What Is a Smear? (Column 234)
With God's help
What Is a Smear?
This morning we were informed of the appointment of Dr. Ayelet Seidler to the position of supervisor of Bible studies in the state-religious school system. Full disclosure: Dr. Seidler is my colleague at the Bar-Ilan midrasha, and formerly deputy head of the midrasha. This is the closing chord of a stormy dispute (within the Religious Zionist sector) that has been taking place over the past few days around the appointment. The way things unfolded led me to conclude that although, in my view, Bible studies in schools, and generally, pour sleep into my eyes and send my waking hours, like doves, back into their cotes, and although the learning itself (insofar as this can be called learning) is generally, in my opinion, devoid of importance, improving our discourse nevertheless requires us to clarify a bit the concept of a “smear.”
Background
The campaign was led by Rabbi Kobi Dvir of Yeshivat Mitzpe Ramon, one of the rabbis of the Hardal organization Libah. He wrote a sharply worded appeal to school administrators against Seidler’s appointment to the post:
To
Principals of the State-Religious Schools,
Greetings and blessings,
Would you agree that our children—our students be taught the interpretation of Herbert Zoner—a German Protestant theologian? Or of
Charles Augustus Briggs—a Christian priest? Or perhaps Mitchell Dahood—an American Jesuit priest?
Would you agree that our children—our students be taught that Mordechai the Jew, the righteous man, was actually assimilated??
All this may, heaven forbid, happen as of this coming Tuesday if we do not awaken.
On this coming Tuesday, a vote is expected to take place on appointing a supervisor for the Bible subject in the state-religious system, and as of today the leading candidate for the position is Dr. Ayelet Seidler of Bar-Ilan University.
As is known and obvious to all of us, the Bible subject is meant to educate and raise our children to love Torah, from a perspective of holiness and reverence for Heaven.
I was stunned to hear that the leading candidate for the position is Dr. Ayelet Seidler of Bar-Ilan University, whose activity and writings (attached here as well) show that her approach is a distinctly academic one that relates to the Bible in a human, literary, and historical manner, one that does not refrain from presenting the great figures of Israel who merited prophecy as human beings with weaknesses and urges like ours, in an analysis that criticizes them and their actions.
It is shocking to think that for so important and significant a role, with far-reaching implications for the education of our children, a person whose approach is so illegitimate and so unacceptable would be appointed.
Attached is a letter sent to the Minister of Education on Friday, as well as a brief report on Dr. Seidler’s approach and a file containing some of her articles.
We must act immediately, appeal to the Minister of Education, to the heads of the state-religious system, and to relevant officials in order to stop this appointment and find in her place a male or female candidate suited to the spirit of reverence for Heaven and holiness that should characterize state-religious education.
Anyone interested in helping, please contact me by return email as soon as possible.
With blessings,
Yaakov Dvir
Well, first a small correction of wording. Instead of “our students—our children,” it should read “your students—your children,” since the children and students of these Libah fellows do not, in principle, study in the state-religious institutions whose curriculum is what is being discussed here (after all, those are completely controlled by the European Union and the New Israel Fund, with missionary interests lurking behind them, heaven forfend). They are careful to establish separate institutions that will educate the young of the flock in the pure spirit of the true worldview transmitted to us by our rabbis, from Adam through Moses our teacher to Rabbi Kook and straight on to Rabbi Tau.[1]
In addition, Rabbi Dvir also wrote a fairly detailed letter to the Minister of Education and attached to it a file containing a few grains from Dr. Seidler’s teaching, together with some interpretive pearls of his own. Around this, over the past few days, there was also a text-message campaign and more, so it is unlikely that Rabbi Dvir acted alone. This is a typical campaign by the Hardal circles of Har Hamor (“the Kav”), which as usual uses apocalyptic cries of alarm as though the world were about to be destroyed. These modes of response are very characteristic of Haredim of all kinds (the knitted and the black), as Amnon Levy describes very well at the opening of his book, The Haredim. He notes there that among these people there are no minor matters. Every statement or event is either destruction and Holocaust or redemption. Behind every motion or move stand cosmic powers, satanic or divine, and behind every hand a person lifts down here stands either an angel (Rabbi Tau and Elijah the Prophet) or Satan (the New Israel Fund and the European Union) directing it from above.[2] The sons of light are fighting the sons of darkness, and therefore: vote Noam!!
Rabbi Dvir’s obvious fear is that one of our dear students may accidentally wake up in Bible class from his pleasant slumber and even notice what is actually written in the Bible itself. He apparently prefers that the students continue sleeping, regularly and in order, to the melody of sermons from the God-fearing teacher who explains to them that there is no connection whatsoever between what is written in the Bible and what in fact happened, and that one must not interpret its written words in the ordinary and accepted way. This is really a text written in code, whose whole purpose is to advance Rabbi Tau’s method concerning the redemption of our age. In his letter, Rabbi Dvir conveys the feeling that the whole essence of study in the schools will change with an immediate sword-stroke this coming Tuesday, the moment the newly appointed supervisor—may she live long and well—is chosen for the role. The wondrous learning from which we have suffered until now at the hands of hundreds and thousands of teachers bestowing blessed sleep in all the institutions will change in a single stroke. (By the way, I have not seen such marvelous and decisive confidence in the powers and possibilities of a supervisor in the Ministry of Education in a long time. It is a genuine compliment, though somewhat detached from reality.) May God preserve and save.
To Rabbi Dvir’s credit, it should be said that he did some homework. In his letter to the Minister of Education and the accompanying file, he lays out the main points of his case against Dr. Seidler. There he shows that she uses Christian theologians, heretical Bible scholars of various sorts, and even relates to biblical heroes “at eye level” (they fall in love, regret, sin, and so on). She makes use of literary and historical methods and employs “human” insights, heaven forfend. From all this one might arrive at the hasty conclusion that the Bible and its heroes are human, and that what is described in it indeed took place in history and not only in the fevered mind of Rabbi Tau and the other “transmitters of the tradition” from generation to generation. Dvir notes in his letter that this is a repeat round of a similar campaign that was conducted against Miri Shlissel, a previous supervisor (there the focus was mainly on the offense of “Bible at eye level”), and there too it failed (the New Israel Fund overcame the strongholds and the Holy Ark was captured. But let not your hearts fall, for This is how the redemption of the Jewish people comes: little by little. (such is Israel’s redemption: little by little), with ups and downs. But we are assured that in the end stupidity will triumph and Yinon will come from the Valley of Arbel and save us from their hands).
