More on Women and Feminism (Following the Statements of the Rabbis of Eli. Column 123)
With God's help
In recent weeks, statements featuring the Torah gems (in both senses) from the study hall of the Eli pre-military academy have resurfaced again and again. Rabbis Klener and Levinstein insist on talking nonsense with their absurd essentialist stereotypes, and Rabbi Sadan issues, at most, a feeble denial. Only yesterday I saw a statement by Rabbi Sadan from four years ago that had been conjured up again (and incidentally, in my view it was entirely reasonable, even though I did not agree with it). Opposed to them rises the no less foolish and stereotypical protest of the various feminists and liberals.
What among us is somehow, and for no fault of its own, called "public debate" still looks as usual: stupid and superficial, tendentious, captive to slogans, taking things out of context, deficient in reading comprehension, subordinating reality and interpretation to desires and ideology, shrill and hysterical. Everything as usual. And yet, as part of the educational service I offer the public here on the site, I thought it proper—even though I have already dealt with this here more than once—to return once again to this topic and offer my own framework for the discussion, or in other words to explain again why and where all sides alike are mistaken (business as usual, did I already say that?…). Well, not exactly. I will actually formulate several shades of liberal criticism and explain with which of them I agree and which I oppose.
Starting Point
Following the above-mentioned gems of Rabbi Klener and the response of Rabbi Sadan in the Sabbath supplement of Makor Rishon (Parashat Tetzaveh, this year), I received from a friend by email his reaction (only the part relevant to our matter is cited here):
And I was even offended – because Rabbi Sadan apparently thinks our eyes are too dim to read what lies between the lines of his words—the things he did not say.
The words that ought to remove all doubt—that he does not agree at all with Rabbi Klener's remarks—do not spray from the tip of his pen. Nowhere did the keyboard on his desk consent to say that the women of Israel are equal to their husbands in their cognitive abilities, no less than in their spiritual virtues.
Indeed, this is how Rabbi Sadan tries to hypnotize us with his verbal acrobatics: the woman is "a partner in the responsibility to build the house of Israel," but, to prevent misunderstandings, he immediately clarifies what the woman's share in the partnership is: "The strength of our people is determined mainly by the wisdom of the woman." And how? "By all that emotional charge that the mother can give to the fruit of her womb, through nursing, and through maternal love and warmth … the self-confidence and joy in life that the mother—and specifically the mother—knows how to give her children … ", and she is the one who is "responsible for the mental health and emotional intelligence of the newborn"!
Indeed—full partnership! Full equality! For, in his words, "man and woman are equal to one another in the fundamental sense that they were created in the image of God." And therefore, "the woman, exactly like the man, can be filled with fear of Heaven and love of Torah … and every experienced person knows that a woman's love of Torah is the great force that spurs and helps men … to set fixed times for Torah study …".
"… the main thrust of their intention (that of the Sages) is that the emotion that engenders diligence in Torah … is the product of the mother, and the Torah that his father and rabbi teach him … [is the result of] the yearning of the soul imprinted on the boy by his mother." But do not err, Rabbi Sadan asks: "… the mode of Torah study for women must take account of their feminine character." That is—they should be taught things suited to them, to their level. Not every matter in the Talmud and Jewish law is suitable. And this matter, the study required by their feminine character, is defined by Rabbi Sadan as something that is "quite obvious".
Note well: Rabbi Sadan is precise in his wording several times, and says: "Torah study for women," and not Torah study by women. It is clear to the reader who will teach them Torah, given their lack of ability to study on their own.
Women are to be honored because they are the ones who spur the man to diligence, to set fixed times for Torah study. They are to be honored because they give our children mental health and emotional intelligence. They are to be honored because they themselves are filled with fear of Heaven and love of Torah, and so on and so forth.
What Rabbi Sadan wrote resembles the picturesque description coined by R. Yehuda Halevi in his reply to the king: "Our speech … is nothing but the chirping of the starling and the parrot. We do not know what we are saying, either in this or in anything else!"
To this I wrote back:
I agree with the main thrust of what you say, but the positive assertion that there is full equality is no better grounded than Klener's positive assertion that there is not. In general, equality as a fact is empty of content (it is not clear to me that it even has any meaning at all: are the distributions of intelligence and its varieties identical between the sexes?) and of course unsubstantiated. Incidentally, Eli Sadan himself wrote that women who are suited to it can study Torah and other fields, except that he asks that not all of them be forced to act against their nature (in his view). That is a more moderate claim (with which I also do not agree). True, he twists himself around a bit there, but the substance of what he says is not as extreme as you portrayed it.
And he replied to me:
Indeed, I hesitated whether to send you a copy and annoy you or not.
But although I knew your view of the 'depth' of women's learning, I discerned that even in your opinion this is not a genetic problem but the result of long years of deprivation, such that if they make the effort there is no reason to assume they will not reach the goal. If I exaggerated in the description, as you say, that too is a technique for stirring up interest and anger. No one knows that better than you. And if I erred in my assessment of your view of women's capacity for deeper study, I am sorry that you were angered. Forgive me. So – let them go on nursing, knitting, cooking, and baking, and above all – enabling us men to set fixed times for Torah study, in which their share is like a drop in the bucket.
And I answered him:
Please, don't be angry. Where did you see that I was angry? Not at all. I merely wrote my view. I think these comparisons are completely meaningless, if only because men are not equal to one another either, so in what sense can one say that women are equal to men? There are women of this sort and that sort, and men of this sort and that sort. There may be differences or similarities in certain averages, but why is that interesting? What matters is that every person be judged individually and according to his or her talents and inclinations, man or woman. All I said is that these general comparisons have no meaning and no importance, and it is a shame to engage in them.
Indeed, women seem to me on average much less profound, but that may certainly be the result of long years of deprivation. I have no way of knowing, and I do not think anyone does. So again, the discussion is a waste of time. The important discussion concerns the present state of affairs, and whoever denies the differences in the present state of affairs is simply burying his head in the sand (and against this I wrote in Makor Rishon and angered many of our female colleagues).
