Contributory guilt in sexual assault cases

I don't know how to give a criterion. There is conduct that seems reasonable and there is not. But I think everyone would agree that there are situations in which the victim has contributory guilt and there are situations in which he does not. Therefore, the question of the criterion is placed before all of us, and not just me. Only those who are unwilling to acknowledge contributory guilt at all are exempt from proposing a criterion. In the past, I have already stated that the great liberals see the ascent to the Temple Mount or the Kahanist parade in Umm al-Fahm as provocations that justify violence by Arabs, but are unwilling to hear about a sexual victim having contributory guilt. [By the way, there is a difference between the two situations. Among Arabs, violence is initiated and deliberate and receives social legitimacy, including from the Jewish left, while sexual violence is usually the result of a violent instinctive outburst that is very difficult to overcome.] The distinction will depend, among other things, on the question of what we consider reasonable and logical conduct, or even a basic right that it is unreasonable to demand of a person to give up. In my opinion, walking naked is not a basic right, since it is not that difficult to cover up a little, and therefore I see such walking as contributory guilt. But of course, what seems reasonable and what does not, what is a basic right and what is not, is a question that depends on social norms. My argument is against social norms and not specifically against this or that woman. It is important to understand that there is a complex dependency here between facts and norms: norms determine what is reasonable and what is not legitimate to demand that people give up, and from this, guilt and responsibility for what happened (the facts) are determined. But the actual results and the risks that arise from them play a role in determining norms. My point is that if there is a violent situation that in the existing social atmosphere cannot be overcome, this is one indication (of course not the only one) that it is reasonable to demand that people give up on it (that it is not a basic right and it is legitimate to demand abstinence). If the sexual drive and violence are such that current conduct fails to prevent acts of sexual violence, this is an indication that it is necessary to examine whether such conduct is reasonable or whether it is right to demand that it be given up, and to see those who do not give it up as sharing in the blame (contributory guilt). Contributory guilt also lies with the society that sets norms, and not just with the individual person who acts according to them. And by the way, even in the legal world there are no criteria for contributory guilt. The criterion is reasonableness (the proportionality of the demand against the intensity of the risk and its consequences).