A Look at Intentions and Their Significance (Column 295)

The deferred explanation regarding slanderous speech—that the intent is an indication of the underlying considerations—seems (to me) very plausible. Since in halakhah one cannot punish for slanderous speech that in the end turns out not to have been for a constructive purpose (perhaps I am mistaken about this), one is forced to impose severe restrictions from the outset.
Admittedly, in a concrete case where the facts are true and only the proper intention is lacking, justice would dictate that one may tell it. But if that were the rule, many people would err in many cases and think it is slanderous speech for a constructive purpose (and therefore Shimon is preferable to Reuven, because there are thousands of other upright Shimons out there who will be harmed by unjust slander more than the Shimons who will be harmed justly).
The justification for the prohibition of slanderous speech is different from the justification for clarifying the facts, because personal bias can cause a person to skew the interpretation unconsciously or to be negligent in checking the facts (while thinking he did check them), but not to knowingly violate an explicit prohibition. Therefore the requirement to ascertain the truth (where it is easy for a person to err) is different from the requirement of purity of intention (where it is hard for a reasonable person to err). All the more so from “Who is a Torah scholar fit to rule on a tereifah for himself?”—meaning that bribery does not overcome him to permit something on the basis of a flimsy halakhic (or factual) rationale. In avid inish dina lenafshei, if he made a mistake he compensates and pays.

You are in good company. It seemed that way to the Chafetz Chaim too.
Even if you are right, I would expect clear proofs (in the sense of “if it is a received tradition, we shall accept it”). Without that, there is room to act according to reason, and by reason it seems to me more like what I wrote.

If I am not mistaken, in the notes on the Chafetz Chaim he writes that he does not mean that if one sees wrongdoing he should not report it, but that he should subdue his inclination so that it be for a constructive purpose. Independently, one could explain that this is speaking of a case where it is evident that the person speaking slanderous speech is doing so out of personal motives, and then the public (and likewise the sinner) will not distance themselves from bad deeds as a result, but will see it as a quarrel and a dispute on a personal level, and nothing beneficial will come of the statement

Perhaps. But if so, then there is not really a condition of intention, but a condition that the words be accepted and actually be beneficial.
I’ll only note that the description as though this is about preventing a crime is exaggerated. That is already outright the law of a pursuer. We are talking about preventing probable harm.

A similar problem also exists, according to some understandings of the Rambam, in the law of dina de-garmi, where one could understand that the intent to cause harm is the criterion distinguishing garmi from grama, and those who want to say that dina de-garmi is law and not a fine twist themselves up explaining this point.

However, it seems to me one should distinguish between slanderous speech and a transgression for the sake of Heaven. In slanderous speech, it seems very reasonable to say that this is a prohibition focused on the person, and this person may not say these things if his purpose is merely to derive enjoyment from them. But if he also intends a constructive purpose, that already enters the realm of permission. I do not think there needs to be a requirement that the intention for a constructive purpose be exclusive.

By contrast, with a transgression for the sake of Heaven, as you noted, the conceptual framework is different, and therefore only in a case where the entire intention was for the sake of Heaven can such a thing be “permitted.” The moment there was even a trace of a consideration not for the sake of Heaven, the act is flawed. One cannot deny the benefit in it, but we could never tell a person to do such a thing.
(Of course, with slanderous speech one could not reach a situation of a transgression for the sake of Heaven on this basis, because the moment he does it “for Heaven’s sake,” it is no longer a transgression.)

Even if you are permitted to tell it in order to prevent harm, you must minimize the account as much as possible and remove all the sensationalism around it that is not necessary in order to prevent the harm. In the parable of the surgeon-doctor: if he indeed performs the operation with a positive outcome, but does not administer sufficient anesthesia and unnecessary suffering is caused to the patient, then he is negligent.

Regarding the intention of the person telling it, we certainly do not say “sin so that your fellow may gain” (aside from the reasoning that when your intention is not pure you may see things through a distorted lens).
Will the benefit not occur because of his intention? Of course it will occur, but that does not contradict the fact that along the way he committed a transgression. The Chafetz Chaim cannot require a person to violate a negative commandment in order to bring benefit to his fellow, however great that benefit may be (after all, if he says nothing, he will not commit a transgression).

Regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven:
If Yael had enjoyed the act, it would fall under “it began under compulsion and ended in culpability,” because her intention was for the sake of Heaven (it is just that her body enjoyed it, because that is how nature is built—when you eat ice cream, the sweetness exists even if you have diabetes and your intention is to save something by it). If Yael had gone to commit sexual immorality because that was her main desire, and besides that she had a score to settle with Sisera (because he cheated her father out of a million dollars, for example), and along the way she says: after all, this will also do good for the Jews if I cut off his head—then I do not think anyone would see that as a transgression for the sake of Heaven.
Would you also ask here:
“Is Yael’s spiritual level more important than saving all Israel? Does the fact that she cannot overcome herself justify the loss of many Jewish lives? What matters is the result. If indeed having relations with Sisera saves many in Israel, then this act is legitimate (I am careful not to say ‘permitted’). True, if Yael enjoyed it then perhaps she is not worthy of such great praise, and perhaps it is even correct to say that she is a wrongdoer who derived pleasure from a sinful act, but it is still clear that she was permitted and indeed ought to have done it, and it would not have been right for her to refrain from the act because of concerns about her own enjoyment of the transgression”?!..

The straightforward sense of the Netziv is: it began under compulsion (meaning the intention was purely for the sake of Heaven), and ended in culpability because, at the end of the day, the body’s systems function normally and it is hard to detach them with the intellect. And not like the example I mentioned, where the main act is for pleasure and would have been done even without any benefit, and it just happened to come out well that it also brings benefit to all the people of Israel.