In short, my claim against the egalitarians is twofold: 1. What is the meaning of the claim of equality? And even if it has meaning, how do they know that equality indeed exists? That is no better grounded than the claims that it does not. 2. What matters is the present state of affairs, and here these egalitarians are seeing what their hearts prompt them to see. They champion equality in theory and apply it to practice, that is, to the description of the real situation.
But, as stated, I of course oppose the very approach of the rabbis of Eli, since they too err in those same two ways: a. They decide a priori that in essence there is no equality, and as stated this is the same error as no. 1 of the egalitarians. b. They demand that this be applied to reality, and that is an injustice even if they were right (for each person must be judged individually and not by his or her gender). Note this carefully, for in my view this is the balanced approach, which relates correctly to facts and desires and does not confuse them, as both sides do here. I am beginning to think that perhaps I should write some post here to clarify this issue.
In fact, the point is self-explanatory. Here I only wanted to sharpen the main point a bit.
On Baseless Essentialism I: Religious Prejudices
As I wrote, the rabbis of Eli (as do most of their Haredi and Hardali (Haredi-nationalist) colleagues)[1] view the reality before them through essentialist lenses. They examine and interpret it in light of the words of the Sages, and no observation or fact will change that. For them, women are always frivolous and emotional, and therefore a woman's glory is indoors—in other words, they are meant for nursing and cooking. Women, in their view, always want marriage at any price, even if the husband is diseased and abusive. It does not really matter to them that the facts here slap us in the face, and that women today certainly do not want to marry at any price. They believe this not because it is the reality they see, but because, in their opinion, that is what is written in the Talmud. Therefore reality must be interpreted in ways that do not contradict the binding dogma. I cannot refrain from quoting the immortal Zehava Galon: "Bennett thinks there is no occupation—because the Tanakh told him so…" (it is worth hearing the words in her own voice if that is recorded somewhere. It is truly a gem. In our family this is a joke that sends us into fits of laughter every single time).
In the past I already pointed to such a perspective with respect to non-Jews as well. The religious public sees them through essentialist lenses because of sayings of the Sages and verses of the Tanakh. Therefore non-Jews are always wicked, less moral than we are (they of course have no "Jewish spark" within them). Even when they do something moral, it is like the pig that stretches out its hoofs and says, "See, I am pure"… Such an attitude characterizes broad sectors of the religious public and its rabbinic leadership, but especially the Haredim. The rule is: the more essentialist you are, the more Haredi you are.
In my view, essentialist approaches—whether to reality or to the words of the Sages—are almost always baseless. It is very difficult to infer that some characteristic of a group or person is essential, eternal, and unchangeable. If the women or non-Jews we encounter have some characteristic, we have no way of knowing whether it is essential or accidental, that is, whether it can change in the future. Incidentally, the statements of the Sages can also be interpreted this way. I have not been convinced that they always intended essentialist claims rather than simply describing the condition of the women or non-Jews they saw before them. But even if they did think that we are dealing with an essential nature—it is certainly possible that they were mistaken. They may have drawn an essentialist conclusion from an accidental fact. They were not endowed with supernatural tools for understanding reality; rather, they analyzed and understood it as we do, and of course they too were exposed to the stereotypes and lack of knowledge that prevailed in their time (just as we are exposed to all these in our own time. We are all human). Just as among us there are rabbis and others who view the reality before them through essentialist lenses, nothing prevents the Sages from having done so as well (in their period this was even accepted. The ability to free oneself from essentialist vision is a modern ability).
On Baseless Essentialism II: Liberal Prejudices
Many people do not notice that in many cases the liberal protest falls into the same pitfalls. After all, none of our liberal cousins can determine that women are equal to men in some respect in an essential way. That too is an essentialist assertion, and therefore it too is baseless. Their "religious" assumption that a woman can do anything a man can do—manage, fight, and the like—is also essentialist. The assertion that religious essentialism is not true can itself fall into the essentialist pit. Their protests against essentialist statements like those of the rabbis of Eli are usually uttered with no less essentialist certainty.
And here we come to my first point of agreement: criticism that merely points out that religious essentialism is baseless, without putting forward an opposite positive essentialist assertion, is perfectly fine. But in many cases it sounds as though the liberals advocate an opposite essentialism, and it is important to understand that this too is as groundless and baseless as that of their religious essentialist cousins.
All this is said with respect to the differences between women and men. The reason is that even today no one disputes that there are clear differences between the two populations. Involvement and success in the exact sciences, management, level in chess and basketball (and not only in physical ability and endurance, which is obvious, but also in maneuvering ability and individual and team technique), combat in the army, degree of emotionality and sentimentality, and more. But our liberal essentialist cousins tend to dismiss this evidence and say (usually with uncompromising certainty) that it is the product of many years of social construction, brainwashing, and the form of education that girls undergo from infancy. Perhaps that is true and perhaps not, but we have gone no farther than conjecture. Perhaps there is an essential difference and perhaps not, but all these are not arguments but excuses. Once we actually see equality in these areas, then we can speak about facts. Therefore, if their intention is only to undermine the opposite essentialism, that is fine as stated. But presenting an opposite essentialist thesis is equally problematic.
And what about non-Jews and Jews? It seems to me that here the situation is more complex. In recent generations the gaps have narrowed so much that this casts serious doubt on essentialism along this axis. On the level of morality I see no difference today. In scientific success there are rising groups (especially from East Asia) that are certainly approaching Jewish achievements in these areas. One must understand that a state of inequality admits of no clear interpretation (for it may be essential or accidental), but a state of equality is evidence of equality. There may of course be offsetting parameters, such as that Jews are indeed more talented than Koreans but Koreans have more motivation, and therefore they come out equal. But that already strikes me as a rather speculative argument. The conclusion called for by a state of equality is that there is indeed essential equality between these populations.
True, with respect to the male-female axis as well there has been significant narrowing in our day, which indicates that the difference is not as sharp as people once thought. But we are still far from real equality, and therefore the question of essentialism remains open to tendentious interpretation. At least at this stage I would be cautious about essentialist assertions in either direction.
