The War on Coronavirus – Systems Thinking (Column 284)
With God's help
In recent days, the main topic everyone is occupied with is the coronavirus (which is a refreshingly novel topic compared to coalition politics, although some insist on linking the two issues, for all our benefit, of course). In this column I wanted to touch on the question of the fight against coronavirus and point to a few flaws in the way people think about it. I ask your forgiveness in advance for the conformity I will display in this column.
The Kindergarten Teachers' Protest
On Thursday, at a press conference, we were informed of new decisions regarding the fight against coronavirus. The announcement was that in-person studies in all institutions would be halted, with exceptions made for special education institutions, kindergartens, day-care centers, and the like. As expected, the kindergarten teachers and caregivers immediately protested, asking why their blood was less red than that of others. This immediately turned into a work-to-rule strike on Friday, when kindergarten teachers and caregivers reported sick and did not come to work. My assessment is that the kindergartens and day-care centers will quite soon be shut down as well, since the government will not withstand this protest.[1]
Everyone understands that essential services are not shut down, and there no one thinks of complaining that his blood is less red than that of others. One must also understand that essential services are not only services intended to save lives. Essential services on the economic plane are essential as well. We all need to live both now and after coronavirus (if we indeed get there). And yet, their feeling is apparently that their service is not essential, even in the economic sense. But that is apparently plainly an erroneous claim. I heard on the radio that shutting down the education system costs hundreds of millions of shekels per day (I think), and if you subtract kindergartens and grades 1-3 from it, the cost drops almost to zero (because children from fourth grade and up who remain at home do not necessarily need their parents home with them).
For these reasons, the demand of the kindergarten teachers and caregivers seems outrageous to me, and the government's expected capitulation is also very problematic. But it seems to me that at the root of this protest lies a misunderstanding of the nature of the fight against a special epidemic like coronavirus.
The Nature of the Coronavirus Epidemic
An ordinary epidemic contains two components: rapid infection of people, and the danger posed to each person who is infected. Therefore there are two components in fighting ordinary epidemics: preventing infection as much as possible (isolating the sick or suspected cases), and optimal treatment of those who are infected.
In this sense, the coronavirus epidemic is unique. Its main problematic feature is the very rapid and easy transmission from person to person (even people who show no symptoms infect others). The second component, the disease itself, is fairly marginal in this context. One must understand that coronavirus is not essentially different from ordinary influenza, from which dozens of people die every year in Israel alone, and, if I understood correctly, hundreds more die from complications caused by it. The number of deaths from coronavirus is negligible in the ordinary population (up to age sixty). Beyond those ages, or in populations with special risk, the percentage rises somewhat. Therefore, the struggle against coronavirus focuses on preventing its spread and less on treating it itself (as far as I understand, with coronavirus itself there is no real treatment, only perhaps for complications that may result from it).
Preventing Infection: Between the Individual and the Collective
Since the disease itself is, in most cases, not so terrible, isolation, hygiene, and avoiding gatherings are the main measures, since these are the measures dictated by considerations of contagion. One needs to understand that the mechanisms by which such an epidemic spreads are very complex, and epidemiology, which deals with them, is based on mathematical analyses of these processes (I would like to believe that the numbers set by the government and the Ministry of Health—up to 5,000 or up to 100 people, and this evening we were informed of up to 10—were not determined arbitrarily, but rather through a systematic and orderly analysis of the situation). The size of the permitted group and the number of contacts among people in the social network are parameters that in principle depend on the nature and mode of the epidemic's spread.
It follows from this that when a person is told not to come to work or to take various preventive measures, this does not stem from a desire to protect him. As noted, the risk to the individual is quite negligible (even if he becomes ill, his risk of being harmed is rather low, unless he belongs to a population with special risk). The goal is to prevent the spread of the disease throughout society as a whole (which would lead to illness among at-risk populations). Preventing contact between people significantly delays the spread. The other side of the coin is that if a given person is required to come to work, there is no significant risk to him. This is a small contribution to the spread of the epidemic (because one person is not so significant), and a small risk for him.
So why shouldn't we all just go to work? Because if we all go to work, then the spread of the disease throughout society will be rapid, and as a result those who belong to at-risk populations will be harmed with high probability. I will try to sharpen this subtle point a bit.
Individual and Collective Considerations
The Talmud in Shabbat 42a says that it is permitted to extinguish a metal ember in the public domain, and this is likewise brought by all the halakhic decisors. It is quite clear that this refers only to the public domain, that is, there is no direct danger here (otherwise they would have permitted it in the private domain as well). The medieval authorities dispute whether they permitted even a Torah-level act of extinguishing or not, but we will not enter that here.
The basis of this permission can be understood in two ways: 1. A special stringency or leniency in matters that concern the public because of the importance of the public. In several contexts of Jewish law we have found special permissions when the matter concerns the public, even in things that would not be permitted with respect to an individual. 2. A probabilistic consideration. Suppose the risk that a person will be injured in such a situation is 1 in 10,000. If we are speaking of the courtyard of a private individual, that is a negligible risk and there is no reason to permit him to extinguish it on the Sabbath. But in the public domain thousands of people pass by, and therefore the expected harm there is almost certain. Out of ten thousand people who pass there, there will probably be one who is injured or dies, and that already justifies violating the Sabbath by extinguishing it. Notice that the second explanation does not relate to the public differently from the way it relates to an individual. The permission is based on a tangible danger, except that only in relation to the public does a tangible danger exist. In other words, this is not a permission for the public (because of its special importance) but for a large group of individuals (where the probability of harm is very high). It seems to me that the second explanation of this permission is the correct one.
My student, Hanan Ariel, once wrote an article,[2] in which he proposed requiring everyone to use public transportation and forbidding private transportation on the roads, in order to prevent loss of life on the basis of such a probabilistic consideration. There he brought an example of such a consideration from a question that an army officer asked Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu regarding unloading a weapon on the Sabbath. Army regulations provide that unloading a weapon after guard duty is done only by an officer, and at night one must use a flashlight and shine it into the chamber (to make sure no bullet remains there). This can also be done by inserting a finger and checking physically, but past experience showed that mistakes do occur, and therefore the army required the use of a flashlight. A certain officer asked Rabbi Eliyahu whether he was permitted to unload a weapon with a flashlight on the Sabbath, and Rabbi Eliyahu permitted it. At first glance this is a very remote concern. The chance of missing a bullet in the chamber by checking with a finger without a flashlight is virtually nil, and it is clear that a private individual has no permission whatsoever to turn on a flashlight in order to prevent such a negligible risk. And yet, when the instruction is directed to the public as a whole, there is permission to turn on a flashlight. And again, the consideration is like what we saw regarding the metal ember. Even if the probability is 1 in 10,000, if a single person is deliberating, it is clear that one does not violate the Sabbath for such a negligible risk. But when tens of thousands of soldiers and officers are given the instruction, one must take into account that one of them will almost certainly be harmed, and therefore the general instruction must be stringent even regarding such a remote concern.