Quite a few people responded to this bizarre letter and hysterical campaign. Of what I saw, I will mention here the letter of the current supervisor, Dr. Yehuda Troper, and Rabbi Amnon Bazak’s response in a Facebook post in which he argued that Rabbi Dvir had “framed” Dr. Ayelet Seidler. Both point to the detachment from reality and the absurdity of the arguments raised in the letters and material against Dr. Seidler, and to the fact that the members of this sect (again, see column 19) behave like other sects that see themselves as filling the universe and allowing no existence besides them. They show there that the Sages and commentators on Scripture not infrequently studied the Bible precisely as Dr. Seidler does (humanly, literarily, and historically, heaven forfend), but in their sins they dared deviate from the path of the Lord’s anointed, Rabbi Tau, and therefore Seidler’s approach “is neither accepted nor legitimate” in our tradition and in the spirit of old-time Israel (= apparently this means the grandfather of Rabbi Tau’s grandchildren).[3]
Well, until now I have vented and mocked at the expense of this sect of fools. Now it is time to get to my point.
Confusing smears with substantive arguments
During the uproar, I also received emails saying that there is an obligation to respond to the hurtful attacks and smears being spread against Ayelet Seidler and that one must not remain silent in the face of them. Despite everything I have said so far—which certainly gave me a good laugh in this world (don’t tell anyone)—I went through the materials and saw no smears in them. There were substantive arguments there—absurd and bizarre ones, to be sure—but I found no smear among them.
This discussion, as often happens, mixed ideological and conceptual arguments with personal ones. Both sides in the dispute have a tendency to do this. The critics strengthen their claims by pointing to the person himself (wicked, heretic, the long arm of the New Israel Fund), and the defenders are thereby exempted from answering the substantive claims, since they need only defend the person. Such mixing is always harmful, because on the one hand it exempts the critics from providing reasons (personal disqualification is enough), and on the other hand the defenders too need not resort to arguments on the merits (which can sometimes be correct), but only to the person. Sometimes, when you have no arguments on the merits, you resort to the person.
Between harsh language and smears
The impression one gets is that the conservatives and Haredim are the ones who smear, while the righteous liberals do not complain about darkness but rather add light. Well, not so. In several cases, and here too, the reality is exactly the opposite.
In two articles (see here and here) I showed a similar phenomenon regarding the dispute over conversion. There too, the Haredi side raised substantive arguments and very few, if any, personal ones, whereas those who defended Rabbi Druckman raised mainly personal arguments (how righteous he is, how many merits he has, and in general how can one speak this way about such a righteous man?!), which exempted them from having to address the critical arguments on their merits (from an inquiry I conducted at the time, it emerged that most of Rabbi Druckman’s defenders actually agreed with Rabbi Sherman on the substantive plane).
Both in the context of conversion and in the case of Dr. Seidler, it was specifically the Haredi-conservative critics who raised substantive arguments, and specifically the Religious-Zionist defenders who resorted to personal ones (albeit in moderate language and in favor of the person criticized, not necessarily against the critics). So why was the feeling that emerged that the critics were the ones smearing? It seems to me there are two reasons for this: the sharpness of the language and the reference to the person. The Haredi criticism in both cases was, as noted, apocalyptic and shrill, as has always been their way. That is the sharpness of language. In addition, they also referred to the criticized figures themselves (Rabbi Druckman and Dr. Seidler) in unflattering descriptive terms (heretic, wicked, lacking reverence for Heaven, not subordinate to the leading sages of the generation, deviating from the spirit of old-time Israel, etc.). The defenders, by contrast, did not address the attackers but the criticized figures, yet in both cases they did so only on the personal plane and not on the substantive one. They also used milder and more delicate language, without labels (certainly toward the rival). And yet, the Haredi form of discourse in both cases is, in my view, far more appropriate and substantive.
The reason is that a discussion should first of all be conducted about arguments and positions, not about people. Do you support a conversion of this sort or not? Do you support this form of Bible study or not? The question of manners and wording is secondary and not very important. If you say it in harsh language, that may perhaps be less effective because people’s nature is to be hurt by harsh language, but discussion on the merits is what matters most. To treat such statements as smears is to confuse categories. There is not the slightest trace of smear in any of this. Moreover, even if you are only defending the person under criticism and not engaging the critic, but you do so on the level of the person—that is, you explain how righteous and God-fearing he is and protest the fact that anyone dared speak against him—and even if you do so in moderate and clean language and out of respect for the other side, it is specifically you who are introducing the personal plane into the discussion, and usually thereby evading the substantive plane. That is a much more serious flaw than the question of style.
Incidentally, my impression is that in both these cases this was done for similar reasons. In the conversion controversy, the defenders did not want to deal with the matter on its merits because on that plane they actually identified with Rabbi Sherman rather than Rabbi Druckman (they also opposed what Rabbi Brandes called “wink conversions,” in which there is no serious acceptance of the commandments). It was therefore convenient for them to protest Rabbi Druckman’s honor rather than speak about the issue itself. The same is true in the case of Dr. Seidler: at least some of the defenders actually side with the approach of the Hardal critics regarding Bible study, and so it was convenient for them to ignore the substantive plane and focus on defense and protest on the personal plane. As I said, in my view this is a mistake and even a lack of honesty.
This reminds me of the case of Smotrich, who in the context of the segregation ruling in Afula (see the previous column – 233) spoke about the judge and the prime minister in a harsh style, and immediately everyone came out to condemn him for the style. As I remarked in that column, it was very noticeable that, as to the substance of the matter, many people actually seemed to agree with him.[4] There too, focusing on style was apparently more convenient for people than admitting that substantively he was right.
Why is this so confusing: what is not a smear?[5]
As noted, Rabbi Dvir’s letter contains only arguments on the merits. Their level should not surprise anyone familiar with the approach of “the Kav” and its sect (see my remarks in column 19). True, they are not the sharpest pencils in the box, and their sobriety is certainly diluted with more than a pinch of hysteria, but stupid and hysterical arguments are not necessarily smears. If a person says that he opposes studying the Bible “at eye level” (presenting the heroes of the Bible as human beings with human weaknesses and motivations), or that he opposes the use of non-Jewish scholars or those who are not in the spirit of old-time Israel (whatever the definition of that particular grandfather’s spirit may be), these are stupid but substantive claims. That is his opinion, and one is allowed to be stupid. Therefore, if someone says that a person who teaches this way is harmful, or not committed to the spirit of old-time Israel (yes, that is the same grandfather from before), and perhaps even a heretic, heaven forfend, these too are substantive claims and not smears.
Therefore, I thought that the main response to the attacks on Dr. Seidler should address the approach underlying Rabbi Dvir’s letter, rather than protests about smears (which, as I said, in my view were not there at all) and responses on the personal plane. I argued that it is important to explain that whether one supports or opposes the integration of foreign approaches and sources into Bible study, ignoring them is not a realistic option nowadays. Even if you want to oppose them, you need to know the material and equip yourself with reasons and arguments that explain your opposition substantively; otherwise you have already failed. Withdrawal through protests and boycotts is an unappealing approach whose time has thankfully passed. Even if it once had some point (in my opinion, absolutely not), today, in the era of the global village, it is simply ineffective. But my colleagues outvoted me and said that what mattered was to address only the smears and explain that Dr. Seidler is God-fearing and committed to Torah and commandments, and to dwell on her professional and personal virtues (all of which is entirely true), while protesting the detractors. At that point I understood that I was once again encountering a misunderstanding of the concept of “smear,” its definition, and its meaning, and so I decided to devote the present column to it.