Do Essentialist Assertions Have Meaning?
In the background of these remarks I cannot refrain from noting a methodological question that is not simple. I am not at all sure that such essentialist assertions have any meaning whatsoever. After all, no one disputes that there are women who reach what are considered male achievements in all these areas. The same is true of men endowed with what are considered female characteristics in various fields. There are emotional men and cold, rational women. There are soft men and tough women. There are excellent female athletes and men with no athletic ability (for some reason, someone like that comes to mind now). So what is the meaning of saying that this is an essentialist assertion?
Notice that I do not mean to repeat the claim that it is difficult to determine whether essentialism is correct. I am asking a more fundamental question here: what is an essentialist assertion at all? Does it have any meaning? After all, no one today can claim that no woman can serve in Sayeret Matkal, play basketball on a men's team, or excel in physics. At most one can claim that on average there is a difference in the abilities of the two groups. So that is a claim about averages. But then the question arises: how different must the average be before we call this a valid essentialist assertion? What would the standard deviation have to be for that to happen? All these are questions to which the answers are undefined, and I doubt whether they even have answers (and again, not whether we have answers in hand. We do not. But whether there are answers at all. Whether answers are even possible).
By way of comparison, I do not think there is any cat that can study physics or play basketball at even the most basic human level. Therefore here it is easy to speak of an essential difference. The rule is sweeping and absolute for every individual in the group under discussion. But even the greatest essentialists would not deny that this is not the situation between women and men, and certainly not between Jews and non-Jews. Therefore I doubt to what extent essentialist assertions have any meaning at all.
And here we come to my second point of agreement: if the liberal criticism intends this point, I am inclined to agree with it. But my sense is that at least part of it intends opposite positive claims, that is, an essentialism of equality.
Do Essentialist Assertions Have Implications?
And to conclude this short post, all that remains is to discuss the most important question: what are the implications of these differences? Is there any point to this argument at all?
If there really is a sweeping essential difference between women and men, then there is a point to the argument. If women categorically cannot be infantry soldiers or study Torah, exactly as a cat cannot play basketball, there is no point in pushing them to do so. The same applies to the ability of men to raise children and send their wives out to work and bring home a livelihood. But as stated, that is not the situation. Even if there are differences, and even if they are unchangeable, eternal, and imprinted in the nature of man or woman, by all accounts these are statistical differences. It is clear to everyone that there are quite a few exceptions, and that the differences can appear on several different levels. There are women who are very well suited to supporting the family and some who are less so. There are men who are very well suited to raising children and some who are less so. The differences are not universal in at least two senses: they do not characterize all the individuals in the population, and they do not appear with the same intensity in every individual.
The conclusion is that even if this argument had meaning, and even if it could be decided, and even if it had already in fact been examined and decided, it still would not have much significance. When someone comes before us seeking admission to physics at the university, to Sayeret Matkal, or to the national chess team, there is no point in asking whether that person is a man or a woman. One must evaluate the person individually and see whether he or she is suitable or not. Every person has a right to engage in what he or she wants and can do, and has a right to be enabled to do so insofar as the situation justifies it. Acting on the basis of stereotypes is unjustified not only when the stereotype is false, but even if it is statistically true. Acting on the basis of stereotypes is improper because every person has a right to engage in what he or she wants and is talented for, even if most members of his or her gender or sex are neither talented for it nor interested in it. Therefore one should evaluate the candidate and his or her suitability as such, not through his or her belonging to this or that nationality or gender. There is justification for acting according to a stereotype only if there is pressure of time or resources and rapid, inexpensive decisions must be made. If the army has to decide which soldiers to accept to an elite unit, and has neither the time nor the resources to examine each one, then in such a case there is justification for making a decision on the basis of a stereotype (especially if it is a pronounced stereotype, that is, if the difference is significant, very broad, and unequivocal). But, as stated, one should avoid such a situation as much as possible.[2]
And if we return to the question of educating girls—whether to allow them to study Torah or other fields, whether to educate them to succeed and build a career—in my view, certainly yes. Boys and girls should receive the same opportunities even if there are statistical differences between them, and even if these are essential differences (that is, ones that cannot be changed, if such a thing can even be known). Afterward each and every one will have the tools and the opportunities, and he or she will make decisions according to what they want and according to their abilities and inclinations.
I conclude here with my third point of agreement: with this liberal criticism, which does not challenge essentialism but argues that it is irrelevant (as opposed to the opposite essentialism I described above), I completely agree.
[1] In fact, this is the essence of the Haredi outlook. The unwillingness to change Jewish law and one's attitude toward reality is generally based on an essentialist conception of both. They do not accept the possibility that these are facts or claims that are not essentialist and can change.
[2] Incidentally, the army really does do this through the Kaba score (one of the state's best-kept secrets). One of its parameters is place of residence. Thus, for example, my children, whose bad luck it is that their parents live in Lod, have difficulty being accepted to units and military positions that require a high Kaba score. The criticism of the army on this issue is, in my opinion, entirely justified (I now read that in 2018 the army plans to change the Kaba score, but I understood that not the stereotyping itself. They will merely update it).
Discussion
“One way to clarify discussions about differences in group averages is to assign them numbers. Psychologists often use a specific number to express the magnitude of the difference between the sexes, a number called the ‘effect size’ (Effect Size—a measure that indicates the strength of association between variables), which in its most common use is represented by the statistical value d. A positive d value indicates that a certain trait is more prominent among men, and a negative value indicates that it is more prominent among women. The value of d expresses the precise size of the average difference between the sexes.
A d value close to zero means that the difference between the sexes is only marginal. Once the d value reaches +/- 0.20, psychologists tend to regard the sex difference as meaningful. A d value of -0.20, for example, indicates that in 58 percent of women a certain psychological trait is present more strongly than in the average man. These are considered ‘small’ effect sizes. Differences between the sexes in the tendency to trust others, conformity, and general verbal ability fall within this range.