Regarding the program Yatzata Tzaddik—(by the way, the same applies to any program that criticizes a person in the political system, and other programs that have the advantage that they indirectly prevent corruption, even though the motives are hatred in many cases; compare the submarines affair and The Fifth Dimension, but this is not the place to elaborate)—besides the intention of the program’s producer, one must also take into account things that are not necessary for achieving the benefit and are slanderous speech par excellence. Likewise, if the benefit comes even without my watching it, then why is it permitted for me to watch it? After all, the benefit is not against the specific wrongdoer, but for “so that others may hear and fear,” and for that it is enough that the tradesmen (or the politicians) think that I watched it in order to fear doing deceptive things—or alternatively, they may think that I am an undercover investigator who came to investigate them, or that a legal case may be opened against them.

As for the implication for Column 291: I think you too would agree that if you were told explicitly that in the general laws of theft there are no exceptions (unlike slanderous speech), even in extreme cases like mortal danger, then the prohibition stands in full force (that does not contradict that the reasonable person would violate it, and perhaps this is a declarative prohibition, as you define it). Therefore, in my opinion, there it would be different, and it would be more correct to say, as you brought there from the opinions of the earlier and later authorities.

Precisely in dina de-garmi one can distinguish more easily, in my opinion. In damages there is an exemption of compulsion (full compulsion, according to some Rishonim), and its basis is that once the damager was compelled, he need not bear the consequences more than the victim does. The victim’s bad luck caused it. If so, one can definitely understand that intention has significance. The discussion is not about permission to cause damage (for even grama is liable in the Heavenly court), but about the obligation to pay.

But when slanderous speech is said for a constructive purpose, refraining from saying it causes harm. The question is: how does my work on my character justify harm to my fellow?

Would you instruct Yael not to lie with Sisera, even at the price that many in Israel would fall? I would not.

I do not understand your claims.
According to your approach, why do we say to a pursuer, “sin so that your fellow may gain”? Especially since “a minor sin in order to prevent major harm” is indeed said by quite a few Rishonim. The discussion is not whether he committed a transgression, but whether to instruct him not to do it.
Regarding Yael: what does “its beginning and its end” have to do with anything? I am asking whether you would instruct her not to do it even at the price that thousands in Israel would fall, simply because she enjoys it. And for the sake of the discussion I mean even when she is doing it only for the pleasure, and uses the rescue argument merely as outward justification.
Regarding the program, you raised an interesting point. You argue that if the benefit will be achieved even without my watching, then there is no permission to watch. I disagree with you because of the categorical imperative. This was explained in Column 120, and in greater detail in the following article:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%98%D7%92%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%91%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94

I read your article eagerly,
but I do not really understand the analogy you saw between the dispute there about something that is ideal ab initio or only acceptable post factum, such as the heter mechirah—for obviously there is no prohibition in consuming it; it is simply a post-facto arrangement. After all, even according to Rabbi Friedman, there is no prohibition in consuming produce under heter mechirah; it is just a matter of bediavad—and the prohibition of slanderous speech, which is a definite prohibition. Therefore, if both can be maintained, meaning that the benefit can be produced by the speaker and I still do not have to hear it, then obviously there is no reason for me to hear it, and seemingly I would transgress the prohibition of listening to slanderous speech. (Later I will address the categorical imperative.)

The analogy from the shopkeeper’s sale of chametz is also different in my opinion, because there the matter is entirely permitted and the sale is an excellent sale, and whether I buy or not does not change the core sale in the slightest, since the products are standing there for sale. But here, if the benefit is achieved by transgressors—for example in a case of mere gossip about a politician without direct benefit to the public, though of course there is indirect benefit, in that the politician will see and be seen, lest when he violates a real value it too be exposed to the public—does that mean I am permitted to consume the slanderous speech because some benefit comes out of the very slanderous speech? That benefit has already occurred; what does it matter that I add to it by listening to the slanderous speech after the goal for which the thing was permitted has already been achieved?
Likewise in Yatzata Tzaddik: the benefit is caused only because of my consumption of such a program (unlike chametz, where, as I wrote, the sale exists regardless). And that consumption is done by transgressors. So why should I be permitted to enjoy the slanderous speech even though my personal viewing is not needed for the sake of the benefit, which has already occurred? It is similar to desecration of Shabbat that was already done for the sake of saving a life and now is no longer needed; I will address this in more detail below.

The matter is different with the sale of chametz, for although the basis of the permission for selling chametz, as you noted, is because of great financial loss—and that loss will be prevented even if I, who am stringent, do not buy there—still, once the thing has already been permitted, the sale was a real sale (what matters is not the motive but the result). Unlike our case. The slanderous speech remains slanderous speech the whole time, and if I consume it merely because I like sensationalism, then as far as that is concerned, the slanderous speech was not permitted. The result has already occurred even without my consuming it—just as if I am permitted to desecrate Shabbat for the sake of saving a life, there is no place to permit smoking a cigarette that is not needed for any life-saving at all; the same applies here, for satisfying my curiosity is not needed for the benefit in the slanderous speech.

Another point: even in Rabbi Nehorai’s claim—aside from the fact that there the discussion concerns lechatchilah and bediavad—it seems there needs to be a directed intention that the purchase be for the lofty purpose of supporting the farmer, unlike consuming the above program, where my main reason for watching it is to satisfy my curiosity or my desire for vengeance against the corrupt.

As for what you wrote in passing about the Haredi approach that denies universalism, and that the Haredim refuse to adopt any sort of systemic approach (as you wrote there), and that they seek only a solution for the individual person without paying attention to the system as a whole—perhaps that itself is the point of dispute. In a case where one can uphold both, and because of that the matter will remain within the category of what is forbidden to the individual person, there truly is no place for universalism. Only in cases such as the dispute between Rabbi Nehorai and Rabbi Friedman, about lechatchilah and bediavad, is there room for a universalist conception. (If you disagree, I would be happy to receive an example.) And here, of course, not only Haredim but every person as an individual will perform individual actions even though as a sweeping norm—a categorical imperative—it tells him not to act that way; there is still room for individual considerations as stringencies.
For example, the Gemara you brought in Shabbat 42 about a coal in the public domain, and the implication for the coronavirus: for the individual person the matter is not dangerous, so if he can continue as usual he will do so; but for the public it will cause harm. Consequently, one could also say the reverse in a case where for the public the matter is permitted because of the totality of circumstances—for example, eating luxuries and things that are not the healthiest. Clearly, the individual person who takes upon himself a diet and avoiding unhealthy foods is not regarded as Haredi (in that personal behavior in which he was stringent), but as a reasonable person acting out of personal logic. And in that respect, the Haredi who sees room to be stringent upon himself in matters that are not necessarily tangible is no different from someone who abstains from eating meat and ice cream.

