Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 10

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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Laws relating to minors: education, non-separation from prohibition, and actively feeding with one’s own hands
The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about the nature of the commandment of education, and the implication of Kehillot Yaakov
The age of education: flexibility, physical ability, and understanding
Education on Yom Kippur: fasting for hours, boys and girls, and Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah
The Ritva, Queen Heleni, and the requirement of “according to Jewish law” in the law of education
Resolving the difficulty of fasting for hours: “there’s no choice” or “part of the commandment”
The Turei Even: intention in a minor, disqualification rooted in minority, and additional examples
Tzitzit made for their own sake, spinning by a minor, and the meaning of the distinction between a minority-based disqualification and an object-based disqualification
Eating on Yom Kippur: Rashi, the Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah, and the distinction between a father and others
Rabbeinu Manoach: two laws of education on Yom Kippur and the connection to Tosafot
The scope of the prohibition of active feeding: eating versus all prohibitions, the Sabbath, and “so that your son and your daughter may rest”
Saving life, muktzeh, and proof from Avodah Zarah: “a woman rinses one hand”
Object prohibition / person prohibition, positive commandment / prohibition, and sukkah as a model for understanding active feeding
Minors and the other afflictions: the baraita on 78b and their well-being
Opening the topic of prohibitions of eating: the uniqueness of Yom Kippur and the route through leaven and sourdough
Beitzah: Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, “its leavening is severe,” and “fit for eating”
Maimonides in the laws of leaven and matzah: “the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one causes leavening are one and the same”
Conclusion of the lecture: Sanhedrin 6b, “justice and righteousness,” and compromise

Summary

General Overview

The lecture continues the topic of minors on Yom Kippur and places it within a broader picture of the prohibitions of eating and drinking, distinguishing between rabbinic education, the lack of obligation to separate a minor from prohibition, and the prohibition of actively feeding a minor by hand, which according to most views is Torah-level. A dispute between Rashi and Tosafot is presented concerning the definition of education; its implications are discussed regarding fasting for hours on Yom Kippur and the fulfillment of commandments “according to Jewish law” by a minor; and the question of active feeding on Yom Kippur is examined in relation to saving life, education, and the type of prohibition involved. At the end, an introduction is opened to the prohibitions of eating through the uniqueness of leaven and sourdough, in preparation for understanding eating and drinking on Yom Kippur as not necessarily a standard eating prohibition, and the lecture closes with an aggadic passage in Sanhedrin about “justice and righteousness” and compromise.

Laws relating to minors: education, non-separation, and active feeding by hand

The lecture distinguishes between the law of education, which is straightforwardly rabbinic (as brought in the Talmud in Sukkah), and the law of “if a minor eats carcasses, the religious court is commanded to separate him,” which is ruled in Jewish law as meaning that they are not commanded to separate him, and the prohibition of actively feeding minors by hand, which most views define as a Torah-level law on the adult, and therefore it does not depend on the age of education. The lecture notes that, aside from the Rashba, the common tendency is to view active feeding by hand as a prohibition that the adult himself violates when he feeds / assists directly, and not as an obligation defined by the halakhic state of the minor.

The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about the nature of the commandment of education, and the implication of Kehillot Yaakov

The lecture presents a dispute over whether education is a rabbinic commandment on the minor to fulfill commandments (Tosafot, by analogy to the “dedication of the altar” as the beginning of activity), or an obligation on the father to educate the child and accustom him in preparation for adulthood (Rashi). The lecture brings Kehillot Yaakov, who argues that even according to Tosafot there is also a commandment on the father, and offers an explanation that the responsibility is placed on the father because the minor lacks sufficient understanding and responsibility to ensure fulfillment of the obligation incumbent upon him. The lecture emphasizes that even if there is an obligation on the father according to Tosafot, it is defined as ensuring that the minor fulfills his present rabbinic obligation, and not as preparation for a future life of commandments, as emerges from Rashi’s conception.

The age of education: flexibility, physical ability, and understanding

The lecture states that the accepted view is that the age of education is not uniform, but depends on the child and on the commandment, and is measured according to two parameters: physical suitability for fulfilling the commandment and understanding. The lecture cites the Talmud at the beginning of Chagigah, about a minor who cannot walk and is therefore not obligated in pilgrimage / appearing, as a model for a physical determination of the age of education, and gives the example of “a minor who cannot keep a clean body.” It also compares this to gentiles through a responsum of the Rosh and the Chatam Sofer, that their obligation begins “from the time he understands” and that “fixed measures were not given to gentiles,” and sharpens the point that among Jews, age thirteen is only a rabbinic presumption for two pubic hairs, while the actual measure of adulthood is “two pubic hairs,” attributed to “measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.”

Education on Yom Kippur: fasting for hours, boys and girls, and Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah

The lecture stresses that in the sugya of “we educate for hours” on pages 81–82, the gradation is determined according to physical ability and not according to understanding, because there is no difference in understanding between fasting for hours and fasting a full day. The lecture addresses the distinction between boys and girls and notes that Maimonides, in his commentary on the Mishnah, explains this as a physical-biological difference of earlier development and ability in girls. The lecture notes that Maimonides is troubled by the possibility of reading this as a difference in understanding, and prefers to interpret the distinction physically.

The Ritva, Queen Heleni, and the requirement of “according to Jewish law” in the law of education

The lecture brings the Ritva’s inference in the sugya of Queen Heleni in Sukkah: the question raised about a sukkah over twenty cubits teaches that education requires fulfillment of a commandment in a valid way, and therefore one does not give a disqualified lulav to a minor under the law of education. The lecture suggests that this explanation fits very well with Tosafot’s conception that education is an obligation on the minor to fulfill commandments, and therefore the halakhic definition of the commandment must be met, whereas according to Rashi one might have thought that sometimes didactic tools are enough, though even according to Rashi one could still argue that one must educate “properly” and not with “exercises.” The lecture sharpens the point that this creates a difficulty regarding fasting for hours, which appears to be an incomplete fulfillment of the commandment.

Resolving the difficulty of fasting for hours: “there’s no choice” or “part of the commandment”

The lecture proposes two main ways to understand why education through fasting for hours is possible even though it does not complete the day. One possibility is that on Yom Kippur it is not practically possible to educate in the proper full way, because a minor cannot fast an entire day, and therefore a unique educational framework was instituted, dealt with in especially detailed fashion in this sugya. A second possibility is that fasting for hours is not a “commandment done improperly,” but a full fulfillment of the commandment for part of the time, unlike a disqualified lulav, where the act counts for nothing. The lecture links this to the question whether the commandment of affliction applies “at every single moment” or “over the entire day,” and notes that if it is a commandment for every moment, it is more reasonable to speak of education through fulfilling certain moments.

The Turei Even: intention in a minor, disqualification rooted in minority, and additional examples

The lecture brings the Turei Even’s question in Chagigah: according to the view that commandments require intention, how can a minor’s commandments be “commandments” if a minor lacks understanding and cannot intend properly? The Turei Even innovates that when the deficiency in fulfilling the commandment stems from the very fact of the child’s minority, this is not a flaw in education, unlike an external disqualification such as a disqualified lulav. The lecture reinforces this with the story of the Avnei Nezer regarding kiddush on Yom Kippur, and with the example of transferring ownership of the four species to a minor in relation to the law of “for yourselves,” where the ownership deficiency is attributed to minority and therefore the educational value remains as preparation for adulthood.

Tzitzit made for their own sake, spinning by a minor, and the meaning of the distinction between a minority-based disqualification and an object-based disqualification

The lecture presents a dispute in the Mishnah Berurah over whether a minor can spin tzitzit for himself when they must be made “for their own sake” and a minor is not fit for such intention, and examines whether that minority would still allow him to wear halakhically invalid tzitzit in the framework of education. The lecture emphasizes that according to the view that the purpose of education is habituation for the future, there is room to permit this, because when he performs the same act as an adult he will fulfill his obligation, but according to the view that education requires present fulfillment according to Jewish law, this does not work—especially since here the invalidity can easily be avoided by having an adult do the spinning. The lecture uses this to distinguish between situations where there is no way out except to forgo an element rooted in minority, and situations where one can already fulfill the commandment properly in childhood.

Eating on Yom Kippur: Rashi, the Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah, and the distinction between a father and others

The lecture notes that the Magen Avraham prohibits actively feeding food to a minor on Yom Kippur, and points out that Rashi on 82a implies that “we do not afflict them” means that one is not commanded to separate them if they eat, but handing it to them directly remains prohibited. The lecture quotes Mishnah Berurah 616:5 and Sha’ar HaTziyun, who cast doubt on this regarding a minor on whom there is no prohibition at all, and suggest that the prohibition of active feeding applies only where there is a “full prohibition,” such as an eleven-year-old girl or a twelve-year-old boy who must fast and complete the day, but not in the case of a minor for whom there is no prohibition at all. The lecture adds the reasoning that when the duty is the commandment of education incumbent on the father, perhaps others are permitted to feed the child even initially because they are not subject to the obligation of education, and cites Rabbeinu Manoach, who distinguishes between education through completing the fast, which is “the essence of the prohibition,” and education through fasting for hours, which is “just a commandment upon the father.”

Rabbeinu Manoach: two laws of education on Yom Kippur and the connection to Tosafot

The lecture presents Rabbeinu Manoach as proposing a two-track distinction: minors who complete the fast are subject to the laws of education in the sense of an obligation on the child himself, whereas education for hours is defined as an obligation on the father merely to accustom the child. The lecture uses this to explain how one can speak of fasting for hours even according to Tosafot’s conception, because the child’s own obligation begins only where he is capable of completing the fast. The lecture emphasizes that this move assumes two independent laws—a Rashi-type law of habituation for the future and a Tosafot-type law of current obligation—and concludes that this does not fit with the explanation proposed in Kehillot Yaakov, that the father’s obligation according to Tosafot is only responsibility to ensure the child’s fulfillment of his obligation.

The scope of the prohibition of active feeding: eating versus all prohibitions, the Sabbath, and “so that your son and your daughter may rest”

The lecture responds to the claim that the prohibition of active feeding applies only to food and notes that the accepted view is that it applies to all prohibitions, bringing the example from Sabbath 121, “a minor who comes to extinguish,” and the derivation in Yevamot 114, which includes a priest’s impurity as a non-eating example. The lecture brings the Rashba’s innovation at the beginning of “Mi Shehechshikh,” that on the Sabbath there is a special law of “so that your son and your daughter may rest,” requiring the rest of the child, and remarks that this is hardly brought by the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) besides the Rashba and the Magen Avraham in his name. The lecture develops from this a principled question of how to treat explicit verses that in practice are not really “recognized” in Jewish law, and brings examples such as the Minchat Chinukh regarding “do not place a stumbling block” and the Yad Ramah in Bava Batra, which connects damage to “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.”

Saving life, muktzeh, and proof from Avodah Zarah: “a woman rinses one hand”

The lecture brings halakhic authorities (Rabbeinu Yerucham, the Ran, Minchat Chinukh) who explain the permission to feed minors on Yom Kippur through concern for danger, and presents a practical implication: if the permission is only because of saving life, then after the child has already eaten and there is no danger, further feeding by hand would be prohibited if there is a prohibition of active feeding. The lecture rejects the claim that the food would be muktzeh, and explains that muktzeh is not determined according to one specific person so long as the rest of the household can use it. The lecture brings proof from the Talmud in Avodah Zarah in our context that “a woman rinses one hand in water and gives bread to a child, and she need not be concerned,” where it appears that the concern is the washing and not the feeding itself; from this it emerges that the Talmud does not assume an absolute prohibition of active feeding in feeding minors on Yom Kippur.

Object prohibition / person prohibition, positive commandment / prohibition, and sukkah as a model for understanding active feeding

The lecture presents a distinction between object-based prohibitions and person-based prohibitions, and argues that some later authorities limit active feeding by hand to object-based prohibitions, bringing sukkah as an example where the prohibition depends on time and place, so one can understand that there is no prohibited object in the food itself. The lecture also notes the Magen Avraham’s view that perhaps there is no prohibition of active feeding in relation to a positive commandment, only in relation to a prohibition, and brings Divrei Yechezkel, who suggests that if the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, then perhaps the prohibition is drawn after the positive commandment and is more lenient regarding active feeding. This lays the groundwork for the question whether eating on Yom Kippur is an object prohibition or primarily a personal obligation “to afflict oneself” as a person-based commandment, and the matter is left open for the continuation of the discussion on eating prohibitions.