A d value of +0.50 is considered ‘moderate’ and indicates that in 69 percent of men a certain trait is present more strongly than in the average woman. Differences between the sexes regarding the ability to rotate an object in space, certain mathematical abilities (spatial geometry and arithmetic), and leadership in task performance (focusing on achieving the group’s goal rather than achieving harmony within the group) fall within this range.
A d value of -0.80 is considered ‘large,’ and indicates that a certain trait is present in 79 percent of women more strongly than in the average man. Differences between the sexes in the tendency toward emotional identification, greater interest in people than in other things, and lack of interest in casual sex fall within this range.
Higher d values are less common in psychology, but a value of +1.00 indicates that in 84 percent of men a certain trait is present more strongly than in the average woman. Differences between the sexes of this magnitude include differences in height, in expressing interest in engineering as a profession, and in the absence of sexual disgust (for example: not feeling disgust when hearing the neighbors having sex).
A d value of +2.00 indicates that among 98 percent of men some trait is present more strongly than in the average woman. These are the cases in which researchers come close to finding truly opposite traits in the two sexes, such as throwing ability, grip strength, and vocal pitch.
Regardless of the size of the difference between the sexes, there is almost always substantial overlap in the distributions of men and women. There are women capable of throwing a ball faster than certain men. Psychological sex differences concern group distributions, not binary dichotomies of all men versus all women.
Biology matters”
There are still practical implications to the question whether this is essentialism or social construction. For example:
Suppose we conclude, on essentialist grounds, that 20% of men can serve in an elite commando unit, while only 0.2% of women can handle it. Then in school education and guidance toward choosing tracks, we would place more emphasis on that option for male students than for female students; we would also try to enhance the prestige of that track when it comes to boys, and less so when it comes to girls. Because education and guidance always relate more to the average and the density of the distribution around it, and less to the extremes (even if the extremes are fairly broad). If we assume that the differences are essential, we would not even think of trying to equalize the averages through educational-social change.
By contrast, if this is social conditioning, one can choose to change the culture and society.
I assume nothing, aside from the ethical assumption that a woman has the right to realize herself however she wishes. Therefore one should not dictate roles to her regardless of her distinctiveness or some such social structure or other (I don’t know what an organic structure is).
I didn’t understand what all this added to the discussion. Is there some novelty in the fact that there are differences between populations in statistical distributions? Did I say there is absolute identity between the groups? If you define parameter d or any other parameter as a measure of statistical variance, will that change anything? I don’t understand your claim.
If you want to define a significant difference as essentialism, I have no problem with that, and I addressed that in my remarks as well.
These are marginal differences, and they become relevant only when the difference between the populations is very, very large. Such an argument does not justify any of the concrete proposals raised by the conservatives. If we are discussing preparation for Sayeret Matkal, I’m willing to accept that they invest more in the boys than in the girls (and even there, if there is a girl who wants it and is suitable, she can be allowed to try).
With God’s help, 27 Adar 5778
Rabbi Berekhiah (Yoma 71a) says that Torah scholars were called ‘ishim’ because ‘they are like women [Rashi: humble and physically weak] and perform valor like men.’
Rabbi Berekhiah’s words imply that there are traits that especially characterize women—such as humility, which brings openness and listening, and ‘extra understanding,’ which brings empathy for others and faith in their abilities—and there are traits that characterize men—such as firmness and insistence on strict justice.
On the other hand, Rabbi Berekhiah’s words imply the need that there not be a dichotomous difference between a man’s character and a woman’s character. A Torah scholar is required to blend into his character the best of both masculine and feminine traits alike. And jokingly: a Torah scholar should be a kind of ‘bahurilla,’ gentle as a gorilla (see the Wikipedia entry) yet firm as a ‘young man like the cedars’ 🙂
This does not mean that from an educational standpoint there should be identity in the roles of man and woman. In society and in the family there need to be figures of a ‘mother,’ ‘who emphasizes her role of persuading him with words,’ and tends to influence by pleasant ways; and there need to be figures of a ‘father,’ ‘who teaches him Torah,’ who tends more to set sharp boundaries and to ‘establish law and justice,’
Just as in leading the people there was a need for Moses—to lead firmly; and also for Aaron—to be ‘loving peace and pursuing peace,’ ‘loving people’ even while they were still distant from Torah, and drawing them near to Torah with cords of love, and the two complement one another—so too in a person’s education there must be both the figure of the ‘mother,’ who instills in the child the natural desire for good, and the figure of the ‘father,’ who develops more authority and commitment to law.
The differences between the father’s role and the mother’s role are not supposed to be dichotomous. Both father and mother should have both firmness and openness, both rationality and emotionality. But there should be a difference between them in emphasis. A father and mother who are ‘equal in voice, appearance, and height’ and in character—may, God forbid, be a recipe for producing a ‘stubborn and rebellious son’ 🙂
I do not know whether the differences in character and emphases between men and women are essential, or whether they are a result of ‘social construction,’ but it is important that they exist, and through the blessed contrast between them—they will lead to wholeness!.
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
The distinction between the father, who sets for the son the authoritative boundaries—‘teaches him Torah’—and the mother, who ‘persuades him with words’ and develops in him the natural desire for good, and the determination that they are equivalent to one another—appears in the words of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the Mekhilta on the verse ‘Honor your father and your mother.’ See also Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, in his book Adam U-Veito—Six Essays on the Family, p. 144.
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
Just as the moral duty leads the individual to prefer the survival of the collective in war at the expense of his private life, so too moral duty obligates the woman to bear children for the next generation at the expense of her private life.
I really liked the “just as.” I also liked that there are those who decide for her what she needs to do for them and for future generations. Very logical.
This is not true even regarding a man. As explained in tractate Ketubot, if a donkey-driver seeks to become a camel-driver—even though the new profession brings economic improvement—his wife can prevent his professional advancement, because that advancement would bring more frequent absence from home.
No one takes to the grave the honor and money he made in his lifetime—what will remain for us ‘at the end of the day’ are our descendants and our descendants’ descendants, who will continue our aspirations even ‘after a hundred and twenty years,’ and they are the true ‘self-realization.’
