On Experience, Internalization, and Study (Column 452)
A few days ago I saw a charming snippet on Facebook that amusingly reverses roles between men and women:
| Meanwhile, in a parallel world.
Into the Great Synagogue “Ohel Leah” entered the city’s rebbetzin, the brilliant Rebbetzin Penina HaKohen, her face aglow with the light of Torah and with ritcha d’kedusha (holy fervor). She came in, thoughtfully twirled the lace-top wig she wore, and banged hard on the shtender. “My teachers and rebbetzins!” she cried in a weeping voice to the audience of learned women who, with eager eyes, awaited her words. “Bitter and painful calamities are befalling us, and we must vigorously scrutinize our deeds—and mainly our husbands’ deeds—to find why this has come upon us. And it is clear as the sun that men’s standards of modesty are deteriorating, and that the new fashions prevalent among the men in our camp are what bring these harsh decrees upon us. These are things unknown in the days of our foremothers!!! Our modest forefathers would wear long galabiyas that blurred the lines of their bodies, and today the breach has opened and men, brazenly and in the manner of the gentiles, wear a garment called ‘p.’ (for reasons of modesty the rebbetzin did not utter the explicit word ‘pants,’ so as not to arouse improper thoughts) which accentuates what ought not be accentuated. I have heard there are men who cause the multitudes to sin, whose long pe’ot (sidelocks) flutter in the wind and draw the attention of righteous, eye-guarding women hurrying to their house of study. Curled pe’ot slicked with gel, in the fashion of the gentiles—who has heard such a thing? Has anyone granted a hechsher (approval) to a payah (sidelock) that extends beyond the jawline? In recent years a new and shocking fashion has also spread among the Hasidic public: they don very tall shtreimels, growing higher year by year—truly “the sons of Zion have grown haughty.” These shtreimels have tips they call in men’s parlance “spikes,” and I have heard that some of these shtreimels are adorned with various hues and are not of a single dark color that does not catch the eye. And are the Lithuanian men any better? It is unthinkable that a kosher, modest man would wear a suit in the daring color “blue,” which may draw women’s attention and lead them to improper thoughts!!! And the new decree that has spread in recent years—men driving? Who ever heard of such a thing in the days of our foremothers—that modest, pious men, whose entire honor is inward, should drive? And where do they even have to go, I do not understand? Indeed, at times of urgent necessity one may permit travel to a distant place, and therefore we have prepared for men a special section in the back of the bus, for their urgent needs only. My father, a modest and upright man, a husband to a learned woman, never dreamed of having his own private car. He would sit in the back of his home and went out only for urgent needs, so as not to cause others to stumble. Dear women, go home and tell your husbands that you do not permit them such behavior. After all, an upright man does his wife’s will. And may a blessing come upon you.” With that the rebbetzin concluded her stirring words of encouragement, and the learned women in the beit midrash opened Tractate Men and returned to their studies. |
I very, very much enjoyed this piece, and then I heard that it’s a genre that has existed for years, mainly by Sharon Majewski, nicknamed “Rebbetzin Pashmina,” who has posted several pieces of this sort on her Facebook page. See for example this clip.
The Meaning of Immediate Experience
What do I find in such pieces? Let me put it gently: we’ve seen wittier ones. It wouldn’t pass as a Purim rabbi’s dvar Torah in a self-respecting yeshiva. And yet there was something very powerful in it for me.
The content, of course, was no novelty to me. I have always loathed the empty talk of rabbis (men, naturally), usually not the sharpest pencils in the case, who tell our modest women—in that despicable genre called “women’s classes”—that their modesty brings us to eternal life, that the length of their sleeves and thickness of their stockings hasten the Messiah, that their pots and cauldrons are the vestments of the High Priest, that their self-sacrifice in keeping the children beside the apron so that the husband can pray and study is greater than saving lives, and that in general their exalted level is higher than any Nasi of the Sanhedrin who is also the High Priest—especially if they are illiterate and thus do not stumble in Torah study, Heaven forfend, etc., etc. And of course, it’s important to stress the well-known fact that halakha elevates the status of women far above that of men. Their spiritual level is immense and lofty, extra understanding has been planted in them, “all glorious is the king’s daughter within,” and he honors her more than himself. In short, halakha’s attitude toward women is more enlightened and wondrous than anything you will find in any other society. There is no limit to the slogans and demagogic, peremptory declarations devoid of substance. I always thought that if I were in the place of our modest women, I would explode.
But until now, that was only in my intellect. It was understanding, not experience. I understood that this drivel comes from demagogues trying to keep women in their wretched state (in the kitchen and at the sewing machine) and fill them with a soothing, silencing sense of satisfaction, thereby removing from their (hollow) heads dangerous ideas of self-realization or intellectual and spiritual advancement, Heaven forfend. In these pieces I experienced, for the first time, a situation in which such a text lands on me, concerns me, and is directed at me as the listener. Suddenly I immediately grasped the feeling that the speaker with the beard and the frock coat—and in this case, with the lace-top wig (what is that, for heaven’s sake?)—is brazenly doing his business on me from the high diving board, with utter and blatant contempt for my abilities and desires. Suddenly I understood how hard it is for the listener—male or female—to think and be persuaded in such a situation, to believe it’s simply raining (though many modest women manage it. Greater than the High Priest, did I already say?). I realized that women, like me, are made of the same stuff and are offended by the same kind of ridiculous and insulting treatment. Until now I “knew” that if I were in their place I would explode. But now I understood that this is not hypothetical; it really happens to them (I don’t need to be in their place). They—or at least some of them, those who have not yet lost their human image despite the efforts to strip it from them—indeed do explode, just as would happen to me, and with complete justification. The matter moved from a state of “know this day” to “take it to your heart,” from intellect to experience.
At first I simply chuckled at the lines, and that was it. But then I realized how refreshing and instructive this perspective is—and, for me, quite new. It was a very powerful experience for me. I managed to feel the sensations that until now I had only understood intellectually. The matter reminded me of Mary’s Room, a thought experiment already mentioned here a few times. It teaches that one can know the whole of optics in all its branches, but if one has lived one’s entire life in a black-and-white room, then despite all that knowledge one still has no idea what color even is. Encountering red or green is a wholly new experience even for a world-class expert in optics upon leaving the room, for it brings experiential content to the comprehensive yet empty intellectual understanding he had until then.
