On Voting: Lesser-Evil Considerations (Column 189)

In my opinion, indeed most voters choose whoever seems to them to be the “best of the worst,” and the elected officials do, by and large, represent what matters to their voters, compromising only on what does not matter all that much to them.
On what is truly critical to the voters (not what is merely lip service), the elected officials will not allow themselves to compromise.
(If, in the 15th Knesset, Meretz sat in the same government as Shas, that was only because opposition to the Haredim was not really critical to their voters, despite all the shouting.)

This raises the question of when it is the lesser evil and when it is, in your phrase, the best of the worst, and your approach to this question does indeed suffer from childishness.

I’d just be glad to hear what my approach is, and then I will no doubt agree that it is childish. As far as I know and remember, I did not express any approach here on this question, and left it to each person to draw the line as he sees fit.

If we normalize your argument into game theory, then elections, you claim, are not a one-shot game but an infinitely repeated game (infinite in the sense that in no round do we know whether it is the last one). In that situation, you claim that a consistent tit-for-tat strategy can lead to the optimal equilibrium among all equilibria. If I remember correctly, there is such a claim in game theory.

There is a claim that, in practice, this is also what happened in Jerusalem between the Hasidim and the Lithuanians. A large portion of the Hasidim from Hasidic groups that do not belong to the four largest ones had become alienated from what was happening in Agudat Yisrael and therefore decided not to participate in the game. As a result, Agudat Yisrael fell in the current elections to 3 seats, compared to the 6 seats won by the Lithuanians. The Lithuanians, for their part, hope that their achievement at the local level will be leveraged at the national level and bring them parity with the Hasidim. Here the game is not only repeated at the local level but also across two different levels—the local and the national. From the perspective of the Hasidim who are not in the game, their abstention sends a signal to the current leadership of Agudat Yisrael that they are dissatisfied with how things are being run and hope that in the next round the situation will be changed in their favor. The Lithuanians, by contrast, are sending a counter-signal about their power, by means of which they hope to achieve a more equal division of the seats at the national level.

Elections, in this sense, are a kind of communication among voters, in which different voters signal to other voters their relative strength so that in the future they can use this information to improve their position in the next round.

There is, in my view, a risk in what you say. Labor comes to power and goes ahead with Oslo or “convergence” the moment it can. The damage is enormous, even if not total destruction.

You can’t rely on it not being possible and on their refusing. All it takes is some Palestinian leader who smiles and says “peace” for them to hand him Jerusalem and some kind of right of return as a gift, plus blue-and-white headlines in the newspaper, and bye.

In addition, when you suggest that others act as you do, the claim that the individual has no influence is nullified.

We really did need a live demonstration of apocalyptic arguments. So here we are—we got one.
As for the second claim, I addressed it in my remarks.

You are of course right—in a case where the difference between the candidates is not very large, and there is a real chance that blank ballots will signal better candidates to run next time, and there are no other effective ways to send such a signal to new candidates.
And in such a case, there is no difference between the “lesser evil” and the “best of the worst.”

But in a case where the differences between the current candidates really are large, or in a case where blank ballots are not expected to produce a candidate substantially different from the current ones, or in a case where one can signal by other means such as petitions and demonstrations—then apparently there is no reason at all to cast a blank ballot even if it is the “lesser evil.”

Indeed true. I am right if my assumptions are correct. (Except for the question of large differences, which in my opinion is irrelevant.)
??

What I’m saying is that one has to weigh the size of the gap between the current candidates against the gap from a future candidate, and also take into account the likelihood that such a future candidate will even appear (and appear specifically as a result of voting with a blank ballot).
Whoever thinks that the gap between the current candidates is large relative to the gap from a future candidate (multiplied by the probability that he will even appear)—will vote for the current lesser evil.

There is much to reply to in your remarks (not all of them are correct, but not all of them are mistaken either…), and I will make do with one comment, since you rely on game theory. Collective abstention is not consistent with a Nash equilibrium strategy. To illustrate: suppose there are only two candidates and all of Israel listens to you and abstains from voting (except for the two candidates, of course). In that case, it would be worthwhile for at least one citizen to break ranks and vote, and then one of the candidates would win by a majority of 2 votes to 1. (Because the alternative would be a coin toss, as in Tzafria, and then there is a 50% chance that the “best of the worst” will be chosen.) This consideration applies to each and every citizen, and therefore abstention is not a Nash equilibrium.