However, one can certainly relate to the application of the categorical imperative as a principle that is indeed a moral principle, and accordingly the rule that we must act in a way that we would want to become a general law is itself a moral command. And morality certainly demands of us that we act consistently and not benefit from the existence of those who do not act properly. But all this is specifically in a case where the matter is not bound up with a definite prohibition. I absolutely agree in places involving stringencies such as heter mechirah, but one cannot command categorically even things that are not required by the very imperative itself and are fulfilled without it, in a clear way—just as we would not permit buying during the Sabbatical year even without heter mechirah in order to strengthen those who do rely on heter mechirah, even if we managed to prove that this directly strengthens farmers who rely on heter mechirah. That is to say: one should not permit external prohibitions that do not necessarily follow from the very prohibition that was permitted and are tied to the essence of the permission.
The question now is what we include in a prohibition that directly belongs to the permission, and what is considered not necessary to the essence of the permission and therefore not included in the categorical imperative. Therefore, in my view, there is definitely room for the intention of the individual person—why he is doing what he is doing—in a case like this: why he consumes the media in question, or the heter mechirah produce. (Especially if the benefit has already been accomplished and now only the prohibition remains without any benefit.)

And to sharpen the point: I did not mean that I would rely on the secular person to watch the program and thus the goal will be fulfilled, but that once and if it has already been fulfilled, there is no point in my joining in as well!
And let us take the example you brought there regarding desecration of Shabbat: obviously, if I need to desecrate Shabbat for the sake of saving a life, and I came to do so, and a secular Jew got there before me, is there any point in my going back and desecrating it after there is no longer any need?! Here we are already after the categorical imperative, so in our case too the result has seemingly already been realized.

Regarding Yael, my main claim is that if the act would have been done even without the benefit that came out of it, but rather for the sake of the transgression (the pleasure), and it just so happened that it also benefited all Israel—even if the perpetrator knew that it would benefit all Israel—then seemingly this is not in the category of a transgression for the sake of Heaven. (Perhaps in the category of “merit is brought about through the meritorious”… which of course seems self-contradictory.)

I do not know exactly what you came to argue in that long message. I see one point of disagreement: the categorical imperative. And on that my words have already been stated, and I see no point in repeating myself. I claim that if there is an act that is halakhically forbidden, but a situation arises in which one must do it, one should not leave it to transgressors and rely on them to fix the situation; rather, we should do it ourselves. Similar to what is said about desecrating Shabbat for the sake of saving a life. If there is permission, it is general.

In short: if the desecration of Shabbat has already been done, would you also say that because of the categorical imperative it would now be permitted for me too to desecrate Shabbat, even though the benefit has already been achieved?!

Of course not. What does that have to do with anything? We are speaking about a benefit that is created through public use (as with heter mechirah and the sale of chametz). In such situations one cannot say that we rely on the secular and on transgressors.

The connection is to the question about Yatzata Tzaddik, where the benefit has already been realized before I watch the program. And that is what I compared to desecrating Shabbat after the result has already been obtained.
As for heter mechirah and the sale of chametz, I expanded on that and for some reason you refused to read it.

The benefit has not been obtained, because a program without viewers is not made and has no influence.
I read everything, and my position stands.

You assume that the result is what causes the permission, but that is not so. Rather, an action that has two results can be considered either a permitted act or a forbidden act—depending on the intention of the doer.
For if the speaker intends a constructive purpose, then he is acting to repair and not to destroy, and his act is not the slanderous speech that was forbidden. But if he intends the harm done to So-and-so and not the benefit that accrues to someone else, then the act is primarily attributed to that, and this is the forbidden slanderous speech.
As with any action that has two effects, where the intention is what defines the act [so long as his intention is not nullified], and the second result is incidental and does not define the act—so too in the examples brought in the column.

I most certainly do not assume that (are there not in halakhah commandments that require intention, unintentional acts, and other things that depend on intention? Are we dealing with fools?). I explained in the column what I do assume.

I did not really understand the permission regarding Yael.
Surely it is forbidden to murder one person in order to save 10 others, as is stated explicitly in “Hand over one of you and we will kill him, otherwise we will kill all of you”—let them all die… and this does not seem to be merely a declarative ruling.

And how is forbidden sexual relations different? Seemingly, sexual immorality is forbidden to Yael even if thousands of Israelites will die?
What is the understanding here?
Only if we say that intention for the sake of Heaven removes the transgression can we begin to understand a direction toward permission.
Perhaps in combination with karka olam.

Quote:
“Because I am unable to overcome my urges and my intentions are not pure, Reuven should lose his money? In my view that is utterly unreasonable.”

Do I need to commit a transgression so that Reuven’s money may be saved?

It seems to me, on the contrary, that I certainly may not commit a transgression, and Reuven’s money is not more important.

One must discuss whether there is here an obligation מצד השבת אבידה of Reuven’s property that I am obligated in, while on the other hand I will stumble in malicious joy / slanderous speech.

First, this is about the public and not many individuals. Second, Sisera was a pursuer, so there is no problem at all. The transgression is not murder but a married woman. And finally, “Hand over one of you” is not a law in the laws of murder and preservation of life, but in sanctification and desecration of God’s name. They are not at all comparable. See my article in Techumin about Siamese twins.

This is speaking about a situation where the expected harm to Reuven is from Shimon. Therefore, slanderous speech about Shimon is harming a pursuer (even if not intentionally).

