Hello Rabbi,
Thank you very much. I have a few more questions, please.
1. Someone explained to me that when the Sages establish a certain definition, it is not an evaluation of what reality is, but that they determine it. For example, in muktzeh they did not try to think whether most people set this object aside or not; rather, they determined that the definition of this object is to be muktzeh or not. And similarly in the laws of impurity and purity, whether unfinished metal vessels can contract impurity or not does not depend on reality but almost on the decision of the Sages, who determined whether in their opinion this counts as completed manufacture or not. Or for example, whether a bucket’s chain can contract impurity up to 5 handbreadths or up to 3 handbreadths, they do not check what actually happens in reality, but determine the definition of when the chain is connected to the vessel and when it is not. Is that correct?
2. In tractate Kelim, chapter 11 mishnah 2, it says: “Any metal vessel that has a name of its own is impure.” Rabbi Kehati explains: that it is known and designated by its own name, and does not have a secondary qualifying name. What is the reasoning behind this? After all, if it has a receptacle then it is impure, and if it is a functional vessel, why should I care whether it has a qualifying name?
3. Is the rule of “if it is not relevant to this matter, apply it to that matter” (meaning that there is an “extra” verse and it is interpreted for a completely different law) a Torah-level rule according to all opinions? And do we have any way of tracing and understanding how the tannaim knew to take a verse on one topic and connect it to another law in the Torah, when it does not always seem that there is any connection between them?
4. In the laws of impurity and purity there is a rule that a vessel that holds 40 se'ah is pure because it is not movable when full and empty. But this is a bit difficult, because if there is a vessel of 20 se'ah, for example, intended to carry metals, and it is not movable when full, and there is a vessel of 50 se'ah intended to carry only feathers, and there is no problem at all moving it, why did the Sages make the rule depend on volume rather than usage?
5. Is the rule that the Jewish law follows Rabbi Akiva against one colleague absolute? Because I found an example where it seems not to be so, and someone told me it seems absolute to him.
6. In my last letter I asked you why the Talmud in Makkot tried to find for Rabbi Yohanan a way to learn a certain law from the plain sense of the verse and not from a verbal analogy, and you answered me. I just wanted to sharpen what I meant to ask: according to the notes in the Schottenstein edition, even after we establish that Rabbi Yohanan will learn the law of eating sacred foods in impurity from an exposition of the verse and not from a verbal analogy, he will still need the verbal analogy for other laws. So I don’t understand: if you only needed that one law and you gave up the verbal analogy, I understand. But if in any case you keep the verbal analogy to learn the other laws besides that, then why is it so important? He will learn it by means of the verbal analogy, which is valid and in place. I’m trying to understand what the Talmud gains by saying that instead of having one verbal analogy from which laws 1, 2, 3, and 4 are learned, law 1 is learned from a verse and laws 2, 3, and 4 are learned from the verbal analogy.
7. There is a Rabbi Akiva Eiger (for some reason I have the Talmud next to me and I can’t find it) who cross-references between two mishnayot, where in one place Rashi establishes a mishnah in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, I think regarding labor not needed for its own sake, and in another place a different mishnah in another chapter in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, also regarding labor not needed for its own sake. Why is it impossible to understand that Rabbi anonymously taught one mishnah one way and another mishnah the other way? Must Rabbi anonymously teach only in accordance with one opinion?
Thank you very much, and especially for the links about the Vilna Gaon. I didn’t know there was an understanding of the Vilna Gaon that tzimtzum is not literal, and I didn’t know this was an earlier dispute even before the Vilna Gaon and the author of Tanya.

Hello Y.,

1. It depends on which Jewish law we are talking about. Sometimes the Sages evaluate reality, and sometimes they establish a definition on their own. But when they say something about reality, that is a factual determination. Sometimes they draw a line in order to establish a halakhic definition, but it still has some connection to reality. For example, the determination that a garment of three by three can contract impurity is their determination drawing the line that defines a garment. There is no factual determination here about what a garment is, and therefore the Sages need to draw the line.
2. See there in Yakhin’s commentary, who writes that vessels with a qualifying secondary name are not vessels but parts of vessels, and therefore they do not contract impurity. Thus, for example, a kav is a measuring vessel, but the “kav of the trumpet” is part of the trumpet and is not a vessel in its own right.
3. This is a hermeneutic rule of “if it is not relevant to this matter,” and plainly this is a rule like the other interpretive rules. As with all expositions, the Sages exercise their own judgment and decide when it is not relevant to its own matter and redirect it to another matter. Thus, for example, regarding terumah that one gives generously, it is clear that this is not speaking about the great terumah, because it has no fixed measure (and therefore it is not relevant to speak of giving it generously), and so they redirect the verse to the tithe-terumah, which does have a measure. See Gittin 31.
4. There is an assumption that a vessel of such volume usually is not used for carrying. It is possible that if there is a vessel that actually is moved, it would contract impurity even if its volume is above 40 se'ah, as with all presumptions that are meant to determine the law where the reality is unknown. And when the reality is known, one does not follow the presumption. I haven’t checked.
5. No rule in Jewish law is absolute. Even very clear rules such as Beit Shammai versus Beit Hillel, or Abaye versus Rava. The rules are default rules.
6. I explained this. A law learned from a verse has a higher status than a law learned from a verbal analogy. It is not that one uses the verse in order to “save” a verbal analogy.
7. Usually, when Rabbi anonymously teaches a mishnah, it is because the Jewish law follows that opinion. So clearly he is not supposed to anonymously teach two contradictory opinions.

Hello Rabbi,
Again, thank you very much.
Just one question, please:
Lately I tried to formulate an understanding on a certain topic, and I wanted to write to you and know what you think about it:
I understand that on the issue of Torah versus science, and whether there is a contradiction between them, there are three groups:
1. There is no contradiction between the Torah and science — and this group tries to reconcile everything that seems contradictory with various explanations.
2. There is a contradiction between Torah and science, and science is wrong.
3. There is a contradiction between Torah and science, and the Sages were wrong on various points.
Is this division basically correct?
Also, it is written that Joshua son of Nun made the sun and moon stand still in their places, and there was a day of (according to one opinion in the Talmud) 36 continuous hours. Once a certain rabbi approached me and tried to find a scientific explanation for the phenomenon. I want to argue that such a thing has no scientific explanation. Science knows how to address and explain only phenomena that have regularity; if there is no regularity, science also has no explanation. The very movement of the heavenly bodies is something that has regularity, and therefore science can explain it. But if a miracle occurred and the system operated not according to that regularity, there is no scientific explanation for that, and I do not think anyone can understand scientifically what exactly happened, because it has no such explanation — that is the “nature” of a miracle. What do you think of what I wrote?
Thank you,
Y.

The division is basically correct, but all the positions can be correct, each with respect to some questions. With respect to one question, it may be that the Sages were wrong; elsewhere science is wrong; and in a third place there is a reconciliation.
In principle, a scientific explanation for a unique phenomenon is possible. If one explains it on the basis of the regular laws and explains why it happened. Moreover, there are rare phenomena like a solar eclipse that do have a scientific explanation. Even the sun standing still could in principle be a rare phenomenon that might recur even ten thousand years from now. I don’t see a possibility for such an explanation, but one cannot dismiss it out of hand.