Admittedly, elections are “repeated games,” and therefore one must take into account what is called a “perfect equilibrium” (in the open-loop model and the closed-loop model, etc., but this is not the place to elaborate). Presumably, if discipline is broken once and one citizen votes, we will return to the equilibrium of the “lesser evil.” According to this, the graph you drew is not correct. The equilibrium of the “lesser evil” is a stable equilibrium, whereas the equilibrium of abstention (if it is even possible for that to be an equilibrium) is not stable.

And having written this, fairness requires me to note that nevertheless, and although many researchers have dealt with it, there is still no complete and satisfactory answer to the “paradox of voting” (why people vote when the chance that their vote will be decisive is negligible). Behavioral economists tend to argue that the voting paradox definitively refutes the assumption of rationality. I do not accept this claim, but again—not the place to elaborate.

By the way, mocking apocalyptic forecasts is not a persuasive argument. The lowest voter turnout in Israeli Knesset elections was recorded in 2003. Then we got Ariel Sharon and the “disengagement,” which brought upon us 4 wars, countless “operations,” a missile threat over the whole country, and still there is no end in sight. Presumably you will argue that a right-wing voter would have voted for Sharon anyway, since he stole the voters’ votes and changed his policy after being elected. But that is political fraud and vote theft, which can also be done by a candidate for whom you would want to vote (because you see him as the “best of the worst”). The point I wish to stress is that in the State of Israel, apocalyptic forecasts are not as ridiculous as you present them. I still remember Rabin’s “cowards of peace” speech, and similar and no less sharpened speeches by Peres, and ever since then I tremble in fear of such “peace.” Happy is the man who fears always.

Hello
A question regarding the first paragraph:
The probability of closing out a seat is indeed very small, but it is not zero. Therefore, in my opinion, one should consider the expected value and not only the probabilities. If I did in fact close out a seat (a very small probability), I received power disproportionate to my weight. As is well known, rare events do happen.

I disagree. We are talking about the gain from a continual long-term improvement of the entire system, and therefore comparing current differences is almost meaningless.

Weight it. The result is negligible.

Mordechai, hello.
First, I did not at all rely on game theory; I merely spoke in terminology related to the terminology commonly used there. I did not base myself on any particular result from there. If anything, it is closer to evolution.
Second, I do not assume that everyone will accept my proposal and refrain from voting. My goal is to create a significant segment of the electorate that is open.
Third, regarding what you called the paradox of voting, I explained it very well in the columns mentioned here (the categorical imperative), and showed that both morally and purposively it is right to do so. In my humble opinion there is no paradox here at all, at least not beyond the paradox that exists in any moral altruistic behavior (where a person acts correctly despite there being no immediate benefit to him in it. And I do not accept the common assumption of “rationality” that he does so for the satisfaction or the good feeling. See the column on altruistic actions—in that same column 122 mentioned here).
Fourth, I do indeed mock apocalyptic forecasts because there really is nothing to them. No one from the Labor Party, or even Meretz, will hand over the whole country to them just because he heard the word “peace,” as some clown wrote above (that is precisely the apocalyptic hysteria). As for the example you brought, even if we see the disengagement as a disaster, as your remarks imply (I am not at all sure of that. The Lebanon model that might have emerged without it is not necessarily better. Beyond that—the question is whether the current results are the result of the disengagement itself or of the policy of neglect carried out afterward. A political plan is not a one-time step but a consistent policy also pursued in its wake), the question still is what the expected damage is versus the expected gain in the long term. And one must also consider whether someone else would not have done something similar as well. Beyond that, I explained in the column that abstaining from voting is not supposed to change the results even in the short term (if the distribution of abstainers matches the distribution of voters—an a priori assumption that is not implausible).

Elections are a kind of signaling.

As far as I understand,
the expected value will be small because I live in a country together with 8 million other citizens, regardless of closing out seats. For the sake of argument, if they were to double the number of Knesset members, the chance of closing out a seat would increase, while the expected value would remain unchanged.
As for our matter,
you receive an influence ticket worth your share of the population (or more, if one takes invalid votes and non-voting into account).

I thought of another categorical criterion that could lead to the desired result (reaching the absolute maximum and not only a local maximum) without compromising in the short term on the local maximum:
1. Every person who thinks he can provide a better governing alternative than the current government should try to compete for the voters’ support regardless of his chances of success (that is, even if the polls predict he will not cross the electoral threshold).
2. Every person should choose the least bad option among the existing governing options at any given moment, regardless of the chances of success of the party he chooses (that is, even if the polls predict the party will not cross the electoral threshold).

