I can offer Rabbi Michi’s bot answer in the beta version:

*Clarification* – The answer is based on the web writings, articles, and columns of Rabbi Dr. Michael (Michi) Abraham. There may be inaccuracies, so anyone who wants to examine every detail should consult the original sources on his site.

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## A. “A woman’s voice is nakedness” – how the topic is structured

| Talmudic source | Context | What is said | Meaning according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) |
| ————————— | ————– | —————————————————— | ———————————————————————————————————————— |
| **Berakhot 24a** | Laws of reciting the Shema | “A woman’s voice is nakedness” – it is forbidden to *recite the Shema* when hearing a woman’s voice | Most medieval authorities (Rif, Rosh, Maimonides in Responsa Pe'er HaDor) understand that the prohibition here is **limited to times of Shema and prayer**. |
| **Kiddushin 70a-b** | Distancing from sexual prohibitions | “It is forbidden to hear the voice of nakedness” – within the framework of prohibitions of erotic thoughts | Here the emphasis is on **sexual enjoyment**: if the purpose is to listen for pleasure, it is forbidden even outside prayer. Rif and Maimonides rule this way in the laws of forbidden sexual relations. |

### How did it get into the Shulchan Arukh?

* **Orach Chayim 75:3** – “It is forbidden to recite the Shema in the presence of a voice of nakedness.” This is a direct continuation of the passage in Berakhot.
* **Even HaEzer 21:1** – “It is forbidden to hear the voice of nakedness” without qualification. This is the product of the passage in Kiddushin.

The double distinction (prayer-time versus concern for enjoyment) remained, but the Shulchan Arukh—and likewise most halakhic decisors in later generations—expanded the “concern for enjoyment” to almost any case of *singing* (as opposed to ordinary speech), out of a reasonable concern that it includes an element of pleasurable experience.

### A fresh reading (in Rabbi Michi’s direction)

1. **The original context** – in Berakhot the issue is the *concentration* of the person reciting; when there is no recitation of the Shema, there is no sweeping prohibition.
2. **Dependence on enjoyment** – in Kiddushin the language of “enjoyment” highlights that the prohibition is not the voice itself but the experience of arousal. Therefore singing that does not arouse sexuality (a mixed choir, a memorial ceremony, etc.) does not automatically fall under the prohibition.
3. **The habituation factor (“habit” and cultural context)** – if in a certain environment a woman’s voice is not arousing, it is hard to see it as “nakedness.” This approach already appears among some major later authorities (Acharonim), and Rabbi Michi emphasizes it.

In the column dealing with coercing people to listen to female singers in the IDF, he writes that although he does not think there is a halakhic prohibition against hearing women sing, one should respect those who think otherwise.

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## B. Am I (or are you) obligated to follow the Shulchan Arukh?

### 1. **Substantive** authority versus **formal** authority

* Since the sealing of the Talmud, there is no longer any *formal* authority to create prohibitions; halakhic decisors afterward are only **experts**, and their authority stems from the likelihood that they are correct (“substantive authority”).
* Therefore, someone who studied the topic in depth and reaches a reasoned conclusion different from the Shulchan Arukh **is not committing a transgression** if he acts differently—as long as he is not violating a binding communal custom.

### 2. So why do most rabbis in Religious Zionism still “stick” to the Shulchan Arukh?

* **Social factors and unity** – the Shulchan Arukh serves as a halakhic “mother tongue”; sweeping deviation could unravel the public halakhic fabric.
* **Epistemic humility** – even a serious student admits there is a good chance that others already considered his arguments; basic conservatism reduces mistakes.
* **Public acceptance** – in many places, the accepted practice is that the Shulchan Arukh is the default, and therefore anyone who breaks from it needs to justify himself well.

Rabbi Michi emphasizes that there is no current-day “do not deviate” here; the obligation is a product of a **social contract** and not a formal law.

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## C. A practical conclusion in the case of women’s singing

* If I studied and found that the prohibition applies *only* when there are erotic thoughts of desire, then I may listen to a concert by a female singer, so long as it is clear to me that I am not taking sexual pleasure in it.
* And nevertheless, when the community or the army includes people who are concerned about the prohibition, there is room to consider solutions of mutual sensitivity—exactly as Rabbi Michi suggests: “Don’t force people to listen, but also don’t forbid those who are willing.”

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### Bottom line

The passages in Berakhot and Kiddushin create two circles: a prayer prohibition and an enjoyment prohibition. The Shulchan Arukh merged them broadly, but in principle—and especially according to Rabbi Abraham’s approach—someone who is well-versed in the matter, and who reasonably thinks that the Shulchan Arukh expanded beyond the actual law, may rely on his own understanding, with responsibility, transparency, and respect for tradition and society.

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For the interested reader: a detailed analysis of the authoritative and methodological approach can be found in columns 280, 393, and 568 on the site *mikyab.net*—recommended.

Wow… with all the asterisks it looks like those old compositions from the 1980s-90s with the Einstein program, for whoever remembers, or like they used to duplicate them with a stencil, or on a home manual typewriter. Check Google.