The taste of cutting an egg that was born on Shabbat
Regarding the decrees of the Sages, they are usually a reservation to the Torah commandments, and sometimes proper regulations and practices. But there are some that seem to a weak-minded person like me to be incomprehensible, and I would be very grateful for help in understanding their meaning. We learned (Beitza 2.), a egg that was born on a holiday is forbidden. Among the methods cited in the Gemara (2:3.) is the method of Rav Yosef that this is a decree because of the fallen fruits, that is, the Sages decreed that fruits that fell from the tree on Shabbat or on a holiday should not be eaten, lest he come to pluck fruits from the tree when he does not find sufficient satisfaction in the fallen fruits. And the method of Rabbi Yitzchak, that this is a decree because of the drinks that were poured from the fruits on Shabbat, that the Sages forbade drinking on that Shabbat. There too, the above explanation that this is the same decree is repeated. The Gemara explains that this is not a decree for a decree, but rather it is all one decree. That is, according to Rav Yosef, the chicken is similar to a tree, and the egg to a fruit that falls from it, and according to Rabbi Yitzchak, the chicken is similar to a fruit, and the egg to a drink that is made from it. I will quote Rashi's words explaining the matter:
"It is a decree – not that it is a decree that I do not have access to the fruits of the fallowing, but when they counted and decreed about the fruits of the fallowing – even an egg was in the sense, and even on the back of a dalit in it because of plucking, who among the general group of sages was the decree that it was also the fruit of the fallowing."
That is, there is no qualification here, but this is the same ruling. It can be added that it is proven that this ruling is not due to a fear that someone would confuse an egg that was born with a drink that leaked from the fruit, since the halakha is that fruits that a person has gathered for the purpose of eating, drinks that have leaked from them are permitted, since there is no fear that he will squeeze them. If the Sages were afraid that someone would make a mistake and permit the squeezing of fruits, they would first have to issue a prohibition on drinks that leaked from fruits that are ready to be eaten before issuing a prohibition on an egg that leaked from a hen.
In short, I asked and requested, what did the Sages think about adding this to the decree of fruits that fall or to the decree of waters that spilled the egg that was born on Shabbat. What need and what purpose does this decree have?
לגלות עוד מהאתר הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Sometimes there is a different reason behind the ruling, and what is said in the Gemara is only the boundary. For example, it is possible that the ruling on drinking wine is actually a result of a birth, and therefore is an egg in the ruling. And what they decided to rule on drinking wine is only the boundary of the ruling and not its reason (especially if the later rulers did not have the authority to issue a new ruling, they have no choice but to rely on the first ruling, so they do so with an expansive linguistic interpretation of it).
Although the Rashi you cited apparently states a different reasoning. He claims that one follows the language of the regulation and not its taste, and the fruits that fall include the egg that falls from the hen. Although it is difficult to say so regarding the drink that has been poured, it is true that Rashi seems to have understood it this way there as well, cf. his words there. And see the Harzan Goldberg in his article in the collection of Seekers of Torah on Yot (B.2), who wrote that one follows the language of the regulation and not its taste, because he went into it at great length. Although according to our path, there is no need for this. If we are talking about later sages who cannot derive their own interpretation, they make an expansive linguistic interpretation of an earlier ruling, but not necessarily because they always follow the language of the regulation. This is similar to what some recent scholars have divided the prohibitions of Shabbat on Shabbat between Shabbats that expand a work from the Torah (such as picking up food that is impure or picking up food waste, which is a rabbinic prohibition) and Shabbats that introduce a new prohibition (such as riding a horse while harvesting, which is certainly not a rabbinic prohibition).
According to Rashi, this means that this is a linguistic extension, and it should probably be said that in their time, people really understood, in the language they used, that the egg was the fruit of the hen or something that came from it. It is difficult to learn from our language about the language that was used in their time. In any case, according to him, this is a linguistic consideration.
Although in the law of a decree for a decree versus a single decree, one must extend it in general. Some have understood that it is a matter of timing (I remember that this is what the Rambam says), if the two decrees are at the same time, they constitute one decree. According to this, there is no difficulty in what is said here. The Gemara says that the decrees were decreed together and therefore constitute a single decree (there does not need to be a substantial connection between them. Perhaps the linguistic difference and the like are sufficient).
