The Arbitrariness of the Will in Leibowitz's Thought – Positivism and Pluralism

2006

Avi Sagi, in his article "Leibowitz: The Man Against His Thought"[1] criticizes Yeshayahu Leibowitz, stating emphatically that he was inconsistent with the conclusions that ought to emerge from his doctrine. It seems to me that this criticism, which also represents several other similar critiques of Leibowitz's thought, is based on a basic failure to understand his doctrine. Beyond that, in my opinion there is a typical failure in the analysis of positivist positions in general, and that is mainly what I wish to address in this article. For these reasons, the purpose of the present article is not to respond specifically to Sagi's remarks. His article will serve us as a clear typological representative of the approach that will be the subject of discussion.

The failure I shall describe here has deep roots in the cultural-philosophical development of the present century, which is only now beginning to leave its mark on contemporary Jewish thought as well, and I shall try to address this briefly in the third and final chapter of the article.

A. Sagi's Critique

In the article mentioned above, Sagi points out, and in my opinion rightly, the revolutionary character of Leibowitz's claim that Judaism is a normative system of values, and not a system of truth-claims about the world. Leibowitz, as a product of a positivist world of thought, refused to ground his faith and his service of God on a system of truth-claims about the world, since these necessarily include claims that cannot be established by the rigorous empirical standards of cognition demanded by positivism.[2]

For this reason, in Leibowitz the system of service of God is based on an evaluative decision by the individual, who decides to accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments. This is not the result of belief in revelation, or in some physical-historical event, but rather, as Leibowitz repeatedly emphasizes, an 'arbitrary' act of will.

The reasoning for this position, as Sagi describes it, is based on two parallel lines that may be schematically described as follows:

The first line of argument is based on the incommensurability of values, that is, on the lack of ability to decide rationally in a conflict between two different basic (= underived) values, owing to the absence of a common (evaluative) measure. From this situation Leibowitz infers (implicitly) that, in the absence of a rational way to decide, a person must decide 'arbitrarily' between those values.

The second argument is based on Hume's naturalistic fallacy, according to which one may not derive an ought from an is; alternatively, values cannot be grounded in facts alone. One must always add to the grounding argument an additional assumption that links the plane of facts with the plane of values. In the context of service of God and observance of commandments, this means that the very revelation at Mount Sinai cannot constitute a ground for the obligation, which is evaluative by its very nature, to accept the yoke of the commandments with which we were commanded there. To the factual plane, which deals for example with revelation, one must add the autonomous decision of the individual to accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments given in the revelation at Sinai. This is the addition that links the factual plane to the normative-evaluative plane. Here again there is an 'arbitrary' decision, since it rests neither on facts nor on rational argument.

From both these arguments it follows that a person standing at an evaluative crossroads must decide in a 'non-rational' manner (in positivist terms), or 'arbitrarily' in Leibowitz's terminology, which evaluative direction he chooses.

Later in his discussion, Sagi points out that Leibowitz inferred from the situation of conflict between values that, since he cannot persuade another to act 'correctly,' if one wishes to change another person's beliefs and mode of conduct, one must enter into a struggle with him (and even a violent struggle, in certain contexts and senses) in order to impose one's own values.

Sagi argues that Leibowitz's basic position should necessarily have given rise to a pluralistic stance (at least in the weak sense; see the explanation and references there). He goes on to argue that Leibowitz, being, as noted, an advocate of evaluative-cultural struggle, did not move in the direction required by his own doctrine. Sagi argues that Leibowitz erred on this point and sinned in inconsistency. If Leibowitz indeed assumes that a person's values have no justification and that choosing them is arbitrary, he cannot call for an evaluative-cultural struggle that presupposes the superiority of his own system of values over alternative systems.

Sagi further remarks that Leibowitz erred also in thinking that an evaluative decision cannot have any justification, since a justification need not be universal. An evaluative decision can be non-universal and yet not arbitrary. It may have personal-subjective justifications.

Sagi concludes by saying:

The conclusion, then, is that Leibowitz's conception allows and perhaps even requires a pluralistic worldview, at least what I called weak pluralism. Leibowitz refused to acknowledge these things even after they were presented to him. It is precisely the man who succeeded in applying to the Jewish realm the idea that religious-evaluative commitment is not based on truth-claims about the world, who recoiled from applying this idea to polemic within the Jewish world itself. In this he indirectly returned to the claim that Judaism, in the Orthodox interpretation, is based on truth-claims.

