Halakhic Stringency Based on Rabbi Yehuda’s Rejected Opinion
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The Rabbi’s Opening Post
Halakhic Stringency Based on Rabbi Yehuda’s Rejected Opinion
Posted on 9/12/2006
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Halakhic Stringency Based on Rabbi Yehuda’s Rejected Opinion
I can think of two cases at the moment in which Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with the Sages, the law is decided in accordance with the Sages, and yet, as a matter of preferred practice, we are stringent in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda as well:
1. Regarding binding the lulav, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the lulav requires binding. In practice the ruling follows the Sages, but for the sake of enhancement we bind it. It is quite clear that this is not enhancement in the sense of beauty; rather, it is a halakhic enhancement, intended to satisfy Rabbi Yehuda’s view.
2. Regarding the destruction of leaven, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it must be done only by burning, whereas according to the Sages one may crumble it and scatter it to the wind. In practice (according to most opinions—at least among Sephardic authorities, and likewise in the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema) we rule in accordance with the Sages, yet the Rema writes that our practice is, from the outset, to burn it. And the various customs connected with burning the leaven, and the ideas attached to it, are well known.
My questions:
1. Is there some consistent method here?
2. What distinguishes these disputes? After all, we do not do this in every halakhic dispute.
3. Are there additional cases in which we go out of our way to be stringent in accordance with a rejected opinion?
4. In these cases as well, is the dissenting authority whose view was rejected Rabbi Yehuda?
Source (the forum "Stop, People Are Thinking Here"): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2102624&forum_id=1364