The more people adopt the two above criteria, the more the governing vacuum will shrink, and at the same time, the gradual transition from the current government to the future government will not require short-term compromise.

At your service.

I am not among the naïve people who believe every politician. But I think there are worthy politicians trying to steer the State of Israel to safe harbor. For example, Netanyahu. With all his shortcomings. He certainly brought the State of Israel to significant achievements, even though I do not vote for him. Also, Bennett’s and Lapid’s backing down from their political demands (which caused them political damage) indicates that there are politicians for whom the good of the state stands before their eyes.

So therefore what? In practice the influence is negligible, and therefore not worth even a second of investment. So what if it is proportional to the number of citizens? I have no claim of unfairness in the fact that I have no influence.

I did not understand why the vacuum would shrink.
In any case, practically speaking it does not seem that such a process would actually work. Again and again candidates would be shattered on the rock of the electoral threshold, and nothing is likely to progress.

True, this criterion would not work in practice because not many would adopt it, but as a categorical criterion it should not be affected by considerations of practical ineffectiveness. Just as the categorical voting consideration does not take practical effectiveness into account.
Beyond that, take for example the case of the Zehut party. It is not clear whether the party will cross the electoral threshold, and the party’s potential voters ask themselves whether it is worth voting for them and risking losing a vote to the right-wing bloc, or going with the safer option and voting for a familiar right-wing party, while giving up Zehut’s specific agenda. The categorical criterion I proposed is supposed to help decide that dilemma in the direction of voting for Zehut, even at the price of losing a vote to the right-wing bloc, because if everyone acts this way, Zehut will eventually cross the electoral threshold, whereas if everyone is afraid of losing a vote to the right-wing bloc, then it will never cross the electoral threshold.

As for the vacuum, it would shrink because potential candidates would offer themselves for election even without having a realistic chance. That is, I am including the candidates too under the categorical obligation, and not only the voters.

I think you are mixing levels of discussion. From the standpoint of the categorical imperative you may be right, but my suggestion not to vote was not stated as a moral instruction (in accordance with the categorical imperative), but as a proposal for practical improvement. Therefore, if I am right that your proposal will not bring practical improvement, then it is not an alternative to mine.

There are additional considerations.
In my opinion, as long as the law-enforcement system, the media, and the old elites are persecuting Netanyahu (and surprisingly it is evident that you are influenced by the blackening campaign), voting for Netanyahu is obligatory in order to preserve democracy. Political liquidation through the police, the court, and a mobilized media is an old communist tool that must not be allowed to win here in Israel.
P.S.: Please spare me the arguments about paranoia and conspiracy theories. You are the one who does not see the reality, and its gravity, clearly.

On the other hand, you are right, because I too, after the Netanyahu era, really do not intend to go vote.

What is the advantage of abstention, which is convenient for the candidate against whom we are protesting, as compared to consciously choosing another unfit candidate, which would simply bring the end of our unfit candidate closer?

If you have a candidate you are willing to vote for, do so. My remarks are addressed to one who does not find such a candidate and adopts a policy of the lesser evil.

My question is this: the rabbi argues that the policy of the lesser evil is flawed; therefore one should abstain. Abstention, by definition, does not benefit any candidate, so practically you only want to create a protest. I argue that the candidate who is the lesser evil—he is the one who should be removed (if he insists on keeping his place and removing other candidates), therefore one should vote for another realistic candidate, even at the price that that person’s views are much farther from mine than those of the lesser evil.
Isn’t that more effective? (Leaving aside the moral side.)

I don’t understand.
I will just note that in my view abstention is not a protest but an effective step.

I accept the argument that if there is a good third candidate with low chances / there is a good party that probably will not cross the electoral threshold, then it is better to take the risk that the vote will be thrown away. Simply not voting is not vacuum rule. In any case there will be 120 MKs / some mayor. I don’t know how many people pay attention to turnout percentages or blank ballots after the day following the election. If there is a situation in which many people are voting for the lesser evil, that is usually public knowledge, and whoever could decide to run because of low turnout rates could also run because of that understanding. From there, as I said, it is worth taking the risk and voting for him. If there is no good candidate one can take a risk for, I do not see the point.