I have already explained that claims against the issue itself, however sharp they may be, are not smears. And what about claims against a person because of his views (for example, calling him a “heretic” or “wicked”)? I think these too are not smears, so long as they are reasoned. If I think that so-and-so’s view is heresy against the principles of faith or Jewish law, then even if others do not agree, I see no problem whatsoever in calling him a heretic. That is an entirely substantive description, even if it can be disputed. The fact that people do not like being regarded as heretics is a matter of taste and habit. It does not turn such a statement into a smear, or even into an otherwise objectionable statement. At most, perhaps, it is worth avoiding such statements because people are offended by them (though it is not clear to me why), and therefore they are ineffective. But in my view this mainly reflects a negative trait (oversensitivity) on the part of those offended, and I suspect that here too the sensitivity and protests against being hurt are merely a way of bypassing the need to explain oneself substantively. Someone who cannot explain himself directly prefers to take offense and expect apologies and restraint. That is much easier and far less demanding. The use of sarcasm and irony is not a smear either. It is a mode of expression, one may like it or not (I personally do), but what does that have to do with smears?
In column 63 I explained that I have no problem whatsoever with someone who calls me a heretic or an apikorus. That is his opinion, and he should say it in a clear and ringing voice. His opinion of me is the result of his substantive positions, and therefore his relation to me is likewise entirely substantive. I can explain why I think as I do, and everyone else can explain his own positions and why he thinks I am mistaken. The decision how to label me—whether as a heretic or not—is reserved to every person, each according to his own way, and good health to all of them. It is a derivative of his view of my conceptions, and therefore an entirely substantive position. Am I supposed to expect someone who thinks I am a heretic not to say so? Why? On the contrary, I expect open and substantive discourse with arguments on all sides, not politically correct concealment. I definitely do have a problem with someone who is dogmatic and unwilling to listen to the arguments of the other side, but I truly have no problem with someone who clearly expresses his own position and also draws conclusions from it, personal and otherwise. I actually have more of a problem with someone who does not express his opinion of me out of false respect and manners. As is well known, Maimonides interprets the prohibition You shall not hate your brother in your heart. (“Do not hate your brother in your heart”) to mean that the prohibition is not the hatred but keeping it in the heart. If a person hates me—let him say so to me and not keep it in his heart. If a person opposes me and my views—let him say that to me. Preferably politely, but that is not really obligatory; in any case, I would be happy if he did not use polite and laundered words that hide his opinion of me and my conceptions.
What is a smear?
If saying about another person that he is a heretic and wicked, lacking reverence for Heaven, or leading Jewish children astray—if all these are not smears, then it is not really clear what a smear is. What remains after all this? Is there any statement at all that deserves the title of smear?
It seems to me that for any statement to count as a smear, it must contain lies (which are of course lies even according to the speaker’s own view, that is, he is doing it deliberately and not because these really are his opinions), or true facts that are irrelevant to the matter under discussion (and are raised in the discussion only in order to harm the other side—ad hominem). It is possible that directing relevant facts and judgments to too broad an audience, one not relevant to the discussion, can also count as a smear. But that is all. Sharp statements, just like personal references to a given individual, are not necessarily smears. It is not true that harsh or sarcastic speech is necessarily improper, and even if someone thinks it is improper—there is still no smear here. Especially when dealing with an appointment to some position, reference to the person himself (through his views and conceptions) is highly relevant, since that is precisely what the discussion is about.
If you now look again at Rabbi Dvir’s letter and his appendix equipped with these criteria, you will readily see that there is not a trace of smear in it. There is quite a bit of nonsense in it, plainly illogical conceptions, hysterical preaching, foolish interpretations of Dr. Seidler’s statements, dogmatism and conservatism and every other fine virtue. But none of these are smears. The time has come for us to begin addressing arguments substantively, both when criticizing someone and when defending him.
[1] Incidentally, one should not infer from this that such criticism is improper. There is nothing wrong with criticizing an institution or system that you are not part of, so long as one raises substantive arguments. My point here was only about the demagogic trick of using the first person plural in order to express the depth of the distress and the supposed shared stake. That is throwing sand in people’s eyes, and that alone was my point.
[2] See on this in column 19.
[3] It seems to me that in column 19 I already pointed out that among groups holding a novel approach with no real basis in our tradition (which, incidentally, is entirely legitimate in my view), appeal to the tradition of our rabbis is very common. A person disqualifies others because of his own flaw. (a person disqualifies through his own blemish), and therefore for them everything is examined through the question whether it fits the tradition and whether it has a pedigree. This is true of the Brisk school, and it is also true of the disciples of Rabbi Kook (the Har Hamor sect), and also among followers of the Hazon Ish (those of the counterfeit variety, not those who do what they themselves think is the way of the Hazon Ish), and more.
[4] Except for the Women’s Lobby and a few legal academics who signed a public statement supporting the ruling—about whom George Orwell already said that some things are so stupid that they can come only from the mouths of intellectuals (I believe this was said in the context of intellectual support for communism. But the principle is more current today than ever).
[5] On these matters, see also column 63.
Discussion
Absolutely.
Wow, that almost empties the concept of slander of any content.
With God’s help, 22 Av 5779
Dr. Ayelet Seidler’s statement that Mordecai was assimilated is strange. After all, Mordecai refuses to kneel and bow to Haman and explains his refusal to bow by saying “for he was a Jew.” A person who risks his life out of loyalty to Judaism—is he assimilated?
Regards, Shatz Levinger
Since Mordecai was a senior official in the royal court, “sitting at the king’s gate,” he received from his superiors an official name—just as “the chief of the eunuchs” gave Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah the names Belteshazzar, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego. The fact that someone serving in the royal court had to accept the official name attached to him by his superiors does not indicate assimilation.
All the more so in Susa, in the province of Elam, where the Babylonian idols were not accorded divine status, and in the days of Ahasuerus—who destroyed, “in the third year of his reign,” the temple of Marduk in Babylon and removed that idol’s image—“Marduk” was an idol nullified by a gentile and no longer counted as idolatry.
“Marduk” originally means “the sun-disk,” and “Esther” is “the morning star,” “the hind of the dawn,” and being called after a luminous heavenly body need not be connected to an idolatrous connotation. Might one claim that Rabbi Rafi Peretz tends toward assimilation because women named “Ayelet” are appointed to senior positions? 🙂
In paragraph 2, line 2
… that “the chief of the eunuchs” gave …
These (Seindler’s interpretation) and these (Shatz’s interpretation) are both pure guesswork.