The Categorical Imperative
One implication of the above analysis is the application of the categorical imperative (see column 122). A certain officer can say to himself that despite the general instruction to turn on a flashlight when unloading a weapon, he will cut corners. After all, for an individual the risk is negligible and does not justify violating the Sabbath. Seemingly he is right, for as we saw, with respect to an individual there is certainly no justification for this permission. But if we all make this calculation, then each one individually takes upon himself a small risk, but, as the song says, all of us together are a mighty light—that is, within the public as a whole there will likely be casualties. Therefore the categorical imperative holds that the individual must act according to the rule that he would want to be a universal law. As I showed in that column, this imperative is not consequentialist, but in the final analysis only it can bring about the desired results.
It goes without saying that in such a situation there is very great importance to obeying the rules. The obedience of each individual to the rule, by itself, has no consequence, but the obedience of all the individuals to this rule prevents harm to some individuals within the collective (see the detailed discussion in columns 252–4).
Another example of this matter is the instruction given during the Gulf War to enter protected spaces when a siren was heard. Those instructions made me laugh, and people's hysteria in those days made me laugh even more. The risk that a ballistic missile launched from a distance of 2,000 km would hit my immediate surroundings is so negligible that comparing it to the risk in a car accident is ridiculous. The chance of being harmed was absolutely nil, and therefore the pressure and the rush to the protected spaces were completely hysterical. And yet, on second thought, in such situations there is very great importance to obeying instructions that come from above, since if we all make such a probabilistic calculation and do not enter the protected space, there will be those who are harmed.[3] The same applies to obeying road signs and traffic laws. There too the risk to the individual is negligible, but if we all cut corners there will certainly be those who are harmed.
The Other Side of the Coin
There is another side to this coin. Suppose there is no general rule to turn on a flashlight when unloading a weapon, and a certain officer wants to be stringent with himself (in matters of danger to life, and lenient in Sabbath law) and nevertheless unload with a flashlight. In light of the account I have given here, it is clear that he is forbidden to do so. There is no justification for turning on a flashlight on the Sabbath when the risk is so slight. If there is no such general instruction, his contribution to preventing harm is so negligible that it does not justify permission to violate the Sabbath. The obligation to turn on flashlights derives only from the fact that there is such a general instruction. The obedience of the individual is important as part of collective behavior, and only that has significance in this context. The behavior of a private person is insignificant in such situations.
Thus, for example, a few days ago I was asked whether it is proper to refrain from going to pray in a synagogue these days. My answer was negative. If there is such an instruction, it should be observed as part of the collective. But when there is no such instruction, there is no logic in adopting such a stringency upon myself. My contribution to preventing contagion by not going to the synagogue, and the risk if I myself become infected, are entirely negligible. There is no justification for refraining from prayer with a quorum because of this. In short, just as one should not deviate from the instructions given from above (even if someone thinks they are hysterical or unjustified), so too there is no point in being more stringent than those instructions. A private action changes nothing. Incidentally, these things were written before the instruction that was given this evening, according to which no more than ten people may gather in the same space (while keeping a distance of two meters between every two people). At this point it is certainly not correct to pray with a quorum of more than ten.[4]
It is important to understand that if infection itself were dangerous to the individual (as in an ordinary epidemic, and not like coronavirus), then personal stringency would indeed have significance. I increase my chances of being saved from contracting a serious illness, and that justifies stringency. Precisely because of the unique character of coronavirus, where the problem is social contagion and not the disease of this person or that one, there is no point in being more stringent with ourselves beyond what the directives require.
The Haredim and the Yeshivot
Yesterday it was reported that in the yeshivot (rabbinic academies), kollelim (advanced study institutes for married men), and the Haredi (Lithuanian) educational system, studies would continue as usual. The claim is that precisely the continuation of study will protect us from the epidemic. The yeshivot were exempted by Health Minister Litzman (would any other minister have done this?) because they have no ability to study remotely online, but the Lithuanian elementary-school institutions are simply ignoring the general instruction.
I think that even if we ignore the question whether study indeed protects, I recall that they did not continue studying when missiles were falling here during the Gulf War. At that time many of the yeshivot sent their students home. Therefore it seems likely to me that the consideration behind continuing the studies now is based on the perception that the risk is not great or direct, and therefore does not justify suspending studies. But as we have seen here, this is a misunderstanding. The question is not what the risk is to this or that student, but whether the general instruction is being observed. Such a step has implications for the public as a whole, and it cannot be that every person does as he sees fit. The results of his decision concern the public as a whole and not only himself. On the contrary, for him personally the consequences are indeed negligible, but the expected harm is to the public as a whole, and therefore only the central authorities are authorized to make these decisions (Litzman?). With all due respect to Rabbis Edelstein and Kanievsky, they cannot make such a decision, especially when they display a lack of understanding of the basic mechanism of the matter.
I cannot refrain from quoting here the clarifications of associates that are cited in the article in the name of Rabbi Edelstein:
Those around the rabbis explained the violation of the directive: "Since the world exists by virtue of the breath of schoolchildren (the breath of schoolchildren reciting Torah) – one may not forgo their Torah, and that is dangerous." According to them, Rabbi Gershon Edelstein mentioned that during the vacation periods in yeshivot there are more disasters, and he attributes this to the fact that there is no study then. "You can see it tangibly," he said.
The proof from the disasters during the vacation periods is especially amusing to me. It is indeed surprising that precisely when people are out on trips and on the roads they have accidents, whereas when they sit in yeshiva, by a miracle they do not fall off cliffs, do not bang into the lectern, and are not injured in traffic accidents. From this, obviously, we can all tangibly see that Torah protects and saves (Torah protects and saves), can't we? It is hard to believe that an intelligent person would advance such a foolish argument.[5]
My wife, may she live and be well, wanted to make a charitable case for this nonsense, and said that perhaps his intention was that if the boys and children wander the streets and do not study, traffic accidents are to be expected because they are out on the roads. Continuing the studies protects not because Torah protects and saves but because they are not exposed to dangers. That is not what is written in the article, but one can judge him favorably and assume that perhaps that is what he meant. If so, then that is a correct fact and a logical conclusion that follows from it, and still there is a misunderstanding here. The problem because of which they want to stop the studies is not the risk to the children and the young men themselves, but the danger to society as a whole (of which the students are a part) because of contagion. I do not see how concern for the welfare of these fellows if they are sent on vacation can justify a decision that harms the public as a whole. One might perhaps say that a person need not endanger himself in order to save his fellow (which is not true in situations like these, where the risk is general), but even if that consideration were correct, such a decision still has to be made by the authorized institutions that represent the public as a whole and not by private parties, important and wise as they may be. A person cannot make decisions on his own that affect the public as a whole.
Are the Measures Excessive?
Many are discussing the question whether the measures being taken in Israel (especially in light of the stricter measures announced this evening) are excessive or not. It is difficult to determine this, and the matter depends on data not available to us, and especially on mathematical models and cost-benefit considerations unfamiliar to most of the public. In my personal opinion, extending the shutdown to kindergartens and day-care centers and to children in the lower elementary grades is unjustified, and it was adopted only because of capitulation to pressure and to the protest of the kindergarten teachers and caregivers.