I’ll note that I last mentioned Mary’s Room in a similar context, in column 446. There, too, I argued that one who has not experienced the feminine relationship to makeup cannot issue halakhic rulings on that subject. I broadened it there to any decisor required to rule on a question whose circumstances he does not know by direct (rather than merely intellectual) experience. I claimed that in questions where experience is necessary for decision (though this is probably a small minority of them), and when the gap between worlds is wide enough, such a decisor cannot and may not rule. That is exactly the effect I am talking about here. I have never experienced what a woman experiences when men talk over her head and, with deadly seriousness, employ ridiculous slogans that describe her to herself—without her even having a mouth to tell them to do us all a favor, jump off the diving board, and drown themselves.
The woman is the subject of these demagogues—some mute object discussed over her head as if she were a pet cat. These prophetic fools speak in learned tones as if they were omniscient, and explain to me, the simpleton, what God will do to me and what reward I will receive for the thickness of my stockings and the quality of my cooking (so long as I keep cooking and stay silent, of course), as if any of them has the faintest idea what he’s talking about. Needless to say, the stupidity of the speakers and of their words only sharpens and magnifies the sense of insult. Suddenly I understood the frustration that leads women to protests, to stances, to statements, and to extreme steps against religious conservatism. Many times I had (and still have) criticism of their positions, but now I understand that it comes from great and justified frustration. Fools have plowed across my back, and I am to keep silent, swallow, digest, and obey.
A Puzzling Question
In a conversation about this, Haya Ta Deutsch shot me a surprising question directly to my face in response to what I said:
Haven’t you just defined the very role and power of art, literature, legend, and midrash? Isn’t what you’ve written here a kind of ‘learning’?
She refers to a position I have expressed more than once regarding learning aggadah and midrash. I claimed there is no “learning” there, among other things because no new conclusions or insights are inferred. And here I did not learn something new; I only experienced something I already understood. And yet what I am describing is a significant and important lesson that I learned from it. Is that not learning?
She also tied this to other statements of mine:
I’ve heard/read you several times talk about the inability to rule for a person without understanding where he is, what his feelings truly are. You spoke about responsa from the Holocaust: that one who wasn’t there cannot rule. Seemingly, the role of art, etc., is to do exactly that. It reminds me of the new insight I had after seeing Gur Heller’s film “Layla” (“Night”), when all at once I understood the Palestinian situation in a wholly different and much deeper way.
Indeed, I wrote about these matters in a paper, in the above column, and also in the trilogy. If, indeed, bridging the experiential gap is the role of aggadah and midrash, then seemingly such engagement is unequivocally Torah study.
This question prompted me to rethink my firm stance regarding the study of aggadah and midrash. Just as Mary, upon leaving her room, learned something new about colors, so too I suddenly understood differently things I already knew beforehand. Seemingly that is what aggadah and midrash are supposed to do: transfer knowledge from the mind to immediate experience. It is a different kind of knowing. Is that not Torah study—or study in general? After I argued in column 450 for the obligation to try to enter the other’s position, this seems like a good opportunity to apply those points to this very sugya.
Reminder: My Position on Studying Aggadah
My claim about learning aggadah has two tiers: it is not “learning,” and it is not “Torah.” It is not learning because we do not accumulate new insights, and our conclusions will always match the understandings with which we approached the text. It is not Torah because these insights are universal. Conclusions such as the duty to be humble, to behave morally, or various psychological insights are not unique to Torah. In fact, they are usually drawn from other sources (like our own experience), and only afterward do we find them in aggadic texts. Even if there is a novel article or class in aggadah, the novelty is never in the content or conclusions but in the method of interpretation (how the well-known conclusions were extracted from the text). Sometimes that can be a brilliant move, but the brilliance is only on the interpretive plane. In the “west” (i.e., in content and conclusions) there is nothing new.
In the terminology I have proposed in the past, there may be room to define such insights as Torah “in the person” (be-gavra) but not “in the object” (be-cheftza). But if midrash is Torah be-gavra, then so too, I argued, are Kant and other philosophers; likewise Crime and Punishment or other fine literature and poetry, etc. From all of these we learn various insights (almost all of them known in advance, of course, but nicely presented in the text, which at best helps us internalize and reinforce them).
Another Look at Studying Aggadah and Midrash
Haya’s remark truly led me to reconsider this position. I’ll start from the end: bottom line, I conclude that I accept the claim partially. At times, such engagement does constitute a kind of learning, for the transition from understanding to experience is indeed a form of insight and an added depth. But I still maintain that while it may be learning, the content thus learned is not Torah (be-cheftza). I will now explain briefly.
First, the lessons I derive in this way are matters of fact, not norms. What a woman feels and what is or isn’t important to her are factual questions, and as such they are not Torah. One could also conduct a survey of women and ascertain their opinions and feelings. This is done all the time in (superfluous) departments of gender studies and psychology. What has Torah to do with that?! I do not claim these questions are unimportant or unnecessary for halakhic ruling. Certainly they are, as I explained above. But there are many questions necessary for halakhic ruling, and not all of them can fall under the rubric of Torah. For example, one must know various areas of mathematics to calculate distances for graves and mixed species, and even the laws of mikva’ot. One must know physiology to rule on the laws of niddah, terefot, and life-saving on Shabbat. One must know psychology to understand the human soul, and so on. Does that mean that engagement with any of these fields is Torah study? Unlikely. At most these are instruments of a mitzvah (machshirei mitzvah) for the sake of halakhic ruling, but not every instrument for ruling is Torah study. To take an extreme example: eating breakfast and getting a good night’s sleep give me strength to study and rule on halakha—does that make them Torah study? In my view, no.
[In parentheses I’ll add that there is room to discuss whether factual inquiry conducted in a beit din (examining witnesses and clarifying reality) falls under Torah study. I tend to think not, and in my opinion that, too, is a mere instrument for a mitzvah. Yet within court proceedings there may be room to argue that the entire inquiry is conducted within the context of halakhic ruling, and therefore perhaps it is included in the learning itself. Likewise, an archaeological inquiry done to clarify a term in the Mishnah or the Talmud could perhaps be considered Torah study, though studying archaeology per se, as I understand it, is not Torah study.]
Second, this modern midrash certainly added an important dimension to my understanding of women’s experience, but most midrashim do not do this for me. At least for me, midrashim at best further internalize somewhat the well-known and obvious values or insights, but they do not add information, nor even understanding and internalization (experientially). In this sense, in my estimation the modern midrash I brought here is an exception. Note that this consideration (unlike others I present here) leads to the conclusion that in most midrashim there is not even learning here, let alone Torah.