The self-realization of our other talents brings us livelihood and breadth of mind, a ‘preparation for a mitzvah’ for our main purpose: to do what is right and good in our lives, to prepare ‘a generation of the upright that shall be blessed,’ which will continue doing what is good and right after us as well.
My comment ‘Self-realization before obligation to family?’ refers to Rabbi M.D.A.’s words above in the discussion with ‘Y.D.’
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
Then would His Honor please explain the difference?
It’s really not very complicated.
1. There is no obligation to have children. No one sues a woman for not having children. Even in the religious dimension there is a mitzvah, and the mitzvah is incumbent on the husband, not on her.
2. Even if she has an obligation to bear children because only she can, that does not mean she has an obligation not to study Torah or not to study physics or to stay home and raise them.
3. Even if she has an obligation, it is her decision whether to fulfill it or not.
4. The fact that the individual prefers the survival of the collective (assuming this is a value and not a product of evolution) does not allow anyone to command him to do so. Thus, for example, in military ethics (and in my opinion also in halakhah) there is no obligation to sacrifice one’s life in war, only to take risks. Sacrificing one’s life is a decision of the person himself alone. And certainly there is no place for commanding half of humanity to sacrifice itself for the other half.
I don’t understand one thing.
A. If you admit that in practice there are some differences between man and woman, whether natural or cultural, essential or acquired.
In the end your argument is that every woman who is capable of serving in an elite commando unit has the right to do so.
And you are obviously not talking about her democratic freedom, but about the public good versus the individual.
In the end, when I look around me, even a woman who has the basic physical and mental qualities for the role nevertheless has internal restraints by virtue of her nature as a woman, such that when she overcomes them the result is not precisely equivalent to a man with the same traits and abilities.
A currently available example that I was exposed to: in one hospital there was, among others, a girl who served as a security guard. It is hard to exaggerate the coarseness and cruelty that characterized her actions in the role; when all the men beside her tended to compromise with the visitors, she immediately moved to the aggressive side, to the point that her friends were sometimes ashamed of her.
That is, can’t one accept the argument that when a woman serves in Sayeret Matkal she acquires an androgynous structure that is unpleasant, unattractive, and inappropriate?
B. I can also extend this argument more broadly: if we allow exceptions in every gender to realize their potential, this collapses the entire gender distinction that is generally correct, and therefore it endangers the accepted personality structure of the average woman and undermines the social order. After all, it is comfortable and pleasant for most men and women to feel, for instance, that women are indeed gentle.
Of course, in such a matter the will of the collective conflicts with the will of the individual, and perhaps the individual’s will will win, but in my first argument it seems to me that there is no complete conflict here.
I am not gifted in philosophical writing, but I hope you will answer my question at length.
Some of them really are marginal differences. Some are significant.
But the question is whether these differences bother us and whether we will try to change them or not.
For example, there is a very large difference in the success of men versus women in mathematics and physics (if we take as a measure the percentage of winning prestigious prizes in the field); the question whether this is an essential trait or not (my guess: at least for the most part it is not essential). That question can affect our attempt to try to change this average. How many resources and how much effort we invest in that, if at all.
That is a very practical implication
(this is not about trying to prevent or exclude, but about allocating resources with a view to shaping society).
Thank you very much for the column.
In my opinion, the real discussion here is the moral discussion, which you did not emphasize enough, in my view.
It is more or less agreed that average differences between men and women exist.
The questions of what they stem from and whether they can be eliminated are secondary questions. First one must clarify whether it is even proper to eliminate them.
Is it proper that there be differences between the sexes? Should we aspire to abolish these two modes of humanity because their existence sometimes creates injustices? Or should we fight the injustices but cultivate, or at least preserve, these differences, which also contain great blessing for us all (and on that too there is no dispute; the only question is whether that blessing is worth the price).
In my humble opinion, the main motivation on the liberal side stems from an interpretation—mistaken in my view—of the value of equality. According to this interpretation, the morally ideal state is not only equality of opportunity but also that everyone be equal in practice in every matter of importance—for example, that they have the same salary, the same intelligence, and the same satisfaction in life.
In the comment ‘Self-realization before obligation to family?’, paragraph 1, line 1:
…as explained in tractate Ketubot (62b), that a donkey-driver who seeks to change his occupation and become a camel-driver…
1. There is “He did not create it a chaos; He formed it to be inhabited.” Philosophically, one can argue that society as a whole desires life, not only the individuals within it.
2. I did not claim that. And still there are priorities in life, and Tosafot already wrote on the verse “See life with the wife whom you love” that work and career are secondary to one’s wife.
3. Everything is her decision, and still one can make a general public statement.
4. That is an interesting question, and still, from the words of the Minchat Chinuch and Rav Kook on the mitzvah of settling the Land of Israel, it does not appear as you say.
Today an interesting item was published on ‘Srugim’ about women ‘Torah scholars’ who want to be examined in the laws of niddah by the Chief Rabbinate, but it prevents them from doing so solely because they are women.
The women argue that this is invalid discrimination. All the more so because passing the exams grants certain benefits in various areas similar to an academic degree, so that even a woman who is not interested in becoming a ‘halakhic decisor’ but only in proving accumulated knowledge—cannot do so.
The Rabbinate, for its part, argues that the Rabbinate exams are meant to test suitability for a rabbinic position, and since women cannot be ‘rabbis,’ there is no place to let them take the exams.
It is amusing that the argument is taking place דווקא over the laws of niddah, laws that are plainly connected to the woman’s body.
Just imagine a situation in which women took guardianship and seized control over ‘male laws,’ and were the exclusive decisors regarding seminal emission, one wounded by crushed testicles, and one with a severed member…
Too bad there’s no like option here
Regarding the second point the rabbi raised about the significance of essentialism, it seems to me that those who support essentialism see every statistically significant bias as evidence that a certain factor exists in every man or woman, except that external reasons alter it (somewhat like what holders of the egalitarian position claim with respect to every bias toward one side—social construction, gender oppression, etc.). Of course, this has no practical implication whatsoever, but it still has meaning as a claim. What does the rabbi think?