With God’s help, 22 Av 5779
To Moshe—many greetings,
What I wrote, that “sitting at the king’s gate” denotes a senior position in the royal court—this is how Dr. Y. Tz. Moskowitz explained it (in Daat Mikra), and he brought proof from Daniel 2:49: “Then the king made Daniel great… and made him ruler over the whole province of Babylon, and chief prefect over all the wise men of Babylon. And Daniel requested of the king, and he appointed Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego over the affairs of the province of Babylon; but Daniel was at the gate of the king.” That is to say: Daniel’s being “at the gate of the king” means holding the office of “chief prefect over all the wise men of Babylon.”
The giving of an official name to members of the royal court is documented in Daniel 1:7: “And the chief of the eunuchs gave them names: to Daniel he gave the name Belteshazzar, to Hananiah Shadrach, to Mishael Meshach, and to Azariah Abed-nego.” This custom, of giving high officials an official name, is ancient; so too Pharaoh did when he gave his viceroy the name Zaphenath-paneah.
On the meaning of the name “Marduk” — “the sun-disk” — see the Wikipedia entry “Marduk.” There are also cited the words of Herodotus that Ahasuerus desecrated the temple of Marduk and removed its image in the year 482 (note that this is “the third year of his reign”), thereby diminishing the greatness of the head of the Babylonian pantheon.
As for “Esther” — see Daat Mikra (Esther 2:7): “Esther — some say this is a Persian name meaning ‘star’ (star), and some say that Esther is the name of the planet Venus, which according to idol worshippers was the star of Ishtar or Istar, as the Babylonians called her.” Note that the Sages’ exposition that “the hind of the dawn” (Psalms 22) refers to Esther also relies on the meaning of the name “Esther.”
Regards, Shatz Levinger, Morning Star, father of Chaya-Esther
It is possible that the custom of giving an official name to members of the court led Pharaoh’s daughter to give her foster son the name “Moses” (“son of the Nile” in Egyptian).
In paragraph 4, line 1
… it is a Persian name meaning …
This is a discussion about the interpretation of a term, not a logical discussion. Our main concern is what a reasonable person means when he uses this term or another.
It seems to me that an ordinary person means by the term “slander” also what you mention: lies about the person rather than about the issue, or truth that is irrelevant to the topic,
but also when one speaks about the argument itself but not on its merits, and instead gives grades and labels to arguments such as “stupid,” “illogical,” without any basis—that too is baseless slander.
When one says an argument is “stupid” without explaining why, that is a label being attached to the claims; it is baseless slander.
It seems to me that statements appearing in your article like “If you now look again at Rabbi Dvir’s letter and its appendix … there is in it quite a bit of nonsense, blatantly illogical notions, hysterical preaching, stupid interpretation of Dr. Seidler’s statements …”
These kinds of labels and descriptions you hand out to his letter, and in general to the people of Har Hamor, throughout your article as though it were law given to Moses at Sinai, as if everybody knows that Rabbi Dvir’s and Har Hamor’s arguments are stupid, illogical, etc.
Your article is a good example of what baseless slander looks like.
This is not about semantics. The question is whether such statements are improper, or involve unjustified harm. Call it slander or “May the Merciful One grant full release.” In any case, that is why in my opinion my remarks do not fall into that category.
Beyond that, I also explained it briefly, if it even requires explanation (I mentioned the detachment from the text and from its meaning), and I also referred to others who did so (Troper and Bazak, since that was not my topic). In any case, if someone still wants to hear more detailed arguments for why I thought it was stupid or nonsensical, let him ask. Though it is hard for me to see how someone would not understand that on his own, or in light of the sources I referred to.
Beyond all that, if we are already dealing with semantics, when a person does not provide reasons that does not mean the slander is baseless, as you wrote. It is “slander” whose basis is not presented in his words. Baseless slander is when there is no basis. But here the matter is self-evident.
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, “And you shall remember all the way,” 5779
The Bible describes the failings of its exemplary figures—kings, prophets, and righteous men (and according to Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani in the name of Rabbi Yonatan, it even intensifies the description of the fall beyond what actually happened). The question is in which direction we take this.
If the aim of our engagement with the sins of great people is to legitimize our lowly state—look, everyone has weaknesses and sins, even the very greatest, and we need not get excited about our own flaws, for “this is the whole man”—that is very bad. When we cast ourselves down into the dust, bury ourselves in the mud in order to stay there because “that’s life” and why make an effort?—we lock the path to change before ourselves.
The value of dealing with the falls of great people is when we learn from them two basic lessons: (a) how careful a person must be not to fall, when we see, for example, what happened to King David as the result of one improper glance… (b) even when a person has already suffered a terrible fall, he still has hope of rising and shaking himself free, taking responsibility and repairing things—as David, who fell and knew how to rise, and is remembered for generations as “the man who was raised on high” — who raised up the yoke of repentance.
Relating to the great figures of the nation “at eye level,” as though they were “just one of the guys,” is improper (and Rav Ashi was already punished for calling Manasseh “our colleague”). The exemplary figures of the Bible should be studied with “raised eyes”: to learn from them the caution not to fall, and to rise and shake oneself free even after the fall—and indeed to rise from it to a higher level than before the fall.
With Sabbath greetings, Shatz.
The root k-f-sh appears only once in the Bible, in Lamentations 3:16: “He has broken my teeth with gravel; He has made me cower in the dust.” Rashi explains it there in the sense of the root as used in rabbinic Hebrew, that it is like k-f-h: He forced me down to the dust.
Ibn Ezra explains, based on the parallel to “He has broken my teeth with gravel,” that “He has made me cower in the dust” means “He made me taste dust,” and the author of Daat Mikra explains that k-f-sh is like k-b-sh, “He buried me in the dust.”
And as I already explained, burying oneself in dust, which makes clear to us the extent of the fall, has value only when it paves the way to break free and rise from it—a kfesh leading to freedom 🙂
Regards, Shatz Levinger
Rabbi Michi, you wrote: “It seems to me that for some statement to count as slander, it has to contain lies.” I think there need not be blatant lies in a statement for it to count as slander—it is enough that it imply something and create a false impression. I can testify about myself that before this whole affair I had never heard of Dr. Seidler, and when I read the letter, the picture that emerged was of a secular woman, or at the very least someone not really religious—certainly I did not think we were talking about the deputy head of a midrasha. From what I later read, I understood that this impression was incorrect, indeed the opposite of reality. Therefore, in my humble opinion, even by your stricter criteria for defining “slander,” that letter was indeed slanderous.
I do not agree. As long as what was said is true, the conclusions you draw are your responsibility. Assuming they correctly described her views, then that is what she is. Now you decide whether she is secular or not. If they use misleading or ambiguous language—then there may be a problem.
“If we were looking among all the thoughts of mankind for the most unmistakable marks of folly and prejudice, most of our examples would be taken from men’s reflections upon one another’s reflections.” (John Stuart Mill)
That is the problem with almost all interpretation, and all the more so with interpretation of interpretation.