But Torid (Shabbat 31) understood that a decree is a decree that means that the first decree was made in the same thing in which it was decreed, and then another decree can also be made on it. He distinguishes there between shaking in Carmelite, which is forbidden because it may come to shake in the Lord, and therefore something else should not be decreed, and shaking in Carmelite, which is a decree for a decree. But burying in embers, which is forbidden because it may burn in the coals, what they forbade to bury in anything that adds abel, burying in embers is not a decree for a decree, because lest it burn in the coals, is in the body of that embers that is forbidden and not in anything else. Therefore, a decree for burying in embers that adds abel, burying in embers is not a decree for a decree, but is a decree for a decree. (According to the Law, it turns out that this will also be the case if the second decree is in the same thing that the first decree was made in, even though the first is in something else.) According to his opinion, the things again fit together well, since both the drink that spilled and the fruits that fell are a decree on the drink and the fruit themselves, lest someone come to pick or squeeze them, and it is possible to slowly deduce these decrees as another decree on an egg, and it is not a gazirah for a gazirah, but rather a single decree. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Thank you very much for the answer! With your permission, a few comments: A. It is not possible to understand that the ruling on drinking water that has been spilled is actually because of a birth. As is proven by the ruling I cited at the end of my remarks, that fruits that are ready to be eaten from drinking water that has been spilled are permitted. And it is clarified that the concern is because of a squeeze, i.e. a leak, and not some other concern. on. Marshi does not seem to have been a later linguistic expansion, but rather, when ruling on fallen fruits or water that has spilled, they included the egg that has been hatched in the ruling. [It is quite difficult for me to imagine people so stupid that ruling on fallen fruits or water that has spilled would be lacking for them and doomed to failure if it did not also include a hatched egg. On the other hand, water that has spilled from fruits that are ready to be eaten is permissible, and the aforementioned fools accept this with understanding and there is no fear that they will confuse the cases.] third. The Maimonides you mentioned is found in the commentary on the Mishnayot, Shabbat, Chapter 4, Mishnah 1. 4. I was not familiar with the Torah, and I am grateful for the important information! (His words on page 21a). However, it seems to me that even according to his view, in the Nada, this is a decree for a decree and not a decree alone. After all, the decree is not that one should pick the fruit that has fallen, or squeeze the juice that has already flowed. It is forbidden to eat the fruit that has fallen and drink the drink that has flowed, lest one pick another fruit and squeeze another drink. If so, it is similar to shaking a Carmelite, and the decree for a hatched egg is a decree for a decree (if not according to Rashi). —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: A. It can be said that in fruits that are ready to be eaten, a drink that has been produced is not born, since food and drink are food. As it seems to me that there is a contradiction between the issues in this matter. As a rule, the interpretation of decrees is done linguistically + substantively. There may be a linguistic extension, but it will not be applied to fruits that are ready to be eaten because it is already food. It is true that there was room for a linguistic ruling here as well, but for substantive considerations, they did not make a ruling.
on. In Rashi, I did not necessarily say that this was a later expansion. Nor is it about fools. The question is what is included in the phrase "fruits that fall" or "drinks that spill."
third. indeed.
D. Indeed, there. As for the matter at least in the case of the farmers who have been affected, the concern may also be about this fruit. —————————————————————————————— Asks: A. The hen whose egg we are discussing is one that is fit for eating (as explained at the beginning of the tractate), and the egg is defined as "Ochla Daifrat" and is not born or assigned on its own, but rather due to the decree of the wine that has spilled or the fruit that has fallen. on. Aren't we talking about fools? So why and for whom did Chazal include the egg that was born in their ruling, just to tease? D. The ruling is on the drinks that flowed from the fruit, not on the fruit itself. And in the drinks, one must not transgress a prohibition. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Note that the order has changed. on. Even without fools, as I wrote, it can be said that this is a conceptual expansion. It is not because someone is stupid, but because the language of the decree also includes an egg and they did not divide it into decrees. This was not done to harass, but to create order and that what the language includes will be forbidden and they will not start to enter into purposeful interpretations (like a ta'ama daqra). A. See above, section B. If we see the egg as a linguistic extension of the word "mishkin szevu" then it is essentially "noled", at least it falls within the linguistic rule of "noled" and "nelken" and is therefore prohibited. The ruling on "mishkin" which is "noled" means that the egg receives the ruling of the mishka and is "noled". Incidentally, I remember a long and detailed topic in Tractate Shabbat that refers to the word "mishkin szevu" as "noled" and not as an extension of the rabbinical term. I didn't have time to look it up now. D. The fruits are part of the fruit and therefore considered a part of the same thing. And certainly in an egg inside a chicken that is ready to be eaten, it is part of the food.
לגלות עוד מהאתר הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
השאר תגובה
Please login or Register to submit your answer