Sagi further argues that this contradiction arises anew in analyzing Leibowitz's conception of the shift in the question of the meaning of the religious world from the causal context to the question of meaning.

I shall not elaborate here on this argument of Sagi's, because in my opinion it is no more than a reformulation of the previous one from a different angle. His main point is that Leibowitz held that the Jewish-halakhic world can be understood only in terms of meaning, and not in terms of rational-causal grounding. A cultural world can be understood only from within itself and in its own terms, and not by means of any objective system, or any other system external to it.

This shift, Sagi argues, once again confirms the pluralistic stance that lies at the foundation of Leibowitzian thought, and his reason is:

For if the meaning of an activity is internal, there is no room for comparison and no common criterion can be set up by which to examine the value of other ethical systems… I do not see how Leibowitz can reject this position, which stands at the foundation of his evaluative conception.

At the conclusion of his article Sagi writes the following:

The rejection of the pluralistic stance is often based on the assumption that if you do not truly and wholeheartedly believe in your own evaluative world, then you are not committed to your values if you do not reject the world of the other. This position is by no means necessary. A person's fidelity to his values is not measured by the degree to which he negates the world of the other, but by the degree of his willingness to live his values consistently and to remain committed to them in difficult situations no less than in easy ones. Evaluative fidelity is connected to a person's disposition toward his values, and not necessarily to their cognitive superiority over other positions. This clear lesson emerges from Leibowitz's doctrine even if he did not explicitly admit it.

Thus far Sagi's critique.

Had Sagi argued that it is possible, at the principled level, to ground a stance of Jewish pluralism on the basis of Leibowitz's doctrine, I would have remained silent, although I do not agree even with that. But Sagi's claim is far sharper: he argues that Leibowitz erred in that he did not draw the pluralistic conclusions that necessarily follow from the premises of his doctrine. It seems to me that in this claim, concerning the necessary derivation of a pluralistic position from Leibowitzian premises, Sagi himself is plainly mistaken, as I shall try to show in the next chapter. As I said in the introduction, in my humble opinion this failure has far broader significance than any particular correction in understanding Leibowitz's doctrine, and I shall address this later.

B. Positivism and Pluralism

In Leibowitz's argument (according to Sagi's reconstruction, which seems reasonable on the principled level) there are two levels of discussion: first, he assumes an arbitrary choice of values. Second, despite this he assumes that there may be situations in which someone will wish to impose his arbitrary values on another. Hence, since the path of persuasion is not open to him, according to Leibowitz, who advocates the arbitrariness of evaluative choice, he finds himself forced to choose struggle (sometimes violent).

Sagi contests Leibowitz's intolerant conclusions, but it seems to me that the disagreement is not on the plane of the modes of struggle and the relation between systems of values, that is, not in the conclusion drawn from these two levels of discussion, but on the more basic plane. The disagreement is at the fundamental level at which Leibowitz determines that despite arbitrariness, there may be a situation in which a person will want to impose his values on another. In particular, Sagi contests what such a desire presupposes, namely the assumption that a person who advocates an alternative value system, contradicting mine, is mistaken in his way. As appears in the quotation at the end of the previous chapter, Sagi determines that a person's fidelity to his values is not necessarily derived from the negation of alternative systems of values.

A deeper examination of Leibowitz's positions, one that takes into account their distinctly positivist orientation, shows clearly that he seriously believed in the value system he chose, and even granted it a truth-value.[3] It is therefore clear that if someone chooses to adopt a contradictory value system, he should not expect a pluralistic attitude from a positivist like Leibowitz.

It seems that the focal point of the misunderstanding lies on the plane of the relation to the rationality of values, and to positivist rationality in general. More precisely, the focus of the discussion is the question of the meaning of the 'arbitrariness of the will' in Leibowitz's terminology.

My main claim is that when Leibowitz argues that no factual grounding for values is to be accepted, what in his language is called an 'arbitrary' choice, this does not mean that he has no confidence in them, or that they have no truth-value. He means only that they cannot be objectively justified, intellectually or empirically, and that they cannot be argued over or be the subject of persuasion.

From Sagi's interpretation of Leibowitz's doctrine it follows that a person's act of evaluative choice is nothing but arbitrary indeterminism. A person chooses his values just like that, exactly as a die 'chooses' to fall on one of its faces.