Minors and the other afflictions: the baraita on 78b and their well-being

The lecture brings the baraita on 78b: “Children are permitted in all of them except wearing sandals,” and analyzes the reasoning of the Talmud that this distinction depends on the question of what would be considered an act of an adult “today” and what can be attributed to “from yesterday.” The lecture quotes Rashi, who explains that in the sense of asking about initial permission there is no permission to wash, but the Talmud rejects this and explains that the rabbis did not decree in matters that are “for their comfort,” whereas wearing sandals is not such a need. The lecture notes that understanding the sugya depends on one’s position regarding the prohibition of active feeding on Yom Kippur and on whether the issue is mainly education or also active feeding, and emphasizes that regarding the afflictions there are additional grounds for leniency because some views hold that they are rabbinic or only a positive commandment, and therefore it also depends on the dispute between Maimonides and the Rashba whether there is active feeding with rabbinic prohibitions.

Opening the topic of prohibitions of eating: the uniqueness of Yom Kippur and the route through leaven and sourdough

The lecture opens an introduction to prohibitions of eating in order to place eating and drinking on Yom Kippur within the general framework, and argues that eating on Yom Kippur is not a “standard” eating prohibition and may not be defined as an object prohibition. The lecture chooses to begin דווקא with leaven because it is time-dependent and has characteristics similar to Yom Kippur, and brings the Mishnah at the beginning of Beitzah: “sourdough in the measure of an olive-bulk and leaven in the measure of a large date” (according to Beit Shammai), and the parallel to the measure of a large date on Yom Kippur. The lecture presents the uniqueness of leaven in that the Torah links it to sourdough in the verses, and brings the Tosefta in Beitzah, which defines sourdough as “that which causes others to leaven” and says that its time is “from when it becomes unfit to feed to a dog,” and asks how there can be a prohibition of eating in something not fit even for a dog.

Beitzah: Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, “its leavening is severe,” and “fit for eating”

The lecture brings the Talmud in Beitzah, which explains Beit Shammai through the extra mention of sourdough, teaching that “the measure of this is not like the measure of that,” and explains that the stringency of sourdough is that “its leavening is severe,” and therefore its measure is an olive-bulk, while leaven’s measure is a large date. The lecture emphasizes that the Talmud itself also raises the axis of “fit for eating” in Beit Hillel’s argument in the tzerikhta: had only leaven been written, we would have said sourdough is permitted because it is unfit for eating, and therefore both were needed. The lecture sharpens that this is especially difficult for Beit Shammai, who maintain that they would have prohibited sourdough even without a verse, and raises a fundamental question why the Torah here prohibits something unfit for eating when elsewhere there is no such prohibition.

Maimonides in the laws of leaven and matzah: “the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one causes leavening are one and the same”

The lecture quotes Maimonides at the beginning of the laws of leaven and matzah, where he defines the prohibition of leaven as carrying karet for eating an olive-bulk, a prohibition of benefit from “leaven may not be eaten,” and that one violates “it may not be seen” and “it may not be found” by leaving leaven in one’s domain. The lecture emphasizes Maimonides’ wording: “the prohibition of the leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one causes leavening are one and the same,” and suggests that this is a response to the difficulty that sourdough itself is not fit for eating, but is defined as part of the same prohibition because it causes others to become leavened. The lecture compares this to a conceptual structure in Maimonides’ laws of the Sabbath regarding preparing dye as a derivative of dyeing, as a way in which a preparatory action is included within the definition of the labor itself.

Conclusion of the lecture: Sanhedrin 6b, “justice and righteousness,” and compromise

The lecture closes with a quote from Sanhedrin 6b: “It was taught: Rabbi Natan said, this verse was a commonplace in the mouths of the expounders,” on the verse “And David administered justice and righteousness to all his people, and Yoav son of Tzeruyah was over the army,” together with the Talmud’s exposition on the connection between David’s justice and Yoav’s military power, and vice versa. The lecture brings the Talmud’s question, “But wherever there is justice there is no righteousness, and wherever there is righteousness there is no justice,” and its conclusion, “What is the justice that contains righteousness? You must say: this is compromise,” which identifies justice-righteousness with settlement through compromise. The lecture notes Rashi’s interpretation that David would vindicate the innocent and obligate the guilty, and if the guilty party was poor he would pay him out of his own house, and sets this against the Talmud’s conclusion that the passage is speaking about compromise and not private payment.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, today I want to begin—to continue—the topic of minors on Yom Kippur, and also begin—we have, I think, two more meetings besides today, right?—and begin the topic of the prohibitions of eating and drinking. And there too, as I’ve done until now, I want to give some kind of broader picture and place eating and drinking on Yom Kippur within that framework. Meaning: the prohibitions of eating and drinking in general, and within that to see where Yom Kippur fits. So I’ll start with the issue of minors. In the previous lecture we talked about the different laws that apply to minors. One law is education, which straightforwardly is rabbinic; we saw that in the Talmud in Sukkah. The second law is: if a minor eats carcasses, is the religious court commanded to separate him? And the halakhic ruling is that they are not commanded to separate him. And then there is the prohibition of actively feeding minors by hand, which according to most views is a Torah-level law; that’s a Talmud in Yevamot. And it doesn’t depend on the age of education, unlike the law of education itself—again, according to most views. Aside from the Rashba, who wants to argue that it does, and here and there there are some who want to argue that it does, but the accepted approach is that it doesn’t depend on the age of education, because it doesn’t really touch the question of what happens to the minor. The prohibition of feeding by hand, in the simple understanding, is a prohibition on the adult. If the adult actively feeds the minor by hand, then he himself has thereby violated a prohibition, so it doesn’t matter how old the minor is. It applies to the adult. Last time I started getting into the issue of education. I said there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot on the question whether the law of education is a rabbinic commandment on the minor to fulfill commandments, or whether it is a law on the father to make sure of this, to teach the child to fulfill commandments in preparation for becoming an adult. I said that these are two meanings of the concept of education. Either it’s like the dedication of the altar—the beginning of activity—which is Tosafot’s conception, saying that the obligation is on the minor. Or it is education in the sense we use the word today: to educate the child, meaning to teach him to fulfill commandments. That is, straightforwardly, Rashi’s conception. We saw Kehillot Yaakov, who says that even according to Tosafot it is clear that there is also a commandment on the father besides the commandment on the child himself. I suggested an explanation for that. I said that apparently it doesn’t look like there are two separate laws of education; there’s one. But it may be that because the commandment of education, according to Tosafot, is imposed on the minor, it is imposed on someone who doesn’t have the responsibility needed to make sure it is fulfilled. He lacks understanding. So the responsibility is therefore placed on the father. And that is the commandment of education on the father. In other words, the commandment of education on the father means making sure that the minor does what he is supposed to do. And if that’s really so, then it turns out that the second educational law in Tosafot’s view is not the same educational law as Rashi’s. The first one certainly isn’t, because it’s a law on the minor himself. But even the second law, which says that it is a law on the father regarding the minor—even that is not defined like Rashi’s conception of the law of education.

[Speaker B] How does all this split up in the first place? Why? The obligation is on the child, and the responsibility for the commandment is on the father.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How can you ask that—as if there wasn’t a previous lecture? Last lecture I went on about this at length. I said that when there is—like in the public setting of Hakhel—when there is some party who doesn’t have responsibility, or we can’t be sure that he will fulfill his obligation, sometimes the responsibility is imposed on someone else to ensure that the other person’s obligation gets fulfilled.

[Speaker D] So what nevertheless is the difference between Rashi and Tosafot even if we say it’s on the father?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I still think that’s not Rashi’s definition. Because Rashi’s definition means educating the child in the sense in which we speak about it today: teaching him, habituating him, so that he will perform commandments when he grows up. According to Tosafot, the law on the father means making sure that the minor is now fulfilling his present obligation. Not preparing him for his life as an adult. He has a rabbinic obligation right now to fulfill commandments, but he isn’t intellectually responsible, so the responsibility for ensuring that he now fulfills commandments is placed on the father. So it follows that the father’s role is not to teach him what to do when he grows up, but to be responsible for his current fulfillment of his present rabbinic obligation. Okay? So I mentioned that there are disputes about what the age of education is. There are those who want to say that there is some universal age here—people argue six, seven, or I don’t know exactly what. But the accepted view is that the age of education is something flexible, depending on the child, depending on the commandment; every commandment is judged on its own terms. Basically, you could say it depends on two parameters. So it depends on two parameters. One parameter is the child’s physical suitability. For example, the Talmud at the beginning of Chagigah talks about a minor who rides on his father’s shoulders not being obligated in Hakhel or in appearing on pilgrimage. Why? Because he cannot walk, and one has to ascend on pilgrimage. Since he cannot walk on his own, he is not obligated. In other words, the age of education there is defined by a physical parameter. That is: can he fulfill the commandment? Or a minor who cannot keep a clean body. There too they say: fine, that’s not yet the age of education. In contrast—

[Speaker C] What? A minor who can’t fast…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m heading toward fasting; in a moment we’ll see what happens with fasting. But right now this is the general introduction to education. The second parameter is of course the obvious one: understanding. Meaning, from the point when the child is capable in this area, when he understands what we’re talking about, when it makes sense to begin teaching him this matter—that is the age of education. Now of course this can differ from one commandment to another. Obviously, when you teach him Torah, what do you teach him? There are things he still can’t handle, and things he already can. With different commandments it depends on what he understands and what he doesn’t understand.

[Speaker B] But that’s not something subjective. If he can, then you’re obligated; if he can’t, then you’re not obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what’s the problem?

[Speaker B] What’s novel about that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whoever is obligated—that is, whoever has reached the age of education. What is the age of education? It depends on the circumstances. What’s the problem? From when is a gentile obligated in commandments?

[Speaker B] No, but you said that if, for example, he can’t fast—he has a problem with fasting—then he isn’t obligated to fast.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I haven’t said that yet; I haven’t talked about fasting yet. So far I’m just giving a general introduction. We’ll get to fasting in a moment. From when is a gentile obligated in commandments?

[Speaker B] A gentile? Right. He observes the seven Noahide commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From when does he observe them, or from when is he obligated to observe them?

[Speaker B] From when he understands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From when he understands. Right. There’s no fixed measure, right? In a responsum of the Rosh and also the Chatam Sofer they talk about this. Fixed measures were not given to gentiles. So they don’t have an olive-bulk, they don’t have a perutah’s worth, they don’t have—there are no fixed measures for gentiles. So where do we get thirteen from? Thirteen is only a rabbinic presumption; the actual measure is two pubic hairs.

[Speaker C] A presumption that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no derivation for it. No, no—the measure is two pubic hairs. Thirteen is only a rabbinic presumption that from age thirteen one has brought two pubic hairs. So the measure of adulthood—which is the measure of two pubic hairs, not the age of thirteen—for Jews is, say, a law given to Moses at Sinai, because “measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Among gentiles there are no measures. So from when is a gentile obligated? From when he understands. That’s what the Chatam Sofer writes, and it’s obvious. So there too you see there is no uniform age. You evaluate from when the child understands, and from then he is obligated. So again, the determination of the age of education, in the accepted understanding, is that it depends on the commandment and on the child—according to the circumstances. You said… And when you examine the two parameters—physical suitability and intellectual understanding or something like that. Now if I go into fasting: the sugya on pages 81–82, the sugya of “we educate for hours,” which I also mentioned last time, there it is pretty clear that the measure is determined not according to understanding but according to capability. Right? Because what is the difference between the understanding needed for fasting three hours, four hours, or a whole day? If you understand what Yom Kippur is, then you understand; if you don’t, then you don’t. Clearly the gradation we make there according to age is a gradation connected to physical capability, not to understanding. But beyond that—

[Speaker E] Wait, why? Because you see there’s a difference between boys and girls. And that is connected to understanding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Maimonides argues—look at Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah—he argues that there is a physical difference, that girls reach the ability to fast earlier. That’s what he says. On the contrary, he felt exactly the point you just raised.

[Speaker C] That people say girls understand earlier.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—maybe that’s also true, but Maimonides says that here, in this case, it is also a better or earlier physical capability.

[Speaker C] Because of biological development.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. You see it physically.