1. Of course one should aspire to relate to the person as such and not to specific differences between the sexes, but almost always one acts in a state of lack of knowledge. The army not only lacks the resources to check who is suitable for a certain role; it also has no ability to check everything. All it knows is that X percent of the men it tries to put through the training succeed in completing it, and a significantly lower percentage of women succeed. If I manage the military system and want better results, it is preferable for me to accept a man. Only if I think the army’s role is to give people opportunities to realize themselves can I reach the conclusion that despite the above I must accept women.
2. In the same way, even regarding myself (and certainly regarding educators trying to guide their students), if I am a twenty-year-old and need to decide how to manage my life in the coming decade, my knowledge about whether I should start a family and how I am going to feel after starting a family is limited. It is worthwhile for decision-making to be guided also by what is accepted in society, because that reflects people’s real preferences. For example, if I (a man) am at work and do not see my children all day, it does not hurt me—my wife, yes. If this characterizes society (statistically), and I think it does, and I am not sure that a fifteen-year-old girl knows this, then perhaps it is still worthwhile for her to act in light of such differences.
3. I heard of a study that tried to examine whether the differences between the sexes are essential by comparing societies that strive for freedom of choice and erasure of differences between the sexes with societies that give less freedom. And they found that in the egalitarian Scandinavian societies there are actually more differences between the sexes (for example in occupational preferences—women work as nurses and men as engineers), which leads to the conclusion that there are essential differences between the sexes that are not a product of society.
4. In our wealthy society today we have many possibilities; there is no complete contradiction between preferring family and succeeding in a variety of other fields. Until not many years ago, people had to succeed in finding their place in the world correctly and quickly in order to survive. Today, even if we accept the existence of essential differences, we have much more space and freedom to try to succeed in various fields. A person can try to enter a field that stereotypically ‘belongs’ to the other sex; if he was mistaken, he still has time to correct it. In the past, if you made a mistake, the economic significance could be far too severe.
Your words contradict one another. In the previous post you argued that self-sacrifice in war is the proof for the existence of moral altruism stemming from the existence of a moral duty, and here you argue that there is no moral duty whatsoever on the basis of which one may demand self-sacrifice in battle. If there is such a moral duty—apparently to prevent harm to the collective even at the expense of harm to the individual—then it is unclear why one cannot demand a similar demand from women. And if you argue that there is no moral duty and what happens in battle stems from some evolutionary illusion, what proof do you have for the existence of altruism?
I think you are mistaken in describing the positions of Levinstein and Kalner.
They are not talking about essentialism, but about the institutional design of social mechanisms that necessarily must use statistical tools.
And this, in my opinion, is the main deficiency in your words:
You completely ignore the systemic institutional reality, which is not characterized—and cannot be characterized in the real world—by an individualized relation to each individual.
When we deal with the design of institutional policy, we will be required to use statistics in accordance with the empirical state of affairs before us.
I think you also ignore the reactive nature of these positions vis-à-vis the immense opposing forces that are trying to express a zealous positive stance against any claim of gender-role characterization, no matter what.
There is a slightly different essentialist claim—it’s not that women in practice are not equal to men, but that their ideal is not to be. That is, if a woman wants to act according to the ideal, she should help her husband study Torah, raise the kids, etc. It seems to me that this is a somewhat different claim, no?
It should be noted that suitability for a role is a necessary but not sufficient condition. If we assume that one woman out of a hundred is suitable for the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, it is still not worthwhile for the unit to accept her, because this will require it to adapt the unit to women in other areas. For example, to install additional bathrooms and showers in order to maintain separation. One must consider whether accepting that one woman is worth all the effort of these adaptations.
As for the “one thing” you didn’t understand, it seems fairly detailed. 🙂
A. I didn’t write that she has a right to serve in a commando unit, but to receive equal treatment. Service in a commando unit is an example one can argue about (for example, if it greatly disturbs other male soldiers, it may not be worth introducing one woman even if she is suitable. Clearly considerations of the public good can also carry considerable weight.
And if you are claiming that in reality even a woman who is ostensibly suitable is not suitable, that is a factual claim that should be examined on its own merits. If you are right, then we have no disagreement, and that is not what I was discussing. I am talking about a situation in which she really is suitable, not a situation in which they claim she is suitable and that is not true. So your example is not relevant.
B. This conservative argument strikes me as ridiculous. Nothing of the sort collapses any gender distinction, only distinctions that exist in the fevered imagination of conservatives. All these apocalypses stem from a baseless agenda and conservative fears of change. This is exactly how they also argued against giving equality to Blacks in the U.S.
As stated, we are not dealing with resource allocation. That is a different question, and it could also be applied to allocating resources to different groups according to talents, not necessarily according to gender.
In my opinion this discussion is not relevant. I am not talking about acting to erase the differences, but about granting rights to anyone who wants to do what they want, to the extent possible. That’s all. Whether it comes out equal or not—that is a byproduct that will emerge in any case. As I wrote, I am not sure what will actually come out (whether they are equal or not).
1. Indeed there is “He did not create it a chaos; He formed it to be inhabited.” And that does not override anything significant. Certainly if she has already fulfilled be fruitful and multiply. Philosophically, one can argue anything. I only recommend doing so at your own expense and not at the expense of others.
2. Yes, you did claim that. And what Tosafot wrote does not seem to me to change anything. The question there too is whether this is essence or accident, and even if Tosafot thought it was essence, I do not accept that (at least not so long as evidence has not been brought).
3. One may make statements as much as one wants. As long as you let her decide. I have nothing against statements, only against decisions and restrictions imposed on women.
4. I disagree. The Minchat Chinuch speaks about a risk to life, not necessarily certain mortal danger. After all, even among us you hear talk about the soldier’s duty to risk himself. Still, one cannot obligate him to sacrifice his life. But even if they did think כך, I disagree with them.
I understand. And regarding that very point I said there is no proof from here. This could be essence (offset) or accident.
1. I wrote that when decisions have to be made in the absence of information, there is justification for stereotypes. It is a question of dosages and of when the situation is such that this is indeed justified. I think such decisions are sometimes made far too easily.