But one thing can be said on this issue as well, in light of what I have described here. The results (how many dead or ill there are) are not a relevant consideration in this discussion. The fact that there are almost no seriously ill patients and no deaths at all in Israel does not mean that these measures are excessive. As stated, the discussion here concerns the question of how far the disease will spread, and not the condition of the sick. The need to prevent so-and-so from becoming infected is not because of the condition of that so-and-so, but mainly because of the concern that someone else will also become infected (and if he belongs to a population with special risk, his condition may be very bad). This is apart from economic considerations and considerations of social functioning, which must also be taken into account, even though ostensibly these are questions of danger to life.
[1] This was written even before they announced on Saturday night the shutdown of the kindergartens and day-care centers, as expected. In my view this is a very mistaken decision, but as noted the government cannot really withstand this protest, although, as I explain below, it is unjustified and based on a misunderstanding.
[2] Hanan Ariel, "Public Transportation– A Halakhic and Moral Obligation", Tzohar 15 (Summer 2003) 15-22.
[3] In the case of the Gulf War this is even more severe, because every individual casualty is a blow to the public in the war it is waging against its enemies. The enemies pride themselves on the achievement of harming an Israeli civilian. In this respect war differs from an epidemic and other collective actions (see on this in columns 252–4).
[4] Clearly, the resolution of ten as opposed to twelve or fifteen is not an exact and unequivocal determination. There is no principled difference between ten and twelve, but in my opinion one should obey the instructions as they are, otherwise the slippery slope endangers us all.
[5] This can be connected to the proof that religious life raises quality of life and life expectancy. There too many people "see it tangibly," although there are fairly obvious natural explanations (the tranquility that faith instills, communal support, and the like).
Discussion
"Suppose there is no general law to turn on a flashlight when unloading a weapon…"
Since when does the categorical imperative depend on an actual general directive? Ostensibly, the categorical imperative says that a person should act in accordance with what he thinks ought to be a general law. No?
Or does the rabbi mean that in this case the general law is the very act of obeying the guidelines..?
"It is hard to believe that an intelligent person would make such a foolish argument" – there is no point living with contradictions; the obvious conclusion is that we are indeed not dealing with an intelligent person!!!
It seems that you deliberately ignored the explicit mention here of the classic examples (voting in elections, taxes, conscription, the environment) and brought only examples in which the consideration is expected value and not a cumulative issue. But as far as I understand, the reasoning you propose is exactly the same reasoning—is that indeed so?
Indeed, it is the same reasoning. I’m not sure what you meant by saying that those are matters of expected value and not a cumulative consideration (I assume you mean Parfit-type issues). It is cumulative here too.
Regarding the permission to keep the yeshivot operating:
I didn’t understand why yeshiva students cannot study remotely. After all, the main form of study in yeshiva is in chavruta pairs, and only a small part of the material is delivered in a formal lesson. Could it not be arranged that the studies take place in chavruta pairs in the neighborhood synagogue, and the source sheets or lessons be received by fax (suppose there is no email and therefore no internet).
On the other hand, yeshivot that function as boarding schools might perhaps be excluded for a different reason: they function as a home environment. To the extent that the yeshiva maintains isolation between itself and its surroundings, perhaps it can function as a single unit. Provided that separation is maintained between the yeshiva students and the staff members who come to operate it and go home at the end of the day.
Another point – desecration of God’s name. To the extent that the Haredi public disregards the instructions, these things will be publicized and the secular public will be outraged. All the more so if there is indeed mass infection because of such disregard; the reputational damage will be enormous.
Today I saw that the Haredi public is disregarding the instructions even outside the context of Torah study; for example, it was reported that in the Belz Hasidic court a tish was held as usual. For those who know, this means hundreds and thousands of people standing densely packed together, and eating from the Rebbe’s "leftovers," which are passed from hand to hand. Is it also said regarding a tish that "Torah protects and saves"?
Here is the link regarding the Belz tish ("In the holy court of Belz, a ’tish' was held this Sabbath, with the participation of thousands of Hasidim, with no difference whatsoever from previous Sabbaths, contrary to the instructions of the Ministry of Health, which as is known forbade gatherings of more than 100 people in one place" – https://www.kikar.co.il/351106.html Kikar HaShabbat).
Aharon Rabinowitz on Twitter: "Netanyahu is currently in a conference call with Litzman, Gafni, and the secretaries of the 3 Councils of Torah Sages.
They are trying to get a decision from Rabbi Kanievsky and Rabbi Edelstein regarding guidelines for the yeshiva world and the cheders."
– Suppose there is no internet and therefore no email
Binyamin, Binyamin. It is common knowledge that highly intelligent people in one field can speak nonsense in another field. And it has already been said that there is nonsense that only intellectuals can say.
Specifically regarding Rabbi Edelstein, I am sure his Gemara lessons are of a high level. One does not become rosh yeshiva of Ponevezh for no reason.
As for a tish, obviously. If there is Torah that protects and saves, it is the tish.
Indeed, the categorical imperative does not depend on guidelines but on truth. But in these cases the guidelines are what ought to be seen as the binding truth. This is beyond the duty to obey orders, as you wrote. And these are exactly the words of Ran in the homilies regarding "you shall not deviate." He explains that the obligation to obey is itself also a halakhic truth, whose non-observance causes harm, and not only the halakhic ruling under discussion. Therefore, the rebellious elder must obey a ruling that seems erroneous to him despite the spiritual harm that this will bring upon him.
The commandment of immersion on Friday eve (for men) also protects and saves:
"One of the major problems is the men’s ritual baths, which on Fridays are filled with thousands of immersers in honor of the holy Sabbath. For whereas on weekdays only the Hasidic public generally immerses, mainly in the morning, between 07:00 and 11:30, on Fridays the Sephardi and Lithuanian publics also frequent the baths, and the resulting situation is a load of hundreds of people simultaneously in the municipal mikvaot, with hundreds of people immersing in each immersion pool in a single hour"
-Kikar HaShabbat https://www.kikar.co.il/350958.html
"It is common knowledge that highly intelligent people in one field can speak nonsense in another field" – Rabbi Michi, Your Honor refutes his own statement…
Akiva Weiss on Twitter: "Leader of the Lithuanian Haredi public, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky, has decided that studies in the yeshivot and among Torah students will continue as usual for the time being, while strictly observing rules of caution."
So there you have yet another self-evident proof that intelligent people also talk nonsense. 🙂
Rabbi Kanievsky (as of 10 PM Saturday night) ruled: the Talmud Torah schools, yeshivot, and kollels will continue, since there are not 500 sick people and 3 dead, therefore it is not a "plague" (apparently based on the Mishnah in Ta’anit—except that there it is speaking of a city that sends out 500 foot-soldiers)
Shocking
Thank you, Rabbi, for the article, and now I have a practical question:
I have three children in a Talmud Torah that is holding classes tomorrow as usual; one of them is in a risk group because of disability and health problems.
Suppose all my children were healthy:
According to the general categorical imperative in the country, I should keep them at home, in order to prevent the spread of the disease, and thereby reduce the danger threatening the entire public.