[Speaker C] Girls are stronger than boys at age twelve? In sixth grade you see that the girls are more…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe in terms of size, but… yes, the question is what sort of capability—endurance for fasting, maybe, I don’t know, I have no idea. And it’s not exactly physical strength. Fine. Anyway, it’s not so important, but Maimonides… when he says this he is troubled by exactly the difficulty you raised. But there’s another difficulty here. The Ritva, on the sugya in Sukkah with Queen Heleni that I mentioned last time, infers from there—after all, the Talmud proved there, it asked: how did Queen Heleni seat her children in a sukkah that was over twenty cubits high? There is a law of education, and okay, it’s rabbinic, doesn’t matter—but how could she seat them in an invalid sukkah? From here you see that under the law of education one does not fulfill the obligation if you do it in a way that invalidates the commandment. Because one might have said: what difference does it make? If I have to educate the child or accustom him to commandments, then I do it in whatever way I can, but what’s important are didactic methods and so on—he doesn’t need actually to fulfill the obligation. So why should I care whether the sukkah is valid or invalid? Since that’s so, why does the Talmud ask its question? What bothered the Talmud? The Ritva says: from here you see that the Talmud assumes that the law of education requires the minor to fulfill the commandment properly, exactly as an adult does. Therefore, for example, you cannot give an invalid lulav to a minor under the law of education. It has to be a valid lulav. Okay? Behind this, maybe one could connect it to the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot that we saw. If we understand that this is only to teach the minor so that he will know what to do when he grows up, then there is room to say: I teach him using an invalid lulav—what’s the problem? The main thing is that I teach him what one does: one takes a lulav. I can even explain to him why this lulav is invalid—look, it’s invalid because of this and that. When you grow up, take a valid lulav, but let me teach you what one does, how one waves it, when one waves it, and so on. Teaching him is just a didactic tool. So why do you need a valid lulav? But if you understand that this is a rabbinic obligation on the minor to fulfill commandments, then he has to fulfill the commandment as an adult fulfills it. True, he is obligated only rabbinically, but rabbinically he is obligated to perform the commandment as the commandment is defined for adults. So here it is very clear why the commandment has to be done properly. I’m not completely sure, though, because maybe even according to Rashi you have to educate him toward the commandment properly, because when you teach him, teach him how to do it correctly. Now true, in principle maybe you could explain to him: yes, this lulav is invalid for such-and-such reason, and when you grow up you’ll take another lulav. But no—at the end of the day, educate him properly. Don’t do all kinds of tricks and slap band-aids over gaps in the education; do the education properly. You can understand this definition even according to Rashi, whereas according to Tosafot it is required. According to Rashi, maybe one can say it; according to Tosafot, it is mandatory. Okay? But that raises a difficulty for us. What is fasting for hours? Fasting for hours is fasting not in the proper full way. So what sense does it make to educate when you are not doing the commandment properly? So this Ritva creates a difficulty for our sugya. The Bi’ur Halakhah brings him in the laws of lulav.

[Speaker D] Is that not connected to the question whether the commandment of affliction applies at every single moment, or whether it is a commandment of affliction for the whole day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that is connected. In a moment I’ll comment on that—it could be connected.

[Speaker E] And maybe from here you can see that in fact it is possible to accustom a child to parts of commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So seemingly that goes against the Ritva. Meaning, you are doing the commandment not properly. So here one could say one of two things. First, there could be room—I don’t know, I didn’t find anyone who says this, but I wouldn’t be surprised if someone does—to distinguish between an invalid sukkah or invalid lulav and other commandments. It could be—even lulav maybe not—in a case where the invalidity is not noticeable. If the invalidity is not noticeable, maybe one can do that with a minor. Where the invalidity is noticeable, then you say: with that, don’t educate him. Of course that would probably fit Rashi and not Tosafot. Because according to Tosafot, what difference does it make whether it’s noticeable or not? He has to fulfill the commandment properly. According to Rashi, where the purpose is educational, there is room for distinctions. Okay? So in a case where the education still has value even when the commandment is not properly fulfilled, or where it isn’t noticeable, or something like that, then fine. But on Yom Kippur that won’t help. It’s very noticeable. You fast three hours and not a whole day. There’s no way around that. One could say that on Yom Kippur there are several possibilities. One possibility is that on Yom Kippur you simply can’t. With lulav you can give a valid lulav; with sukkah you can put him in a valid sukkah. On Yom Kippur you can’t—he can’t fast a whole day. The assumption is that until age twelve or thirteen he cannot fast a whole day. So what are you supposed to do, not educate him about Yom Kippur? How will we educate him? So here, in this case, there is a special law of education that is not in the ideal full form. And not for nothing, unlike all other places where there is hardly any discussion of the law of education, the sugya here is more detailed than anywhere else. The sugya here is the most detailed sugya in the entire Talmud dealing with the law of education. Why? Because apparently this really is some special law on Yom Kippur, and they discuss it—so wait, what does apply, since you aren’t educating in the full proper way? So you see that there is some special enactment of education for Yom Kippur, probably because one can’t educate in the proper full way. That’s one possibility. A second possibility—

[Speaker E] In all the other cases he’s really, as it were, fulfilling the commandment. Its time has arrived too, yes. Here it’s education in the sense that you’re accustoming him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too it’s education, but there the education has to be done in a way that fulfills the commandment properly. Here the education can be done even in a partial way.

[Speaker E] Is there a difference here between Rashi and Tosafot according to their approaches in our case?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to both it’s difficult here. Obviously according to both it’s difficult, so you have to say something like this—maybe there’s no choice. That’s one possibility. A second possibility: when you do part of the fast, it’s not that you are doing the commandment improperly; you are simply doing part of the commandment. That’s not the same thing. When you take an invalid lulav or an invalid sukkah, then even what you do counts for nothing. When you fast three hours, what you are doing is a full commandment—it’s just that you are not doing it for the whole time. You are fully performing the commandment during part of the time; it’s not that you are performing the commandment improperly. That’s not the same thing. Okay? This can of course join what I said earlier: since they can’t, I waive the time element. Maybe I wouldn’t waive the quality of the commandment, but I waive the time. But it could also stand on its own. Okay? And this may depend on what Doron noted earlier—maybe it depends on how we understand the obligation of fasting on Yom Kippur, what we talked about one of the previous times, the question whether this is an obligation at every single moment or an obligation over the entire day. If it’s an obligation over the entire day, it’s harder to say this, although maybe still possible, I don’t know. But if it’s an obligation at every single moment, then I think it is more reasonable to say this. The moments you can, educate him for those; and the rest—fine, then he doesn’t…

[Speaker C] We talked about measures, that each child should fast as much as

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as he can.

[Speaker C] Right? And here it’s as if they say nine, ten…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s just the question why they fixed standards here, really. The Sages probably didn’t want you taking risks or something like that, so they established something standard. Okay? So that’s regarding this special kind of education that exists on Yom Kippur, where it isn’t according to the ideal full standard. There are several limitations on the obligation to educate in the proper full way, what the Ritva says. And this too may connect to things we talked about. For example, in Turei Even in Chagigah on page 6, he asks: according to the one who says commandments require intention, a minor’s commandments aren’t really commandments, because a minor lacks understanding and cannot intend. So how can one carry out the commandment of education properly at all, in any area, with minors? So he says—and this is a well-known innovation of the Turei Even—that anywhere the problem in the minor’s fulfillment of the commandment is created by his very minority—not that you’re giving him an invalid lulav; the invalidity is that of the lulav and has nothing to do with the child’s minority—that is forbidden. But where the problem is created because of the child’s minority, there is no problem. Why? According to Rashi this is very understandable, because all you want… I mentioned the story about the Avnei Nezer, right? With kiddush on Yom Kippur. His father asked him whether he had recited kiddush, and he said he had not. But why not—after all, you ate? So he said: because all that obligates me to recite kiddush is the law of education. The law of education is to accustom me so that I’ll know what to do when I’m an adult. When I’m an adult, I’ll fast, so I don’t need to know how to recite kiddush on Yom Kippur. So the same thing here: the minor cannot have intention when fulfilling a commandment, but he cannot have intention because of his minority. So what I tell him is: intend. His intention isn’t worth much because he isn’t intellectually responsible, but still—intend. When he repeats the same thing and does it as an adult, he’ll fulfill the obligation. So what’s the problem? The only reason he doesn’t fulfill the obligation now is his minority, but I have educated him very well in what to do when he becomes an adult. Exactly what he needs to do is what I told him, and when he is an adult that will indeed be good. There is another example of this, for instance in transfer of ownership—when the four species are transferred to a minor. After all, there is the law of “for yourselves,” so how does the minor fulfill the obligation with the four species? Again, same thing.

[Speaker C] He can acquire, but he can’t transfer ownership.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can acquire, yes. It depends—if another person grants it to him—and even that is a dispute whether it is Torah-level or rabbinic. But the simple assumption is that he doesn’t have Torah-level acquisition, and if he doesn’t have Torah-level acquisition, especially since in the Talmud there are cases where one can transfer ownership to him too, then it’s quite clear that this is only rabbinic. And there too they say the same thing as the Turei Even: since the only reason he does not acquire is because of his minority, when he does the same thing as an adult—they will transfer the four species to him and he will take them—he will fulfill the obligation. So there is no problem; it’s fine. Of course this is much more plausible according to Rashi, because if you want him actually to be fulfilling a commandment, he isn’t fulfilling it. Now of course, one can come and say, as I said about the Yom Kippur fast: since he cannot fulfill it as a minor, what do you want him to do? So here too, even according to Tosafot, who hold that there is a rabbinic obligation on the minor to fulfill commandments, what he cannot do, he cannot do. Let him fulfill it in the way he can, and if he cannot because of his minority, then he cannot—skip over that. The meaning is: the Torah did not command him to do something impossible. Such a thing cannot be. Okay? Not the Torah—the rabbis.

[Speaker E] Another point: does it make sense, then, to give him something that is not… what? According to what we’re saying now, would it make sense to give him an invalid lulav?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If what prevents it is his very minority—not that you’re giving him an invalid lulav because he’s a minor, because the invalidity of the lulav isn’t because you are a minor, but because the lulav itself is invalid.

[Speaker C] So what do I gain in that case from the habituation idea? Not just the fulfillment of the commandment or habituation—also for the fulfillment of the commandment I gain something.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: it works best according to Rashi, because according to Rashi it is exactly what you’d expect. You are habituating him, and when he does the same thing as an adult everything will be fine. But maybe even according to Tosafot you could say what I said about the Yom Kippur fast: since here the problem is his very minority, not like an invalid lulav, then you can’t assume the rabbis obligated him to do something that a minor cannot do. So what? How could you assume the rabbis—

[Speaker E] According to the view that intention is indispensable, then why give it to him at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: because they obligated him to do what he can, excluding obstacles that stem from his minority.

[Speaker E] A minor who knows how to wrap himself gets a tallit; if he knows how to take the lulav—so it sounds from there as though if I just want to accustom him, then I don’t really care whether he knows or doesn’t know; over time he’ll know more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—on the contrary. “Who knows”—only then do you… even when you teach someone, he has to understand.

[Speaker E] So that’s because of his minority; it’s not that the tzitzit are invalid. I give him the tallit already at age three—true, it keeps falling off and whatever, but there’s no invalidity in that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then put it back on him again—what’s the problem?

[Speaker E] The tallit is kosher, and as he gets older and older he’ll know more and more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the tzitzit isn’t invalid when you give it to him there; no problem even arises at all. What’s the problem with giving him tzitzit at age three?

[Speaker E] Because it says that only when a minor knows how to wrap himself do you give it to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Before that there’s no law of education. The question is why. If I say it’s because of his minority, then I don’t care at what age to give it to him.

[Speaker E] The tzitzit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, what does “because of his minority” have to do with it? Everybody agrees that before the age of education there is no law of education. It has nothing to do with “because of his minority.”

[Speaker E] Yes, but there you see that it’s not one fixed age.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I said that plainly the conception is that the age is a function of the commandment.

[Speaker E] Clearly. So there’s no such possibility that if I claim, for example, that intention is indispensable, then just as it doesn’t make sense to give a tallit to a child who doesn’t know how to wrap himself, so too it doesn’t make sense to give it to him if he doesn’t know how to have intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but then the conclusion would be not to give it to him at all, that’s it—not to give it to him and waive the intention. That’s what I’m saying. So that’s the difficulty. What I’m saying is either because there’s no choice, or because the approach is like Rashi—that it’s only practice for the future, and that future practice you do achieve. Okay. One of the implications, for example: there’s a dispute the Mishnah Berurah brings—can a minor spin tzitzit strings for himself? They have to be spun for the sake of the commandment, and a minor isn’t capable of that “for its sake”; he has no halakhic intent. Okay? Now, a minor spins tzitzit for himself and wears them. Since the tzitzit is invalid because it wasn’t spun for the sake of the commandment, he’s basically walking around with a four-cornered garment without tzitzit. Right? With invalid tzitzit. So there’s a dispute in the Mishnah Berurah whether, when the minor himself spun the tzitzit, he can go around with that tzitzit or not. Meaning, can one fulfill this commandment, this educational commandment, if…

[Speaker B] What? If you’re coming to educate him and to know what to do in the future, then it’s fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, if the issue is practice for the future, then what’s the problem? If he does the same thing when he grows up, everything will be fine. Right? But if you say he has to fulfill commandments properly, then this won’t work. Why? First, because the commandment isn’t being fulfilled properly, because in practice the tzitzit is invalid. Second, this isn’t even like Yom Kippur or like a minor lacking intention, because here an adult could spin it for him. An adult can spin the tzitzit for him—it’s not impossible. So why should I assume I exempt him from that? Let him take valid tzitzit that an adult spun and wear that. So here those conditions don’t apply. Therefore here it’s obvious there will be a dispute whether this is even possible. Not that everyone agrees it’s possible and they only dispute why. No. According to the view that the minor must fulfill commandments properly, you can’t do such a thing. Okay?