The distinction between an arbitrary act and an act of choice is well known, and I see no need to clarify it here.[4] Choice is an act of decision which indeed has no intellectual, or other, cause in the accepted senses of the concept ’cause'; that is, it is not deterministic. But on the other hand it is also clearly not arbitrary in the sense of sheer indeterminism. The result of such a decision is belief, in the full sense of the word, in the value system the person has chosen to adopt. Admittedly this choice has no rational justification, certainly not in positivist terms, but that does not mean that it is not true. I do not mean here 'truth' in the sense of correspondence to some state of affairs in the world, but rather a binding belief subject to the law of non-contradiction. A person's responsibility for the consequences and meaning of his moral choice, something Leibowitz himself often emphasizes, clearly presupposes that it is not arbitrary.

It is entirely clear that when Leibowitz speaks of an 'arbitrary' choice of values, he means to deny grounding them on a factual-empirical basis, or on an intellectual-rational adjudication between contradictory (incommensurable) values, that is, to deny the possibility of positivist justification. But this does not mean that they do not in themselves have the meaning of truth. His position holds that there is neither point nor possibility in arguing about values, but this does not mean that all of them together are right. As noted above, values too, according to Leibowitz, are subject to the law of non-contradiction.

A common distinction is drawn between conflicts of beliefs (BELIEFS), cognitive conflicts, and conflicts of desires (DESIRES), conative conflicts.[5] In cognitive conflicts, once a person forms a position he thereby rejects everything that contradicts it; in simple terms, there is no possibility of a genuine cognitive conflict. In conative conflicts, by contrast, one can desire two contradictory things at once. Williams already pointed out that a normative conflict, that is, a conflict between duties, resembles not a conative conflict but precisely a cognitive conflict.[6] Recognizing a certain duty as binding upon me negates the legitimacy of the contradictory duties.[7]

To be sure, these remarks primarily concern consistency within a person's own position; that is, if he takes upon himself as a duty to do X, he rejects not doing it (or doing not-X). I wish to argue that for Leibowitz this applies not only inwardly, to the individual himself, but also outwardly, toward others who hold such duties. A person who adopts a certain value system, according to Leibowitz, necessarily rejects another who holds a contradictory system. This is what I meant above when I said that Leibowitz grants truth-value to a person's evaluative ('arbitrary') choices.

In Leibowitz's book 'Faith, History, and Values'[8] there appears a lecture on tolerance (from 1979), where Leibowitz discusses the positions of the Radbaz and Maimonides on this issue. The main point is that according to the Radbaz one cannot punish a person if he acts on the basis of his best judgment, even if he denies a cardinal principle (in the view of R. Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin, cited there, such a person is considered coerced), whereas according to Maimonides precisely such a person should be punished severely. But according to all views it is clear, including to Leibowitz himself, that such a person is certainly mistaken. The dispute concerns only the degree of tolerance that should be adopted toward him. Leibowitz, characteristically, inclines in this issue as well toward the position of Maimonides.

According to Jewish law, clear and severe sanctions are imposed on idolaters, and on transgressors in general, and I do not see how one can propose a substantive pluralistic interpretation, even in the weak sense, of the Jewish-halakhic system. In any case, it is clear that Leibowitz himself certainly did not do so, and he says this explicitly in a number of places (see, for example, the long quotation I shall bring at the end of the article).[9]

Leibowitz argues that since one cannot persuade a person in rational discussion to change his values, all that remains is to fight him in order to impose upon him the 'correct' value system, namely Leibowitz's own. This seemingly puzzling position stems precisely from the fact that Leibowitz does indeed fully believe in the values he has chosen, and they are not arbitrary in his eyes. It therefore follows that alternative systems that contradict them are regarded by him as mistaken. It is true that according to Leibowitz one cannot persuade the other of his mistake, but that does not mean he is not mistaken.

We saw above the connection that exists between duties (values and norms) and cognition (not desire). There are also propositions in the cognitive world that have no 'rational' justification at all (in the positivist view), and yet they are regarded as correct in the eyes of the one who believes them, and their opposite is therefore regarded by him as mistaken. What is this comparable to? To a positivist who suddenly discovers that a certain concept, which in his eyes is well defined and understood by every rational person, is not successfully grasped by his interlocutor. In such a case he would have no choice but to fight that foolish individual until the latter understands what every rational person ought to understand. One cannot rationally persuade others concerning the meanings of self-evident basic terms, and therefore there is no choice but to struggle with one who does not accept them. Inability to persuade, especially for a positivist like Leibowitz, does not necessarily testify to a state of relative truth or justice.