And third, the insights that arise here are not unique to Torah. They are universal insights. This is certainly true of our case, which concerns a factual understanding of the nature and situation of women in the world. But it is also true of cases where some aggadah sharpens for me a moral insight. I have already explained several times that moral values are universal (there is no uniquely “Torah morality”), and therefore learning moral values is not Torah study. Think of a story that raises psychological insights (like Crime and Punishment) or moral-human insights (like Uncle Tom’s Cabin), and the like. How does “studying” such texts differ from studying the modern midrash about women’s situation? Could it not be written and studied by anyone, Jew or not? Were the circumstances of Black people in the U.S., who felt their white masters treated them as objects, as mere property devoid of feelings, thought, and dignity, essentially different from the lesson learned here about women (I am not comparing the situations themselves, of course)? In what way is it different? Only in the religious identity of the author, if at all. Why, then, should this text be Torah while Uncle Tom’s Cabin or The Help (the film and the book) are not?
One could of course claim that indeed all of these are Torah (as they do in secular batei midrash today, where sources of inspiration are by definition Torah—though for them this has no normative meaning). But if everything is Torah, we have emptied the definition of Torah of content (which is why, in my opinion, Torah is not actually studied in those batei midrash, even when they tackle the Ketzot—which usually they do not, and not without reason). I have explained in several places that perhaps all these (including Uncle Tom’s Cabin) can be seen as Torah be-gavra, but that is not Torah be-cheftza (unlike the Ketzot). Either way, it is no different from studying general literature or general philosophy.
Perhaps where aggadah sharpens for me the meaning of a law—that is, a normative instruction belonging to halakha itself—there is room to regard it as Torah. Matters said around halakha can certainly be considered a certain halakhic addition. But regarding lessons from other fields, I do not see how they can be considered Torah.
Source of Inspiration or Source of Authority
These three points are distilled into a fourth aspect that threads them all together. When we study midrash or aggadah, we are engaging a source of inspiration, not a source of authority. The conclusion begins and ends with me and what seems to me reasonable or moral. No one accepts things merely because they were stated or extracted from the aggadic text, unless he himself agrees with that conclusion (and usually already knew it beforehand). At most, he finds in it inspiration that resonates with ideas he himself had already thought, and, as we saw here, perhaps also internalizes their significance and transfers to him an experience he did not have directly. But of course this also happens in many other texts that by all accounts are not Torah, while at the same time it does not occur in many aggadic texts. Therefore, to regard such texts as Torah seems to me very implausible, even taking into account the novelty evoked in me by the experience as I described above. If I had not understood on my own (intellectually) the problem in the attitude toward women, this modern midrash that transfers the insight to the experiential plane would not have convinced me that it exists. At most it can awaken me to that insight and perhaps reveal to me that it exists, and of course also bring it to an experiential level within me. But a new insight that I do not find within myself—no midrash will cause me to accept it. From here we see that midrash is not a source of authority but, at most, a source of inspiration.
We must remember that each of us draws inspiration from different sources. It can be fine or not-so-fine literature; the flight of a bird; a utility pole or a solitary streetlight standing at the edge of the neighborhood; a passerby’s remark overheard by chance; cold weather; an image I saw; a poem I read; and more. All these raise in me various insights, some perhaps very important and sometimes even applicable to Torah and halakha—but they at most direct my attention to these insights; they do not teach them to me. Inspiration from such a source is not learning. Beyond that, as I have explained, these insights are also not unique to Torah but universal. All this reflects the fact that, for us, these sources do not constitute sources of authority. I am not obligated to accept the insight I drew from the bird or the utility pole. Therefore I claim that drawing inspiration from some source generally should not be regarded as learning; and even if it is learning (as in the case of Rebbetzin Pashmina), it is not Torah, for all the reasons I have described above. As I mentioned, secular batei midrash treat sources of inspiration as Torah and their engagement as Torah study—but they truly do not distinguish between midrashim and literature or poetry or any other text. I disagree with them on this, of course.
Conclusion
Returning to the modern midrashim—like the one we saw above, or those of Rebbetzin Pashmina—it seems right to say that I partially retract: this is indeed learning (unlike engagement with most midrashim), just as Mary’s exit from her black-and-white room taught her something. But I still maintain that what I learned in this way is not Torah.
Discussion
Despite the fascinating satire, are we completely ignoring the concept of “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”? Is there really absolute symmetry between the parable and the point? (As also in the comparison between analysis and scholarship between the two sexes.)
In addition, are you also prepared to challenge your own view regarding spiritual experiences and emotions? Perhaps if you were to experience such things, you would change your view of religious faith (first of all in that very respect, that religious experience has meaning, because it cannot be explained rationally and only one who has experienced it can say so…)
Could I get a translation into Hebrew? Or tell me what language this was written in, and then I’ll try Google Translate.
There’s automatic language detection there (though I understood it even without that)
The language of people who were born with feeling. If you don’t feel, you won’t understand
I’ll try anyway. I asked two things.
A. In your view, is there no place for women’s modesty, and for discussions about attractive clothing that they wear (top lace, etc.), as a fence around the commandment “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind”? And is it not proper that men should conduct the discussion on the subject, since they are more skilled in scholarship?
B. You’ve claimed more than once that emotional religious experiences are meaningless in your eyes as a value for religion. I asked about that: in light of your change of position regarding emotional understanding of things, would you agree to reconsider this issue as well? Because in my opinion, a person who undergoes an emotional-spiritual experience suddenly understands its value and tremendous importance. And how much emotional connection to the commandments is the whole essence of their observance. As stated, it is impossible to explain why this is true until one feels it.
“Before the blind” with regard to a woman’s clothing—simply insane chutzpah. I’ve never heard of a prohibition against buying a nice house or driving a nice car so as not to cause the public to stumble under “before the blind.” This is halakhic nonsense.
Anyone skilled in halakha wouldn’t bother with this nonsense.
When writing prose, as opposed to poetry, one ought to explain one’s intentions in words and not rely on the feelings that will be aroused in the reader. On this site, the questions, answers, and arguments belong to the prose genre. This is irrespective of the problematic character and tendencies of the site owner, an autistic/Asperger’s person, who does not understand what people are saying to him unless they explain it.