I have noticed that women, and especially those who belong to the Conservative/Reform camp (or those who present supposedly open positions similar to theirs), receive from you an exceptionally protective treatment.
A statement heard from the mouth of an old-style/conservative rabbi, which wins your disdain and disgust, retroactively and without even a minimal effort to understand it, is not like the “enlightened” statement of some academic, where a bit of reflection reveals it to be hollow, yet from you it receives honor and esteem, along with strenuous—almost pathetic—attempts to clarify the lofty profundity hidden within it.
Regarding what you wrote in note three: from your words it appears that you see the Briskers, the Hazon-Ishniks, and the students of Rav Kook as a renewed approach. Why is the Hazon Ish’s method innovative? Even the Brisk method is not innovative; what is new there are only the tools (the conceptual ones). Only regarding Rav Kook can one say that his method is innovative (of course one must take into account that the reality in his time was also very innovative, even messianic), and even that only in the worldview part of his thought.
I always love your emphasis on the fake devotees of the Hazon Ish; to me it is so very true.
“Slander: saying blunt things against a person that damage his good name; defamation.”
Michi—I agree that in the above-mentioned letter there is no slander, only a strong desire to advance the writer’s agenda by using the tactic of “the sky is falling on our heads” (cf. Asterix and the Gauls).
But whether you agree with this or not—the form of discourse and the choice of words have great significance in creating civilized discourse between worldviews. To assign someone the label “heretic” instead of saying “I fundamentally disagree with what he says” makes a big difference both in the tone and in the culture created in a heated argument between sides.
One can and should say sharp things in an argument (if they have substance, methodology, and logic).
There is no need to crush the opposing position through direct attacks on those voicing and representing it.
I know your “loving” attitude toward postmodernism and the “deep appreciation” you have for it, but there is one thing you find hard to take from it: they managed to permeate existing discourse with the insight that the whole matter of camps is a fata morgana.
In a world of narratives, you can find yourself wandering from camp to camp (from narrative to narrative) without much intellectual effort.
The mental place (yes… sorry for using psychology, Heaven forbid) we occupy in a postmodern world allows each person to hold an opinion and move along the scale toward different truths (in his own eyes).
Or as the Rebbe calls it: if they show me a good argument—I’m even prepared to convert to Christianity…
You are right that with the Hazon Ish there was no new comprehensive method, but he did innovate quite a few things in halakhah and in general. The fact is that there are “Hazon-Ishniks,” meaning this is perceived as a distinct method (and one can discuss this according to the two interpretations). In practice, the Hazon Ish was not methodical at all (rather, he was balebatish), and therefore he is not especially beloved in the yeshivot (unlike R. Chaim, R. Shimon, and R. Shmuel). In every context he said what seemed right to him there, and not by way of a general method.
I did not understand the last comment (about postmodernism) or how it relates to the discussion here.
The letter implies that Seidler supports teaching children interpretations by Christian theologians. Can that be inferred from the fact that they appear in footnotes in her articles, and even if she bases lessons on them (allow me to guess that this is not for schoolchildren)? Clearly not, and I assume Dvir knows that too. That is slander.
In the letter to the Minister of Education: “a woman all of whose thinking, lectures, and articles are in the secular-literary approach and academic criticism” — it is clear to me that for Dvir it is easy to fall into the aforementioned alarmist approach, but can he really stand behind the claim that *all* her thinking (where is Orwell when you need him?), lectures, and articles are like that? His evidentiary material certainly does not establish this. I find it hard to believe he has more material that he did not present. I am even willing to guess that one could find even a full half-hour of her speaking that would be fine. This is outright slander.
In the file of evidence there is a heading: “Questioning the truth of the Torah.” The meaning is clear—Seidler questions the truth of the Torah. Was any proof brought for this? No; this is slander.
It seems to me that even when people slander you, you tend to get angry and protest the slander before addressing the substance. And you write columns of astronomical length that only bored people (in this case, I simply thought it would be nice to join in the annoyance at the Kavniks) like me read, and you can address every claim in detail. Publicly speaking, I think that this letter first of all requires condemnation for its slanders.
A public discussion about how to study Tanakh is not something Rabbi Bazak, for example, avoids. Quite the contrary. But I think his decision not to address it now on Facebook is correct.
When Dvir sends a letter, even a sharp one, arguing that it is inappropriate to appoint someone who studied Christian interpretation, who writes academic articles, who analyzes Tanakh with literary tools, and who relates to biblical heroes as flesh-and-blood people, then it will make sense to respond on the merits.
By the way, it seems to me that the two words “Nehama Leibowitz” could end the discussion, because the point is that there is no real point—according to Dvir there are no sacred principles at all, because the sacred principles are in any case subordinate to the people who decide what they are. Thus, if Nehama Leibowitz analyzes with literary tools, then one can no longer argue against that. If she cites Benno Jacob of Mendelssohn (with an “R” at the beginning—Rambaman!) then that too is permitted. And if Tao says tomorrow that PJ Library is terrible and awful, then Rabbi Aviner, who said yesterday that it was fine, will immediately say that it destroys the foundations of holiness. So what substantive discussion can one conduct when the person opposite you cannot stand behind any substantive argument and everything for him is personal?
By the way, to the camp of Haredim with black or knitted kippot that you mentioned, one should also add the leftists. For example, Ram Ben-Barak with blacks versus whites, Dan Margalit with children of light and children of darkness, and also the two bizarre lunatics, the bearded old man and the shrieking young woman.
*half of Solomon = a full half hour
Yishai, it seems to me that you got carried away. These are mere hyper-literal quibbles, and the general thrust is clear. If a woman studies and teaches Tanakh with Christian thinkers, the concern that she will also do so in high school is certainly reasonable (with or without quoting them). That is really not slander. The same goes for “all,” which you parsed with microscopic precision, and that is meaningless. By the way, you also write that in his view “there are no (!) sacred principles.” Really “none”? Is “everything” personal? Do you have evidence that he has nothing that is not personal?
This teaches you that this is how people write, and there is no (!) slander here, and therefore there was also no need for protests against slander. Any reasonable reader who is not out to get him understands the point correctly. The Kavniks have enough faults; let us not add to them.
And also regarding belief in the truth of the Torah: if his definition of the truth of the Torah is literal factual truth, then she indeed does not believe in the truth of the Torah (if she writes that something might be fictional). True, Dvir himself also does not think it means literal truth in the plain sense (since he himself argues that David did not sin), but that is just a contradiction in his own doctrine. There is no slander here.
With God’s help, 25 Av 5779
Regarding the use of Christian interpretation of Scripture—it is well known from the testimony of Rabbi Matzliach bar Eliyah of Palermo, who was a student of Rav Hai Gaon, that when they were uncertain in the yeshivah about the explanation of a verse in Psalms, the Rav sent his student to “the Christian catholicos” to hear from him whether he had a good explanation of the verse.