Leibowitz's stubborn formulations about the 'arbitrariness of evaluative decision' are what cause the confusion in understanding his words (and the matter stands out very sharply in Dialogue A with Tony Lavie, which will be mentioned below). It is clear that Leibowitz does not mean an arbitrary decision in the indeterministic sense, for if that were so there would be no point at all in voicing his opinions and in the unceasing preaching and rebuke he addressed to those who disagreed with them. In his eyes, choosing the values of morality and justice is 'arbitrary' to precisely the same degree as choosing religious values, and consequently there would likewise be no point in persuading others, or preaching the need to realize them.

My main claim is that Leibowitz insists on 'arbitrariness' solely in order to exclude the view that such a decision is the result of rational, empirical, or intellectual deliberation. His aim is to emphasize that this is the free activity of the will, and that it does not depend at all on intellect, cognition, or thought. It is clear that according to Leibowitz the value system a person chooses by means of an act of will is absolute, and all systems that are not commensurable with it are mistaken (not right/moral/fitting).

I shall try to elaborate somewhat on the misunderstanding of the positivist position, because in my opinion it has broader importance than the present discussion. For the purposes of the discussion I shall define strict positivism, in broad outline, as the position that claims there is no point in dealing with propositions and concepts that cannot be defined and proven precisely. According to this position, every concept one uses must be clear and well defined, and every claim one makes must be capable of proof (or refutation).

It is clear that such an approach presupposes the existence of a system of atomic basic concepts, which themselves cannot be defined, and by means of which all other concepts will be defined. Likewise, at the basis of any such positivist thought there must be some basic propositions, axioms, which cannot be proven, and by means of which all derived claims are proven.

Since the positivist demands a strict and clear definition for every concept, and proof for every claim, one may ask him what grounding he proposes for his own basic propositions, and what definition he offers for his own basic concepts. Since no grounding or definition can be offered (in the positivist sense described above) for concepts and propositions at the atomic level, one might think that they are arbitrary.

It seems to me that the sharp transition that took place in the twentieth century from positivism, which dominated its first half, to postmodernism, which came after it, is based on an argument of this kind. Since a proposition is true only if it has strict proof, the axioms, which of course cannot be proven, are arbitrary. Consequently, every person or group may adopt axioms as they wish, and the only requirement they must meet is consistency with their assumptions. In such a process we arrive, as if by magic, from positivism, which seems so stringent in its demands concerning the concept of truth, directly to the nihilistic postmodern skepticism according to which there is no truth at all. The result is that each group has its own narrative (and in our terms, its own fundamental system of assumptions and definitions). In my opinion this describes (schematically and simplistically, of course) a cultural-philosophical process that lay at the foundation of some of the central intellectual transformations of the twentieth century.

Here the obvious question arises: what did that positivist of the early-mid twentieth century think, and was he not aware of the relativity of his basic assumptions? How did those basic assumptions meet his stringent demands for justification by proof? It is clear that the positivist understood that there are propositions and concepts that are self-evident. They are not arbitrary, nor are they simply without grounding. It was clear to him that these are propositions or concepts that do not require grounding at all, because they are understood by every rational person. In other words: they are arbitrary (= not open to justification), but true (= their opposite is incompatible with them, and therefore mistaken).

Let us now consider what will happen when that same strict positivist defined above encounters another positivist, no less strict than himself, who has adopted a different system of basic assumptions, one that contradicts his own. By the stringent criteria accepted by both, according to which every claim requires proof, it is clear that neither will be able to persuade the other that he is mistaken. On the other hand, as noted above, each necessarily believes that he is the one who is right and that the other is, of course, mistaken. It is clear that in such a situation neither of them will have any choice but to go out and struggle against the other.

One should note that such a positivist believes in his system of basic assumptions with complete faith, and yet he is aware that they are accepted only by him and the members of his group, and not by the members of the rival group; he is also aware that he has no way of persuading them of his system. Is he required to conclude from this that each of these systems of assumptions has the same truth-value? Or alternatively: must he necessarily arrive at pluralism? Perhaps so, and then we would arrive at Sagi's position; but this cannot be said with certainty. It is entirely possible that such a positivist would continue to hold his position, and therefore continue to believe that his colleague is entirely mistaken, despite the fact that it is clear to him that he cannot rationally persuade his colleague of its correctness.