[Speaker E] But say it’s only because it isn’t noticeable, because if you say it’s nothing when a minor spins for himself, then it’s the same as if the garment has three corners and not four—there’s no difference at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is there no difference? That’s because of his minority, and this isn’t because of his minority. What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] No, there’s no difference if he spun the tzitzit himself. That too is because of his minority. You give him something that you spun.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I’m saying. So what didn’t I understand?

[Speaker E] If the fact that he spun it for himself—those who permit that—would they also permit invalid tzitzit? No, right? So why should the fact that he spun it for himself…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said because when he spins for himself, if he does that same thing as an adult—spins for himself and wears the tzitzit—it’ll be valid. The invalidity is only because of his minority, so even those who don’t allow it when the invalidity is because of his minority—they would allow it.

[Speaker E] Yes, but here there’s another possibility. When we say “because of his minority,” he has no other option.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t say that when the invalidity is because of his minority it’s because there’s no other option—quite the opposite.

[Speaker E] With intention there’s no other option.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here you have an option. No, but you’re mixing two reasons. When the invalidity is because of his minority, it’s not only because there’s no alternative. The fact that right now it’s invalid is just because of minority, and then I don’t care even if one could avoid it—so what? It’s still good education, everything’s fine, according to Rashi. Understand? And according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), according to Tosafot, that he has to fulfill the commandment properly, then who cares that it’s because of his minority—in practice the commandment isn’t proper. Here I said fine, but maybe it’s impossible. But in tzitzit it’s not true that it’s impossible, because in tzitzit an adult can spin it. There’s no necessity here, okay? Not like acquisition or intention or things like that, where there’s no way out: the person himself has to intend or has to acquire; nobody else can do that in his place. The Mishnah Berurah in section 616 writes—he discusses the Magen Avraham, who forbids directly feeding a minor on Yom Kippur. It’s forbidden to put food into a minor’s hand on Yom Kippur. Actually, by the way, that’s also what seems to emerge from Rashi. Rashi on page 82a: the Mishnah says, “we train them by hours,” “we do not afflict them,” minors, “we do not afflict them,” so Rashi says: meaning, we are not commanded to separate them from it. Why does he interpret it that way? “We do not afflict them”—that we are not commanded to separate them from it.

[Speaker C] Exactly, it implies in Rashi…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That “we do not afflict them” means that if they eat, you don’t have to stop them from it—“if a minor eats forbidden foods, the religious court is not commanded to separate him from it.” But to feed them directly—since we hold that if a minor eats forbidden foods the religious court is not commanded to separate him from it, therefore “we do not afflict them.” But to give it directly, that is forbidden even according to Jewish law. So Rashi implies that it’s forbidden to feed a minor on Yom Kippur. That’s what a number of halakhic decisors write, including the Magen Avraham, and the Mishnah Berurah brings him, section 616:5. What?

[Speaker C] It’s not so realistic. Why? What, the children will look for food on their own and eat?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Prepare it for them in advance, show them where it is. Again, if the child is very small and can’t do it, then it falls under danger to life, no problem. But if it’s in a case where it’s not danger to life? Show him, yes. There’s that boy and girl in the Talmudic text in Yevamot 114b—there was a synagogue key that got lost in the public domain, in Abaye’s place, and the advice the person got there—the sexton or whoever it was—was: send children to play in that area so they’ll find the key and bring it. As long as you don’t give it to them directly, it’s fine. So he brings the Magen Avraham, who says it’s forbidden to feed a minor on Yom Kippur, and says: “See also Chikrei Lev, section 108, who discusses this at length. And in my humble opinion”—this is the Sha’ar HaTziyun—“the Magen Avraham’s words are not compelling, for this applies only to a full prohibition, whether Torah-level or rabbinic, such as a girl of eleven or a boy of twelve, who at least rabbinically must fast and complete the fast. But not here, where for the minor there is no prohibition at all.” Someone who must fast, only not necessarily complete—there you are forbidden to give it to him directly. But one to whom this doesn’t apply at all—there is room to permit it.

[Speaker E] That’s by hours, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: “And on the contrary, he is certainly not obligated to feed him after three hours.”

[Speaker E] So even within the three hours? Maybe that would be the option, maybe that would be the distinction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Within the three hours, plainly it’s forbidden to feed him directly because of the law of education, regardless of the issue of direct feeding. The question is whether there would be a separate prohibition of direct feeding—which is a Torah prohibition—beyond the question of education. Why not?

[Speaker C] Within the three hours, it seems to me obvious there would be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He has no obligation to fast; there is only a law of education on him. Now the question is whether education is a law on the minor or a law on the father. Is it rabbinic or Torah-level? In rabbinic commandments—I just remembered, I think—in rabbinic commandments there’s a dispute between Maimonides and Rashba whether there is a prohibition of direct feeding.

[Speaker D] As long as you can say that it’s permitted to directly give him a prohibition because he has no obligation, since he’s a minor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Here the whole law is the law of education, so the law of education doesn’t address this age at all. Torah laws may address every age; it’s just that from age thirteen the child himself is responsible for his actions. Before that, the father is forbidden to feed him directly. But the whole law of education is a rabbinic innovation. So if they didn’t require it at all for a child under age six, who says I have a prohibition to feed him directly? So the prohibition of poultry with milk is not a good example, because poultry with milk is a rabbinic prohibition. Suppose I gave poultry with milk directly to a three-year-old, okay, then it depends on the question whether there is a prohibition of direct feeding to a minor regarding rabbinic prohibitions. Rabbinic—that’s a dispute between Maimonides and Rashba. But when I’m talking about the commandment, about the commandment of education for the minor, I am “feeding” him the commandment of education—I’m causing him to violate the commandment of education, okay? Here there is room to distinguish, because the commandment of education is defined from the outset only from the age of education. Below the age of education the commandment simply isn’t defined. It’s not that he’s exempt because he’s coerced or something. No—our Sages never instituted this commandment at all there. The question is whether regarding such a thing we would say there is a prohibition of direct feeding. I’m not sure at all. Okay? Torah prohibitions are defined for every age; it’s just that the minor is exempt, we don’t demand it of him. But if you feed it to him, it’s forbidden, because relative to him pork is still prohibited. But education is not a prohibition in itself; it’s a rabbinic enactment, and the Rabbis enacted it only from age six. So below age six, this isn’t like feeding him pork. So what’s the problem? Maybe. There’s room to discuss it. In any case, he says: “And it is evident that no prohibition applies to his eating; rather, only his father is commanded to educate him in commandments.” Again, Rashi’s approach. “And where there is no commandment of education, such as with others, perhaps there is likewise no prohibition of direct feeding.” Meaning, if others feed him directly—not the father—it may be that they are permitted to do so from the outset. Why? Because the child isn’t eating any prohibition at all. If the father fed him, then the father would violate the law of education, because the father has a commandment to educate. But if I’m someone else, and I put food into the child’s hand, what the child is eating is not prohibited, since from the child’s perspective there is no duty to fast; there is a duty on the father to make him fast. Okay? Therefore, when I give it to him, there is no duty on me to make him fast, so what’s the problem? Then direct feeding won’t apply here either. That is exactly the reasoning I said earlier. And then he says: “And I found a similar line of reasoning in Rabbenu Manoach, who distinguishes between the educational requirement of completing the fast, which is the prohibition itself, and education by hours, which is only a commandment on the father—see there at length.” This is a very interesting reasoning. Rabbenu Manoach on Maimonides—Frankel prints Rabbenu Manoach. So he wants to argue that there is a difference between minors who complete the fast, ages eleven and twelve, and minors who are trained by hours. Minors trained by hours—that is a law on the father. Minors who complete the fast—that is a law on the child. Okay? And I think this certainly fits the conception of the Kehillot Yaakov, because in the Kehillot Yaakov you see that there are these two laws of education, and you also see the implication we talked about earlier. What was the implication? I asked: how can fasting by hours work according to Tosafot? According to Tosafot, the commandment of education is an obligation on the child to fulfill the commandments. Right? It’s an educational law on the child himself. So the child himself isn’t fulfilling Yom Kippur if he fasts only three hours. So what’s the point? Either if he isn’t capable, then he shouldn’t fast at all; and if he is capable, let him fast the whole day. Why three hours? It’s like an invalid lulav, right? That was my question. So according to Rashi, it’s practice for when he grows up—that works. But according to Tosafot, he isn’t fulfilling the commandment. Okay? Rabbenu Manoach says: you’re absolutely right. Tosafot’s law of education, which addresses the child, applies only to a child who completes the whole day. Why? Because there indeed the meaning of education is that the minor himself fulfills the commandment, not that the father habituates him. Education by hours is a definition of the father’s duty to train his son to fulfill the commandment, and there you can play around, because it already depends on that; it does not have to be fully according to Jewish law. Okay? Therefore the practical difference would be, for example, an invalid lulav. Under the second law of education, I can give a child an invalid lulav. Suppose I don’t have a valid lulav to give the child, I only have an invalid one—is there any point in giving it to him at all? The claim is yes, even according to the Ritva yes; the Ritva says no. Why? If you don’t have a valid lulav, give him an invalid one. Why? The commandment the child himself has to perform he won’t fulfill—the lulav is invalid—but my duty to educate him is fulfilled here. The Ritva only claims that effective education includes both, and therefore when you educate, you have to do it properly. But if you can’t fulfill the law that rests on the child himself, then at least fulfill the law that rests on the father to train the child. Yes—according to Rabbenu Manoach there are these two laws, which is really like the Kehillot Yaakov in the Ritva: there are two laws of education. Okay? But even if it’s like the Kehillot Yaakov in the Ritva, notice that this is not what I suggested in the Kehillot Yaakov. Because I argued in the Kehillot Yaakov that if there are two laws, then the obligation on the father is not defined like Rashi. The obligation on the father is to make sure the child fulfills his obligation, not to habituate him in what to do when he grows up. That is not correct here. Because education by hours won’t help if the child isn’t fulfilling the commandment, so what did the father fulfill? The father’s whole role is to ensure that the child fulfills the commandment. And if when the child fasts three hours he in any case does not fulfill the commandment of affliction, then the father also hasn’t fulfilled his duty. Therefore it’s clear that Rabbenu Manoach and the Biur Halakhah assume that even if there are two laws—one on the father and one on the child—this is not what they mean. Rather, the two laws are Rashi’s law and Tosafot’s law. Rashi’s law is to train the child to know what to do when he grows up, and Tosafot’s law is a rabbinic obligation that the child himself fulfill commandments. And they are unrelated to one another. Not that the father has to ensure that the child fulfills commandments. No—the father has to educate him so that he knows what to do when he grows up, and the child is rabbinically obligated to fulfill commandments. These are two independent laws. Two laws of education. Okay? And that does not fit with the explanation I suggested in the Kehillot Yaakov.

[Speaker C] In the other commandments, do we have this phrase from the Mishnah, “so that they become accustomed to commandments,” or is that only here, by hours and that kind of thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are almost no discussions of the law of education in the Talmud. Almost none. It really comes up only indirectly, with Queen Helene. Yes, yes—education is hardly mentioned anywhere. There’s at the beginning of Chagigah, as I said there regarding appearing, but there too it’s not…

[Speaker D] In Sukkah, third chapter, I don’t remember if in the Mishnah or in a baraita, the one that says that women…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Women and minors are exempt from sukkah.” We brought that on 28, there—regarding which commandment says that the age of education depends on the commandment.

[Speaker D] I think it’s a baraita.