2. Even so, only you should make the decision, not others for you. And if you are mistaken—you’ll be in good company. Therefore one may recommend to women to do or not do something masculine, but the decision should be entrusted to them.
3. On the face of it, what you described is far from being proof.
4. That of course strengthens my point.
I see no contradiction whatsoever. A person has a duty to perform altruistic acts. But the decision is his and not that of others for him, and the extent is also debatable. We are repeating ourselves.
I do not think I am mistaken. They said very clear things about female nature and not only about the institutional structure of society. These are facts, and I see no point in arguing. Just listen to what they said.
Beyond that, even regarding the institutional structure of society, I do not agree with the claim that what seems to you a worthy social structure justifies harming the aspirations and desires of others, particularly when it comes to half the population. The goal of liberal criticism is to bring about a situation in which there is individualized rather than stereotypical treatment. You assume an existing structure and on its basis argue against them. But that is precisely what they are trying to change. In my opinion, justifiably.
Indeed there is also such a claim. But it seems problematic to determine for her what she should do and what she should devote her life to. At most you can recommend it to her.
I completely agree, and I even wrote that above. By the way, regarding women serving in combat roles in the army, I personally oppose it for several reasons, so it’s a shame to argue specifically about that.
Hello Rabbi Abraham. I will preface with a short introduction of a few words and afterwards formulate my questions.
It seems that the substantive claim of the liberal bodies did not come out of nowhere, but is the product of a tremendous intellectual effort in the faculties of the humanities (the philosophy department), the social sciences (the gender studies department), and even the exact sciences (the neuroscience department—regarding the question of the male and female brain). This effort created an enormous gap between the liberal outlook and the conservative-religious outlook (the hyphen is deliberate, as in your article “Religious Zionism without a hyphen”); I mean that there are endless articles examining the differences between men and women, whereas the religious world has remained partly perplexed with generalizing texts from hundreds of years ago, which invites collision with the liberal-social outlook (social, specifically).
Not study but action is primary, and indeed the conservative approach advocates preserving the sexual gap in work and society (in which too the gap is steadily narrowing, in the sense of “diminishing, and good for it”). Yet if we go out and look, we will see that the women of the religious-Zionist public study and become educated, and the discussion is actually only about specific subjects, which presents the discussion somewhat differently. That is, there is a broad though not complete possibility of choice for women, so why not bless what has already been achieved? This is healthy conservatism, which does not stagnate but allows slow and controlled change as much as possible (and of course each case on its own merits).
The trend is clear: physical jobs are becoming fewer and fewer, and the world is becoming faster thanks to technology; therefore there is no dispute that “man has no advantage over woman” in a world that is gradually becoming more computerized, and so women will be integrated more into public activity. In my humble opinion there is an essential psychological difference, but that is not the place to elaborate.
Thus far the general introduction.
First question: setting aside the words of Hazal for a moment, is the Torah not essentialist? After all, women are hardly mentioned in the Bible.
Second question: what about the issue of modesty? This is an argument that many feminists mock, claiming that it is a pretext for oppression.
What is your opinion on the matter?
All the best.
I do bless what has already been achieved, and I call to continue and finish the job. Even if conservatism is healthy, the liberalism that balances it is no less healthy. You can view the situation as though each side is doing its job.
I did not understand your question about the Bible.
Modesty is a value, but its applications sometimes seem problematic. I am not among those who think they were invented for the sake of oppression (postmodern subversion), but in practice I agree that there is an element of oppression in them.
First of all, what a pleasure finally to hear a balanced and matter-of-fact position on these issues. Truly. A position that clearly distinguishes between the is and the ought, discusses each thing on its own merits, and reaches logical conclusions. I have only one really marginal comment regarding essentialism—you write that there is no way to decide whether there are essential differences or not, but I think straightforward reasoning indicates that there are essential differences (which, as you said, should not affect practice, because each case stands on its own, so this is a marginal point in my eyes). It is hard for me to believe that the psychological structure of a human being capable of growing a complete human being in her belly for some nine months, giving birth to him and surviving, and then becoming the being on whom the baby’s life depends for at least a year because only she can produce suitable food for him—would be entirely identical to the psychological structure of a human being who cannot do this. In other words, I think evolutionary psychology is a very significant thing when one approaches analyzing reproductive behavior—sexuality and motherhood/fatherhood in particular (among humans this is behavior that includes many aspects of life, and according to at least certain branches of psychology it also shapes the psyche in many ways), and indeed one can also see among “unsocialized” animals differences in behavior between males and females in these areas. So of course it is possible that human beings were created in the divine image and their psychology is completely detached from their biology because they have a divine soul, but I doubt this assumption, because when it comes to such basic needs, even if we perhaps have an additional layer that animals do not have—the ‘animal’ layer is alive and kicking. Strongly.
Many thanks. I would only note that it is obvious that there are psychological differences, but they are only averages and statistics, and besides it is possible that they are subject to change (at least to shift the distribution) בעקבות normative changes.
But you are completely right that this is a marginal point.
Ah, my point was not that “there are psychological differences”—that is obviously true—but that there is very reasonable basis to assume that these differences are not always the result of channeling and social construction, or in other words—‘essentialist’ differences (I define an essentialist difference not as ‘a difference that will always appear and can never ever be erased,’ but as ‘a difference that stems from the very fact that the specific being is a man/woman’).
Rabbi Michi,
See Berakhot 61a, the Maharal’s commentary, and Ein Ayah on Berakhot, chapter 9, section 15. It appears from the words of the Maharal and Rav Kook that the essentialist position has its basis in the holy mountains. But one must ask whether Adam and Eve are a basis for a generalization about all men and all women, or whether each man and woman is a world unto themselves. And it seems more likely that each man and woman is a world unto themselves. The proof is that on the one hand Abraham was secondary to Sarah in prophecy, and on the other hand Rebecca was secondary to Isaac in prayer.