On the other hand, according to the categorical imperative in the community in which I live, there is no point in keeping the instructions, because if all the children in the Talmud Torah come to study tomorrow, my children’s coming or not coming does not raise or lower the danger to the public.
This is a question every parent of a child in a Talmud Torah who sins 🙂 and enters this website ought to ask himself, but I assume most parents do not think about it, so apparently all the children will be brought to the cheder tomorrow.
And now let us add to the question the state of my son who is in the risk group. There is a side that says that even if his brothers go to school, perhaps it is preferable to keep him at home.
On the other hand, if one member of the family gets infected at school or elsewhere, it is almost impossible that he would not infect him at home as well, since caring for him requires constant contact.
What do you think?
The rabbi is mistaken in his assessment of the severity of the virus.
Corona is at least ten times more dangerous than the flu—3.4% according to the World Health Organization, which is about 34 times the flu. In my opinion their estimate is lenient, and it is even more severe.
If you look at patients who have finished with the disease, 93% recovered and 7% died.
As for the risk population, we are talking there about over 15% mortality.
Nothing about this virus is negligible.
By the way, these numbers are correct if one believes the reports from China and Iran; personally I have no doubt that Iran is lying and that the number of sick and dead there is orders of magnitude higher than reported.
Aharon, sorry for butting in, but it seems to me that according to the categorical imperative you should remove your children from the cheder and transfer them to a regular educational institution, as I did, and thank God I succeeded
Rani,
When calculating mortality rates, two data points must be taken into account:
1. There are infected people who do not develop symptoms, and they too need to be factored in, though it is hard to calculate this.
2. There are people who die because of the virus when they do not receive proper medical treatment, which happens in undeveloped countries, or in countries where the health system collapses.
To Mr. Rani—to reduce your hysteria, I would suggest comparing to countries like South Korea and Germany, where the mortality rate is less than 1 percent…
There is a good chance that what has become fixed in public opinion as though the rate is 4 percent or more is simply because they did not diagnose all the mild cases.
At the same time—of course, it is important to keep the instructions because of the rapid contagion, as Rabbi Michi wrote in the article
Apparently Mikyab’s crystal-clear eyes missed the view of the Or Sameach, Laws of Murder 7:8, and Meshekh Chokhmah on Exodus 4:19, that one may not put oneself into possible danger even to save the whole of Israel, and there are opinions that one is only permitted but not obligated, but this is not the place to elaborate
In this column there are several examples (infection, private car, protected space, flashlight*), and the classic examples (elections, taxes, environment) that appeared in previous columns were not mentioned explicitly. In the examples in this column, it seems there is no accumulation but probability. Each person has a small chance of infecting, and if everyone goes out there will be widespread infection. It is not correct to say that each one took a small part in the infection; rather, each has a small chance of infecting. This is unlike the classic examples where there is accumulation.
It seems quite striking that you intentionally brought specifically new examples of probability, and not the classic examples of accumulation. Therefore, while reading I thought that a different argument was about to appear here from the argument given for accumulation. It turns out not.
I indeed do not think there is a moral difference between the two groups of examples, but there is a difference in analytic/Talmudic terms.
*I did not include the coal, because there a single isolated action leads to rescue in expectation. I understand that the coal comes only to illustrate the expected-value consideration, and it is not really similar to vaccination, and therefore categorical imperatives are not really needed for it either.
[By the way, I am still scarred from those columns on consequentialism and 'not yet' (a euphemism) I still haven’t been freed from act consequentialism (with adjustments). But בעקבותיהם I got hold of Parfit’s book and Kagan’s article, and perhaps thanks to corona isolation I will manage to get to them faster than I thought].
Don’t you get it???
Haven’t you done 1+1???
Listen carefully,
No more fake news or rumors!
Why all this fuss from the endless race? Why are people being sent into isolation?
Pay attention,
The plague of the firstborn is already here, friends.
One step before redemption!
"In Nisan we were redeemed, and in Nisan we are destined to be redeemed"
We have already seen the 9 plagues throughout the whole world – rivers turned red, locusts that consumed crops, and more and more.
What did God command Israel just moments before they went free?
Enter your homes, shut the doors, sit together and eat from the Passover festival offering!
And meanwhile, outside, a plague!
The plague of the firstborn – corpses, corpses are falling. And over the houses of the Jews the blessed Lord passed over!
Pay attention again:
No studies, just before a general shutdown. An entire country is about to enter a forced lockdown, and why all this? God is arranging everything so that we sit together, for a month—until Passover—prepare היטב, clean the houses, dress for the festival, hold on tight and believe that soon—we will eat the lamb of the festival in tranquility, and afterward we will go out with great wealth!
Where will we be when the Messiah arrives?
Shopping? Entertainment? Trips? Everyone is going into his home, to prepare, to anticipate, to await the great news.
China – the letters spell "miracle."
The extra yod has the numerical value 10.
The people of Israel saw 10 miracles in Egypt, a huge hint to the 10 plagues that have ended and been completed in the world. And now the time of redemption has arrived!
And now, God is striking the firstborn lands. Who is for us a firstborn, at the head—if not China? The great empire? And after it Italy – Rome the superpower?
Let us wake up, please!
The lockdown is meant to bring us closer to our family, to one another, to our children. To unite us! To be alone with the Creator of the world, in prayer, in conversation.
Let us also strengthen ourselves in faith.
No more coincidences in the world… no more 'natural disasters' – the Lord has done it only for the honor of Israel. The greats of Israel have already said that the Messiah is not at the threshold nor just one foot in—as they used to say. The Messiah is already here waiting to be truly revealed. And we need to cry out, ask, and pray that this favorable hour will bring with it the redemption, God willing!!!
Tell our troubles: enough already ♥
The quotation brought from R. Gershon – bizarre and disgraceful!
And in order not to cast aspersions on the entire Haredi public, I will bring a quote from the words of Rabbi Yoel Cohen, may he live long, one of the great Chabad Hasidim, and an extraordinarily talented and brilliant man. And by the way, if I’m not mistaken, once he had a conversation with R. Michi.
Here you are: https://youtu.be/zxFQAJ_E-EQ
To Mr. Yechiel, I’m not hysterical, thank you, just aware of the data.
Why did you decide these countries are representative? Because they fit the thesis that this is like the flu?
Since you brought it up, I’ll explain my view on the matter.
As for Germany, the numbers there jumped in the last week, so it is not representative, since the median time to death is 14 days and therefore people there should not yet have died.
As for South Korea, which is the real outlier, the explanation in my view is that this is the only country that did sweeping tests on people without symptoms.
They performed sweeping tests on over 200,000 people and therefore in effect diagnosed even healthy people who tested positive.
To compare South Korea’s numbers to flu numbers is to compare apples to oranges. For the flu, the number of deaths is among people with symptoms, and likewise in the rest of the world for corona, the number of deaths is among people with symptoms.
It is not known what the number of flu cases is worldwide among people without symptoms, so the mortality figure does not refer to them.
That is, if the figure for the flu today is 0.1%, it is likely that this number would be smaller if they did sweeping tests for the flu, and then we would still remain at a severity level 50 times that of the flu; simply both numbers would be smaller because they take into account also people with no symptoms at all.