As for your questions:
A. Demands of modesty from women did not arise in the column, not even with a magnifying glass (they arose only as an expression of the attitude toward women as an object), and I cannot see the connection between them and what I wrote. And regarding the demand itself, you were answered correctly, and this is not the place to elaborate.
Whoever should conduct the discussion is anyone who understands halakha and knows the female psyche well, whether man or woman. Actually, that is who should decide. Anyone can express an opinion. But even that isn’t really what I was discussing here. The main question is the content and character of the discussion (the attitude toward women as an object).
B. There is not the slightest connection between experiences and emotions that I discussed in the past and experiential insight into a defined claim (which is my subject here). Experiences in themselves have no religious and/or intellectual value whatsoever; direct understanding of claims and their meaning does. Mary’s experience of color upon leaving the room is not an emotion.
Someone who experientially understands the meaning of the commandments misses the point badly. He turns them into instrumental means. That is a good example of the bias in emotion.
From now on, would it be correct to say (even on your view) that literature, aggadah, and poetry are “preparations for a mitzvah”? They are preparations for a mitzvah in the sense that their role and purpose is to expand the soul and consciousness, to sharpen subtleties and insights, where that refinement and sharpening are useful for anything whatsoever, including the performance of commandments. For example, Shakespeare’s King Lear is useful for precision and depth regarding honoring father and mother—as Rabbi Lichtenstein argues in his essay “Torah with Inheritance,” and so on. (One person is influenced by a modern parodic midrash, another דווקא by an ancient midrash.) And what is the difference between a preparation for a mitzvah and the category of “Torah in the person”?
Of course. I never claimed otherwise. Midrash is like King Lear, Dostoevsky, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, or a good movie. That is precisely my claim.
Moishe Blech, I apologize for the insolence. I am not a Neturei Karta person, nor do I hold these positions, but in any case I am willing to discuss them seriously and not disdain them like the “liberals” who dominate public discourse today. The data show that infidelity and divorce are more common today in the general sector, so yes, it is worth discussing seriously every aspect of the issue of separation between the sexes, and not burying our heads in the sand and compare it to buying an apartment or a car.
Rabbi Michi, you brought here a satirical post which, alongside its humorous side, you also sided with in its content and the criticism that emerges from it, among other things regarding women’s modesty in the private sphere and the fact that men deal with women’s issues, etc. On that I challenged you, even though that is not the essence of the column, since these are interesting insights for discussion that arose from it.
B. That itself—I claim that sometimes, in order to discuss the importance of a certain emotion, one simply has to… feel it. Just as you did not understand intellectually the significance of sensation and emotion in illustrating a certain insight. What I mean is that it is hard to discuss the value of an experience without experiencing it.
And by the way, in my opinion a person with feeling would not have responded so cynically to a comment on his own column. Just as you would not have responded that way to a participant in your lecture.
I wonder whether with a bit of creativity this could be turned into a mitzvah in itself of the kind of general commandments. Suppose: “And you shall do what is right and good” (how can you do that if you do not have deep and rich human understanding?)
To Chayuta,
I read your book, The Rabbi’s Wife, the Bishop’s Wife, an extremely stirring story and very well written. I have a few questions, if I may:
A. Will the book be translated into other languages such as English, French, and Spanish?
B. At the end of the book it describes how the hands meet despite the corona regulations. Ostensibly despite the laws of religion as well. As a religious reader this arouses a bit of discomfort. I wanted to ask how you approach this? Is this what suits the characters, and therefore that description has to be included? Or from your perspective does it not matter? I have no problem with the romance between them, but from your perspective as a writer, how do you understand what is right to describe and what is not right to describe (how does it work, in short)?
Thank you, but A. I don’t think Rabbi Michi’s site is the appropriate place for this discussion. B. The protagonists of my book are not necessarily observant about refraining from touch, and I try to describe them as they are, credibly. Of course I have boundaries, but they do not necessarily run through that point.
I have no other way to contact you, so I took the opportunity. If it’s not suitable, then thank you.
As far as I’m concerned there’s no need to delete it; it doesn’t matter to me. Up to the discretion of the site owner. And meanwhile, thanks for the advertisement, and while I’m at it I’ll add for the questioner that the book has already been translated into English and is available on Amazon.
And by the way, the subject of boundaries of modesty (and perhaps other areas) in the work of a religious creator is an interesting topic, and if a post is ever devoted to it, I’ll presumably have something to say about it.
It’s not only matters of modesty. It’s also honoring Torah scholars, for example. Once I wrote a piece about a Torah scholar I knew and mentioned that he had sweat stains under his armpits. It was clear to me that this was part of his description and essential to the story. Literary freedom is sometimes necessary, but what exactly the tune is—that’s a question that intrigues me.
There are nuances here of course: do you want to mock him? Are you writing about him (not as a Torah scholar, but as a person) out of respect? It is permissible to mock the wicked. Simply making people ridiculous—less to my taste.
It wasn’t mockery. It was part of the contrast in the story. I too have no interest in mocking people.
Where did the issue of separation between the sexes come up? You raised the issue of women’s modesty in what I think is a far-fetched context of “before the blind.” In the halakhic definition this is complete nonsense, and I brought you the contrast to “You shall not covet” to emphasize the absurdity in the connection.
Separation is also part of the issue of modesty. If immodesty (including lack of separation) causes infidelity and prohibitions, then there is “before the blind” here, and of course one must add to that the daily sin of “do not stray” and lustful thoughts, etc. etc.
You don’t have to be a great genius to understand that the inclination is far more effective in the case of women than in purchasing a house, and that this causes many more serious transgressions. Be that as it may, this “contrast” does nothing to answer my claim. Maybe indeed there is a problem with causing jealousy and covetousness? One does not answer a difficulty with another difficulty. I did not understand how one sees here the complete nonsense of the halakhic definition.
Because the definitions of “before the blind” speak of active causing to sin, as in “the two sides of the river,” where without him the other would not have sinned.
And according to some of the Rishonim, rabbinically prohibited even on the same side.
In the Shulchan Arukh there is an example of striking one’s adult son, which may cause the son to strike back and thereby violate the commandment of honoring father and mother. All the more so in the case of an immodest girl causing lustful thoughts (not even merely by way of “indirect causation”), who can be considered as placing a stumbling block before the blind. Even if you disagree, this is certainly a topic for discussion at the very least..