[Speaker E] The question is whether there’s some connection between the word “we educate” and the phrase “so that they become accustomed to commandments,” or whether that’s something unique to this case of hours?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That will depend on how you understand education. Yes, certainly.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, regarding the prohibition of direct feeding, why don’t we say that it applies only to foods—“do not feed them”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The accepted conception is that it applies to… there are disputes about this. Some wanted to argue that. I don’t remember all the views right now. The accepted approach is that it applies to all prohibitions. For example: “If a minor comes to extinguish, we do not say to him ‘extinguish’ or ‘do not extinguish,’” in the Talmud in Sabbath 121a. A minor comes to extinguish a fire on the Sabbath. I’m not allowed to tell him to extinguish it. A fire breaks out in the house—maybe I’ll tell a minor to extinguish it? I’m not allowed to tell him to extinguish it, and we also don’t say to him “don’t extinguish,” meaning you don’t have to stop him if he comes to extinguish. So the Talmud there asks… well, not the Talmud itself—the medieval authorities (Rishonim) ask. The medieval authorities ask there from the perspective of direct feeding to a minor and to a gentile… wait, with a gentile I think one even says it, and with a minor one does not. A minor—his resting is incumbent upon you, but with a gentile not. How does it go there? I don’t remember now; we’d have to look at the Talmud there. The medieval authorities, like Rashba for example, ask there: what about the law of direct feeding? How is it permitted to tell a minor to extinguish? I don’t remember in what context it’s permitted there; I don’t remember the Talmud now. There is, after all, the law of direct feeding. So they say it also applies to the prohibition of extinguishing, not only to foods, in the medieval authorities. And in the Talmud itself, about impurity… no, one of the three examples from which they learn it is defiling a priest—that’s explicit in the Talmud. In Yevamot 114 they bring three sources for the law of direct feeding. One is creeping creatures: “Do not eat them,” which is read as “Do not feed them.” So one is creeping creatures, one is impurity of a priest, and one is milk I think, or blood—I don’t remember which of the two. But impurity of a priest is an example that is not about eating. But it’s true there are some who want to claim it only for eating; I just don’t remember. The accepted conception is that it applies to everything. By the way, regarding the Sabbath, Rashba’s view, for example—this is a very interesting point, I once wrote about it. Regarding the Sabbath, Rashba asks… how does it go there? Because “his resting is incumbent upon you.” Rashba argues at the beginning of the chapter “One Who Was Overtaken by Darkness”—not on the Talmud there in “All Sacred Writings”—at the beginning of that chapter Rashba argues that on the Sabbath there is a special law: “so that your son and your daughter may rest,” meaning there is a law of your child’s resting. And then that means that direct feeding on the Sabbath—or on the Sabbath even beyond direct feeding—is forbidden; you even have to separate him, because his resting is incumbent upon you.

[Speaker C] Not because of education.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because of education and not because of direct feeding, but broader than that. Yes, broader. It’s a special law on the Sabbath, which is very strange, because the only one who mentions it is this Rashba. It doesn’t appear in the Talmudic passages, it doesn’t appear in any of the medieval authorities, at least as far as I know. The Magen Avraham brings it in one or two places in the name of Rashba, and that’s it. Nothing else. Seemingly it’s an explicit verse: “so that your son and your daughter may rest.” The resting of one’s animal—that’s a law with entire passages about it. The resting of one’s child—nothing. It’s not mentioned in the Talmud. Now the question is whether there is such a law. And Rashba argues yes; he learns it from the verse. But there’s no Talmudic source, only a verse. The question is whether a verse itself generates laws, or whether it always has to pass through the Talmud or through the Sages. Because among the medieval and later authorities besides Rashba, it seems that they simply do not recognize this prohibition at all. They ask there all kinds of difficulties that he resolves easily because there is a law of resting there, and resting on the Sabbath is a special law. And they discuss it from the angle of direct feeding—there is no direct feeding here, so why is it forbidden, and so on. Rashba says: what do you want? These are Sabbath laws. In Sabbath laws there is a special rule.

[Speaker C] But “so that he may rest”—that sounds like the reason for the verse, not the explicit command, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And how do they learn the resting of one’s animal? It’s the same verse.

[Speaker D] Oh, so that’s really a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The resting of one’s animal is a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker D] “You shall not do any work—you, and your son, and your daughter, and your servant…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And your maidservant, and your animal,” yes, it’s all the same verse. The resting of one’s animal. The resting of one’s utensils is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. But the resting of one’s animal is a Torah prohibition, not stoning. It’s not one of the categories of labor, but it is a Torah prohibition of the Sabbath. It’s a Torah prohibition of the Sabbath. Really it’s not even a prohibition—the resting of one’s animal is a positive commandment. But regarding his son, I once called this in one of the articles in Midah Tovah “verses left unread,” meaning commandments that are written explicitly in verses and yet are not recognized in Jewish law—there is no such law. Meaning, they are not brought in the halakhic works. It’s explicit in the verses. Why? Because the Sages didn’t deal with it, didn’t say it’s a commandment. And the question is how exactly to relate to this kind of thing. Well, there are the really absurd things, yes. The Minchat Chinukh wants to say, about “do not place a stumbling block,” that there is no prohibition against tripping a blind person physically in the road. What is prohibited is causing him to sin or giving him unfair advice. “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” The Minchat Chinukh says—in the verse itself it says, yes, causing a blind person to stumble physically in the road; the Sages derive from that that similarly it is forbidden to give unfair advice or to cause him to sin. He says only those things are prohibited; the plain meaning of the verse is not prohibited. That’s completely absurd, of course. It’s not… well. By the way, there are medieval authorities who say this explicitly. For example, the Yad Ramah wants to argue in the second chapter of Bava Batra, and the Kehillot Yaakov brings it, that there is a source for the prohibition of causing damage from “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” After all, that’s always the opening lesson in Bava Kamma: from where do we derive the prohibition of causing damage? So the Yad Ramah brings that the prohibition of causing damage is learned from “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” Why is it forbidden to place a stumbling block before him? Because it will cause him harm; it’s forbidden to cause damage. But here you clearly see that he understood the verse to be speaking about physically tripping a blind person, not about causing him to sin or giving him unfair advice. Well, of course you don’t need the Yad Ramah for that.

[Speaker C] So how can you feed minors on Yom Kippur if you say there is a prohibition of direct feeding?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the question—I already mentioned this. The Magen Avraham really claims that you can’t, and there are several halakhic decisors who say that you can’t, but most decisors claim that you can. The Ran says it, Rabbenu Manoach says it, other decisors say you can.

[Speaker E] According to that, the food would have to be muktzeh? What? According to that, the food would have to be muktzeh. The food muktzeh? Why muktzeh if you’re feeding the children?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if you can’t feed the children, it doesn’t matter. Since it has a use for children, it isn’t muktzeh. No, it doesn’t have to be that you yourself are allowed to feed them.

[Speaker E] If you can’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you can’t give it to them, then it’s muktzeh? No, because the children can eat it.

[Speaker E] Oh, because they can eat it, so for me it isn’t muktzeh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. In this house it has a use—what difference does it make whether it serves this person or that person? If it serves one person, is it muktzeh for someone else? That’s the Talmudic text about the poor. There is no muktzeh for the poor that isn’t muktzeh for the rich. Muktzeh is either muktzeh or it isn’t. There’s no such thing as muktzeh for one person and not for another. And if it has a use for the relevant person, then it isn’t muktzeh. Okay, so regarding direct feeding to minors: there is a Talmud in Avodah Zarah on page 2 in our tractate, that a woman washes one hand in water and gives bread to a baby and need not be concerned. Okay? Meaning, all that bothers the Talmud there is the prohibition of washing. The fact that she gives bread to the baby—plainly it seems that the Talmud is not bothered by direct feeding of food on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker C] Then say it’s below the age of education. No, but we said it’s the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Direct feeding has nothing to do with education.

[Speaker C] Direct feeding is from age zero; direct feeding applies at any age.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Talmud there brings Shammai in that context—Shammai the Elder, who didn’t want to feed, and they decreed against him that he should feed with both hands and not one hand. The woman washed one hand in water, yes, and there too from the context it sounds like the problem was the washing, not the feeding. Meaning, it seems the Talmud thinks it’s permitted to feed minors on Yom Kippur. I said that in Rashi it sounds, on page 82 on the Mishnah, that it is apparently forbidden, because he interprets the Mishnah that “we do not afflict them” means we do not prevent them from eating—that is, we do not separate them from prohibition—but it implies that to feed them directly is forbidden. But here in the Talmud plainly it seems permitted.

[Speaker E] Can there be a case where someone who doesn’t need to fast would still involve direct feeding? Say that again? I didn’t understand this principle—that even below the age…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A minor can also eat pork, so why is it forbidden for me to feed him pork?

[Speaker E] To whom?

[Speaker E] To the minor. Maybe really it’s forbidden for him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How is it forbidden for a minor to eat pork? Why? He’s a minor, he isn’t obligated in commandments. So when he grows up… when he grows up, yes—but right now he isn’t obligated in commandments. I’m talking Torah law now. He isn’t obligated in commandments. Only Torah law. I’m talking about Torah law, not the law of education; the law of education is something else. The question is whether he is obligated in commandments. He isn’t obligated in commandments. What’s the difference between this and pork? So there are Rabbenu Yerucham and the Ran and the Minchat Chinukh; all of them write that it is permitted to feed a minor directly. All of them explain that this is because of danger. Now here that’s a little forced, because all in all—let’s say at least I would leave that for cases where it’s clear to you there’s no danger. A child of twelve or eleven, when you know him, can fast; it’s not danger to life. So you can say maybe there are children for whom it is, and certainly in such a case feed him. But where do you get such a sweeping permission? Maybe because of the severity of danger to life, they made a uniform standard and didn’t want to get into risk calculations. Maybe. I don’t know. That’s how they explain it. They claim the only issue is danger to life. In other words, in principle there really is a prohibition of direct feeding; it’s only that here, because of danger to life, they permitted it. Okay?

[Speaker E] Eating in measured quantities, like they do for sick people?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, maybe, maybe yes.

[Speaker E] Suppose the minor eats outside the sukkah. Are you also going to say there: how is it permitted for you to feed him outside the sukkah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says it’s permitted?

[Speaker E] Obviously they feed him outside the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean “obviously”?

[Speaker C] And who says that it’s…

[Speaker E] And what kind of prohibition would that be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the view that one does feed him…

[Speaker E] And who says that that counts as directly feeding a prohibition? Because you’re used to that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says? That’s exactly where the debate will be.

[Speaker E] That the minor isn’t in the sukkah. Rather, maybe it’s an object-based prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] His eating outside the sukkah?

[Speaker E] Is it forbidden for him not to be in the sukkah? Maybe direct feeding of a prohibition in sukkah is object-based? So here there are several explanations in sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, that’s not certain. But there are several explanations. One explanation is that the commandment of sukkah is time-bound. Since it is time-bound, the law is person-based and not object-based, and on person-based laws there is no prohibition of direct feeding. The prohibition of direct feeding applies only to object-based prohibitions. Now, in sukkah, beyond the fact that it is time-bound—even if it weren’t time-bound—it is pretty clear that this is not an object-based prohibition, because there is no problem with the food itself that you are eating; the problem is only the place, that you are not eating it in the right place. So therefore here, regardless of time-dependence, it is not an object-based prohibition. A third explanation is that sukkah is a positive commandment, not a prohibition. And the Magen Avraham writes that for a positive commandment there is no prohibition of direct feeding, only for prohibitions.

[Speaker C] Only for prohibitions, or for…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore also on Yom Kippur, for example, the commandment to fast according to that would not be a problem, but the prohibition would. But as a result of this—and I mentioned this—Divrei Yechezkel wants to argue that if on Yom Kippur the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, then there will be no prohibition of direct feeding, because for a positive commandment there is no prohibition of direct feeding. And if the prohibition on Yom Kippur comes to support the positive commandment, like Nachmanides in Kiddushin regarding the parapet, what we saw, then the prohibition too is pulled along after the positive commandment, and consequently there will be no prohibition of direct feeding. That’s another answer for why it’s permitted to directly feed a minor on Yom Kippur. Okay?

[Speaker C] And if we say it’s only by object-based prohibitions, then fasting and Sabbath are not object-based prohibitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Plainly not. There is room to hesitate, but because it’s time-dependent maybe, something like that, there is room to say these are object-based prohibitions. There’s a common conception among later authorities that a prohibition dependent on time is a person-based prohibition. That’s true.

[Speaker C] But what is object-based about the prohibition of affliction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On Yom Kippur it’s an object of prohibition. The bread is an object of prohibition.

[Speaker C] But the commandment is to fast, so what does it have to do with the bread being an object of prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The commandment is to fast, and therefore the bread is an object of prohibition.