My intention is that the benefit does not come from the specific story but from the very reality that everything is recorded and one day you could be put on the stake.
After all, it is obvious that if gossip materials are published without any direct benefit, but even in publishing these materials some benefit will result in that people will be careful in cases where it would be worthwhile that such acts not occur—in other words, the benefit is not direct against the specific person, but a benefit of the overall system, namely that others will hear and fear—then we are not coming to save people from the little crook who was caught in the program’s net, because it is likely that the exposure of him is small relative to the millions of people who saw his nakedness. And if we say that it is still worthwhile because of the benefit that others will hear and fear, then perhaps it should also be permitted to publish mere gossip, because that will lead to prevention of crimes out of fear that the matter will be exposed.
The fact that so-and-so committed some offense is not a reason to use him in order to educate all the people of Israel; therefore, to warn people about that person, it would have been enough to publish it in a regional local paper, for example, and not before all the people and Twitter.

I already explained that the benefit is not achieved without viewers. And in particular there will be no future programs without viewers. And the benefit is general, for all tradesmen who are wary of the program.
All this is very simple, and I do not see why one needs to keep getting tangled up in it over and over.

Where does the rabbi learn from the verses that the prohibition is specifically against saying “evil” speech, and if it is not evil then it is permitted? (I am not talking about testimony in court, which the Chafetz Chaim defines as a separate sin.)
I always thought that the source of the permission is from the command “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood,” which stands against the prohibition of talebearing and accepting false reports. It may be that the requirement of intention is needed in order to fulfill the commandment of “Do not stand by your fellow’s blood,” and this requires further analysis.

What is your opinion about a gossip program about tradesmen, unrelated to their actual workmanship, where the benefit is that an all-seeing eye and an all-hearing ear cause all tradesmen to be afraid to do wrongs in their field of work because of that? (In politics, these are things that happen every day, morning, noon, and night.) And if the answer is no, then seemingly the same would apply even in a case where the tradesman really did wrong in his work: the scam carried out by the crooked plumber for one or two hundred shekels—where even if he cheats all his customers until the end of his life, they will go on living normally—is minor. Rather, it is the crook who cheats by thousands who will be deterred. So why, then, should one have to punish the small crook with selective punishment, not in order to save us from him, but in order to gain benefit from the general class of crooks? And if it is true that a person who did something wrong is a good vehicle through which to gain the benefit, then the same should also be true regarding gossip about shameful acts unrelated to his actual profession.

In the link where you dealt with the categorical imperative, in the course of your remarks you mentioned your practice of buying only flour that was ground after Passover, and that after some years, because of the categorical imperative, you changed your practice.

During the festival I looked a bit into the issue of this stringency, and I was astonished to see that there are real concerns in the matter, particularly in places where there is concern that shopkeepers continued using the merchandise they had sold, such that their sale was retroactively nullified. So apparently there is simply no connection between the sale of chametz and the categorical imperative. (For if there is an actual flaw in the sale itself, there is no room for the discussion.)
I will attach a link to a detailed responsum on the matter by R. Asher Weiss: https://www.torahbase.org/%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%A6%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%92%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%A5/

Your response:

Where there is a grocery that is not suspected of this, there is no such problem (I lived then in Bnei Brak). Beyond that, this is a doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition. And beyond that, even if the shopkeeper used the chametz, if there is a valid sales contract then the chametz is sold and he is a thief.

I will quote R. Asher Weiss’s ruling brought at the end of his responsum:

“However, it is clear and obvious that if a shop owner or factory owner sells his chametz, and during Passover he trades in this chametz and continues selling it in the shop just as he does all year, then indeed the sale is null and void, and his end proves about his beginning that he never fully resolved to sell at all.

And for this reason I ruled to the questioner regarding the shops in the airport, which according to him sell chametz in the middle of Chol HaMoed Pesach, that their sale is no sale and the chametz in their possession has the status of chametz that passed over Passover.”

From the whole give-and-take there it seems that the sale is nullified, besides the fact that he also ruled this way, and so too it seems from the other decisors.

From the email ☝️⁩

At the moment I do not remember whether a source is cited for this. But that is how it seemed to me by reason. According to your approach this is “pushed aside” and not “permitted”; that is, there is no permission here within the framework of the laws of slanderous speech, but rather one prohibition being overridden by another commandment or prohibition. That does not seem to emerge from the words of all the decisors. There it seems that when it is for a constructive purpose there is no prohibition.

I did not understand the question. I clarified my position. When you harm a person who is doing wrong, it is permitted even if the benefit is not only with respect to him. What is so complicated about that?

And I do not agree. If there is a legally valid contract, the sale takes effect. And if the legal system does not recognize this contract, then even without using the goods it is very doubtful how much value it has.

You were speaking about slanderous speech that brings direct benefit by saving people from the wrongdoing person, whereas in our case the main benefit is saving from others, and the wrongdoer who was caught serves as leverage for attaining that benefit. On what grounds is that permitted?!

Quote

“First, this is about the public and not many individuals.”

What is the difference between the public and many individuals? Is it not the same thing? What is the source for making such a distinction?

“Second, Sisera was a pursuer, so there is no problem at all. The transgression is not murder but a married woman.”

How did you get to that? Where did I claim there was a transgression of murder? All I did was compare murder and forbidden sexual relations: these are severe transgressions in which quantity does not count, and just as we do not kill one in order to save many, so too the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations should not be overridden in order to save many. A person’s life matters up to the three cardinal sins, and with bloodshed it is newly taught that this applies even against many, and forbidden sexual relations is learned from bloodshed. So from where is there permission to commit forbidden sexual relations in order to save many? We are not discussing Sisera’s sexual prohibition, but Yael’s, of course. I do not understand where you got the law of a pursuer from; it seems you read rather hastily.

And finally, “Hand over one of you” is not a law in the laws of murder and preservation of life but in sanctification and desecration of God’s name. They are not at all comparable. See my article in Techumin about Siamese twins.

Forgive my lack of familiarity—do you have a link to the article?
And before reading the article, it is not at all clear to me: what difference does it make for what reason it is forbidden? It is forbidden, and forbidden sexual relations is compared to that prohibition.
And the straightforward inference is that one may not violate forbidden sexual relations in order to save many.

