The modal ontological proof

I recently came across the modal ontological proof. I assume the Rabbi is familiar with it, but I couldn't find a reference to it on the website, so I'm asking.
Very briefly, the proof goes like this:
1. It is possible that there is a perfect imperative.
1.1 That is, there is a possible world in which there is a necessary perfect.
2. If there is a possible world in which something necessarily exists, then in every possible world it will also exist, meaning it is necessary (this is an assumption of modal logic).
3. Therefore there is a necessarily existing perfect.
 
The assumption of modal logic by which the conclusion is reached is so reasonable and intuitive that it is difficult to challenge it. On the other hand, accepting the first assumption that there is a possible world in which there is a necessary perfect (God) seems almost trivial.
Did the analyst really manage to escape his emptiness and prove the existence of God analytically? This proof was developed by the philosopher Plantinga as an upgrade to the usual (and failed) ontological proof, and it seems that he did a pretty good job.
I already have some thoughts about the problems with this argument, but since things are not clear to me and I know that the rabbi deals a lot with the analytical and the synthetic, I would love to hear his opinion on this proof.
Here is a more detailed link to the proof:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#PlaOntArg