[Speaker C] I don’t know, I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that this idea—that “do not eat them” / “do not feed them” applies only to object-based prohibitions—is not agreed upon. There are later authorities who want to argue this. So you can tell them what I said before. Certainly, you can say this as I said about sukkah; you can say the same about Yom Kippur. Both because it’s time-dependent, making it a personal commandment, and because the definition of the commandment is to fast, not that the object is an object of prohibition, but that I must refrain from enjoyment. Fine, it’s not so simple. We’ll see this in food prohibitions. Plainly, in food prohibitions too I am forbidden to derive benefit from this prohibited object, but we’ll see more. So I brought the positive commandment point. Chelkat Yoav wants to argue that what allows feeding a minor directly is because fasting on Yom Kippur—and we already said this reasoning—the fast on Yom Kippur is an offshoot of atonement. You do it as infrastructure in order to gain atonement. And the minor doesn’t need atonement. He is not subject to atonement. He has no sins; he is not in the category of atonement; it doesn’t apply to him. So consequently, there is no point in afflicting him. Here it is clear that for education this is irrelevant. Because for education, the whole point is precisely because of his minority, so you have to train him that when he grows up he will fast, because then indeed he’ll also need it for atonement. But here we are talking about direct feeding, not education. Direct feeding concerns the essence of the prohibition, not training him for when he grows up. And the essence of the prohibition does not apply to him. And this is from the side of atonement. I mentioned this as one of the explanations for why women would be obligated on Yom Kippur even though it is a positive commandment dependent on time—if indeed, as “the Merciful One includes them,” what I brought from the Talmud in Berakhot 20, there is an explanation based on the content of the commandment itself, which also applies to women, then women are obligated even though it is time-bound. So I said there: what is the content? The content is either the fasting or the infrastructure for atonement, and women also need atonement, so women are obligated. So that same explanation that says why women are obligated also says why minors are exempt—because they do not need atonement. Okay? So that’s… In any case, according to Rabbenu Manoach, according to all those who speak about danger to life—Rabbenu Yerucham, the Minchat Chinukh, all those who speak about danger to life—it seems that there really is a prohibition of direct feeding even on Yom Kippur. Okay? It’s only that where there is danger to life, there’s no problem. Okay? But then of course you have to start discussing. Suppose the minor has already eaten, okay? There’s no danger to life now. Is it permitted now to give him more food? A second helping? He doesn’t need to fast; there’s no issue. He may eat; there’s nothing wrong with it, because his education is done—he completed his three hours and now he ate. Everything is fine. Now I come and want to give him another meal. That’s not danger to life now, right? Am I allowed? If there is a prohibition of direct feeding, then I’m forbidden. I can hint to him, “take from there, take from here,” but not give it to him. Okay? But if the entire permission is only because… yes—if the whole permission is only because of danger to life, but there remains a prohibition of direct feeding, then here I would be forbidden. If I say one of the explanations I gave earlier—that there is no prohibition of direct feeding at all with food on Yom Kippur—then I may, even though it’s not danger to life. Okay? These distinctions have practical consequences. Okay, one last point related here to minors—this is taking me too long—one last point speaks about the other afflictions. What happens with minors regarding the other afflictions? So the baraita on page 78b says: “Our Rabbis taught: infants are permitted in all of them except wearing shoes.”

[Speaker D] Where is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On 78b. “Permitted in all of them except wearing shoes.” Why is wearing shoes different? “Because people say: they did it for him.” The others too, people could say they did it for him. Fine. Meaning, why is wearing shoes different? Because with wearing shoes people will say the adult put them on him, therefore it’s forbidden. And the other afflictions not. The Talmud asks: what do you mean? The other afflictions too—if they see that he’s washed, they’ll say the adult washed him or… So it says: with washing and anointing, one can say they did it yesterday. And with shoes, the Talmud explains that no—it’s for today.

[Speaker E] So if the adult did put the shoes on him, would that count as direct feeding, Rabbi? What? If the adult really did give him the shoes, what’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Plainly it seems that you may not directly cause it to him. Yes. Only because of that reason? Right. “But it says permitted from the outset.” Yes: “infants are permitted in all of them except wearing shoes.” So what are they permitted in? Wait… what happened… I need to look there… The Talmud apparently assumes that this isn’t called “permitted,” but rather with shoes—since you can’t do it from yesterday—they’ll say you put them on him now. But with the other afflictions it was possible from yesterday. Since it was possible from yesterday, they’ll say he did it for him yesterday—he did this thing for the child. Okay? Then if we say, but he did it today, then it would be forbidden. Right? Since when you see it on the minor, you don’t know if the adult did it, and you won’t assume the adult did it because it could have been done yesterday. With shoes, you will assume the adult did it. Right? I think that’s the intention. Yes—“but it says permitted from the outset.” Rashi says that if he comes to ask for instruction, we say to him: feed him and wash him. “But then it’s clearly known that he did it today.” It implies that obviously you’re forbidden to do these things for them today. So why are they “permitted”? Why are they permitted to wash? Because there is no concern that people will say the adult did it—it could have been done yesterday, and we wouldn’t know. But if the adult now comes and asks me whether to wash the minor on Yom Kippur—certainly not. The Talmud asks: but it says “permitted from the outset”? The Talmud understands that “permitted from the outset” means that it is permitted from the outset for an adult to do it for the minor. Okay? So the Talmud says like this… where are we… in the Jerusalem Talmud? Yes: “Rather, those things that are not for their well-being, the Rabbis decreed against them; those things that are for their well-being, the Rabbis did not decree against them.” There are things the minor needs for his life, meaning for his functioning, whereas with… what?

[Speaker C] You’re saying that washing him is permitted from the outset.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t decree… it’s his vitality. The Rabbis did not decree where it’s needed—yes, where it’s needed for his vitality. But from here it sounds like the whole point is only because the Rabbis did not decree. What about direct feeding?

[Speaker C] Maybe that’s rabbinic. Isn’t direct feeding rabbinic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe they mean here education—that we ourselves should not do it, but only allow him? It’s a bit hard to understand the Talmud here. Maybe we only allowed it? No—directly, certainly it would be forbidden according to the views that there is such a prohibition, yes? But here the point is that from the perspective of education I should have stopped him. Fine—indeed I should have stopped him. But if one can attribute it to having been done yesterday and they won’t blame me for not preventing him, then it’s permitted. Okay? But they are not dealing here with direct feeding, which certainly would be forbidden according to the views that it is forbidden. But even according to the views that it is permitted—if the permission is because of danger to life on Yom Kippur—then regarding the other afflictions, that permission of danger to life is irrelevant, right? So what’s relevant? Washing and anointing are not danger to life. Okay? If you tell me there is no direct feeding at all on Yom Kippur, then with the afflictions too there isn’t; it makes no difference whether it’s danger to life or not. But if you tell me that in principle there is, and the entire permission is only danger to life, then that applies to eating and drinking, but not at all to the other afflictions. So the reading of the Talmud here—regarding whether this is about education… what is the law of direct feeding? Whether the Talmud is talking only about education or also about direct feeding depends on how we understand the prohibition of direct feeding on Yom Kippur: whether it exists and was only permitted because of danger to life, which doesn’t apply here, so here in principle it would be forbidden, and then it turns out that the whole discussion here is only about the law of education, not about direct feeding; or whether direct feeding was never prohibited at all on Yom Kippur, in which case there is no discussion here. We need to… It’s clear that, say, on Yom Kippur with the afflictions it’s easier… so what’s the reason? With the afflictions it’s easier… one second… with the afflictions it’s easier to permit direct feeding, first because the afflictions are at most positive commandments. Depends which affliction. Right, not “at most,” sorry. There is a view… we saw several views. There is a view that all the afflictions besides eating and drinking are rabbinic—when they say “the afflictions,” they mean besides eating and drinking. So there is a view that it is only rabbinic, there are views that it is a positive commandment, and there are views that it is also a prohibition. Meaning, there is no karet, but it is also a prohibition. Okay? According to the views that it is a positive commandment and a prohibition, then it’s like Yom Kippur itself, like eating and drinking. But according to the views that it is only a positive commandment, then here we join the question whether there is direct feeding with a positive commandment prohibition. And on Yom Kippur itself, with eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment; but with the afflictions it is only a positive commandment. If it is rabbinic, then it depends on the dispute between Rashba and Maimonides whether there is a prohibition of direct feeding by a rabbinic prohibition. So regarding the afflictions there are additional grounds to permit direct feeding, beyond what we discussed concerning Yom Kippur in general regarding eating and drinking. Okay? The afflictions are easier, or lighter—either rabbinic or only a positive commandment—and then there are further possibilities to explain why here there would be no prohibition of direct feeding.

[Speaker E] What’s the reason it’s forbidden to put shoes on him? Isn’t that direct feeding? What? That it’s forbidden to put shoes on him on Yom Kippur—isn’t that direct feeding? What other explanation would there be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because of education. Not putting them on him—meaning that you did not prevent him; even without your putting them on him, you also have to stop him because of the law of education. If there is no direct feeding on Yom Kippur, you have to read the Talmud that way. According to those medieval and later authorities who hold there is no prohibition of direct feeding at all on Yom Kippur—how do they read the Talmud here? It has to deal only with the plane of education, not the plane of direct feeding, because there is no direct feeding on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker E] What’s the difference between a sandal and all the rest of this? A sandal—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a sandal there’s a concern that people will put it on him, that they’ll say you put it on him.

[Speaker E] A sandal, and everything else, is… that’s part of his basic living.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. The opposite.

[Speaker E] Right, that’s the final answer, isn’t it? He can probably manage without a sandal. Right, people go barefoot on ordinary days too, ah yes, and therefore it’s forbidden…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore it’s forbidden… He can manage, and therefore it’s forbidden. Correct, yes, exactly. Okay.

[Speaker B] Is the same true of a pin, in the same category? What? Is the same true of the pin—is it the same category? Of what? That he also can… indeed, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that it’s a matter of saving a life, but it is his welfare—his ordinary well-being. “His welfare” isn’t saving a life; it means it’s for the child’s need, he needs it. He needs it in order to function. It’s like the expression about an animal’s ordinary way in the laws of one’s animal resting on the Sabbath, in the case of driving an animal. The Talmud talks there—not about driving an animal, but about one’s animal resting on the Sabbath. The Talmud says there that one’s animal resting on the Sabbath is defined when the animal does one of the primary categories or subcategories of prohibited labor. So what happens when the animal grazes grass? If an animal grazes grass on the Sabbath, I don’t have to stop it from doing that, right? And when it grazes grass it violates the prohibition of reaping. Who? When it

[Speaker B] grazes grass?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One’s animal resting on the Sabbath. “One’s animal resting on the Sabbath” means that when my animal does a primary or subcategory of labor, I have violated the prohibition of my animal resting on the Sabbath. If it did it

[Speaker C] by itself, that’s not because of you. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s its normal way. No, no—one’s animal resting on the Sabbath is specifically when the animal acts by itself.

[Speaker C] Something it itself is forbidden to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not forbidden to the animal; it’s forbidden to me that it should do it. Yes. It’s my resting, not its resting. My resting means that my animal should not do labors; it’s not the animal’s resting.

[Speaker C] But it shouldn’t do it for your sake. No, for its own sake it can do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No, wait—so that’s what the Talmud says: that is its ordinary way, the same reasoning. “Its ordinary way” means it eats this for itself, and that’s the Jewish law for the sake of its life-needs—how do we understand that? Does it mean it eats it for itself and not for me, or that it’s its initiative and not mine? There are possibilities here. But “its ordinary way” means it needs this for its functioning, for its life; it has nothing to do with me. So therefore—therefore—it’s not that this is life-saving. The point is, we came to say that “its ordinary way” does not mean saving a life. “That is its ordinary way” doesn’t mean that washing is life-saving, but it is part of its ordinary welfare. Meaning, a child is uncomfortable or whatever, so you need to wash him; that’s how he functions. This category—his ordinary functional needs—that’s called “its ordinary way.” It’s not necessarily for his life in the sense that without it it would be a matter of saving life.

[Speaker B] Is there some parameter of the law of education, that this “ordinary way” is so that he’ll get used in the future not to wash?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: wherever the Sages saw that this is “its ordinary way,” they did not decree. When he is actually obligated, then he is obligated. From age thirteen he is obligated. But when the rabbis come to obligate him on a rabbinic level, on that they did not make the decree.

[Speaker B] But from the law of education they do come and obligate them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Because if it were Torah-level—

[Speaker B] No, the law of education is rabbinic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, of course. That’s how I opened the lesson, and in the previous lesson too we talked about it. Of course the law of education is rabbinic. It’s a Talmudic passage in Tractate Sukkah; we saw it. Fine, that’s regarding these children. I’ll send you the file afterward; I’ve finished that topic. Now I want to start the issue of food prohibitions. I’ll begin with some general introduction to food prohibitions, the relationship between that and benefit and things like that, and afterward we’ll get into eating and drinking on Yom Kippur. Because eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, as already came up in the previous discussion too, is not a regular standard food prohibition; it’s something a bit different. Maybe it’s not an object-based prohibition at all—there was that kind of definition mentioned here earlier—we’ll see. So I’m going to present this דווקא through a discussion of the prohibition of eating leavened food, because the prohibition of eating leavened food contains elements that, in a certain sense, even have a bit of similarity to Yom Kippur. We’ll see that too—a bit of similarity to Yom Kippur. It’s also time-dependent, and it’s also not clear to what extent it really is a regular object-based prohibition; we’ll see that further on. And in fact there’s the Mishnah at the beginning of Beitzah: leavening agent in an olive’s bulk, and leavened food in a large date’s bulk. The meaning is that the measure for leavened food according to Beit Shammai is like the measure for Yom Kippur, a large date’s bulk. So there is some resemblance, from certain aspects, between leavened food and the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. These are not standard food prohibitions. So I want to discuss leavened food for a bit in order to give some background to the prohibitions of eating and drinking on Yom Kippur. Leavened food is a unique food prohibition. Yes, we know many food prohibitions in the Torah—fruit of the first three years, pork, creeping things, blood, forbidden fat—there are many food prohibitions. Leavened food is unique in several respects.

