield, grooming, etc.)?
In other words: are certain behavioral tendencies (willingness to yield, sensitivity…) properties of the idea of the gendered woman, in the same way that separation of powers is a property of the idea of democracy?
I do not know how to define the different genders. There is a certain elasticity in them, and it is clear that even if there are feminine characteristics, they can appear in varying degrees among men. This is one of those definitions that apparently has to be based on some subset of a broad list of characteristics. That is why people come to the conclusion that there is no definition at all and everything is subjective and depends on the person’s self-perception. That is, of course, throwing the baby out with the bathwater, and it stems from an unwillingness to accept concepts for which we do not have a sharp definition.
So, you do agree that the gender definition has a vague character? Something like what exists, for example, in mental disorders?
I’m bringing this up because in that column you sent, it says that it is not plausible that gender is something vague, and then you brought the example from morality, which according to what you wrote is indeed analogous to gender.
However, if we say that there is also standing to characteristics beyond the feeling of woman/man—characteristics like behavioral tendencies that the person feels and is driven to do—then the definition already becomes something beyond an immediate feeling that cannot be defined. The definition already refers to something beyond a single feeling that someone has—it refers to tendencies in his traits.
Of course, one can always ask why such a behavioral tendency is feminine rather than masculine, but that is already a different discussion (and one could argue here that this is a kind of immediate intuition, just as we say that murder is a bad thing).
Where did I write that it is not plausible that gender is something vague? I don’t remember any such thing. Of course it is vague.
I’m done.
Thank you. In the article she posted here it says that you think it is not a vague concept, but I assume your intention was that according to queer theory it is not a vague concept.
That’s why I asked, and now your position is clear.
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%98%D7%91%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%94/