In fact, one may say that positivism and postmodernism share the assumption that a proposition is true only if it can be proven, and their positions differ over the question of whether such proofs can in fact be supplied. The positivist thought they could; the postmodernist thinks they cannot. Hence the former adheres emphatically to his rationalist position, whereas the latter gives up altogether on concepts of truth in their classical, absolute sense.

Thus far we have seen the positivist's situation as regards his cognitive world. His assumptions and basic concepts are self-evident matters that do not require 'rational' justification, and therefore their opposite will naturally be regarded as mistaken, despite the fact that they lack such justification.

Leibowitz's situation, as a positivist, in the world of values parallels his situation on the cognitive plane (as regards the truth-value that can be attributed to his propositions). Values are the postulates of the will, whose status in Leibowitz is entirely parallel to the status of the postulates of intellect and cognition.[10] As one who already lived in the postmodern era, he was well aware of the relativity of values and of the differences in the beliefs of different groups of people. But he was still a positivist, and as such he believed wholeheartedly in the value system he had adopted. He has no way to persuade his colleagues-opponents of its correctness, because, as Sagi wrote, it does not rest on any state of affairs in the world, nor on any rational proof whatsoever. Yet despite all this it is clear to him that they are mistaken, that is, that they act wrongly. It is true that his ideological opponents are not mistaken in their reading of reality, but their error nonetheless derives from the laws of logic, and especially from the law of non-contradiction. For example, if I truly believe that a Jew is obligated to decide in favor of accepting the yoke of the sovereignty of the God of Israel, I cannot accept the equal standing of alternative value systems that do not choose this.

For this reason Leibowitz determines that there is no way to prove (and for a positivist, that means there is also no way to persuade) the other of the correctness of the system I have adopted, and in his terminology: it is 'arbitrary.' But this does not mean that the other is not mistaken. According to Leibowitz he is certainly mistaken. It therefore follows that the only way to set him right is to fight him.[11]

Here, then, we have a position that decides in favor of a particular moral or religious world, does not ground it in factual-empirical reality, and yet is not pluralistic toward other positions. Contrary to Sagi's determination, there is no philosophical error here. This is precisely the position of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, and it is entirely consistent.

Sagi seeks to take Leibowitz's doctrine in the same way that the postmodernist takes his spiritual father (!), the positivist. The postmodernist argues that if indeed a truth-claim is only a claim that has a proof, as the positivist contends, then since at the basis of every proof stand basic assumptions, which of course cannot be proven, all systems of assumptions are equally valid, as the postmodernist claims.

In precisely the same way Sagi argues that if Leibowitz indeed cannot prove his evaluative positions, he must accept the equal standing of all value systems parallel to them, that is, he must advocate pluralism (or at least weak pluralism). Sagi's mistake lies in not grasping that Leibowitz examines the alternative positions as well from his own point of view, and sees nothing wrong with this. If he believes in a certain evaluative position, it is clear to him that the laws of logic apply to it, and therefore he is also obliged to reject its opposite, and also everyone who holds its opposite.

The concept of the incommensurability of values in Leibowitz's doctrine must likewise undergo a parallel transformation. According to Leibowitz, the incommensurability of values means that there is no 'rational' way, in the positivist sense, that is, no way of proof or empirical observation, to decide between values. But this does not mean that every evaluative dilemma is incommensurable in the substantive sense, namely that one cannot be convinced that one side is right and the other wrong. Although one cannot persuade someone else who disagrees with me, I can nonetheless certainly believe that he is mistaken, and in the same way I can also decide the evaluative dilemma before me. As explained above, the evaluative decision is not arbitrary (at least in the eyes of the one making the decision), but only not objectively justifiable and not open to persuasion.

My basic claim is that a person's awareness that he operates within the system of values and basic assumptions he has chosen does not contradict his ability to believe that parallel systems are mistaken. From within the Jewish-halakhic value system that Leibowitz adopted in what he calls an 'arbitrary' way (but of course not arbitrary in the substantive sense), Leibowitz determines that all other beliefs are a form of idolatry, and therefore mistaken and invalid. I see no inconsistency of any kind in this.