I asked:
Why should Levi violate the prohibition of slanderous speech in order to save Reuven’s money from expected damage by Shimon [according to the case where the “constructive purpose” needed for permission is lacking]?

And this was the answer:
“This is speaking about a situation where the expected harm to Reuven is from Shimon. Therefore, slanderous speech about Shimon is harming a pursuer (even if not intentionally).”

Does the answer answer my question???

Would we, for example, permit me to violate the prohibition of mechamer in order to save another person’s property?

No. I was not talking about that. See the last message. It seems to me I have exhausted the point completely.

It makes things very difficult that you are not continuing the original thread. I no longer remember what was discussed.

The source for distinguishing between an individual and the public is brought by several decisors from the martyrs of Lod, “whom no creature can stand in their section [in Paradise].” Seemingly their deeds should be invalid, because a person may not die or kill in order to save others. On this several decisors wrote (such as the Tzitz Eliezer) that the public is different. This is also simple by reason (as in war), and it has support from additional sources in which public needs are treated like saving life. See my article on “Do not be intimidated”:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98-%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%A3-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%91%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%97%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%91%D7%AA%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%93-%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99

You wrote about murder, so I answered about murder. Afterward you moved to forbidden sexual relations, and I answered that. Perhaps I did not understand and the murder was only an introduction to forbidden sexual relations. Fine.

I say exactly the same thing even regarding bloodshed. So I do not see what argument there is in your words.

Regarding the issue of “Hand over one of you,” you have quite a few errors. The article I referred you to is found here on the site; you need only type it into the search. Here it is:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%93%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%90%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%90%D7%9D

In the Yerushalmi there it says that in “Hand over one of you” it is forbidden to hand him over. Admittedly, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan dispute when this applies, and the decisors dispute whom the law follows. But beyond that, in my opinion one may volunteer. Furthermore, the matter there is extremely puzzling (as the commentaries on the Rambam and many others have noted), for the one being handed over is also about to die. So why on earth should one not hand him over in order to save the rest? This certainly does not arise from the reasoning of “Who says your blood is redder?” The commentators there pressed themselves greatly in resolving this difficulty, and in my opinion came up empty. The simple explanation is that the prohibition against handing him over is because of the desecration of God’s name involved in yielding to the demands of terrorists. But under the laws of murder and preservation of life, it is permitted. And that is what I wrote to you.

And regarding your question at the end: the prohibition of slanderous speech is due to the harm done to the person spoken about. And when this is done because he is a pursuer, there is permission to do it. By the same token, you could ask: what is the permission to violate the prohibition of murder in order to save the pursued? Or to harm the pursuer’s property or body? After all, there is a prohibition against doing so—do we say to a person, “sin so that your fellow may gain”? In my opinion the law of slanderous speech for a constructive purpose is based on that.

I apologize for the awkwardness of comments that are not attached to what they refer to, but that is because I do not know how to reply to a comment. I do not have any button to reply to a specific comment, only at the end of the whole thread.

Now I have noticed
that only your replies have no option for response, and I understand that the intention is to thread the reply onto my own comment or that of others.

According to what you said about the martyrs of Lod, would it have been permitted to hand someone over??
It seems to me that it certainly would be forbidden [if that person is not defined as a pursuer].

They were permitted to give up their own lives, and that is not in the category of murder.
It is obvious that they were forbidden to hand over someone else in order to save others.
And just as it is explained that a person may endanger his own life in order to save another,
taking one’s own life into one’s own hands is not like taking another’s life.
And in my opinion one cannot infer from this to one’s own sexual transgression [that is, choosing to violate the prohibition of forbidden relations] in order to save another.

And
just as Saul may have been permitted to commit suicide to save himself from suffering or royal humiliation, but it would be forbidden for someone else to do that to him!!

Forgive me for butting in,
but regarding the end, you shifted your answer to Shalom Yosef.
Quote: “And regarding your question at the end: the prohibition of slanderous speech is due to the harm done to the person spoken about. And when this is done because he is a pursuer, there is permission to do it. By the same token, you could ask: what is the permission to violate the prohibition of murder in order to save the pursued? Or to harm the pursuer’s property or body? After all, there is a prohibition against doing so—do we say to a person, ‘sin so that your fellow may gain’? In my opinion the law of slanderous speech for a constructive purpose is based on that.”

But it was not said that one may kill a person in order to save others if the person being killed is not the pursuer, even if he is a wrongdoer in some other respect, and there is no doubt that killing him would save the others.
And I return and wonder, and therefore it seems to me that you did not answer me: how is it different in the case of someone who sinned with regard to a mere perutah—even outright theft—where through him one supposedly has to educate all the thieves? For slanderous speech for a constructive purpose applies only toward the one whom that thief is now about to steal from, or at least those who are potential victims of that very person.
And to sharpen it: if, for example, the wrongdoer who was caught has gone bankrupt and finished working and dealing with people here in Israel, but by publicizing his story the benefit will come in deterring other wrongdoers—would it still be permitted to publicize the evil about him?

I think that on this matter I still have not received a clear answer.

To reply within a certain thread, you need to go to the first message in that thread. Immediately after it there is a “Reply” button. Click it and write your message. When you are done, click “Submit,” and your response will appear at the end of the thread (even if there are messages after the first one).

I am sorry, but apparently I have lost track of the discussion. I no longer remember what this is about. The threads are separate and the gaps in time are large. If there is some question that was not answered, I suggest starting a new thread and presenting it from the beginning. I no longer remember what was discussed and what each person said.

A note from the Hafla’ah regarding one who stayed ten years and she did not give birth.

The Tur wrote that we do not compel him to divorce her because we attribute it to the punishment for his living outside the Land, and on this the Hafla’ah asked: why is there such a punishment, since Rabbenu Chaim HaKohen in Tosafot Ketubot 110b wrote that “nowadays it is not a mitzvah to live in the Land of Israel, because there are several commandments dependent on the Land and several punishments about which we are unable to be careful,” and he answered: “Every compulsion is no argument except when the impediment is because of the compulsion, but if he does not want to act, the argument of compulsion does not apply… since he does not go up because of the charm of his place and his country, and not because of fear of danger, the sin is in his hand.”