Following the discussion of Rabbanit Pashmina’s feuilletons and the power of cinema and midrash, this film made by Yaakov Friedland in 2000, 22 years ago, has just now been uploaded to YouTube for free viewing. It reflects a historical point in time from the beginning of religious feminism in Israel. “Kolech” was founded two years earlier. Nehama Leibowitz, quoted here by Rabbi Ariel, died only three years earlier, women PhDs were becoming professors, and so on and so on. A wonderfully sweet and touching film, and it has the power to shake you up if you are the sort for whom films (or midrashim) are shaking. An accessory to a mitzvah. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LdLZBtoP8Ow&t=729s
Accessories to a mitzvah. It requires further investigation whether a film is an object.
In the past https://mikyab.net/posts/7229#comment-13469
I defined in a comment the channels of learning: 1. Sources of inspiration 2. Analysis 3. Internalization
I defined referral as the best learning aid there is for subsequent learning. At the time I debated whether it is actually part of the learning itself, and you almost convinced me that it is not.
“Suddenly I understood how refreshing and illuminating that perspective is, and in fact how very new it is for me. For me this was a very powerful experience. I succeeded in feeling the feelings that until now I had only understood intellectually”
It seems that this post discussed several matters in a somewhat misleading jumble:
issues of women’s modesty / Torah education for women / midrash, aggadah, and literature versus halakha.
Although I think that aggadah, midrash, and literature in general can be a fascinating learning tool even for understanding Torah, in this case I would have preferred your previous approach and would have signed דווקא on the concluding sentence of the post:
“What I learned in this way is not Torah.”
Because perhaps you did not understand. Perhaps you understood only partially. Perhaps the deceptions and little lies hidden in Pashmina’s sermon escaped your notice.
You have never been a woman, and you never will understand everything, even if it seems to you that you did. Most likely you will never fully understand what it is to use a woman’s bodily manipulations vis-à-vis a man—which every woman understands, from her youth, from the day her female body takes shape. (Except for a few righteous women / autistic women who do not experience this and do not understand it).
These things were known and there was nothing new in them until our own day. Suddenly they have become sacred cows that one must not speak about. So true, it is not politically correct to say it, and woe to the man who dares speak of it, but as a woman, I’m pretty fed up with this hypocritical innocence. Not every woman who reads Pashmina’s sermon identifies with it. It is amusing, but it omits many important matters and magnifies things that are not true.
Many women in our respectable and varied world use bodily manipulation through one kind of clothing or another. Not many men do this. Men have other manipulations, and in any event, although I have never been a man, I assume the equation is not symmetrical. The effect of a man’s bodily manipulation on a woman is not similar to that of a woman on a man. And certainly not in its consequences in the halakhic aspect.
Women do need to be aware of the halakhic aspect of what they do, intentionally or unintentionally. Women do need to learn something about this.
True, the mind does not tolerate contempt for women’s intelligence. Of course, all learning for women should be on a high and deep level no less than for men, and certainly classes in the style of the preacher Rabbi Gronam and kindergarten-teacher Pashmina are out of bounds.
In one of the comments the rabbi wrote: “Demands of modesty from women did not arise in the column, not even with a magnifying glass.” Very well, of course one should not raise demands.
But why not propose serious halakhic study on matters of modesty? Perhaps a series of posts that would once and for all bring intelligent order to this jungle?
And regarding insights from midrash and aggadah—perhaps this is what R. Nachman meant when he distinguished between the melody of a kosher musician and the melody of another musician..
With God’s help, Purim Katan 5782
Rabbanit Penina Kohenet is right, long may she live, that modesty was not intended only for women. So too Maimonides explained in Chapter 5 of the Laws of Character Traits, that Torah scholars must conduct themselves modestly, in a way that has dignity but not eye-catching conspicuousness. I will quote a few examples:
‘Great modesty do Torah scholars practice in themselves: they do not demean themselves and do not uncover their heads or their bodies. And even when entering the privy, one should be modest…
A Torah scholar should not shout and scream when speaking… nor should he raise his voice excessively; rather his speech should be gentle with all people… if he sees that his words will be useful and heeded—he speaks; if not—he keeps silent… and he does not alter his speech, nor add nor subtract except in matters of peace and the like. The general rule is that he speaks only either of acts of kindness or of words of wisdom and the like. And he does not converse with a woman in the marketplace, even if she is his wife or his sister or his daughter…
The dress of a Torah scholar—a fine and clean garment, and it is forbidden that a stain or grease mark be found on his clothing or the like. And he should wear neither the dress of kings, such as garments of gold and purple, at which everyone stares, nor the dress of the poor, which disgraces its wearers, but rather attractive middle-range garments.
And his flesh should not be visible beneath his garments, as with the very light linen garments made in Egypt; and his garments should not trail on the ground… but only to his heel, and his sleeve—to the tips of his fingers…’
Indeed, it was not the custom of our ancestors to go in trousers except under a robe that covered them, and thus, for example, the sages reclining are depicted in the Amsterdam Haggadah print, their robe reaching the heel (as Maimonides describes based on the Sages), whereas their students are clothed in a robe covering to the knee, but no less than that.
Only in the 19th century did the kingdoms of Eastern and Central Europe decree that Jews should go in European dress including (for men) a short jacket that does not cover the trousers, and since then this mode of dress spread among the Jews.
Rabbi Aharon Yeshaya Rotter testifies (in Hanhagot HaChazon Ish, at the beginning of his book Shaarei Aharon on Orach Chayim) that the Chazon Ish disapproved of the custom that had spread to wear trousers with no long coat over them to cover them, and when in the blazing summer days he was forced to go without a coat, he made sure to wear a long tallit katan that would cover the trousers. It appears in any case that the Chazon Ish kept this reservation to himself and did not so instruct the public, since the custom to be lenient in this had already spread.
Thus we learn that the ways of modesty are fitting for every Torah person, man as woman.
With blessing, Elyaim Fish"l Workheimer
I assume that the European dress that shortened the jacket for men but not for women derived from the garments of knights riding horses, since it is hard to ride with a robe covering the legs, and therefore they shortened the coat.
And I still stand behind what I wrote. Here I raised one small point: internalization—not in the sense of assimilating a direct understanding—is indeed learning (even if not Torah).