Sagi's claim that belief in a value system does not necessarily mean rejecting alternative systems that contradict it is likewise based on this same position. The identification he makes between Leibowitz's assertion that the value system lacks empirical-rational grounding, and the lack of truth-value of that system, or its non-subjection to the law of non-contradiction, is mistaken. Just as any cognitive system of axioms is not, in the positivist's eyes, open to rational grounding, and yet is true and its opposite mistaken.

Sagi himself apparently advocates the position according to which adopting a value system is an act of arbitrary choice whose result is not subject to the law of non-contradiction (at least outwardly, that is, with respect to the other). This is perhaps a possible position (though not a plausible one in my eyes), but it is clear that in Leibowitz's eyes this is not the case. Even if there is no rational-empirical grounding for an evaluative choice, the result of such a choice is certainly subject to the law of non-contradiction. In my humble opinion, if Sagi does not impose his own beliefs upon Leibowitz's doctrine, he will find no contradiction in Leibowitz's words.

C. Conclusions

Beyond defending Leibowitz's doctrine, which is important in itself, I wish to point here to a broader implication of the argument in the previous chapter. It seems to me that along the same path I followed in my interpretation of Leibowitz's doctrine, and as an alternative to Sagi's interpretation, one can also proceed in interpreting the positivist-postmodern crisis in general.

As noted above, the transition that occurred from the positivist position that dominated the first half of the twentieth century to the postmodernism of its second half occurred because of conclusions drawn regarding the status of basic assumptions. As I have tried to argue, this inference is not necessary. Every proof is indeed based on basic assumptions, and these themselves of course have no proof. But what needed to break down was positivism's identification of truth with provability. The positivist who believed in his basic assumptions even without proof, when he met another positivist who believed in a different system, did not need to conclude that both have equal status. He ought to conclude, as a true positivist would in fact do, that his own basic assumptions are correct even without universal justification. He ought to recognize that even in his doctrine there are truth-claims that do not rest on strict proof. In the earlier terminology, we would say that he must give up strict positivism (as defined above), and recognize the existence of basic claims that do not require proof.[12]

In fact, one can say more than this. Everyday experience teaches us that one can also persuade those who think differently from us by means of various arguments, and this too is generally done without proof. This means that not only is truth not necessarily bound up with proof, as in the case of basic assumptions, but even the ability to persuade is not necessarily bound up with it.

We see people who change systems of values and beliefs following encounters with alternative systems, and this indicates the possibility of persuasion even in discussion about values and beliefs. This is generally not done by means of proofs, because there are alternative modes of persuasion that are also rational and legitimate. Proof is a sufficient condition for truth, but not a necessary one. Some may call such changes 'brainwashing,' but that is not necessarily so. One can change a position in a 'rational,' or at least 'reasonable,' way even without relying on proof in the strict sense.[13]

A contemporary person who is aware that he assumes a certain system of axioms need not assume that it too is arbitrary, even if he cannot provide a proof for it by positivist criteria. I can determine that my colleague is mistaken even if I rely on my own assumptions. Awareness of this does not necessarily lead to pluralism, and certainly not to postmodernism.

At this point, it seems to me that Leibowitz himself is not correct, but in the opposite direction from Sagi. The inability to provide proof does not necessarily mean resorting to violent struggle (nor can pluralism necessarily be derived from it), since one can also try to persuade in less stringent ways. Leibowitz, as a proud positivist product of the first half of the twentieth century, was unwilling to hear of such ideas, since from his point of view 'rational' persuasion is accomplished only by adducing evidence.

Put differently, the assumption shared by positivism and postmodernism, namely that a true claim is only a proven claim, and that persuasion is possible only by adducing proofs, is mistaken. The postmodernist is right in his critique of the naive positivist who believes that he can provide unconditional, objective proofs for all his claims. But his nihilistic conclusion, and even its milder cousin, the pluralistic one, does not follow from this. One may simply abandon the assumption that truth is identical with provability. If one does not assume such a thing, one can accept the postmodernist's critique without giving up concepts of truth. The values I choose, as well as my cognitive basic assumptions, are correct, even though no proof can be adduced for them. More than that, in my opinion (and here I differ from Leibowitz), one can also conduct dialogue and persuade one another regarding these claims.