On the contrary, there is strong reason to say that one who directs the study of Tanakh in the education system ought to be proficient in interpretations that oppose the tradition, so that he can contend with them and provide proper answers to the claims of biblical critics. Thus arose the exegetical project of Daat Mikra, in which Torah scholars joined together who were well acquainted with historical and critical scholarship, and knew how to use the achievements of scholarship in order to buttress the tradition and defend it against its critics.
At the head of this project stood the great Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, of blessed memory, and perhaps this is also the reasoning of his great student Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, who sees Dr. Ayelet Seidler as suited to lead Tanakh study in the state-religious education system. If there are “creaks” in some of her formulations—one can point them out and correct them.
Regards, Shatz
I have encountered an improper phenomenon among some academics, according to whom one may cite in papers submitted to them only “peer-reviewable sources.” That is to say: interpretations by the Rishonim and Acharonim that have not passed through “the sieve of academic reviewability” are unfit to enter the congregation!
And I myself had such a case. I suggested to a student who was about to write a paper on one of the prophets some articles by contemporary rabbis about that prophet, and she told me her advisers would not accept reliance on “non-reviewable material.” And I wondered: “If so, then you are also forbidden to cite the words of the prophet” 🙂 Such an absurd approach—which I very much hope is not Dr. Seidler’s—according to which the words of a Christian theologian with an academic degree are acceptable, while the words of a rabbi are disqualified—is certainly unworthy!
Source citation for the statement of Rabbi Matzliach of Palermo, paragraph 1 — Menachem Ben-Sasson, “The Self-Governance of the Jews in Islamic Lands,” on the CET website, article 1, end of chapter 2.
Correction, in paragraph 4, line 3
… “the sieve of academic reviewability” …
I am astonished. You say that people do not read what is written and just accuse, but you yourself do not read. When one shows you what is written, you call it hair-splitting.
The general thrust is indeed clear, and my descent into small proofs was only because of your strange disingenuousness. They are essentially accusing her of believing in biblical criticism, that is, that the Torah is not from God (even if only partially—it does not matter for our purposes; even if in your view it matters, to both sides it apparently does not), and they accuse her of intending to insert the study of Christian theologians into the curriculum instead of classical commentators. I do not know her at all, but the other side claims that these accusations are completely baseless: that she believes in Torah from Heaven, and that she thinks classical interpretation should be taught, and probably not to introduce non-Jewish interpretations into school at all. So yes, there is a dispute here about the facts, and the claim of slander is not out of place. You, as usual, are not very interested in facts (though you do not refrain from accusing others of getting them wrong), but are interested in principles and want a discussion of principles. That is of course your right, but it is clear that the people on the other side (the side of holiness, namely Har Hamor) will defend Seidler against slander. They first want to set the facts straight (in their view): she believes in Torah from Heaven and does not want to introduce Christian commentators into the curriculum (certainly not to the extent that Dvir and his assistants from the rest of the SMS people are trying to persuade us). After that it will be possible to arrive at a substantive discussion of whether relating to biblical heroes as flesh and blood is good or bad, and whether using literary tools in the study of Tanakh is good or bad.
You are right about the word “all.” There is a chapter in Sefer Ha-Ikkarim where he explains the usages of the word. It goes roughly like this: a. 100%. b. 99.9%. c. 90%. d. 60%. e. above 50%. f. 30%. g. 5%. h. 0.5%. A very amusing chapter… So there is a difference—what proof does Dvir have? He read a few of her articles (academic ones?) and from that decided what her entire approach is. Clearly people will protest. You are right that I do not know him either, and my real claim is not directed at him (because as far as I’m concerned, a priori there is a presumption that, like all his friends, he is not an autonomous individual with whom it is worth discussing) but at Taoism as a whole, and here I think my claim is well founded (surely you cannot claim that it is unfounded when you claim exactly the same thing about them).
I did not see that she raised the possibility that something in the Torah is fictional. Under that heading (questioning) there appears a quotation from her in which it is said that there are scholars who question it. If that is questioning, then Dvir’s own letter is also questioning, whichever way you slice it. It is clear that from Rabbi Amnon Bazak’s perspective, this is the most serious accusation here, and if it is untrue (with no basis whatsoever), it is clear that the first response will be to refute it.
In paragraph 1, line 3
… to hear from him whether he has a good explanation of the verse.
And a note:
A good example of using the interpretation of biblical critics in order to fight them is Dr. Ayelet Seidler’s article, “Psalm 27 — Confidence, Fear, and Hope” (Beit Mikra 56), in which the author discusses Psalm 27, where biblical critics had a field day claiming that there is a contradiction between the confidence in the first part of the chapter and the fear in the second part. And she argues against them and establishes the unity of the chapter.
Perhaps this polemic came in its time and season, on the eve of the Days of Mercy and Forgiveness in which we say Psalm 27 twice daily, and through the controversy we have become aware of her article illuminating its unity.
Regards, Shatz Levinger
I am not sure I agree—because when someone consciously chooses to present partial statements in a tendentious way, one cannot say he “merely presented facts.” It is not much less serious than a lie, and in a certain sense is worse. But it seems to me this is about to become an argument over the definition of the concept “slander,” which is not a particularly productive debate. It does not matter so much to me whether you call it slander or not—what is certain is that publishing a tendentious, one-sided letter that presents someone in an unflattering light (and a distorted one, from what I have heard from everyone who knows her) is not merely a “misunderstanding” but an immoral and unfair act. I think a large part of the book Chafetz Chaim deals precisely with such cases: saying something true but in a way whose result is disparagement of the person. You do not have to call it slander if you want to reserve that term for the definition you gave, but it is still evil speech.
With God’s help, 26 Av 5779
To David—many greetings,
Without addressing Dr. Seidler herself, concerning whom I brought above considerations to both sides and Rabbi Yaakov Ariel’s ruling in her favor, it should be noted that the fact that a person maintains a punctilious religious lifestyle does not necessarily testify to the state of his faith.
We have already encountered observant people who do not believe in Torah from Heaven and hold to Wellhausen’s Documentary Hypothesis, and teachers of Torah who think that God has “forsaken the earth” and does not supervise His creatures. So the suspicion toward people whose words seem to “incline toward heretical views” is not baseless in principle.
Children are the dearest thing we have, and therefore we send them to religious education, and it is our right and duty to ensure that their educators do not “sell” them biblical criticism, nor heresy in “Torah from Heaven,” nor contempt for prophets, kings, and sages—for they too may not be slandered.
In the present case, the controversy only benefited Mrs. Dr. Seidler, because after the presentation of the “bill of suspicions,” important rabbis such as Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, Rabbi Chaim Druckman, and Rabbi Eitan Eisman stood up and judged her favorably. Such is the nature of public discussion—some suspect, some defend, and sages decide.