There is a great deal of conflation here. You put words in my mouth that I did not say and did not deal with. Who spoke about using feminine manipulations? I certainly understand that, especially because those manipulations are directed toward men. Where did I deal with that at all? Where did I write that one must not talk about it? What does that have to do with the column?
One can explode over any infantile sermon; it makes no difference whether it is aimed at women or at men. Since there are plenty of those, I didn’t understand what the specific illumination was from Penina Kohenet’s speech.
If the illumination is about a woman’s feeling regarding the discussion of modesty issues—it doesn’t seem to me that one can learn a thing and a half from the speech about that.
According to today’s feminist discourse, any talk about clothing manipulation is set aside as something disgusting. I assumed you had also been taken in..
And since that is not the case, as far as I’m concerned you can delete that comment and this one too.
The problem is that sermons for women are usually infantile. But my claim was about the common practice of talking to women over their heads. That is all. Modesty was merely an example, because it is the most common subject in women’s sermons. And one definitely can learn from this sermon the feeling of what it is like when people talk over your head.
With God’s help, Purim Katan 5782
To Yosef and Moshe—many greetings,
It seems that both of you are partially right.
In the Mishnah Berurah (siman 75, se’if katan 7) it is explained that there is a difference between a place that is ordinarily uncovered—where, although one who looks in order to derive pleasure violates “do not stray,” the woman bears no responsibility for the man’s sin when he intends to derive pleasure, and she is not obligated to cover it.
By contrast, regarding that which is usually covered—the man is forbidden even “mere seeing” without intent to derive pleasure (as explained in the Mishnah Berurah in the name of the Pri Megadim). It seems that in this (that which is customary to cover) there is “before the blind” in not covering, since it is nearly impossible to avoid the forbidden “mere seeing,” and therefore upright Jewish daughters customarily cover.
With blessing, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
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… in Chapter 2 of the Laws…
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Great modesty do Torah scholars practice…
Indeed, patronizing is repellent. And when it comes together with infantilization, it is even more repellent.
In any case, if you ever decide to bring order and offer something of your own on the laws of modesty, I at least would be very glad.
Today there is confusion, bewilderment, and helplessness in the face of the genre: “My religiosity is not measured by my mini,” “My prayer is more important than my neckline,” “My wife is a true righteous woman, she does acts of kindness—who exactly cares if she walks around sleeveless in the Tel Aviv heat?” and “Why do I need to cover my hair at all, and why in synagogue?”
What is from the Torah and what is not. What is more important and what less, what the boundaries are, how they were determined..
How to explain, how to reach the heart, and how to satisfy the educated and intelligent mind.
With God’s help, Purim Katan 5782
To Isha—many greetings,
Apparently the laws of modesty can be explained in two directions: halakha and dignity.
Halakha—just as a woman is willing to observe all the fine details of Shabbat and kashrut, even though they are inconvenient and not always understood, why should the laws of modesty be any less binding?
Dignity—and here it does not necessarily overlap with the halakhic parameters, but comes close—one can do a simple “Buzaglo test”: would a self-respecting man walk in the street in a “mini,” a plunging neckline, tight pants, or with bare arms without sleeves?
And in any case, the higher a person’s status, the more this is expressed in more meticulous dress. Even someone who would not wear a hat on his head in everyday life will put on a hat as an expression of being in a role. A Jew who is fully in the role as a representative of the King of kings of kings ought to be adorned with a fitting hat.
With blessing, Elyaim Fish"l Workheimer
Dear Shatzal Elya’im Fish”l,
These answers could have been sufficient in better times. Not in this age.
Halakha—it has long ceased to be clear in our circles what is halakha and what is not halakha in matters of modesty. Who determined the knee line, or the elbow, and why precisely those, if that is indeed what was determined? After all, the range is so broad anyway—perhaps black stockings that one may not remove even on a separate beach with a male lifeguard, that is the halakha?
And if it is all so fluid, then perhaps a mini (not an extreme one) in an environment where everyone is in a mini is fine?
Dignity—precisely in the Holy Land every kind of women’s clothing is considered respectable so long as it has the chic and style appropriate to the situation. (Unlike in Europe and the U.S., where for work people actually dress modestly.)
On the contrary, clothing with a “frum-girl” stigma is considered less respectable and less suitable. Girls flee that stigma like fire and do everything so that modest clothing too will be fashionable and lovely and will not “give them away.”
The postmodern representatives of the King of kings of kings do not think clothing says anything about the quality of the representation. Of course, they will not go around naked or blatantly exposed, but from their perspective, as long as they believe in Him, do good deeds, and live somewhere on a religious spectrum—they represent Him faithfully. Of course one can say that this is no different from the way they observe other laws, but apparently because of today’s different female discourse, clothing is a taboo that is very hard to deal with. Any attempt to touch it triggers angry reactions from both women and young men who defend them tooth and nail.
With God’s help, Purim Katan 5782
To A.—many greetings,
I see no reason at all to fear the “angry reactions” of this or that person. We are allowed to think and say what our Sages taught us and what plain common sense requires. After all, we are not police officers to force anyone. But we will not let them intimidate us from confidently saying the truth.
“The knee line” or “the elbow” was determined by our Sages when they said, “a woman’s shok is nakedness.” There is an interpretive dispute whether “shok” means what we call the lower leg, i.e. the bone below the knee, in which case one must cover down to the ankles. But the Mishnah Berurah rules like the view that “shok” is what we call the thigh, and therefore strictly speaking it is enough to cover to the knee and the elbow.
And as I mentioned, the male “Buzaglo test.” Would a self-respecting man walk in the street in short or tight pants? Would a respectable man walk with a plunging neckline or with bare sleeveless arms? Clearly fashion designers ensure that women’s clothing will be attractively provocative, because in their consciousness woman is an “object”; in a culture that respects woman, she is dressed respectably. Why should we not learn from Europe and the U.S.?
And in any case, the fact that there are “spectrum-religious” people teaches that despite everything, the young want to remain connected to tradition. The more we show them a personal example of observing the fine points of halakha willingly, joyfully, and proudly—the sooner or later we will see the young moving upward along the spectrum.
With blessing, Ami’oz Yaron Schnitzler
Dear Shatzal,
I always like what you write, and more than once I have been helped by your words,
but this time it isn’t convincing. This Buzaglo test sounds puritanical, moralistic, and archaic. Today people wear whatever they want.. Of course, one can dress in different ways for a formal meeting, for a party, for walking the dog in the park..