[Speaker B] It has to settle his mind—you need a measure that settles his mind. Not that you ate an olive’s bulk and there’s… that’s on Yom Kippur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with leavened food? On Yom Kippur, since the obligation is to fast, not a prohibition to eat, only a large date’s bulk breaks the fast. But if the prohibition is a food prohibition, then an olive’s bulk is eating. One of the things unusual about leavened food is that already in the Torah itself, in the Torah’s own verses, leavened food is linked to leavening agent: “Seven days you shall eat unleavened bread; however, on the first day you shall remove leavening agent from your houses, for whoever eats leavened food, that soul shall be cut off from Israel, from the first day until the seventh day.” Yes—leavening agent, leavened food—sort of synonymous terms. Right? Or in chapter 12 of Exodus, a few verses later: “For seven days no leavening agent shall be found in your houses, for whoever eats anything leavened, that soul shall be cut off from the congregation of Israel. Unleavened bread shall be eaten for seven days, and no leavened food shall be seen by you, nor shall any leavening agent be seen by you within all your borders.” What is leavening agent? So the Tosefta in Beitzah, chapter 1, says this: What is leavening agent? Something that causes others to ferment. Leavened food that became leavened through something else. From when is it called leavening agent? From when it becomes unfit even for feeding a dog. Meaning, leavening agent is this kind of leavened substance—like yeast—that you put into dough and it makes it rise, yes, ferment. And from when is this thing called leavening agent? In principle it’s leavened food. If you wait a long time it turns into leavening agent—it becomes very sour. Okay, and then it can also ferment other doughs. That’s how they made leavening agent: they simply took leavened dough and waited a long time until it fermented. Okay, from when does it stop being just plain leavened food and become leavening agent? From when it becomes unfit for a dog’s consumption. Because bread is leavened food, but bread is good food for people. Leavening agent is unfit not only for people but even for dogs. Now that is strange. How can there be a prohibition of eating on Passover something that isn’t fit even for a dog? In all the food prohibitions in the Torah, if the thing is not fit for human consumption, there is no Torah-level prohibition. If it’s not fit even for a dog, there isn’t even a rabbinic prohibition. There is no prohibition at all.

[Speaker C] Does the Torah actually say that it’s forbidden to eat leavening agent? It only says it’s forbidden that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but yes—the Torah mentions it together with leavened food, and the Sages do derive that there is also a prohibition of eating leavening agent. Yes.

[Speaker E] Meaning, they understand what the Sages say about the measures of leavening agent to mean not only keeping it around, but also eating it. What? What the Sages wanted to say—the measure for leavening agent is not only for leaving it there, but also for eating it. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how they understand it. But in the Torah—in the Torah itself—you really won’t find leavening agent in the context of eating, only in the context of “it shall not be seen.” The verses always speak so that leavened food goes in the direction of don’t eat it, while leavening agent is about “it shall not be seen” and “it shall not be found.” Sometimes leavened food too is in the context of “it shall not be seen,” but leavening agent always is. Why? Because people do not normally eat it. But there is also a prohibition of eating leavening agent just like leavened food, and it isn’t fit for eating. So this is very strange.

[Speaker B] For example the sciatic nerve, same thing—if it’s not edible…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to the sciatic nerve too. That’s a good point—we’ll get to the sciatic nerve as well. The sciatic nerve really is similar. So here there are various explanations: maybe it’s a special novelty of Scripture, and therefore even though it’s not fit for eating, Scripture itself forbade it—although it doesn’t exactly forbid it; it forbids it under “it shall not be seen” and not under eating—but maybe there’s an analogy or something like that. The Chazon Ish says this, Minchat Chinukh, Pri Megadim—various later authorities want to claim maybe this is a special innovation of the Torah. But even if it is a special innovation of the Torah, we still need to understand why. Why does the Torah innovate specifically here that even something not fit for eating is prohibited?

[Speaker B] So there’s a practical difference, sorry, between the fact that regarding the sciatic nerve it says “do not eat”—there’s an issue of eating. With leavening agent there is no concept of eating at all in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the Torah no—I said that. Leavened food appears in the context of eating. And the Sages derive that leavening agent and leavened food were both prohibited for eating. I said that in the Torah itself, no—it’s from the Sages. Apparently from the Torah’s equation of leavening agent and leavened food. Leavening agent and leavened food are the same thing. The words are interchangeable in the verses, leavening agent and leavened food. It looks as though they’re talking about the same thing; it doesn’t look at all like two concepts. They’re two names for the same concept.

[Speaker B] Except that they say one is edible and one isn’t edible…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Sages explain to you. But in the verses, when you read them, you’ll get the impression that leavening agent and leavened food are two synonymous words. So it seems to me that maybe one can find a basis for this in the Talmud in Beitzah. I copied pages here—maybe take them. We really won’t get very far today, but… look at the Mishnah and the Talmud in Beitzah—that’s the first source, right? Beit Shammai say: leavening agent in an olive’s bulk and leavened food in a large date’s bulk, and Beit Hillel say: both this and that are in an olive’s bulk. A dispute. The Jewish law follows Beit Hillel, of course, that both this and that are an olive’s bulk. The Talmud asks: what is Beit Shammai’s reason? Why do Beit Shammai say leavening agent in an olive’s bulk and leavened food in a large date’s bulk? Why ask specifically about Beit Shammai? Because the simple explanation is Beit Hillel: an olive’s bulk—food prohibitions in the Torah are prohibited in the amount of an olive’s bulk. Where do Beit Shammai invent this large-date measure from? “If so, let the Merciful One write only leavened food and there would be no need for leavening agent, and I would say: if leavened food, whose fermentation is not intense, is prohibited in an olive’s bulk, then leavening agent, whose fermentation is intense…” So why did the Merciful One write leavening agent? To tell you that the measure of this one is not like the measure of that one. Beit Shammai say: the prohibition on leavening agent is unnecessary. I would learn it by an a fortiori argument from leavened food. If even leavened food, whose fermentation is not intense, is prohibited and in an olive’s bulk, then leavening agent is certainly prohibited. So why did the Torah write leavening agent? To teach you that leavening agent really is prohibited in an olive’s bulk, but leavened food is in a large date’s bulk. Why not the reverse?

[Speaker E] It should have been exactly the opposite. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should it be the opposite?

[Speaker E] Because if leavening agent is prohibited, then obviously leavened food would be prohibited. Why? Because if something not fit to eat is prohibited… what do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud here is discussing it only in terms of the intensity of the fermentation.

[Speaker E] The intensity of the fermentation—that I understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you’re noting is a good point; it’s a good question on the Talmud. We’ll get to it in a moment. In the Talmud the a fortiori argument is made not because this one is edible and that one isn’t edible, but based on the intensity of the fermentation. The leavening agent is more sour than the leavened food, a sign that it is more prohibited—more concentrated prohibition, let’s call it that. Therefore its measure is already an olive’s bulk. Leavened food, which is a less concentrated prohibition, is in a large date’s bulk. So if there is redundancy here and we learn from it regarding the measures—that one is in an olive’s bulk and one in a large date’s bulk—the Talmud’s division is clear. Leavened food is in a large date’s bulk and leavening agent is in an olive’s bulk. Okay? The question Adi asked is an excellent question. The Talmud here completely ignores an axis that is much more important than intensity of fermentation: it’s not fit for eating at all, the leavening agent. What, before you even tell me that leavening agent is prohibited, you want to say it is even more severe than leavened food? How is it more severe than leavened food? It’s not fit for eating at all. So in a moment you’ll see later in the Talmud. And Beit Hillel say: both are needed. For if the Merciful One had written leavening agent, I would say it is because its fermentation is intense. But leavened food, whose fermentation is not intense, I would say no. Notice that at this stage they accept Beit Shammai’s mode of thought, that the degree of fermentation is the relevant axis that determines severity. Right? But then they continue: and if the Merciful One had written leavened food, it would be because it is fit to eat. But leavening agent, which is not fit to eat, I would say no. Therefore both are needed. Here suddenly the other side appears. In short, they say this: there is an ambivalent relationship between leavened food and leavening agent. There is a stringency in leavening agent and there is a leniency in leavening agent. The stringency in leavening agent is that its fermentation is intense, and the leniency in leavening agent is that it is not fit to eat. Since that’s so, the Torah needed to write both. Right? So now I have a difficulty with Beit Shammai and a difficulty with Beit Hillel. With Beit Shammai it’s really hard: how do you ignore the fact that leavening agent is not fit to eat? At least as a refutation of the a fortiori argument. Beit Hillel don’t ignore it. But still, after Beit Hillel make the “both are needed” argument, in the end the Torah still says that leavening agent and leavened food are both prohibited. Why? Here it’s not an objection, it’s a question. Against Beit Shammai it’s an objection, and against Beit Hillel it’s a question. Meaning, Beit Hillel say: why is leavening agent prohibited like leavened food? Because the Torah wrote it. Fine—once the Torah wrote it, it wrote it, it’s a scriptural decree, we understand. But why really? It’s worth thinking about: why? Everywhere else, something not fit to eat is not prohibited. Why regarding leavened food does the Torah prohibit it? Beit Shammai is much worse. Beit Shammai claim that if the Torah had not written leavening agent but only leavened food, I myself would have prohibited leavening agent. The Torah wouldn’t need to write it; it would be redundant. Therefore this one is in an olive’s bulk and that one in a large date’s bulk. How would you learn leavening agent? If it had written leavened food, then leavened food is because it is fit to eat; leavening agent I would never have thought to prohibit—it isn’t fit to eat.

[Speaker C] It’s not totally unfit. It’s like salt. Salt isn’t fit to eat by itself, but you put it in a cooked dish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing

[Speaker C] here—leavening agent isn’t fit to eat by itself. But if you eat leavening agent by itself? Yes, but maybe people don’t eat it by itself,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but they do put it into bread. So I’m asking: but if you eat now… I understand. It’s like a kind of spice. If you eat leavening agent by itself now—if you ate it as part of bread, then obviously yes, because you ate bread. And the fact that there is leavening agent in it doesn’t matter; it’s part of the bread. But if you didn’t use it that way, and instead you eat the leavening agent itself—then what if it is fit to make other doughs ferment? So what? Does it become

[Speaker C] some kind of food ingredient? So it’s a food ingredient. Meaning, like a spice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—but still—it isn’t fit to eat, so what about a food ingredient? Even a spice that isn’t fit to eat—if you eat it, you are exempt. A spice made from something prohibited, okay? And if you put it into gelatin, I don’t know, something like that. Fine? There are various views about gelatin, not important now. But suppose you put it into other materials—it’s a food ingredient in every sense; you use it in the food industry. If you eat gelatin by itself, that won’t be a prohibition.

[Speaker F] It seems to me that actually Beit Shammai also agree that this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Not suddenly—inside the bread, not exempt.

[Speaker E] I think that really is what Beit Shammai meant—that only if you put it into bread, not only if you eat…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leavening agent is prohibited by itself. Otherwise what does “leavening agent in an olive’s bulk” mean? Fine. “Leavening agent in an olive’s bulk” does not mean an olive’s bulk of leavening agent within bread. No, no. When you eat the leavening agent by itself, the measure is when you pass an olive’s bulk. When you eat bread that has leavening agent in it, that is in a large date’s bulk.

[Speaker E] If you put into bread an olive’s bulk of leavening agent and then the whole bread became prohibited, like let’s say—I don’t know—there’s here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the bread is prohibited regardless of the leavening agent. Bread is just plain leavened food. You don’t need the leavening agent in order to prohibit the bread. Here we’re talking about eating the leavening agent by itself.

[Speaker E] In order for the leavening agent to be prohibited it has to be inside bread. What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if the leavening agent is inside bread, then it’s bread. Exactly. That’s the prohibition of leavened food, not the prohibition of leavening agent. Maybe not? What do you mean maybe not? So how was the bread made? The bread was made by the leavened stuff in it, the leavening agent in it. Every leavened food is like that.

[Speaker E] I can say that if, for example, you take leavening agent from priestly produce and put it into bread—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else, because that is a problem of priestly produce.

[Speaker E] But in the end will it be bread or priestly produce?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying: there you can discuss it. Because there the bread itself is not priestly produce, but perhaps the leavening agent that causes it to stand or gives it its character makes the whole thing priestly produce—for purposes of priestly produce. But here the bread in and of itself is leavened food. You don’t need the leavening agent to prohibit the bread for you. Here the discussion is whether, if you eat bread that also contains leavening agent—every bread contains leavening agent—or whether you eat leavening agent, eat leavening agent by itself, then the measure is an olive’s bulk, not a large date’s bulk. Indeed, that’s the same thing. Not the normal way of eating? That’s what “not fit to eat” means. Something not consumed in its normal manner is generally called something not fit to eat. We’ll get to that too. So basically this is difficult both for Beit Shammai and for Beit Hillel—of course, for Beit Shammai much more so. Because Beit Shammai claim that even if there had been no verse prohibiting leavening agent, I would have prohibited it by logic. Leavened food is prohibited, so leavening agent is certainly prohibited. What—you would, by your own logic alone and without a verse, prohibit something not fit to eat? How? Beit Hillel have a verse as a source. There is still room to ask for the reason of the verse—why does the Torah here prohibit something not fit to eat when everywhere else the rule is not so? And why not learn from here a general principle for all other places as well? What’s the problem? Fine, but according to Beit Hillel there is a source; I just don’t understand—that’s a question, not an objection. According to Beit Shammai it’s an objection. How would you learn on your own, without the Torah, that leavening agent is prohibited?