Therefore at most you can adopt South Korea’s numbers, which are still ten times worse than the flu, but then also agree that the disease is five times as contagious as people thought.
That is, according to South Korea, the disease infects many more people than the world thinks and kills less; according to the rest of the world, the disease infects fewer and kills more.
In any case, we are dealing with the same level of catastrophe.
The only difference is the probability of death given that someone is infected, which if one relies on South Korea’s numbers is indeed "only" ten times the flu—which, let me remind you, people vaccinate against every year in order to reduce the number of deaths from it (by estimates, vaccines reduce flu damage by 80%).
In any case, even if it is ten times, which is the most optimistic scenario, to say it is similar to the flu is a lack of understanding of the numbers; we are dealing here with different orders of magnitude.
To Rani again:
Since the flu, unlike corona, has been with us for a long time.
I am quite convinced, although I haven’t checked, that when they established the average mortality rate for the flu, they did indeed carry out deeper and more comprehensive tests and studies that also included people without symptoms….
Yechiel, if you’re convinced despite not checking, then of course you’ve convinced me.
Mortality rate in general refers to people who became ill, that is, symptomatic patients.
Therefore South Korea is simply not representative.
In any case, I explained where my numbers come from.
You, on the other hand, did not explain why to choose South Korea’s data. Because it’s convenient for you?
Such large statistical differences need to be explained, not simply to choose the number that is convenient for you.
In any case, you ignore the fact that even if you are right, we are talking about different orders of magnitude.
Despite the sharpness of the remarks, I am forced to agree with them.
Just two comments.
A. I’m not a great admirer of Bibi either, but why do you necessarily connect this to cynical political exploitation? Maybe the situation really does require an orderly government that can manage budgets in an emergency, etc.? Our rabbi taught us that a person’s self-interest does not rule out that there is indeed justification for the move he is making. (An example was brought from Jonah the prophet, that the castor-oil plant protected him, but that was not the reason he prayed for its welfare.)
B. Regarding note 5, who can say that a prolonged life expectancy does not come by way of supposedly natural explanations? It may be that this is the heavenly promise of long life, that it comes as the result of natural explanations that were built into the world by the one who governs these laws (God).
To Mr. Rani.
I think South Korea’s data are more reliable—precisely for the reasons you mentioned, namely the large number of tests.
As for the flu—as I said, I do not really know the studies on the subject—and as I understand it, you do not know them either.
But I assume that if doctors and researchers issue a statement about a mortality rate for a disease like the flu, they probably carried out the studies reliably according to the rules of research, so that they include the distribution of all components of the population
Just note that the quotation was said after Thursday’s instruction, from which R. Gershon could infer that if the little children in the institutions can study, then the yeshiva students can too; that is, even when we know about the risk, it is still not justified in his eyes to shut down things important to the economy like small children, so in his view shutting down yeshivot is also important to the economy.
After yesterday’s instruction it was reported that R. Gershon wrote a letter to close the yeshivot, but the letter was shelved after R. Chaim Kanievsky did not agree to join it.
One consideration was omitted here – the concern about mutation. The prevailing hypothesis among the experts (as it was explained to me) is that the coronavirus passed from animals (apparently because of the Chinese custom of eating certain animals alive) and apparently underwent a mutation when it met other viruses in the intestines of a Chinese person ill with influenza. Since then it has apparently undergone at least one additional mutation, and the experts think that the strain that came out of China is the more virulent one. (The first time in history that a Chinese export was found to be stronger than Western manufacture…). The concern is that as more and more people are infected, the virus will undergo additional mutations that will make it even more virulent, and then the mortality rates will also rise and the dangerous age threshold will drop.
And here in the Lithuanian Independent Education system the instruction is to continue learning?
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5694086,00.html
I do not have a clear-cut answer. I tend to think that one should obey the general instruction of the state. Mainly because the instruction of the cheders is neither legal nor moral (as I explained in the column).
I assume that keeping him at home is still safer than sending him himself to the cheder.
Hello Rani.
Some of the replies already given to you have addressed this. But beyond that, there is no issue here of precise comparisons. Broadly speaking, this is not a dangerous disease, certainly not for normal populations. Even if you are right, it is a slightly more severe flu. That does not change the basic analysis.
My crystal-clear eyes did not miss it; rather, I simply do not agree with it (and as is known, the halakhic authorities disagreed on this, as did Tzitz Eliezer). Moreover, here we are not speaking of putting oneself into possible danger, but of a general instruction from above to enter possible danger (a very small possibility, by the way). About entering possible danger as part of fulfilling orders there is no dispute; otherwise it would be forbidden to go out to war. Especially since here the doubt is truly minuscule and not under discussion.
This is hair-splitting that does not seem very important to me. But I also do not entirely agree. It is not that each person has a small chance of infecting; rather, many do infect, and the effect is definitely cumulative.
Happy reading. 🙂
I am planning a column on corona homilies/derashot (perhaps the next column).
Why disgraceful? Simply mistaken.
(Indeed, we once met at the hesder yeshiva in Yeruham)
What sharpness did you see here?
A. Regarding Bibi, I sufficed here with a very minor remark (originally it was sharper). Indeed, the fact that there is an interest does not prove that one acts on it, but here it is clear to me that he did indeed act on it. His linking this to a call for an emergency government, and the praises that he himself and his government colleagues tied to his leadership, may he live long, smelled very bad. Also the hysteria with which he opened the press conference on Thursday was really repulsive, and quite obviously agenda-driven.
B. With all due respect, I am already tired of the discussion of double causation. See the column on Rabbi Moshe Rat and the talkbacks there.
The matters were brought in the column.
What do you think of England’s method?
Can you make that any more general?
You might as well ask more simply: what do you think? And leave me to fill in the rest.
In these times, when instead of the left putting Bibi in jail he has put the whole nation in jail, I have time to read the three new books of the trilogy (believe me, it’s calming)
Therefore I wanted to clarify: if I have a question, may I ask about things I read on any post, for example here, or should I always look for the post appropriate to the question?
The questions are supposed to appear in the relevant place. Either after a post if it pertains to it, or as a new question in the Q&A.
They simply decided to give up on all efforts to fight the disease in the hope that the population will develop a natural antibody.
And therefore they are simply putting into lockdown, for 4 months as I understand it, all the elderly populations and those at risk.
I do not have the data to form a position on the matter. In terms of the chapter Lo Yachpor, this is the question whether the damager must distance himself or the injured party.
It is only important that they keep a distance of up to two meters between one person and another. 🙂
There is a very fundamental issue here regarding the yeshivot. Apart from the issue of protection, we need to understand, in the Haredi conception, the place of the yeshivot and the kollels. Everyone knows and is familiar with the stories told throughout Jewish history about studying with self-sacrifice in every situation; the meaning of self-sacrifice was not only with respect to persecutions and the like, but even in situations of illness and the like. Of course there are situations of plagues, as explained in tractate Ta’anit and the like, but they studied and held on to the yeshivot with their fingernails. These are the stories upon which Haredi Judaism was raised and by whose light it lives. Of course there is a situation called 'saving life,' but it is hard to define the situation as such now, and there is here a question akin to 'agents of a commandment are not harmed' and 'one who keeps a commandment will know no evil,' in matters that are as important as the very soul of Judaism. And strong upon us are the words of Rabbi Akiva, who said that specifically those who gather multitudes in public are the future of the Jewish nation, and not solitary study. There is a most fundamental issue here.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wPGrmU7Ybg&feature=youtu.be
A bit long, but this is the most serious lecture I’ve heard on corona so far.