Is the difference between human beings’ climbing ability and that of chimpanzees not an essential difference? Chimpanzees have longer and stronger hands than human beings. Does the fact that there are people who spend their whole lives in bouldering (a climbing niche) and climb better than some weak chimpanzees negate the essential difference? Does the fact that men have testosterone at ten times the level of women (in addition to differences in skeletal and muscular structure and almost everything down to the cellular level) not constitute an essential difference? Does the fact that the Olympic committee does not allow women with a certain testosterone level to compete with women not constitute an essential difference?
David, to that I can agree, but then it really does not matter. After all, the important question is not where the differences come from but whether they are changeable. Why should it matter for such a discussion where they come from?
Tomer, not at all. These are arbitrary definitions made for certain purposes, and they too can be challenged.
Equality indicates equality—that is true empirically, but theoretically it is possible that the potential of one (a Jew) is greater, but he does not realize it
It may be so, and it may be not. In principle, this is also true of the difference between human beings and cats (who may have the potential to become greater than human beings, only so far they have not realized it). The question is from where the one who says there is a difference draws his information: does it have a real basis, or is he merely treating an incidental difference as something essential?
I completely agree that it does not matter, that is obvious. It was just a side remark regarding the discussion about essentialism versus socialization, which in my view is a discussion about reality and not a moral discussion, even though “for some reason” there is a clear correlation between moral positions and positions about reality on this question.
As I understand it, according to the Har Hamor school and company, essentialism is only an explanation for the ideology.
The ideology is that women should stay at home and raise the next generation, even if it turns out statistically that women are capable of and inclined toward advanced studies; one must educate that this is their path in the world, this is their role, and this is their fear of Heaven!
And thus they build the line of girls’ education: “the home is the place of the woman—and not the social sphere,” “education for women will harm the quality of life of the nation,” from Rabbi Tau’s She-Asani Kirtzono.
They of course explain that this is also their feminine inclination, and therefore it flows with nature.
And regarding Torah study, in Hazal and the Rishonim is there a distinction between women’s and men’s service of God and fear of Heaven?
Will women receive providence, according to Maimonides, even if they do not study?
Was “an ignoramus cannot be sin-fearing, and an am ha’aretz cannot be pious” said only about men?
There are sayings of Hazal about women as they saw them before their eyes, but ideologically I have not seen a distinction.
Therefore in the end the real point of dispute is indeed how one educates girls. Toward what kind of fear of Heaven? Toward what aspirations?
And one must also remember that today women have fairly long periods in life when they are free, and the question is what they will do with that time—go to a challah-separating gathering or open a book and study …
“And it shall come to pass afterward that I will pour out My spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and daughters shall prophesy” Joel 3:1
Hello Noa. As you wrote, they make both claims (and in their view the connection is not accidental): this is the woman’s character (=essentialism) and this is what suits the nation. The connection is not accidental because that is how the Holy One, blessed be He, created the woman in order to fulfill her role.
As for differences between women and men in Hazal, of course they exist. Beyond statements that depend on the women they saw before them (such as “teaching her frivolity”), the very exemption of women from Torah study indicates this. It is hard to ignore that, and I do not think the rabbis of Har Hamor invented the matter. However, see my lecture here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oAFe4p7SDrw
Regarding providence, they would certainly answer you that the woman will merit providence if she fulfills her role, not necessarily through study.
But truly I see no point in splitting hairs over their views when I entirely agree with you.
What does providence have to do with role? If a person apprehends intelligibles, providence will rest upon him.
Isn’t that true?
Is there a written summary of the lecture?
Are we continuing to split hairs according to their method? If you want me to be the devil’s advocate, then yes: a woman who fulfills her role will merit providence without attaining intelligibles (or via her husband, whom she enables to attain them).
I have no written summary, but the principle appears in my article on reasoning: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A1%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%99/
I think I did not stand there on the implication regarding women’s obligation (except perhaps by hint). It appears in the video lecture.
I think the real difficulty arises when we recognize the importance of the family unit, and nevertheless want to preserve the woman’s ability to realize herself. A young couple trying to decide how they will run their household, understanding that family is important to both of them, and also understanding that they are one of those couples, like most couples, in which the woman is more suited to raising the children and the husband to working—since he will not need to take maternity leaves and the like.
Certainly this should be a private decision of each couple, according to the particular conditions of the case, but very often it seems that the decision will be that the woman stays at home and makes do with part-time work, while the husband goes out and works full-time. Not because of limiting statements and education, but simply because of limiting reality, together with belief in the importance of family.
And thus it seems that without any limiting factor at all, entirely freely, women will leave themselves at home.
If so, assuming the rabbi agrees that there is value to family, how should the household be conducted more correctly, in a way that allows the woman to realize herself without harming the family? It seems there is a need to give up one of the two sides—either family or the woman’s self-realization.
You wrote it all yourself. Each couple will decide according to its understanding. My claim is that one need not set things in stone in advance; rather, one should allow each couple and each person to decide according to their abilities, inclinations, and outlook. Clearly, raising a family requires sacrifices. It is not clear why every type of sacrifice must be made by one predesignated member of the couple.
“In their time this was even accepted. The ability to escape an essentialist view is a modern ability)”
Hello Rabbi,
What is meant here? Could you please elaborate? Why is such an ability possible only in the modern period? Could people in the past not look at things in a deep and non-essentialist way?
It is not only a question of depth and wisdom. There is accumulated experience and human-scientific-cultural development. Once, people took everything they saw as if it were an ingrained nature that could not be changed. Thus the world was perceived as eternal (it had always existed), and so too human nature. In the meantime we have developed and seen that things depend on circumstances and situations and change from time to time.
It seems to me that Rabbi Eli Sadan’s argument is more sophisticated than the simple essentialism of Rabbi Kalner and Rabbi Levinstein.
After all, no one disputes that in current technological reality only a woman’s body can bring children into the world. If we assume an organic structure of society based on a division of labor, one could argue that within that structure the woman’s social role in bearing children should take precedence over the private preferences of this or that individual woman. On the basis of this claim, he disagrees with you regarding the other claims as well (Torah study, military service, profession, and so on).
The implicit premise in your words is that society has no organic structure, and therefore one cannot demand of women that they give increased priority to having children.