Fashion designers do not necessarily relate to women as objects; they design for both women and men beautiful, fashionable, high-quality, comfortable, enjoyable clothes..
Clothing can be attractive, according to the situation, and young people today do not interpret revealing clothing as provocative clothing.
In the U.S. and Europe, of course, you can see everything; it’s just that at work there it is usually much more conservative than בארץ.
Forgive my ignorance, but what do you call “Torah in the person” and “Torah in the object”?
With God’s help, February 15, 6,593,375,496 since the Big Bang
To the Homo sapiensa called “Isha”—many greetings,
As a fossilized prehistoric creature, I have no problem being archaic. And every day I ask: “When will my deeds reach the deeds of my forefathers?”
I proudly adhere to a moralistic and puritanical Torah that demands of its bearers to purify their thought, and which was written in black fire on white fire two thousand generations before the “Big Bang,” a Torah that engraved upon its tablets: “You shall not covet,” and I recite twice daily, “And do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes.”
Accordingly, the arbiters of my taste and “chic” are the prophets, the tannaim and amoraim, the sages of the generations, early and late authorities, who found it fitting for Torah scholars, men and women, to adorn themselves in fine and respectable but not revealing and attention-grabbing clothing, as Maimonides describes in Chapter 5 of the Laws of Character Traits, from which I quoted in my comment “Modesty—the trait of Torah scholars.” This is “Rabbi Moshe’s chic” 🙂
But even from what I see around me, I have not seen in our time any respectable man who is careful that his clothing “be beautiful, fashionable, fun, and comfortable” go to work or to a formal event in short or tight pants, nor with a neckline, nor with bare sleeveless arms. These “honors” the men have left to the women…
If our Sages were concerned for “the honor of the daughters of Israel, that men should not feed their eyes on them”—it is fitting for us too to follow in their path.
With blessing, Archaeo-Buzaglo Saurus the Cretaceous
The source is the Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin chapter 2, halakha 4 (regarding the discussion of who walks first in a funeral procession): “And the one who says the men first—it is because of the honor of the daughters of Israel, so that they should not gaze at the women.”
With blessing, Avaz"k
Haha, no one compares to you. I didn’t mean that it doesn’t convince me. I’m completely with you.
But it’s a bit hard to speak in that language to someone who has difficulty understanding, for example, what is not respectable about ten centimeters above the knee…
Try searching the site
With God’s help, Shushan Purim Katan 5782
To A.—many greetings,
I already mentioned that the matter of “dignity” is not supposed to overlap one hundred percent with the boundaries set by halakha, and there can be gaps in either direction.
A classic example of such a gap is the days of Purim, which began from the natural feeling of the unwalled Jews, who made the fourteenth a day of feasting and joy and festivity and sending portions one to another in order to express their joy over their miraculous deliverance.
Then came Mordechai and Esther, as halakhic people, and both added to and subtracted from the creation of that natural feeling. On the one hand, the halakhic authorities subtracted the “festive day” and refused to establish a sweeping prohibition of labor on the days of Purim, but left this area to “a place where the custom is so.”
On the other hand, they added commandments beyond the “natural feeling.” They obligated even the Jews of walled cities, who did not feel threatened, to celebrate the fifteenth day (as explained by Nachmanides). And they also added the obligation to care for the poor, which was not included in the spontaneous awakening.
So too, in my humble opinion, in explanation one must first of all build the natural feeling that fitting clothing is an honor to its wearer, where the “Buzaglo test” clarifies that whatever no respectable man would wear as reasonable clothing—short or tight pants, a “mini,” a neckline, and bare arms—is not respectable for a woman, not even for a non-Jewish woman.
Upon this natural level, once properly internalized, one can build “level two,” the parameters of modesty deriving from halakha. Here the line of demarcation (according to the lenient definition that the “shok” our Sages defined as “nakedness” is the thigh) is the knee and elbow line. And it is preferable to go a bit beyond, so that even in a sitting position the “shok” will not be exposed.
Thank God, there are thousands and tens of thousands of successful religious women who dress nicely and respectably within the bounds of halakhic modesty. One can learn from them.
With blessing, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
With God’s help, Purim Katan of the walled cities, 5782
To the one in the Diaspora—many greetings,
See Rabbi Michael Abraham’s article, “Torah Study—an obligation in the object or an obligation in the person,” on the Asif website, and also his reply on “Torah in the person and Torah in the object” on this very site.
Incidentally, one might say that there is a distinction between Shavuot, on which there was an object-level event of “the giving of the Torah” to Israel, and the days of Purim, on which there was acceptance of the Torah in the person, in consent and internalization of accepting the Torah in the hearts of Israel.
With blessing, Gavriel Chafzadi Tzveidnimovsky HaLevi
More power to our honored rabbi, the one who gladdens God and men, R. Gavriel Chafzadi, may he live long. Happy Purim Katan!
And perhaps one might say that there is a distinction between Torah “in the Diasporan person,” which operates only on the person to elevate the individual and the community, and “the Torah of the Land of Israel,” which acts to sanctify also the “object” of the land and the whole earthly reality, to be sanctified with the holiness of Torah—and this can be done only by the people of Israel in their land.
And this is the distinction between “Michael the great prince,” who elevates the souls of the righteous, and David and Abraham, who bring holiness down into earthly reality. “Michael” expresses “Torah in the person,” while “David” and “Abraham” bring the Torah down into the “object.”
With blessing, G.Ch.Tz. HaLevi
The miracle of Purim happened abroad. Ostensibly there is a special value to the revelation of divinity precisely there. And this is like the Arizal’s intention regarding “until one does not know,” etc.
With God’s help, Purim Katan of the walled cities, 5782
To the one in the Diaspora—many greetings,
A miracle abroad has the advantage of “From afar the Lord appeared to me.” Life in exile requires the individual and the nation to preserve memory of the past and yearning for the future in order to survive; the present, in which “we are still servants of Ahasuerus,” is bleak. Not for nothing does one need to drink on Purim to an exceptional degree in order to forget the gloom of the present and rejoice.
But there is in the miracle of Purim much preparation for the revival of a free nation in its land. The upright bearing of Mordechai, who refused to submit to Haman’s “cult of personality”; the courage of Esther, who dared to come before the king “contrary to the law” in order to save her people; and the solidarity shown by all Israel when they gathered for prayer and outcry, and afterward for defensive war against their enemies, and finally in accepting the days of Purim in all their places of settlement.