Our master son of David, speedily may Yinnon shine upon us and may his sun rise.
Do you think we live in Zimbabwe? It’s a good thing you didn’t also explain to us the importance of keeping Shabbat and eating kosher.
https://mobile.kikar.co.il/article/351238
Published on Kikar HaShabbat
I’m longing for a column on the corona preachers/interpreters . . Surely you feel the trilogy is in danger . .
Currently in preparation. These homilies bolster the trilogy so clearly that I have a strong desire to try to bring out a fourth volume with a collection of these homilies.
): I knew you were taking great pleasure these days . .
Although I indeed do not think that the aforementioned person mentioned above is intelligent in the field under discussion, nevertheless I think his intention—even if he did not mean it—was that since in any case the Haredi public is numerous and lives in great and considerable density, there is no difference and no practical significance whether they sit crowded and crouch crowded in a study hall far from their residence, or in the synagogue near their parents’ place of residence,
Regarding immersion in the men’s mikveh, the secretariat of 'Kokhav HaShachar' announced:
'A new agreement has been reached between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Religious Services regarding the possibility of immersion in a men’s mikveh. According to the agreement, immersion in the mikveh in the community will be possible starting this morning only under these conditions: no more than 3 people in the mikveh complex at the same time, at a distance of at least 2 meters from one another; washing hands with soap before entering the mikveh; one must shower and immerse quickly.'
In short: with a little creativity and goodwill, it is possible to find reasonable solutions that allow relative preservation of the routine of life, without harming the duty of caution.
Best regards, Shatz
With God’s help, 20 Adar 5780
In my humble opinion, there is reason to say that דווקא from the hygienic side, it is preferable that children and youths be in a supervised framework under the guidance of professionals.
For the moment everyone is sent home – then it is possible that ten children are crowded together in the house, playing and quarreling with one another for many hours without keeping distance between them, while the parents are collapsing from lack of strength, or the children wander unsupervised in the streets.
By contrast, in a school one can split into small classes while maintaining a certain distance between child and child, all under the supervision of the educational staff in accordance with the instructions of the professionals.
Best regards, Shatz
In paragraph 3, line 2
…and all under the supervision of the educational staff…
It is worth noting that contrary to the experts of the Ministry of Health stand the words of Prof. Yoram Lass, former Director General of the Ministry of Health, that corona is not similar to the 'Black Death' that wiped out entire populations, but is in principle similar to the flu, in which the overwhelming majority of those infected get through it with only mild symptoms.
And of course, I am not qualified to decide between the medical experts, and perhaps it is preferable to 'be stringent out of concern' insofar as possible, but what may be taken from the lenient voices is the understanding that even maximal self-protection should be done without anxiety and panic. One should take into account that even in the risk group – calm and a sense of security have significance that helps immunity and recovery.
Let us be careful and meticulous, but as much as possible let us try to do so with as much 'calm-for-you' 🙂
Best regards, Shatz
With God’s help, 20 Adar 5780
To Aharon – greetings,
Regarding a child with a health problem that increases the fear of a difficult infection, God forbid, it seems on the face of it very reasonable in my humble opinion not to send him to the 'cheder,' for this is a case of 'where harm is common, one does not rely on the promise given to agents of a commandment,' and in this even Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky and those with him would agree.
Regarding his brothers, on the one hand there is the fear lest they, God forbid, become infected and infect him; and on the other hand there is the unpleasantness for the child forced to remain at home while all his friends are in the 'cheder,' and after all, the good feeling itself contributes to immunity. Therefore I would suggest consulting a doctor who knows the family and can professionally weigh the risks and chances. Certainly the management of the 'cheder' will accept his recommendation.
With wishes for robust health, Shatz
I will note here some of the range of reactions among Torah greats regarding the 'corona.'
Regarding studies in yeshivot and kollels: a member of the Great Rabbinical Court (ret.), the eminent Rabbi Zion Boaron, took the position of Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky that public Torah study should not be canceled. By contrast, Rabbi David Yosef’s opinion is that one should obey the instructions of the health system, and it was heard that he rebuked worshipers who held a minyan larger than allowed by the instructions. Also in the 'Darkhei Hora’ah' circle of Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu of blessed memory, the instruction was given to married students to study in their homes.
Regarding Talmud Torah schools – in Gur they instituted study in homes by telephone, so as not to need the internet. By contrast, in Belz they instituted split study in small groups, with the teaching staff reinforced by volunteers. Each river according to its own course.
May it be God’s will that speedily 'corona' be transformed into 'a voice of song' and salvation in the tents of the righteous!
Best regards, Shatz
Regarding the question whether a tish has the power of 'protects and saves,' we can check that empirically – a person infected with corona crowded into a tish at 'Bobov 48' (that’s what they’re called), and now even the Rebbe is in isolation:
Many of those who follow Rabbi Kanievsky quote the Gemara in Ketubot 77:
"Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would wrap himself around them and engage in Torah. He said: (Proverbs 5:19) 'A lovely hind and graceful doe'—if it bestows grace upon those who study it, should it not also protect?"
– Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would sit together with lepers, those afflicted with ra’atan, and was confident in the merit of Torah, because if it is capable of bestowing grace upon its students, all the more so it is capable of protecting them.
Without addressing the correctness of the claim, ostensibly our case is different. One who crowds into a kollel or a yeshiva is not entering with concern for his own health, but with concern of becoming a carrier and infecting people in risk groups.
Can it be learned from the above a fortiori argument that Torah can save from this concern as well?
Kikar
Rabbi G. Edelstein and Rabbi Ch. Kanievsky also wrote in their letter quoted on the Kikar HaShabbat website that 'one who has some suspicion of illness or needs isolation (according to the instructions) should keep himself from the study hall and not be liable toward others,' but with respect to an ordinary person they were not concerned. They also instructed that the yeshivot should ensure that 'there is space between flock and flock' and make sure the place is ventilated.
Best regards, Shatz
I went back and saw on Channel 4, 'The Haredi leadership united,' that Rabbi G. Edelstein and Rabbi Ch. Kanievsky agreed to what was instituted in Belz, namely that they should study in small groups of ten. In their letter (on the Kikar HaShabbat website), Rabbi Edelstein and Rabbi Kanievsky emphasize that anyone who has some suspicion of illness or needs isolation should keep himself from the study hall and not be liable toward others, and only healthy people were permitted to come to the study hall. They added that one must ensure 'space between flock and flock' and ventilation of the place.