Regards, Shatz Levinger
They say that Rav Kook said in his eulogy for R. Yechiel Michel Pines that on such a situation it was said, “Whoever sheds tears over an upright person…”—that “upright” means one concerning whom objections were raised and there was a “question” about him, but a sage ruled that he was “upright” 🙂
I have no doubt of that—I know there are many observant people who hold all kinds of strange and unusual views. My point was that the letter creates, in my eyes, a false impression—as though she is not observant; and because I permit myself to assume that she would not be pleased with such a presentation, in my eyes this is evil speech (I do not care so much whether to call it “slander” or simply evil speech).
I do not know whether this falls under definitions of slander. But that is only semantics. The whole discussion by the rabbi seems to me irrelevant. It seems to me that indeed this whole story of Hardalim and Haredim is always personal. I am not sure they are capable of objectivity at all. These people simply live in emotional detachment from the rest of society and look for wars with it in order to preserve their identity and distinctiveness (and their sense of importance). And the Hardalim in particular are simply looking for a pretext to bother everyone else. The supposedly substantive wrapping is only a tool. I read somewhere that Rabbi Shach wrote that the Jews or the Haredim preserved themselves through wars (I do not remember whether external wars or internal ones). I assume that if she was approved by Rabbi Ariel, then the people of the Mor camp could also have been calm regarding her faith in Torah from Heaven, and they could have explained away her quotations themselves (after all, he is surely frummy enough by their standards. So in some sense they are indeed lying a bit). This is simply typical Haredi self-righteousness (mindless) that cannot exist (like any self-righteousness) without “wicked people” to feed the war against them, and without war it (self-righteousness) has no right to exist. So they would have found some other flaw in some other candidate who was not one of their own. They smelled power in their hands (Rabbi Rafi Peretz), and therefore suddenly they were up in arms. But I believe this is not an isolated case. And a bit of evidence for that is the rabbi’s first remark in the article here about how “our children” are in danger, while their children do not even study in that system at all. They are supposedly “concerned” for everyone else under the guise of mutual responsibility, but what kind of responsibility (“love your fellow as yourself”) are they even talking about when they have no respect for all those others mentioned above? So this is not only self-righteousness but also lack of self-awareness—which is an especially lethal combination. The rabbi’s fixation on definitions misses the point. Obviously the Kavniks have something personal here and the whole story is just an excuse. The rabbi also does not like these people. Neither do I. The whole issue here is about the person, not the matter. We should simply put the cards on the table, say it, and separate. That is in any case already what is happening, except that these people are trying, in typical Haredi thuggery, to take over everyone else.
With God’s help, 26 Av 5779
To Eilon—many greetings,
Criticism of involvement in biblical criticism—even when fighting it—and of overinvolvement in biblical realia was voiced by Rabbi Moshe Lichtenstein in his article “God Has Spoken Once—Twice Have I Heard This?” (and Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun responded to his words in “God Has Spoken Once—Twice Have I Heard This!”). Rabbi Elchanan Samet also criticized some of the methods of his colleagues at Herzog College (in the interview with him, “Continuing Nehama,” in Mussaf Shabbat – Makor Rishon).
Rabbi Yaakov Medan already said that there is value in criticism, which prevents those engaged in confronting biblical scholarship and in studying the failings of its heroes from being swept into improper directions. Dr. Ayelet Seidler too, though her lights are probably more numerous than her shadows, was carried away into a few tasteless little peshat-readings, such as that Mordecai, who sacrifices himself rather than bow to Haman because he is a Jew, is assimilated! Or that Samson, who repeatedly conceals the secret of his strength from the wife in his bosom and yields to her only under heavy pressure, wants to cancel his Nazirite status. One need not be a great Hardal to understand that these are mistaken explanations.
And regarding what you argued about the expression “our children”: it may be that some of the “Kav” people send their children to institutions outside the state-religious system, but the overwhelming majority of their thousands of students and students’ students fill the institutions of the state-religious system, and they have the full right and duty to demand that those leading education in that system excel in their faith.
Among our cousins in the humanities this idiotic limitation is very common: cite only peer-reviewed articles. But that is a limitation in writing academic articles, not necessarily in teaching. I know this very well, because quite a number of people who wanted to cite me and discuss my work in their articles were warned not to do so.
In paragraph 2, line 4
… who sacrifices himself rather than bow to Haman, saying “for he was a Jew,” is assimilated! …
Yishai, as usual you accuse without any basis and insist without addressing the arguments. So I will permit myself to do the same. I see no point in the discussion.
A pedantic note regarding note 4—which does not change the rabbi’s point:
“One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no ordinary man could be such a fool.”
– George Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism” (1945)
Usually (mis)quoted as:
“There are some ideas so absurd that only an intellectual could believe them.”
http://p4b.blogspot.com/2010/10/orwell-on-intellectuals.html
I do not see a big difference between the formulations.
I went over Rabbi Yaakov Dvir’s letters again. There is no statement in them from which it can be inferred that Mrs. Seidler is not observant!
Regards, Shatz
Obviously there is no word that says such a thing—that is the whole idea. Nothing explicitly false is stated there, but the letter creates a message between the lines that distorts reality. I do not know whether in terms of the halakhic definition this is only a trace of evil speech or full-blown evil speech, but it is certainly in the area—naturally, the author of the letter will say that it is “evil speech for a constructive purpose” in order to protect our pure children from the terrible flood of heresy, but it is still evil speech.
To our sorrow, in biblical interpretation both biblical criticism and the tendency toward midrashim reflect an unwillingness to study Scripture in its own right and to labor to find the plain sense. The result is the use of Scripture for polemics between outlooks far apart from one another as east is from west, polemics that usually do little good. By contrast, if students are taught to attend carefully to the Holy Tongue and to labor to find the plain sense, then a scholarly debate about what the plain meaning of Scripture is becomes a fruitful discourse, the one that gave rise to most of the great commentators on Scripture—for no verse departs from its plain meaning.
Which claim of yours did I not address?
Is there no limit to your inability to understand what you read or the reality around you? Each time I am newly amazed at the gap between your analytic ability and your other abilities. Though this time, for some reason, it does not seem to me like mere lack of understanding on your part, but just evasion of unpleasantness—and that really does not suit you.
You claimed there is no slander there. I explained to you why there is. You argued about “all,” and I agreed with you that my criticism here is exaggerated, but even without “all,” even if only most or many, it is still slander. On the claim about questioning the truth of the Torah, you wrote things that are simply unrelated to the discussion. And again, as usual, I wonder who those people are who sometimes manage to convince you. I have seen a million smart people trying to explain to you why an entire public that studies Torah and does not work does not contribute to the economy just like other publics, and no one has succeeded in this seemingly simple task. But sometimes you tell of people who taught you new things, and I wonder how that process takes place.
Apparently there is no limit. As stated, I see no point in continuing this discussion. Let the reader read and judge.