The commandments of Purim too intensify solidarity and fraternity in Israel. Solidarity with the people of one’s place, to the extent that even “one who has been there only one day” is considered a permanent resident, and solidarity between one person and another, and between those who have and those who do not have.
The upright bearing is expressed in “Purim of the walled cities.” If on the fourteenth the people struggled for rescue and survival, then on the fifteenth the people struggled for national dignity, for a “confirmation of the kill” against the haters of Israel, even though they had already ceased to pose an immediate threat; but national uprightness requires uprooting the centers of hatred from the root, “to diminish the nations so that they not come upon them.” Therefore this day was designated for cities walled from the days of Joshua son of Nun, the first among those who fought Amalek and conquered the land.
Following the revival of the nation’s spirit in the miracle of Purim, the way was paved for the building of Jerusalem and the Second Temple, and for its becoming once again the center of the whole nation through the enactments of the Men of the Great Assembly.
The second stage began to be built by the Hasmonean household, who fought the decrees of the kingdom of Greece, which sought to assimilate Israel. They succeeded in reestablishing the Temple and reviving the kingdom of Israel until it became a regional power in the days of King Yannai. But the political strengthening did not manage to overcome the tendencies toward internal division, until the two sons of Yannai, in their struggle for control, invited the Romans as arbiters, and they destroyed the independence of Judea and later the Temple.
This is the tragedy of the people of Israel: that in the sufferings of exile it is easier for them to unite around their God and His Torah, whereas when they begin “to be a free people in our land,” processes of corruption and division begin. And we have no remedy except “to juxtapose redemption to redemption,” to take all the load of faith and fraternity that sustained us in exile and not abandon it when we arrive at independent life in our land, and thus we will be “a holy people in our land,” able to sanctify the Name of Heaven even as a nation.
With blessing, Ami’oz Yaron Schnitzler
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… the faith and fraternity that gave us life…
One might also say that the Torah of exile is “in the person” in the constant need to overcome constant obstacles, whether from the “leaven in the dough” or from the “subjugation of the kingdoms,” which delay and hinder.
But in the Land of Israel—we must cultivate the inner desire for the good, the deep desire of the heart that will bring us to worship willingly and out of love. As the Companion says to the King of the Khazars, the Land of Israel will be rebuilt only through desire and longing for it. Not for nothing is the Book of Deuteronomy, given close to entry into the land, full of strong emphasis on serving God with love and joy.
If in exile Torah is “in the person,” in overcoming obstacles—then “the Torah of the Land of Israel” should be “in the object,” full of inner yearning of love of God and love of His creatures, and therefore aggadah, which strengthens and internalizes the desire for the good, takes a central role in the complete building of “the Torah of the Land of Israel.”
That is of course not exactly the plain meaning of Rabbi Michael Abraham’s words 🙂
With blessing, see there
In short:
The Torah of the Diaspora is “in the person,” a Torah focused on the individual and the community and on overcoming a confrontational reality; by contrast, “the Torah of the Land of Israel” is “in the object,” in being filled with desire and yearning for the good until the good will penetrates the depths of the soul.
If the work of the individual involves overcoming urges and obstacles—then the work of the collective involves creating a good atmosphere, an encouraging “public climate” in which the aspiration for good succeeds in becoming the possession of the many, and therefore it affects even the most earthly strata.
If the Torah of Babylonia shines in darkness—then the Torah of the Land of Israel produces bright daylight. A complete Torah in all its expanses, revealed and hidden, halakha and aggadah, and therefore it restores the soul and enlightens the eyes, “like the sun rising in its might.”
With blessing, Nehorai Sarga Agami-Psisovitz
In the Hasidic electronic bulletin Nahalat Yaakov Yehoshua, dedicated this week to “Purim Katan,” it is brought from the book Ne’ot Deshe in the name of the Rebbe Rabbi David of Sochaczew (son of the Shem MiShmuel) that on Purim we rejoice over two things—over receiving the Torah anew and over the miracle of deliverance.
When there are two Adars—the joy is divided. On Purim Katan in the first Adar (adjacent to Shevat, in which Moses began to explain the Torah)—the joy focuses on receiving the Torah anew, and therefore this joy is primarily spiritual.
By contrast, on Purim in the second Adar (adjacent to Nisan, the month of redemption)—the joy focuses on the miracle of deliverance, and therefore there the joy is expressed in deeds—reading the Megillah, feasting and rejoicing, sending portions, and gifts to the poor.
With blessing, Simcha Fish"l HaLevi Plankton
The fact that “Purim Katan” is focused on the renewed acceptance of the Torah also fits nicely with its being adjacent to Parashat Ki Tisa, where we learn about the possibility of renewed acceptance of Torah even after the terrible crisis of the sin of the Golden Calf.
A top-lace wig is a wig whose entire upper part is handmade. It looks more natural, more beautiful, and is more expensive.
It is not impossible that the female preacher is also mocking us, the women of her own kind, and the race in which we are trapped..
And since we're already on literature, and if we're dealing with empty demagoguery, how could we do without the king:
“R. Gronam spread his legs and stood in a posture of submission, and let out several groans, the sort that preachers customarily groan before a sermon, and closed his eyes so they would not stray after honor. Then he spread his legs again…
Rabbi Gronam’s voice grew stronger, and both his eyes filled with a kind of rheum, that rheum that people mistake for tears. All the women began weeping and lamenting their husbands, and all of Meah Shearim filled with crying. Rabbi Gronam raised his voice and cried out, Woe to us from the Day of Judgment, woe to us from the Day of Rebuke. A man walks through the marketplace and thinks he is not sinning, but I say he sins and transgresses. How so? Suppose a wagon harnessed to an ox and a donkey is standing there, and that man smells snuff and sneezes, and the animals are startled and move—he is found to have violated the prohibition of ‘You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.’ A man stands in the synagogue and prays with the congregation and answers Amen; it seems that here, in a holy place, he is cleansed of all sin. But I tell you he sins and transgresses, for he does not answer Amen with all his might…
At that moment the entire congregation trembled. Turn this way—alas; turn that way—woe. Sitting in the study hall—alas; getting onto their beds—woe. Rabbi Gronam knows they wish to hear a word of consolation, but his heart is bitter as wormwood, and he cannot bring forth from his mouth anything but words bitter as wormwood…”
S.Y. Agnon, Only Yesterday
It's worth reading more; it's long!