Q&A: Sexual Extortion
Sexual Extortion
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Recently an article was published about a woman who extorted a man by threatening that if he did not bring her X amount of money, she would tell his wife that she had slept with him (which is what really happened). I wondered whether there is any moral problem with such a threat. After all, the wife has a right to know that her husband slept with another woman. On the other hand, perhaps one could argue that there was implicit consent (an unstated condition) between the man and the extorting woman that their relationship was discreet and not to be told to anyone, and therefore carrying out the threat would violate that condition and constitute deception / bad faith toward another person (revealing information that is not yours alone to a third party). What do you think?
Answer
A difficult question. I don’t have time right now, and I’ll write briefly off the cuff.
Why does the wife have a right to know this? I’m not sure. An actual right she quite clearly does not have, but perhaps there is some value in telling her. On the other hand, as long as she does not know, it does not harm her. Perhaps if she wants to get divorced anyway, and this could be of use to her—then there would be some reason to tell her. Otherwise, I very much doubt that it is right to tell.
Even if the matter has implications for prohibition or permission—for example, informing a husband that his wife committed adultery (which would make her forbidden to him)—the Noda B’Yehuda wrote a very famous responsum expressing doubt about the matter (Orach Chayim, sec. 35), and if I remember correctly he concluded that one should not tell. However, I do not have time right now to look there closely, and I recall that quite a number of responsa were written on that same case following the Noda B’Yehuda.
Discussion on Answer
Exactly for that reason I didn’t address the threat, because if one should tell, then it should be done without threatening, and if not—then not, even with threatening.
I thought again about this issue, and seemingly it should be similar to any secret breach of contract, where the injured party is entitled to know about the other side’s breach.
For example, suppose someone rents an apartment from Mr. So-and-so on condition that he not bring animals into it. Is there an obligation to inform the landlord in a case where the tenant brings animals into the property?
I’m not sure there is an obligation to inform. The fact that he wants to know does not mean I am obligated to tell. If there is a loss involved, then there is “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” and returning a lost item, etc. But when there is no loss, and it is only that he would want to know, in my opinion there is no obligation. By the way, if there is no obligation, it may even be forbidden on grounds of malicious speech.
But clearly in every breach of contract there is a loss to the party against whom it is breached. In the example I gave with the landlord, animals in the apartment create an increased risk of damage to the property (scratches on the doors and walls, for example). Also in the case of a woman whose husband is cheating on her, she is investing every day in the marriage and in the relationship on the assumption that the other side is likewise investing back to the best of his ability. If she knew that her husband was cheating on her, she would invest less on her side (if at all), thus saving time, effort, and perhaps money as well.
An interesting question would be to find a clear source and rationale. But my intuition is that a breach of contract is not like damage, and therefore there is no obligation to save the other person from it unless he has an actual loss.
I mentioned above the responsum of the Noda B’Yehuda (Orach Chayim sec. 35) and a series of responsa written בעקבותיה by several later authorities (Acharonim), discussing whether to reveal a wife’s infidelity to her husband. The discussion is only on the level of preventing a transgression (because if she committed adultery she is forbidden to him), but as far as I remember no one even raises the possibility that one must reveal to one party the other party’s breach of contract.
The discussion is not only whether it is permitted or forbidden to tell, but whether there is a problem with the threat.
And here it seems to me to be either way: if telling is good, then let her tell and not keep quiet for money; and if telling is bad, then she should not tell (and if in any case she intends not to tell and is making an empty threat, then clearly that is not okay); and if the act of telling, taken by itself, is morally neutral (which sounds strange), then there is still a moral problem in the intention to cause harm, which is built into the threat.
And ultimately—if you had done something wrong to someone else and he didn’t know about it, would you want a third party to threaten you? And if someone had done something wrong to you and you didn’t know about it, would you want a third party to threaten him? Presumably the answer to both questions is no, and that seemingly gives a clear answer to the question.