Best regards, Shatz
"The categorical imperative determines that the individual must behave according to the law he would want to become a general law." That is not what Kant wrote. Rather: the law that one can will to be a general law. P. 37, chapter 1, Magnes edition: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law," and he clarifies his intention on p. 39: "I can indeed will a lie. But I cannot will that lying should become a universal law, for with such a law there would no longer properly be any promise in the world" [and therefore they would not believe me, and then there is no possibility of lying at all. Asa] "Hence my maxim, if it were made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself."
Are these Bach’s glosses? What is the point here? Next time it would be better to place them in the correct thread (apparently the next one)
Perhaps the point is that according to Kant, not everyone chooses for himself whatever he feels like making universal, but only contents that follow logically [with an attempted explanation in square brackets. Yehoshafat] from the form of a categorical imperative.
With God’s help, 21 Adar 5780
And for further reading:
The words of Prof. Rafi Carasso on corona and coping with it, in the article 'It is an epidemic, but the disease does not slaughter,' on the Arutz 7 website; guidance by the counselor Iris Granot on how to prevent children’s anxieties, in the article 'You are infecting the children with anxiety,' on the Arutz 7 website.
Best regards, Shatz
Question: It is a commonplace in the mouth of the esteemed author-rabbi that the expertise of halakhic decisors is in value judgments.
But here too, in the end, we are speaking of a value judgment, of comparison between principles, taking risks, etc.
How in light of this should one relate to the state’s guidelines? (Not that I am claiming others have a perfect ability to decide—perhaps they lack factual data, for example.)
A good point. My trust in the decisions of these Jews is rather limited. Especially since they probably do not know and understand the subject matter well. And of course they do not have full data. Our reality is fairly complicated, and when a posek does not know it properly and lacks general knowledge and also does not consult, trust in him is usually not justified.
And beyond all that, perhaps if they were making decisions for the whole public the situation would be better (I am doubtful, as stated). But at the moment they are not the authorized factor, and when each person or group makes decisions separately, the results in such situations are usually less good. Obedience to the policy that has been set, even if it is not optimal, seems to me more efficient (as explained in the column).
With God’s help, 21 Adar 5780
To Ramda – greetings,
The decision is not purely medical, but value-laden. When the Ministry of Health decided to close Torah and educational institutions, but did not order the closing of crowded malls and supermarkets, it is clear that behind this stands a value conception: economic activity is a 'vital need,' while education and Torah study are not so vital.
Then Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky arose and clarified that for us there is a value system in which 'Torah study' is a no less vital value, and in the end a general principle was established (in coordination with the Ministry of Health): ten people in a room while keeping a reasonable distance from one another and ventilating the place. Thus the Prime Minister instructed today in his speech to the public, and thus instructed the Belz Rebbe and Rabbis Kanievsky and Edelstein for the yeshiva world.
The religious and Haredi public need not accept without reservation every norm that comes from the authorities. Through mutual dialogue, suitable solutions are found that enable continued study without harming public health.
Best regards, Shatz
By the way, Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky has an adviser on medical matters, a doctor who studied at 'Netivot Olam,' devoting most of his time to Torah study, while practicing his profession to the extent required for his livelihood and to remain current with developments in the professional literature.'
In paragraph 3, line 2
…and through mutual dialogue, suitable solutions are found…
The Haredi representatives do not only look after the Torah world. Thus, for example, MK R. Uri Maklev approached Justice Minister Amir Ohana with a demand to suspend restrictions on bank accounts due to returned checks, something liable to happen because of the corona restrictions and to harm business owners.
Best regards, Shatz
Thank you very much.
I mentioned halakhic decisors only in order to raise the issue of value judgment. My main question was directed specifically at the attitude toward the guidelines of the authorized bodies. It is very likely that obedience will be more efficient, and surely will also give better results in terms of the number of infected and the number of dead. But the decision that this is what stands above all else is a value judgment.
And we know cases in which the halakhic decision is quite unique—certainly when we are speaking of probabilities, when there is no sick person before you, etc. So true, here we are usually not speaking of transgressing prohibitions (if there were a general directive to be tested every day by a test that desecrates Shabbat, would it be right to obey?), but even when it is a supposedly softer value judgment, the question arises.
The question is more about the conceptual attitude, which would be expressed in public decisions, and less about the practical attitude of private obedience, of course.
Perhaps there is after all a logical consideration behind the nursery teachers’ protest: isolation is quite an unpleasant thing (currently in isolation). In order to greatly reduce the chance that they will have to enter isolation, they want to give up the exception for kindergartens.
Not that this is something worthy of respect.
Indeed, not fun
Indeed the equation is clear: each individual probably does not endanger himself or others when he violates the instructions, but when everyone behaves this way it is almost certain that the disease will spread. The question is why, when there is an official directive and order, this is supposed to change the behavior of the individual; after all, by his behavior he does not change (almost) the general level of compliance of other people. Fine—with moral behavior the categorical imperative is teleological and serves as a substantive criterion, but here we are dealing only with consequentialist considerations. Why should I obey the instructions? Secondly, why is the official order of the state what defines the categorical imperative here? Perhaps the order of R. Chaim, or for that matter Hiba Yazbak’s..? Unlike the realm of civil order, where there is benefit in discipline itself even when the law is mistaken, here only the question of truth itself remains. Assuming the state is professionally mistaken, there is really no reason to be concerned; and assuming it errs in that it is not doing enough, I apparently ought to be even more stringent. What interest is there in collective discipline beyond the professional truth at its base?
See column 122. R. Chaim’s instructions could not become a general law. And since some general law is preferable, one should obey the instructions.
Beyond that, you have a fundamental mistake: the categorical imperative does not negate consequentialist considerations but adds to them.
And one more comment. Even R. Chaim did not claim that the state was professionally mistaken. He offered a value recommendation as it seemed to him.
On the civic plane, preserving order is important and one should obey, because even if the law is mistaken, hierarchy and order are preferable to anarchy. By contrast, on the health issue there is only a question of truth; there is no advantage to the hierarchical structure. That is, assuming the government aims at something truly correct, then we need to keep the instructions even without them having been given, out of reason. And if the government errs in assessing the situation, there is no point at all in implementing the instructions. Obedience as such has no value in this case… unless one can see an implication of violating the law as indirect harm also in other civil and criminal fields in which the very observance of the law has value..
I still haven’t understood what the government has to do with the categorical imperative..
With God’s help, 22 Adar 5780
And perhaps the effective solution is mass testing to identify corona carriers. Instead of treating everyone as corona carriers and shutting down the entire routine of life, Dr. Zvi Marom recommends conducting mass tests to identify corona carriers, and then the isolation can be limited to those who really need it. An interview with him in Shelly Appelberg’s article 'I deliberately am not bringing tests to Israel, lest they even hint that it is a bribe for Netanyahu,' on the TheMarker website. How is it [not] written: 'Go count all the Jews' 🙂
With wishes for robust health, Shatz
I didn’t understand:
If a public directive needs to take into account that the more people fulfill the instruction, though each instance involves only a tiny risk, the more the risk grows and eventually someone will be harmed, then there is no difference between private domain and public domain for the halakhah of a metal coal. If I determine the halakhah for all Israel, who certainly number more than one public domain over the generations (even a Torah-level public domain…), then the chance that someone will be harmed because of my prohibition on extinguishing in the private domain is almost certain.