Hello Rabbi Michi. I hope it is not too late to comment on the matter. I reflected on it a bit. At first your words seemed very persuasive to me. Afterward an idea occurred to me that separates us, and I would be glad to clarify it with you. What emerges from your words here, and perhaps this runs through other places as well, is that the only thing you give weight to in clarifying truth is the intellect that investigates claims and evidence, and you give no weight at all to images or impressions. I mean the picture formed in the soul when encountering something. At times a person resists something or agrees with it in a kind of deep inner feeling, without being able (at least not at that time) to put it into words. Does that mean this feeling is false? Perhaps the Creator implanted within us an inner mechanism that knows how to distinguish between truth and falsehood and between good and evil?
Accordingly, there is also slander when one person calls another a heretic and has reasons for it. In fact there are two claims here: 1. According to the definition of heretic, he is a heretic, and these are the arguments—and that is something that can be judged. 2. Independently of the substantive arguments, there is here a notice being given that a certain person’s encounter with so-and-so (or with his writings) generated in him the feeling that he is a heretic. And according to what we said above, this feeling carries weight. And perhaps its weight rises according to the reliability of the person conveying this notice. I would be glad to hear your response. Thank you.
Obviously the label “heretic” creates a feeling of reservation toward the person so labeled. That is a fact. Precisely because of this, I write what I wrote in order to uproot that feeling. It is an unjustified feeling, and therefore if it exists it should be fought.
Either you did not understand my point, or you simply do not agree with me but without giving a reason. I will repeat my claim:
My claim is that a person’s feeling is a certain indication of truth. A good example for me is that there are people who speak and it is clear to me, in a way I cannot explain, that they are lying. Or the opposite example: a person whom meeting produces a feeling of honesty, but without solid evidence—simply the encounter creates this. Perhaps my words sound mystical, but it seems to me that most human beings live by this. By the way, this can also be explained rationally: our senses know how to absorb messages hidden from the intellect’s eye, such as a person sweating or, alternatively, being calm, and thus an unconscious interpretation is formed about him.
The connection to the present discussion is this: I understood from you that there is no need to fear slander when substantive arguments are stated to support the statement, because arguments are testable and everyone can examine them and decide. I claim, by contrast, that even if on the substantive level the damage is not created by what the speaker says but by objective reality, there is nevertheless damage in my transmitting an emotional impression about another person—and that impression can indeed be true.
I understood, and I disagree—and I also gave my reasons.
A feeling can be an indication of truth, but when analysis shows that the feeling is mistaken, it should be abandoned. What you are proposing is fixation immune to all criticism and analysis. You have a feeling, and that is that, even if strong arguments are raised against it.
I write this precisely as someone who has written quite a bit about the importance of intuitions and the lack of necessity always to present analytic justifications. But from here to rejecting criticism on the strength of an analytic argument is a great distance.
From this your claim about slander falls away. If there is an argument showing that there is no slander here, then the feeling that there is slander here should be abandoned.
I agree that indeed the intellect prevails, because otherwise nothing is measurable. But my claim was that although it prevails, it does not entirely erase the feeling, and perhaps rightly so.
For example: if a person gives me the feeling that he is a swindler, but upon a thorough examination I conducted there are no suspicious indicators, I still think I would take precautions with him because of my initial feeling. And why? Because I do not know whether I investigated correctly; investigation has limits and mistakes can occur in it. On the other hand, it has major significance that I will not decide he is a swindler outright, but merely that there is room for concern…
With that I completely agree. Where in my words did you see anything else? My claim is that there is no slander here and the feelings are mere illusions. So here that is not the situation.
It seems to me that a large part of the core disagreement between the rabbi and those who are crying out (justifiably, in my humble opinion) to defend against slander lies in the sentence:
“The question of manners and phrasing is secondary and not very important.”
On its face, the question of manners (when we are dealing with such forceful injurious statements) is part of the very body of Torah law concerning verbal wronging and is problematic for many other reasons as well, and therefore it seems reasonable to me that the issue of phrasing should generate a backlash no less than the content (and even if one agrees with the content).
I also do not see any lack of manners here (perhaps I do not remember something, but generally there is nothing like that there). Is calling a heretic a “heretic” a lack of manners?
1. Upon further review, I see that in the case of the letter quoted here there is indeed nothing that is unequivocally contemptuous speech.
2. Regarding the question, “Is calling a heretic a ‘heretic’ a lack of manners?” — it depends:
If the definition of heretic were something sharp and clear, or alternatively if we were speaking about a person who is indeed unequivocally a heretic regarding the Torah
(mainly someone who believes that the Torah was written by human beings with no divine involvement or almost none), then there is no flaw
in calling that person by that term.
It seems to me that in borderline cases where one person says “heretic” and the other says “this is just slander,” usually it is not only a disagreement
about the definition of the principles of faith and which views deviate sufficiently from them to define their holder as a heretic (in such a case I
agree that it is logical for someone who thinks so-and-so is a heretic to say so), but rather a mode of thought and speech that intensifies
the matter (perhaps out of a wish to deter), or at the very least judges borderline cases unfavorably.
Therefore there is room to censure the person who holds such an approach, among other things because he demeans others (in the same way that someone who shouts
let us say “Bibi is a thief” on the basis of bribery suspicions is defaming him—both because it is not certain and because it is not exactly theft—and it is forbidden
to do so).
As an aside:
A. It seems to me that some of the ostensibly non-substantive responses are in fact substantive; it is just that the issue is not whether it is good to do X
(the thing under attack) but whether X is heresy/idolatry/destruction of religion.
B. In the case of Rabbi Druckman and Rabbi Sherman, I understood (from a secondhand source; perhaps I missed something) that part of the arguments of those invalidating the conversions was
that Rabbi Druckman is wicked/a heretic, and therefore his conversions are invalid even after the fact. Accordingly, it seems that the claims about Rabbi Druckman’s righteousness are
substantive to the ruling no less than the claims about the conversion).
A broad discussion of the concept of “slander” may be found by the interested reader in R. M.D.A.’s book The Sciences of Kofesh, which will be published shortly upon completion of the trilogy, soon, God willing 🙂
Regards, Levingil Kofash
“I explained that claims against the issue itself, however harsh, are not slander. And what about claims against a person because of his views (for example, calling him a ‘heretic’ or a ‘wicked person’)? I think those too are not slander, so long as they are reasoned. If I think so-and-so’s view is heresy with respect to the principles of faith or halakhah, even if others do not agree, in my opinion there is no problem with my calling him a heretic. It is a completely substantive description, even if it can be disputed” –
“I explained that claims against the issue itself, however harsh, are not slander. And what about claims against a person because of the facts (for example, calling him ‘stupid’ or an ‘ignoramus’)? I think those too are not slander, so long as they are reasoned. If I think so-and-so really is stupid, even if others do not agree, in my opinion there is no problem with my calling him stupid. It is a completely substantive description, even if it can be disputed” –
Agreed?