In recent years, voices have begun to be heard claiming the legitimacy of Orthodox religious Judaism that is at the same time pluralistic, and sometimes even postmodern. It seems to me that at the basis of these positions lies the same misunderstanding regarding the disconnection between the way a person adopts his assumptions and their substantive content. Today it is commonly accepted that a person decides to serve God in a way that does not rest on some factual state of affairs, or on proofs in their strict sense. As we have seen, despite this such a person may remain faithful to the halakhic injunction to condemn evaluative alternatives, and even to punish those who follow them (in cases where this is required). From my point of view, although I am aware that I have no objective ability to persuade the other, I can still believe that I am right, and it therefore also follows clearly that the other is mistaken.

It is interesting to note that, according to my impression, a significant portion of those who think this way, precisely like Sagi, tend to rely on Leibowitz's doctrine, which seemingly presents a completely opposite approach. In my opinion they fall into the same trap to which I pointed earlier. They identify the inability to produce 'rational' evidence with the absence of any truth-value.

As I remarked above, such conclusions can indeed in principle be drawn from the impossibility of producing evidence, and in that sense Leibowitz's doctrine does indeed open the door to Jewish pluralism, but certainly these conclusions are not necessary, as Sagi argued.

Beyond that, as I remarked briefly above, in my humble opinion such a position cannot be grounded within the Orthodox-halakhic framework, regardless of a Leibowitzian interpretation or any other, but this is a discussion that requires a place of its own, and this is not the place for it.

Sagi argued that Leibowitz seemingly opened before us the way to Jewish-halakhic pluralism. Ironically, it seems to me that it is precisely he who made it possible also for those among us who are aware of the subjectivity of their activity and of the narrative within which they operate to remain faithful to Jewish law in its non-pluralistic shades. As noted, the 'subjective' adoption of a value system does not necessarily mean pluralism.

To conclude, I shall present here several representative and illuminating passages from Leibowitz's article 'Jews Among Their People, in Their Land, and Among the Nations':[14]

As for values—one must distinguish in the problem of Jewish essence in our generation among different systems of values, which clash with one another in human thought and action. A theocentric religious system is essential to the Judaism of Torah and commandments, which presents the service of God as an end… the nullification of human values—both personal ones, such as a father's compassion for his son, and general ones, such as destinies for the people and for all humanity in the Covenant Between the Pieces—in favor of the service of God. In the humanistic anthropocentric system everything revolves on the axis of the human being as supreme value, amounting to the deification of man, as in Kant's doctrine…

There is also a false humanism, atheism in religious disguise—namely Christianity. Here too man himself is the center, and his redemption is the central subject of the intention, whereas God is only a tool, a means, and an instrument for the realization of redemption…

But there also exists a system of values that is not only inferior and invalid but even abominable: the ethnocentric conception, which presents as an end not God and not man, but a human collective—a people, race, state, and the like… This is the conception that is the source of much of the evil and wickedness in human reality, and its final logical conclusion is fascism…

Despite this shared consciousness and shared will [of the Jewish people], this collective too is deeply divided—between those who keep Torah and commandments and those who cast off the yoke of Torah and commandments. …If the Jew does not fulfill his obligation, he is a Jewish transgressor, and had Torah possessed real force he would be punished by a religious court, even with capital punishment, yet he would not thereby cease to be a Jew…

But behind the screen of declarations and shared feelings there exists a deep rift in terms of way of life, which does not permit actual shared living, and in the end the difference in reality will prevail over the commonality in consciousness. A religious Jew (or Jewish woman) and a secular Jewish woman (or Jew), each insisting on his or her own way, cannot marry—because of the laws of menstrual separation and family purity… and a Sabbath-observant Jew and a Jew who does not observe the Sabbath cannot jointly maintain an agricultural or industrial enterprise, or a shop, or an office, or even shared experimental scientific research… and a Jew who keeps kosher and a Jew who does not keep kosher cannot dine together at one table. No marriage, no shared economic or technical activity, not even a shared drink that draws hearts together—is it conceivable that the unity of the nation can continue to exist for long under these conditions? Nor is there anything new in this: throughout Jewish history Torah and the commandments were the factor that divided the people…

What is required of us for our spiritual recovery is precisely the thing from which the innocent (or those feigning innocence) among us recoil—the thing that in European political jargon is called "culture war".