(Presumably the question is directed not only regarding a metal coal, but regarding every distinction in halakhah involving tiny risk between public domain and private domain that becomes many through an across-the-board ruling)
A very fine point.
It reminds me of what I once thought about a halakhah and we do not instruct accordingly, which is written in Rambam. If we do not instruct accordingly, why does he write it? And likewise in the Gemara.
I think the case of a metal coal in the private domain does not occur in such a large number of times as to amount to danger to the public. How often is there a metal coal in a person’s yard or house on Shabbat? And even if we measure across all generations and reach a large number, still the risk is spread over a long time, and therefore it is a less significant risk. It is not like a risk to many people in the same place and time.
And beyond that, if we take every small risk to an individual into account, halakhah would be nullified from Israel. Therefore, practically too, we cannot compare a coal in the public domain with a coal in the private domain.
Everything depends on the expert’s name. Prof. Grotto goes for 'brutto,' and Prof. Lass goes for less 🙂
Meanwhile we are celebrating Shabbat Vayakhel in seclusion. And perhaps the portion of 'This month' prevails, telling of eating the Passover lamb in small and closed groups in order to escape the plague.
With blessings for a peaceful Sabbath, Shatz
By the way, the custom in the Land of Israel was that in the four special portions they read only the special portions and did not read the regular order (unlike the Babylonian custom, where they read the four special portions as an addition to the regular reading)
On the need to beware no less of anxiety and depression, see the interview with Prof. Yoram Lass in the article 'The optimistic professor:' on the Globes website (link brought by Ramda below).
Best regards, Shatz
And see also in Eli Zipori’s interview with Dr. Zvi Marom, 'There is no need for panic and horror scenarios' (on the Ma’ariv website), and in his opinion the solution lies in mass testing that will make possible a significant reduction in the 'lockdown.'
Best regards, Shatz
?
I did not understand the answer. Is there really an idea that there should be incorrect halakhah just so that halakhot not be nullified from Israel? This seems to be wonderful proof that in halakhah there are no consequentialist categorical imperatives (just as it is permitted to do thousands of Shabbat desecrations to save one dangerously ill patient, so it would be permitted to do thousands of extinguishings of coals in the private domain throughout the generations in order to save one person in expectation), even if we do not compare it to a coal in the public domain. A coal in the public domain in any case is not connected to categorical imperatives, since extinguishing one isolated coal leads to rescue in expectation and therefore is permitted, and there is no individually negligible act here that one is commanded to do so that by the aggregation of all the acts together there will be benefit.
First of all – yes. Absolutely. There are many examples of this. Beginning with "you shall not deviate" with respect to the rebellious elder, continuing with all the decrees and fences of the sages, the degradation of the court’s dignity, and much more.
Second, perhaps I did not explain the distinctions properly. With a metal coal this is not a categorical imperative but a probabilistic risk because of a large number of people (did I write otherwise here? I do not remember anything like that. On the contrary, I explain in the column precisely that this is not what I mean—see there two possible explanations for the sugya of the coal. In any case, if so, the mistake was mine). This is not a permission because of the public but because of a quantity of individuals (thus it is also explicit in the article by my student Hanan Ariel in Tzohar). When the coal is in a private person’s yard, the risk is small, and therefore permitting extinguishing for all coals in the private domain in order to save one human life is not similar to one extinguishing of a coal in the public domain. In the public domain, the one extinguishing saves on average one person’s life, but in the private domain many extinguishings are needed to reach the saving of one person. The benefit per extinguishing is small, and therefore there is no justification to permit it.
But as stated, all this is not related to the categorical imperative but to probabilistic considerations.
The categorical imperative deals with cases in which each person contributes something to the harm, as in the case of corona or air pollution. True, in column 122 I showed that the categorical imperative also has a consequentialist aspect, but the person’s motivation there is not consequentialist (because from a consequentialist consideration an individual person should not act).
But of course there is no proof from here that there is no place for a non-consequentialist consideration. Specifically in the coal case, it is not a consequentialist consideration.
The distinctions were completely clear in the column itself. But Yaniv asked why one does not apply a consequentialist categorical imperative to a coal in the private domain, and the first answer was a distinction between a coal in the private domain and a coal in the public domain. To that I pointed out that the distinctions are not needed, since for a coal in the public domain there is no need at all for a categorical imperative, and the prohibition in the private domain proves that there is no consequentialist categorical imperative. To this there is only the answer that otherwise halakhah would be nullified from Israel, and that still troubles me a bit. In all the cases you mentioned, we are not dealing with the original law of halakhah but with cases of malfunctions. But to determine the original halakhah (the prohibition of a metal coal in the private domain) in a way that is wrong from the outset just so that there be halakhah (here and in other similar cases) already seems far-fetched. Even a small benefit per extinguishing is permitted, just as it is permitted to do thousands of Shabbat desecrations to save one dangerously ill patient.
With God’s help, 5 Nisan 5780
It turns out that the Chinese also sent experts in traditional Chinese medicine to places where the corona epidemic broke out; they made diagnoses and recommended certain methods of treatment. See the article 'Coronavirus – the coronavirus and the traditional Chinese medicine against it – an interview with a Chinese expert' (on Tom Rotenberg’s website). So perhaps salvation will come from traditional Chinese medicine?
Best regards, Shatz
From what I understood from the article, what helps the epidemic spread is the combination of humidity and pollution (as there was in the Wuhan area). Perhaps it would be worth suggesting that high-risk people move to live 'until the wrath passes' in dry areas such as the Negev and the Dead Sea region and the like.
Regarding the esoteric approach –
I’ll give another angle: there are things for which the listener is not sufficiently ready to discern and go on the right path, and therefore for the time being he will be told something certain, or the truth will be said gradually. Just as there are people who are not intellectually/emotionally developed enough to contain certain knowledge, and therefore it is said according to their level? Say, when you explain to a small child how children come into the world.
I am not in favor of lying, but I think that telling the truth can create the opposite effect. In the case of halakhic leniencies, more than once I have encountered that when people are told it is permitted in exigent circumstances, they take the leniency completely (or perhaps we are not dealing with wicked people..)
That certainly can happen. One should try and prevent it, but not at the price of lying. Adults are responsible for their decisions, and you are not supposed to decide for them.
And where did you get that from? Who said they need to be responsible for their decisions?
The fact is that the Torah established Torah scholars to make a safeguard, and also those who take responsibility (judging and punishment), and also compulsion 'until he says I want to,' etc.
I got it from reason and Scripture. "I have set before you today life and death… and you shall choose life"…
Making fences and judging are not connected to the matter. They receive meaning only after there is responsibility on the person himself. If there is no responsibility on him, then let the rabbis keep the Torah for me, and if I do not keep it that is their problem.
I am astonished that one needs at all to explain something so simple.
An important article that will clarify the importance of this matter (what the government is so afraid of) and why one must strictly follow the Ministry of Health guidelines:
https://www.hayadan.org.il/future-of-corona-1203206