The economic differences between the parties are also not really very great. Everyone is more or less in the same socialist direction. There are some on the left who sound more extreme, but still, the talk on the right about the free market often sounds pretty similar to their “security-minded” talk about fighting terror. Mostly talk. We have still remained with many of the Mapai-style foundations from the establishment of the state, despite 40 years since the upheaval, and there does not seem to be any desire to change direction.

Vacuum rule is not the practical result expected here, but rather an aspiration of the categorical imperative (it is justified not to vote because, from my perspective, a state of vacuum rule is the correct general law). But the main thrust of my argument is on the practical level, and there indeed someone will be elected in the short term. But I argue that in the long term there will be a corrective effect, because an available electorate will be created that will call new forces to enter the game. Everything else has already been discussed.

I feel that you did not respond to my main argument above, in the first comment. The claim was also about the long term—that people usually do not pay special attention to turnout rates, and usually if many people are voting for the lesser evil, that is publicly known, and the same factors that would arise in a situation of low turnout would probably also arise in such a situation, following the knowledge that this is the case. Once they do arise, it is already better not to be afraid of whether “that one” will be elected or of the electoral threshold, but if there is no third candidate, I do not think turnout rates will have much effect.

People do not need to pay attention to turnout rates. The candidates considering entering do need to notice it. And when there are few voters, everyone will notice it very well.

What I am trying to say is that if there is truly a real expectation for something else, I believe people will seize the opportunity anyway. I think the problem is that people are afraid even after he offers himself, not that they increase turnout rates. I assume that even if turnout rates had been high in Yeruham in the situation under discussion, people would understand that they did it only because they had no choice, and someone would also want to run and transfer all the votes from the lesser evil to himself (again, assuming that then they would dare to do it).

In light of what is written in this column, do you think it would be worthwhile to establish a party that is a kind of vacuum party, where voting for it is an act of protest against the lack of a governing alternative? (In the style of Meir Ariel’s Z Party.) This is different from a blank ballot, because a blank ballot is not counted as a vote of abstention but as an invalid vote, so it does not make a sufficiently clear statement that this is an act of protest and not invalidity for some other reason.

Yes, definitely worthwhile. But it is doubtful whether it justifies the effort.
It reminds me of an idea I once raised (I don’t think I wrote it here) to establish a party that would be divided among the different parties according to the current key, and ask the whole public to vote for it. The hope is to replace the entire Knesset without a violent revolution and without regard to worldviews and platforms, and also without changing the balance of power, which is already known today. The voting would only disrupt what everyone already knows.

So why not use this platform to call for recruiting 100 people who will sign to establish such a party? It seems to me that you have enough power to rally 100 people behind you for the purpose of founding the party. As for the bureaucratic effort involved, I think I could spare you that.

This would be an enormous headache. It is not just bureaucracy. It involves publicity and propaganda, registration, determining the Knesset list, explaining the idea to the public, determining policy, etc. All this for a list that probably will not win the voters’ support.
And beyond all that, it is already no longer possible to register new parties. The date has passed.
I’ve been saved. ?

It is possible to begin the registration process for the elections after the upcoming ones. I came across a lawyer on Google who offers an accompaniment service on the subject:
https://lawoffice.org.il/%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%94-%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%94/
Even if it does not succeed as expected, perhaps it could be an interesting experiment.

Why establish a new party? After all, the “organizing committee” of the “Jewish Home” is looking for a party chairman. Suggest Ramda 🙂 to them.

Regards, Pele Yoetz, Shimshon L"tz

Now I remembered that in the last local elections there was something similar in cities where only one candidate ran for mayor: there was an option to choose a green ballot whose meaning was opposition to the sole candidate.

With God’s help, 22 Shevat 5779

And seriously—

Precisely in a situation where there is almost a ‘tie’ between opposing camps—every vote has critical significance. The difference between victory and defeat is a few percentage points. Even fractions of a percent. If you have 50.0001%—you won and you will form the government; if you got only 49.9999%—you will remain in the opposition. And the difference is heaven and earth.

And yet—even a single MK in the opposition has great value. Even when the general tendency is not in the direction he desires—an MK has the ability to influence many small decisions whose effect is slight in the short term, but which can open the door to cumulative influence in the future.

If you succeeded in advancing an educational, social, economic, or scientific project; if you paved a road or established a new neighborhood; if you improved the scenery and the environment—you sowed seeds for a better future.

It is always worth remembering the guidance of our Sages: ‘It is not upon you to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.’ Every small step in the positive direction advances the world toward a better future.

Regards, Sh.Tz. Levinger