In these passages, as in many others, Leibowitz takes pains to distinguish carefully, and even to rank, between correct values (theocentric), inferior and invalid ones (anthropocentric), and abominable ones (ethnocentric). He then explains that the fate of the halakhic transgressor is death (where there is a religious court with real authority to impose it). He adds that we must split apart from one another because of our differing desires and values, and finally he concludes with the urgent and vital need to conduct a culture war. There you have, according to Sagi, an intellectual revolution from which anyone who does not draw conclusions about Jewish-halakhic tolerance and pluralism (including Leibowitz himself) is simply mistaken.[15]

For one who listens to the melody that emerges from Leibowitz's doctrine (not necessarily from his actual conduct)[16], this is precisely the main message he wished to convey. The decision involved in choosing a value system is indeed not deterministic; that is, unlike scientific cognition (according to Leibowitz's understanding), it is not forced upon us by reality or by reason, as some think, but neither is it arbitrary, as others may think. It is the result of the activity of the will, and not of the intellect,[17] yet it obligates no less than the result of an intellectual decision. It is subject to the laws of logic, and especially to the law of non-contradiction, and therefore it necessarily negates value systems opposite to it.

In my humble opinion, two conclusions emerge clearly from these remarks: A. Leibowitz's doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with pluralism. B. This part of Leibowitz's doctrine, to the best of my understanding, is free of contradiction.

Beyond the conclusions concerning Leibowitz's doctrine, as a generalization of this mode of observation I have tried to point out that postmodernism is not a necessary result of positivism, as one might perhaps have inferred from the history of the twentieth century. In the above remarks I also hinted that the possibilities for a Jewish-Orthodox pluralistic approach that have begun to appear in recent years, as well as the postmodern avant-garde of these approaches, suffer from a similar failure. A detailed discussion of this subject lies beyond the scope of this article.

[1] Da'at, issue 38, winter 1997.

[2] On the other hand, Leibowitzian positivism finds opposite expression precisely in the fact that his examinations of Judaism are primarily empirical. He examined Judaism as a living phenomenon, and did not tend to rely in any basic way on quotations from the canonical texts, except as illustrations for his remarks.

[3] 'Truth-value' of a particular proposition means in our context that the proposition is subject to the law of non-contradiction. If it is true, its negation is false. I do not mean to claim that there must be correspondence between it and some state of affairs in the world.

[4] For a clear and simple description, see chapter five in Richard Taylor's book, Metaphysics, Free University, Adam, Jerusalem, 1983.

[5] See, for example, Moral Dilemmas, Daniel Statman, Magnes, Jerusalem, 1991, p. 36.

[6] B. Williams, 'Ethical Consistency,' in Practical Reasoning, Raz (ed.), Oxford University Press, 1978.

[7] It seems to me that this assumption underlies the accepted deontic logics. See Statman's aforementioned book, and Abraham Meidan's article 'Deontic Logics and Possible Worlds,' in The Just and the Unjust, edited by Marcelo Dascal, University Publishing House, 1977.

[8] Akademon, Jerusalem, 1982. See there p. 181.

[9] See the long quotation I shall bring at the end of the article from his book 'Judaism, Jewish People, and the State of Israel'.

[10] See, for example, Leibowitz's discussion in the final article of his book 'Faith, History, and Values,' where he tries to clarify the status of values as postulates of the will.

[11] See, for example, one among many, in Tony Lavie's book, What Is Above and What Is Below, Ma'ariv Library, Or Yehuda, 1997, p. 88.

[12] Today, following Gödel's incompleteness theorems, the distinction between provability (in the strict mathematical sense) and truth is much clearer, and the point is an old one.

[13] For a detailed presentation of such a position, see Chaim Perelman's book, The Realm of Rhetoric, Magnes, Jerusalem, 1984, especially in the introduction, and thereafter throughout the book. Perelman's other books also deal in different ways with this issue.

[14] From his book Judaism, Jewish People, and the State of Israel, Schocken, fifth printing, 1979, p. 291 and onward.

[15] As I noted above, perhaps such conclusions can be drawn from Leibowitz's approach, but in my opinion it is highly doubtful that this is in fact so. In any event, what is clear is that Leibowitz's non-pluralistic position is not inconsistent with his premises, as Sagi wished to argue. Not at all.

[16] On this matter see Hannah Kasher's article in Da'at, issue 40, which argues with respect to Leibowitz that one who behaves tolerantly and appears tolerant is probably tolerant, even if he himself is unwilling to admit it.

[17] See a discussion of this at great length and in great detail in Tony Lavie's aforementioned book, especially in Dialogues A.