Q&A: A Person's Ownership of His Own Body
A Person's Ownership of His Own Body
Question
I didn’t understand why a person does not have ownership over himself, and why it is only accepted to say that ownership is always external, while my body is me myself. But isn’t that a fortiori reasoning? If I can be the owner of and control something external to my body, then all the more so I control the flesh and blood of me myself — with the emphasis on the flesh and blood. And especially according to the Rabbi’s thesis that ownership means an extension of my body, like the periphery of my body, then obviously my body itself should also have a status of ownership. And especially since the definition of ownership (in my view) is something meant to serve me — and that applies equally to my body. In general, I am trying to understand whether there is a parallel between a husband’s ownership of his wife and a person’s ownership of his own body, in the sense that regarding both of these it is stated that they are not the owner’s property.
Answer
Who said he has no ownership? There is a puzzling responsum of the Radbaz regarding “a person cannot render himself wicked.”
See the passage in tractate Sanhedrin 84b, where they asked: what is the law regarding a son letting blood from his father, and they resolved that it is permitted for purposes of medical treatment; see there. It seems that otherwise it would be forbidden even if the father gives permission, and this requires examination. As for what Rabbi Michi wrote, that the Ridbaz wrote something similar, apparently you mean what he wrote in deducing from the language of Maimonides, Laws of Sanhedrin 18:6, that “a person’s life is not his property,” etc.; see there. And there he wrote this regarding the rule that a religious court does not put a person to death on the basis of his own confession, etc., so it is not clear why you said his words are puzzling. Perhaps your intention is that he contradicts himself, from what he wrote in Laws of Kings 9:4 regarding a pursuer, that if he could have been saved by injuring one of his limbs, but they nevertheless killed him, they are not executed for that; and the Ridbaz wrote that this is because he has rendered himself ownerless with respect to death, etc., and this requires examination. [And perhaps your difficulty is from what is explained in Bava Kamma 93a, that waiver is ineffective regarding major limbs, but it would seem that one can distinguish between the cases].