Q&A: Cause and Effect in the Changing of Times
Cause and Effect in the Changing of Times
Question
We find in a number of places that in lomdus there is a possibility that the cause takes place after the effect (throughout the whole concept of retroactivity, and in many other topics as well). But it is commonly said that a cause must take place before the effect. I am not talking about conceptual priority, where Torah Study and the Investigation of Jewish Law works hard to explain that causes precede their effects, but about temporal priority.
Answer
I discussed this at length in the fourth book of the Talmudic Logic series. If one does not assume an ontic basis for Jewish law, there is no problem. The causal relation is merely a definition and does not describe something in reality. If it is ontic, then a problem does arise. See columns 32–33 on a logical definition of time travel; at least in legal reality this may be possible.
Discussion on Answer
My intuition from my yeshiva years is that we do in fact assume some kind of meta-halakhic reality (whether in ritual impurity or in various other sorts of things), and in practice, even if this is not ontic reality, in the end how do things work even in the ideal world of Jewish law?
. There is a classic inquiry in tractate Yevamot (it really seems to appear already in the medieval authorities) whether levirate marriage creates the bond between the levir and his yevamah prior to the levirate marriage itself (the other side is not relevant here). How can a later levirate marriage create an earlier bond?
On second thought, one could say that what creates the bond is not the actual levirate marriage, but its potential, and that preceded the bond.
Obviously the levirate marriage does not create the bond. We are talking about the obligation of levirate marriage, which exists from the outset.
What is obvious to the Master is doubtful to another great man. I searched in Otzar HaHokhmah; Rabbi Amiel himself discusses this in the very context of "cause and effect," and he understands the levirate marriage itself to be the cause, and goes on to say that there is no problem with temporal priority.
As for the first point, is it not clear to the Rabbi that Jewish law assumes a halakhic metaphysical reality?
A matter becoming clarified retroactively is not reverse causality. Even in the case of "from now and retroactively," it is not clear that this is reverse causality, and this can be analyzed in the laws of stipulations and retroactive selection. Everything is explained there.