There is also a well-known Beit HaLevi on the verse “And God saw the children of Israel, and God knew,” that He saw they were transgressing because of compulsion, and He knew what was in their hearts—that they did not desire this compulsion.

[There are also several Shabbat labors about which it is said that the intention toward the purpose of the labor is part of the labor itself, and therefore even when one transgresses by way of an inevitable consequence (pesik reisha) he will be exempt or it will be permitted. The Mishneh LaMelekh writes this regarding refining metal in chapter 10 of the laws of Shabbat; Tosafot write this regarding reaping on Shabbat 73a; and various later authorities raised this claim regarding many other labors. Similar things were also said regarding the Sabbatical year בעקבות the Yerushalmi “the heart knows whether it is for making a bend or for crookedness.”]

Many thanks.

The source for these points regarding compulsion and desire is in the words of several Acharonim on the sugya of modest women and promiscuous women (“and to expound for them that under compulsion it is permitted”). If I am not mistaken, there too it is the Hafla’ah (beginning of Ketubot, and Chelkat Yoav, Kuntres HaOnes sec. 2) and the Pnei Yehoshua there on “they saw that she had come” in the sugya of compulsion in gittin (against Beit Yaakov there). And likewise in the Rivash, who discusses a community that placed a ban on coming to the city so that the king would not amuse himself with them (apparently idolatrous entertainments), and there was one who violated the ban, came to the city, and played; there it is a case of bringing oneself into compulsion, but also both compulsion and desire (he entered in order to play). Admittedly, here one can distinguish. By the way, in these sugyot, according to most views, compulsion plus desire is not considered compulsion.

And to the list in the second paragraph one might perhaps add the tannaitic dispute about legal stratagems regarding suffering of living creatures on a Festival. There too the intention is a condition in the act (and in truth it requires analysis why the legal stratagem helps at all, since it merely presents a façade of proper intention. It seems to me that this is exactly the subject of the column: if the result exists, it helps even if the intention is not proper).

With God’s help, 25 Nisan 5780

In my humble opinion, an act of transgression such as slanderous speech, even when done for a constructive purpose, is not ‘permitted’ but ‘pushed aside’; therefore, when one does it with a negative intention and not with the intention of the commandment, he has not thereby fulfilled the commandment, and all that remains in his hand is a transgression. Just as if one wears woolen tzitzit on a linen garment and does not intend it for the sake of the commandment of tzitzit, he has not thereby fulfilled tzitzit—so what, then, is there to override the transgression in his act?

Moreover, the prohibition of slanderous speech, and all the more so rejoicing at a fellow’s downfall, exist even if they brought about no harm at all to the other person. On the contrary: one who rejoices at his fellow’s downfall brings that fellow great benefit in that God’s wrath is turned back from him—yet despite this, the one who rejoices is punished by having God’s wrath turned toward him. So too, even if evil speech about another brought benefit, the evil intention and the joy at his downfall were not needed at all in bringing that benefit, and with respect to them there is no commandment to override them.

All the more so when an evil intention joins with an act that is evil at its root—the whole act is stamped with a negative seal, and is not entitled to the ‘defense of necessity.’ As the Chafetz Chaim brings (in Be’er Mayim Chaim, subsec. 10) as proof from what is explained in the words of our Sages, that God was angry with the gentiles who did evil to Israel because of their evil intention; therefore, even though the suffering that came upon Israel was justly deserved and was meant to arouse them to repentance, nevertheless those who harmed them will be punished because their whole intention was for evil.

Likewise the Chafetz Chaim proves in section 3 from what is said: “And I will punish the house of Jehu for the blood of Jezreel” (Hosea 1:4): “For although Jehu performed a commandment in cutting off the house of Ahab in Jezreel, because he had been so commanded by a prophet… nevertheless the blood of the house of Ahab was visited upon him, because he too was a great sinner.” From this the Chafetz Chaim concludes that “if he is a sinner like him, and he too is infected with the same transgressions as he is, then it is forbidden to publicize him, because such a person, in revealing his secrets, does not intend for the good and for fear [of Heaven], but only to rejoice at his downfall and disgrace him by this.”

And by the rule that “the measure of good is greater,” a good intention too stamps its mark on the act, for one who desecrates Shabbat in order to save a life is not liable even if his good intention was not realized and did not bring rescue.

With blessings, Shatz

And at one time I heard from R. Chaim Chayim Yisrael Nachman Burstein ztz”l at seudah shelishit in the Breslov Hasidim synagogue that was in Katamon, that Rabbi Nachman said the best remedy for a person’s sins is that people disgrace him and he remains silent; if so, the ‘best of doctors’ is the person who reviles someone—and yet the ‘best of doctors’ of this sort ends up in a place that is not so pleasant :).

And one can similarly say regarding theft for the sake of saving life, that the intention not to pay contributes nothing to the act of rescue, for the rescue will also take place if he takes it with the intention to return it. Therefore the intention itself is a transgression for which there is no ‘defense of necessity’ at all, and the negative intention stamps its mark on the act, which is negative at root, and defines it as a transgression.

I thought on Shabbat that perhaps there is an exegetical juxtaposition between the commands:
“Do not go about as a talebearer among your people; do not stand by the blood of your fellow; I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:16).
Where do we say, “Do not go about as a talebearer among your people”? Where you are not standing by the blood of your fellow. But in a place where you are standing by the blood of your fellow, it is not talebearing.

(I know that the Gemara investigates whether we derive laws from juxtaposition throughout the entire Torah.)

Nice. What they investigate (the tannaim disputed this) is whether we derive laws from juxtaposition in Deuteronomy.

The Gemara investigates whether all the tannaim agree that we derive laws from juxtaposition in Deuteronomy. To the Gemara it is clear that there is a tannaitic dispute regarding the rest of the Torah. And the nice derashah I found is on the rest of the Torah (Leviticus).
Hence the reservation.