[Speaker C] What’s the verse in the Torah that speaks about leavening agent? I read it before. “No leavened food shall be seen by you, nor shall any leavening agent be seen by you”—that’s one place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You shall remove leavening agent from your houses, for whoever eats leavened food shall be cut off.” Or “For seven days no leavening agent shall be found in your houses, for whoever eats anything leavened shall be cut off. Unleavened bread shall be eaten; no leavened food shall be seen by you and no leavening agent shall be seen by you.” Not in the context of eating—there’s no word “eat” there.

[Speaker B] Fine, you

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] keep repeating things we already discussed; we already talked about this. You asked it—you yourself asked it before. And what did I answer? That the Sages made an equation between them from the verses, even though in the verses leavening agent is not written in the context of eating. The Sages understood that both with leavening agent and with leavened food there is both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of “it shall not be seen.” Fine. Maimonides senses this point, because in the beginning of the laws of leavened food and unleavened bread—you have it there: “Anyone who eats an olive’s bulk of leavened food on Passover, from the beginning of the night of the fifteenth until the end of the twenty-first day, intentionally, is liable to excision, as it says: ‘For whoever eats leavened food shall be cut off.’ If unintentionally, he is liable to a sin-offering. Whether one eats, melts it, or drinks it.” Law 2: “Leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says: ‘Leavened food shall not be eaten’—it shall have no permitted form of eating. And one who leaves leavened food in his possession on Passover, even though he did not eat it, violates two prohibitions: ‘it shall not be seen’ and ‘it shall not be found.’ And the prohibition of leavened food and the prohibition of the leavening agent with which one causes fermentation are one and the same. Both the leavened food and the leavening agent are prohibited.” Okay? The same prohibition. It seems to me there is a hint here in Maimonides that he sensed the difficulty. Why does he add “with which one causes fermentation”? Why is that relevant? “The prohibition of leavened food and the prohibition of the leavening agent with which one causes fermentation are one and the same.” He is coming to explain why the prohibition of leavened food and the prohibition of leavening agent are the same thing. Why is leavening agent prohibited like leavened food? Because one causes fermentation with it, so it itself is also considered leavened food. I haven’t explained yet—I’m only saying that’s what Maimonides literally says first. Okay? Somewhat like what you wanted to say earlier.

[Speaker C] That’s not Beit Shammai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll see in a moment. No, we don’t rule like Beit Shammai, it doesn’t matter; but Maimonides is explaining here the reason of the verse. Why does the Torah prohibit leavening agent? Because from our standpoint leavening agent is leavened food, since one uses it to ferment, even though it is not fit to eat; but one uses it to ferment. What does that mean? There is a Maimonides in the laws of the Sabbath. Maimonides writes in chapter 9, law 11: “One who makes a dye has thereby performed a subcategory of dyeing.” Someone who prepares dye—not dyeing fabric or something with it, but preparing dye—that is a subcategory of dyeing, and he is liable to stoning or a sin-offering. Okay? The Raavad asks on that: “And I would not have thought that one is liable for dyeing until he dyes something in which the labor of dyeing is completed. But coloring water, which is not for its own sake”—preparing dye is basically coloring water, right? But dyeing means to take cloth or paper or whatever and dye it, not to prepare the dye. So here it really seems that according to Maimonides, the thing with which I use to dye—if I prepare it, I violate dyeing. That is called dyeing. It somewhat resembles the reasoning he says about leavening agent: since the leavening agent is what prepares the leavened food, the leavening agent itself is considered leavened food. Maimonides has things like this in other places too, especially in the laws of the Sabbath. There too, regarding laundering, I think—I’ll bring it. What? Stretching… as if…

[Speaker F] Maimonides explained that preparation of the thread—there’s a dispute whether stretching the thread, whether that’s on the garment or

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only preparation for sewing.

[Speaker F] Okay. He explained that it’s on the garment, and then it is found in the garment itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That Maimonides says because it is preparation for sewing. Okay. There are more; also in laundering, I think, he has a few—in whitening. In several places he says this. In any case, you can… this is a conceptual explanation. Meaning, you can tell me that leavening agent conceptually is called leavened food, because after all, one causes fermentation with it. Leavening agent really is very, very sour leavened food—that’s leavening agent. So you explained to me why leavening agent is called leavened food, but that isn’t the main question. I don’t care what it’s called; still, it is leavened food that is not fit to eat, so why prohibit it? From Maimonides’ explanation it seems that once I convince you that leavening agent is called leavened food, then you no longer need to be bothered by the fact that it isn’t fit to eat. What matters is what it is called. Okay? And that is an interesting question. Why? What is the idea here? Are there other cases that are not fit

[Speaker E] to eat where maybe they’re simply not called by that name? Meaning, if pork becomes unfit to eat, then it’s no longer pork; but here you still call it, even though

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it isn’t fit to eat, you still call it leavened food.

[Speaker E] If you go by the name…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is pork not food? No—if you took pork and then it spoiled and became unfit to eat, then it’s no longer pork. It has already left the category of pork; it lost its name. It’s not that it is pork that is unfit to eat and stays that way. Meaning, there is no such concept as leavening agent

[Speaker B] that is not fit to eat; leavening agent that is not fit to eat is leavened food. That’s an interesting point—I hadn’t thought of that. An interesting point; it’s a possible explanation. I hadn’t thought of it. A possible explanation—I hear it, we need to think more about it. I’ll offer another explanation, okay? The objection to Beit Shammai was even stronger according to what you’re saying. On the contrary—no, on the contrary, it makes the objection to Beit Shammai even stronger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—why? It actually answers it according to Beit Shammai. Why doesn’t it answer it according to Beit Shammai? Why not? According to Beit Shammai, since leavening agent is called leavened food because one uses it to ferment doughs, therefore it is prohibited. The fact that other things not fit to eat are not prohibited is because they are not pork or forbidden fat or…

[Speaker E] How did they know in advance—that is, without a verse in the Torah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] that it’s called leavened food?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it is called leavened food.

[Speaker E] What’s the problem that it—? Oh, even before the Torah they knew that it was called leavened food?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a logical inference, because it is called leavened food since it ferments other doughs.

[Speaker E] Without the Torah I know it is called leavened food.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah didn’t teach me the name of leavening agent. I know leavening agent is called leavened food because it ferments doughs. That’s logical reasoning. And that could be an explanation of Beit Shammai’s view. Fine.

[Speaker B] If leavening agent, after it becomes leavening agent, is considered not edible, you can’t say it is leavened food at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Yes. Since one uses it to ferment, it is called leavened food. Exactly—that’s what he is claiming. As opposed to pork, where if pork is not fit to eat, you can say it no longer bears the name pork. Pork is food; it’s meat that people eat. Once it spoils or isn’t fit to eat, then it isn’t pork. Fine? But leavening agent—even though it isn’t fit to eat—you can’t say that therefore it isn’t leavened food. It is unfit to eat because it is ultra-leavened. Because it is extremely sour leavened food. And the proof is that one uses it to ferment other doughs. That is what turns the other doughs sour. So how can you say that it itself is not leavened food? It is the father of all fermentation.

[Speaker C] Like you said: if the Torah explicitly prohibits something not fit to eat, that means it enters into the definition of the concept. Meaning, if the Torah were now to prohibit…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that would be according to Beit Hillel. But I’m claiming this even according to Beit Shammai. Because Beit Shammai argue that even without the Torah I would prohibit leavening agent. Therefore this is in Beit Shammai. This reasoning can explain it. According to Beit Hillel it’s just the reason for the verse. It could be that the verse prohibits it for other reasons. But it could also be an explanation of the verse. It just isn’t necessary there. For Beit Shammai it is a necessary explanation. Fine, I’ll stop here, because now I need to begin the topic in tractate Pesachim. Keep the pages with you and bring them next time.

[Speaker C] There’s no class on Thursday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s no class on Thursday because it’s a study day—it’s the Giving of the Torah study day. I’ll keep some pages here a bit in… yes.

[Speaker B] Maybe you wrote down my name.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because I wrote it down right away. Thanks. Page 6b at the bottom: “It was taught: Rabbi Natan said, ‘This verse was commonly found in the hands of the teachers in the study hall.’” I said this once, but I don’t know where it’s from, but it’s from the Talmud

[Speaker B] here in Sanhedrin. Rabbi Natan said: “This verse was commonly found in my hands—a difficult verse: ‘And David administered justice and righteousness to all his people, and Joab son of Zeruiah was over the army.’ What does one matter have to do with the other? Why did David administer justice and righteousness? Because Joab was over the army. Why was Joab over the army? Because David administered justice and righteousness to all his people. ‘And David administered justice and righteousness to all his people’—but surely every place where there is justice there is no righteousness, and where there is righteousness there is no justice? Rather, what is justice that contains righteousness? You must say: that is compromise.” And here Rashi says, basically: he judged the case, vindicated the one in the right and held liable the one in the wrong; if he saw that the liable party was poor, he paid for him out of his own house. That is justice and righteousness: justice for the one whose money was restored to him, and righteousness for the one to whom he gave from his own house. And the Talmud says not like that, but rather: “You must say: that is compromise.” What is compromise? Settlement. The settlement is both the justice and the righteousness.

Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 10

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Laws relating to minors: education, non-separation, and active feeding by hand

The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about the nature of the commandment of education, and the implication of Kehillot Yaakov

The age of education: flexibility, physical ability, and understanding

Education on Yom Kippur: fasting for hours, boys and girls, and Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah

The Ritva, Queen Heleni, and the requirement of “according to Jewish law” in the law of education

Resolving the difficulty of fasting for hours: “there’s no choice” or “part of the commandment”

The Turei Even: intention in a minor, disqualification rooted in minority, and additional examples

Tzitzit made for their own sake, spinning by a minor, and the meaning of the distinction between a minority-based disqualification and an object-based disqualification

Eating on Yom Kippur: Rashi, the Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah, and the distinction between a father and others

Rabbeinu Manoach: two laws of education on Yom Kippur and the connection to Tosafot

The scope of the prohibition of active feeding: eating versus all prohibitions, the Sabbath, and “so that your son and your daughter may rest”

Saving life, muktzeh, and proof from Avodah Zarah: “a woman rinses one hand”

Object prohibition / person prohibition, positive commandment / prohibition, and sukkah as a model for understanding active feeding

Minors and the other afflictions: the baraita on 78b and their well-being

Opening the topic of prohibitions of eating: the uniqueness of Yom Kippur and the route through leaven and sourdough

Beitzah: Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, “its leavening is severe,” and “fit for eating”

Maimonides in the laws of leaven and matzah: “the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one causes leavening are one and the same”

Conclusion of the lecture: Sanhedrin 6b, “justice and righteousness,” and compromise

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Laws relating to minors: education, non-separation, and active feeding by hand

The dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about the nature of the commandment of education, and the implication of Kehillot Yaakov

The age of education: flexibility, physical ability, and understanding

Education on Yom Kippur: fasting for hours, boys and girls, and Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah

The Ritva, Queen Heleni, and the requirement of “according to Jewish law” in the law of education

Resolving the difficulty of fasting for hours: “there’s no choice” or “part of the commandment”

The Turei Even: intention in a minor, disqualification rooted in minority, and additional examples

Tzitzit made for their own sake, spinning by a minor, and the meaning of the distinction between a minority-based disqualification and an object-based disqualification

Eating on Yom Kippur: Rashi, the Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah, and the distinction between a father and others

Rabbeinu Manoach: two laws of education on Yom Kippur and the connection to Tosafot

The scope of the prohibition of active feeding: eating versus all prohibitions, the Sabbath, and “so that your son and your daughter may rest”

Saving life, muktzeh, and proof from Avodah Zarah: “a woman rinses one hand”

Object prohibition / person prohibition, positive commandment / prohibition, and sukkah as a model for understanding active feeding

Minors and the other afflictions: the baraita on 78b and their well-being

Opening the topic of prohibitions of eating: the uniqueness of Yom Kippur and the route through leaven and sourdough

Beitzah: Beit Shammai, Beit Hillel, “its leavening is severe,” and “fit for eating”

Maimonides in the laws of leaven and matzah: “the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one causes leavening are one and the same”

Conclusion of the lecture: Sanhedrin 6b, “justice and righteousness,” and compromise

Full Transcript

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