Indeed. I was mistaken. I even once wrote about it:
https://gabihazut.co.il/-shiurim/%E2%80%8F%E2%80%8F%D7%93%D7%A3-%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%93%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%A1%D7%94-%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%99-%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9D/

Regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven: seemingly we find this only before the giving of the Torah, or among gentiles (Yael). Is there a source for it among Israelites too?

I once saw that answer. It does not have a shred of a hint in the sugya. Perhaps we should say it applies only to women whose names begin with yod?

A levir does not necessarily intend (primarily) for the sake of the commandment. Therefore Ashkenazic decisors prefer chalitzah. The Sephardim nevertheless prefer levirate marriage.
Yevamot 39b: It was taught: Abba Shaul says, one who takes his yevamah for beauty, or for marriage, or for any other reason, it is as though he encounters a forbidden relation, and in my eyes it is close to the child being a mamzer. But the Sages say: “Her brother-in-law shall come to her”—in any case.
That is, Abba Shaul says that although there is here a commandment of levirate marriage that permits the prohibition of a brother’s wife, the matter depends on intending to fulfill the commandment for the sake of the commandment. And if not, then his duty is to go to the other option, which is chalitzah.

At first glance one could understand that they dispute in every case of a commandment overriding a prohibition, whether it overrides only when he intends it for the sake of the commandment. If so, Abba Shaul would not permit slanderous speech for a constructive purpose if he told it for the sake of enjoying his fellow’s disgrace, while the Sages would permit it. [Later in the Gemara there, 40a, it is explicitly proven that even according to Abba Shaul, a priest who fulfills the commandment of eating meal-offerings after the incense has been burned, and eats for the sake of a meal and not for the sake of the commandment, has fulfilled the commandment and the owners obtain atonement. Rashi s.v. haka mai and Tosafot s.v. mai trei gavnei.]
But perhaps the Sages permit it only when there is an explicit commandment, whereas regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven and slanderous speech for a constructive purpose they would concede to Abba Shaul that it is forbidden if he does not intend purely for the sake of the commandment. Or perhaps the reverse: Abba Shaul forbids it only where there is another open option, namely chalitzah, but regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven and slanderous speech for a constructive purpose, where if he does not do it and say it the result will be lost, he agrees with the Sages that it is permitted even if he does not intend purely for the sake of the commandment.

Questions:
A. Do you maintain your position—that intention makes no practical difference (in slanderous speech for a constructive purpose and in a transgression for the sake of Heaven)—even according to Abba Shaul?
B. Presumably, if one slaughters an animal for beauty, then even according to Abba Shaul the slaughter permits it and he has fulfilled the commandment of slaughter [otherwise this would be a super-dramatic dispute throughout the whole Torah and not only about levirate marriage]. What is the conceptual definition of the distinction? By the way, there is a dispute among the Rishonim whether Abba Shaul’s rule is biblical or rabbinic. And there in the Gemara Rav Yitzchak bar Avdimi holds that Abba Shaul has a special derashah that “her brother-in-law shall come to her” means specifically for the sake of the commandment (but perhaps he would make a binyan av?). Is Abba Shaul a דין in the overriding of the prohibition or a דין in the fulfillment of the commandment?

[By the way, one should discuss a case where motives are mixed—what moves the levir. Perhaps only for beauty, meaning he makes his intercourse licentious and the commandment does not interest him at all (1+0). Perhaps only the combination of beauty and commandment would move him (0.5+0.5). Perhaps each one alone, beauty or commandment, would move him, and it just happened that both were present (1+1). Perhaps beauty is a strong reason while the commandment is not enough (1+0.5). Or perhaps even the commandment is a strong reason and beauty is not, but the beauty and enjoyment are mixed in, like one preoccupied in forbidden relations (0.5+1).]

Abba Shaul says that in his eyes it is close to encountering a forbidden relation. This implies that he does not truly see it as an actual forbidden relation. Seemingly it is only a matter of recommendation to perform chalitzah when that option exists. But if there were no option, he would also see a commandment without intention as a commandment.
Beyond that, my arguments regarding the lack of importance of intention concern acts whose value lies in the practical result (as with a transgression for the sake of Heaven in Yael’s case, or slanderous speech for a constructive purpose, and the like). In these cases I argued that the result justifies the act, and it is not reasonable that the lack of intention should cancel that justification. I did not say that intention has no importance in the performance of commandments. In particular, this depends on the question whether commandments require intention.

The Ramban writes that according to Abba Shaul, one who has intercourse with his yevamah intentionally [for the wrong motive] has not acquired her. And from his wording it seems this is biblical. Therefore it is not merely a recommendation, and it is not clear conceptually why the distinction should depend on the alternative option of chalitzah.
In levirate marriage too there is value in the practical result, to establish a name for his brother, as implied by the verses; and some form of levirate marriage existed before the giving of the Torah, as with Tamar and Judah.
What does seem plausible is that Abba Shaul is a rule only in levirate marriage and is not extended to other matters; the question is why. If because only there is there a derashah that “his yevamah” means for the sake of the commandment, then why not make a binyan av?

Perhaps this is connected to Tosafot’s principle in Sukkah that one who did not act in accordance with the enactment of the Sages has not fulfilled the biblical commandment. But the plain sense of Abba Shaul’s language is not like that.
In slanderous speech and a transgression for the sake of Heaven, we are speaking about preventing harm, not producing benefit. I assume that every commandment brings some benefit, physical or spiritual. Beyond that, in a transgression for the sake of Heaven and slanderous speech, the result (preventing the harm) is the essence of the permission and not only a side effect. Regarding levirate marriage, the Sages already took it away from the plain meaning of “to establish a name for his brother” (it seems that from the existence of the alternative of chalitzah one also sees that establishing the name is not the essence, though this can be rejected).
But the existence of an alternative is a simple conceptual distinction. If you do not intend properly and there is another halakhic way to act, then there is permission to do it that way. But in a transgression for the sake of Heaven and slanderous speech for a constructive purpose there is no alternative; therefore there one should do it even without proper intention.

In what way did the Sages take “establishing the name” away from its plain meaning? In the Book of Ruth it says “to establish the name of the dead upon his inheritance, that the name of the dead not be cut off,” and in the end they called Ruth’s son (the wife of Machlon) Oved.

If according to the Ramban this is fully biblical, because it is derived from an exposition, and even bediavad it does not take effect biblically, is there still room to distinguish specifically because there is an alternative? Obviously if it is not fully biblical, then the distinction of an alternative is conceptually straightforward.

In any case, it may be that the Chafetz Chaim regarding slanderous speech for a constructive purpose, and the Netziv regarding a transgression for the sake of Heaven, hold this even according to the Sages of Abba Shaul. For perhaps the Sages only said “her brother-in-law shall come to her—in any case” because that is an actual commandment; but with slanderous speech for a constructive purpose and a transgression for the sake of Heaven, where there is no explicit commandment upon him, they concede to Abba Shaul that the prohibition is not overridden if he has impure intention. All the more so according to the positions that are concerned for Abba Shaul in practice.

(As for me personally, I of course completely accept your reasoning regarding slanderous speech and a transgression for the sake of Heaven; I am only discussing it according to their approach.)

Incidentally, I wonder whether in the Hasidic community, long may they live, they made a big tzimmes out of this view of Abba Shaul. At first glance, the Sages are Litvaks and Abba Shaul is among the descendants of the Baal Shem Tov.

Regarding taking it away from its plain meaning, see Yevamot 24a.
Even with a biblical rule one can say that the reason it does not work is because there is an alternative.

You are right about taking it away from its plain meaning in Yevamot 24a.
Incidentally, perhaps specifically here the gezerah shavah takes it entirely away from its plain meaning, because there is conclusive proof that the conception was that establishing the name was not by giving a name, as is evident from Judah, who performed levirate marriage with Tamar, the wife of Er his son, even before the giving of the Torah (and this was from the laws of levirate marriage of that time, as Ramban writes there), and the sons were called Peretz and Zerach, and this is “and raise up seed for your brother.” Likewise after the giving of the Torah, the Sages knew from Oved, the son of Ruth the wife of Machlon (as Ramban writes on Genesis 38:8). And I seem to recall that they explained that what he wrote, that establishing the name is a great secret among the secrets of the Torah concerning human generation, means reincarnations—that the soul of the dead person is reincarnated in the son of the levir.

Perhaps one can learn from Rashi and Tosafot that the alternative is not the central issue here.
In the Gemara there, 40a, it is explicitly proven that Abba Shaul agrees that a priest who eats the remainder of meal-offerings for the sake of a meal and not for the sake of the commandment has fulfilled it (that is, he has fulfilled the commandment and the owners obtain atonement). According to your approach, this is self-evident, because with meal-offering remnants there is no alternative of redeeming them for a perutah or burning them.
But Rashi s.v. haka mai explained: “for there he may eat it as much as he wishes; there, when he has intercourse not for the sake of the commandment, he encounters a forbidden relation.” That is, in levirate marriage there is the prohibition of a brother’s wife that is overridden (just as with slanderous speech for a constructive purpose the prohibition of slanderous speech is overridden, and with a transgression for the sake of Heaven the transgression is overridden), and only there does Abba Shaul maintain the rule that improper intention disqualifies.
And Tosafot there s.v. mai also wrote that with meal-offering remnants, if he eats for the sake of a meal and not for the sake of the commandment, he has fulfilled it.

Incidentally, from this Rashi it seems that Abba Shaul’s rule is a rule in the overriding of the prohibition of a brother’s wife, not a rule in the fulfillment of the commandment of levirate marriage. [And so too it seems somewhat from the language there in the baraitot, where the issue is “a commandment that at first was within the realm of permission, then became forbidden, and then became permitted again.” That is, it is a qualification in the permission of prohibitions and not a rule in the commandment.] If so, do you perhaps have a conceptual explanation for this?

Perhaps it is a rule in overriding a prohibition where there is an alternative.

It seems a bit strange to me that Rashi and Tosafot would not mention this important condition (an alternative), and would suffice with mentioning only one of the conditions—that there is a prohibition in the background.

One last question: would there be a practical difference according to this, that if so-and-so can tell slanderous speech for a constructive purpose and he intends to enjoy his fellow’s disgrace, while another person can also tell the slanderous speech for a constructive purpose and he does not intend to enjoy it, then so-and-so must leave it to the other person (according to the views that are concerned for Abba Shaul)?

And another question that does not count after the last one because I already asked it: what is the conceptual logic for distinguishing between the overriding of a prohibition (where according to Abba Shaul impure intention harms it) and ordinary fulfillment of a commandment?

Perhaps actually, according to your view that Abba Shaul deals only where there is an alternative, then even in meal-offering remnants there is an alternative in another priest who can eat it, and not necessarily the one who offered it. Therefore Rashi was forced to mention only the permission, because there is no prohibition in the background. But if an alternative in another person counts as an alternative, that has implications.

It seems to me that one should indeed let him do it according to all views. If Abba Shaul did not state a special rule for levirate marriage but a general rule, then your claim about the obligation has some place.
As for slanderous speech for a constructive purpose when he intends to enjoy it, one could say that he commits a transgression and will be punished for it, even though he is obliged to do it. He will be punished for the intention (unless he was coerced with respect to that). However, it is not clear to me whether the punishment would be exactly like someone who violated a negative commandment, or rather a punishment for someone who did not behave properly. Perhaps it would indeed be an actual punishment for a negative commandment, even though he needed to do it (again, unless he was coerced regarding his intention).

I am not sure there is a difference. The fact that he speaks about the prohibition does not mean his words do not also concern the commandment.
But there is a conceptual reason to distinguish. When he intends his own enjoyment, that itself is the prohibition: to derive pleasure from intercourse with his brother’s wife. Therefore, if he does it in order to enjoy, he violates the prohibition. But the commandment to perform levirate marriage is fulfilled even if he intended his own enjoyment (at least if commandments do not require intention).

Which brings us back to your earlier question about someone who speaks slanderous speech for a constructive purpose while intending his fellow’s disgrace—better to leave it to someone else to do it.