On Discrimination in the Provision of Services and Biases in the Discourse (Column 296)
With God's help
Yesterday it was reported that the court in Be'er Sheva fined a print shop that refused to produce an advertising sign for the "Pride Parade" for the LGBT community, in the amount of NIS 50,000. The basis was the anti-discrimination law. At first glance, this judgment looks bizarre, and it is worth giving it some thought.
About three years ago, students from the "LGBT student group" at Ben-Gurion University asked for a price quote for printing promotional materials. In response to the request, the print shop replied to them: "We do not deal in materials of abomination; we are Jews." The students approached the print shop through an attorney, and the matter developed into a lawsuit for NIS 100,000.
Attorney Menashe Yado (of the Honenu organization), who represented the print shop's owners, presented the court with two rabbinic opinions, which determined that according to Jewish law the print shop owners could not print material of this kind. Attorney Yado further argued that the print shop could not be compelled to produce with its own hands a custom-made product (as opposed to a product produced en masse) for a customer in a way that conflicts with its faith and with Jewish law. He also argued that nowhere in the world is a person in the private market forced to contract with someone and produce a product for him contrary to the prohibitions of his religion and worldview, and he cited precedents from various countries.
Judge Orit Lifshitz held in her ruling that "where their faith clashes with the necessity of providing service in a public place, the latter value prevails," explaining that the Law Prohibiting Discrimination in Products, Services, and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places must be interpreted broadly, and that it overrides freedom of religion. Another point established by the judge was that business owners must be required to provide service not only in off-the-shelf products, but also in products custom-made for the person placing the order.
Following this, a protest by Minister Bezalel Smotrich was, as expected, published, claiming that the ruling is scandalous and bizarre, and calling for the anti-discrimination law to be amended accordingly, so as to prevent the recurrence of such rulings in the future. The LGBT Association (and other liberal groups), also as expected, explained that this is racism coming from dark places, etc. etc. Just another ordinary day in our parts…
Anti-Discrimination Law
As noted, in the State of Israel there is an anti-discrimination law, officially titled: "Law Prohibiting Discrimination in Products, Services, and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 2000." To clarify the discussion, I will cite a few excerpts from it here:
| Purpose
1. This law is intended to promote equality and prevent discrimination in entry to public places and in the provision of products and services. Prohibition (Amendment No. 1) 2005 (Amendment No. 3) 2014 (Amendment No. 5) 2017 3. (a) A person engaged in the provision of a product or public service, or in the operation of a public place, shall not discriminate in the provision of the product or public service, in granting entry to the public place, or in providing service at the public place, on account of race, religion or religious group, nationality, country of origin, sex, sexual orientation, worldview, party affiliation, age, personal status, parenthood, or wearing the uniforms or insignia of the security and rescue forces. (Amendment No. 4) 2017 (a1) A person engaged in the provision of a product or public service, or in the operation of a public place, shall not discriminate in the provision of the product or public service at the place of business, in granting entry to the public place, or in providing service at the public place, on account of place of residence; however, no distinction shall be regarded as discrimination under this subsection when made by a local authority between its residents and non-residents, to the extent required for carrying out its duties or exercising its powers for the benefit of its residents, all subject to the provisions of any law. (b) For the purposes of this law, it makes no difference whether the activity is carried on for profit or not for profit, and whether or not payment is charged for the provision of the product or public service, operation of the public place, granting entry to the public place, or providing service at the public place. (c) In this law, "a person engaged in" includes the owner, holder, or manager of a business, as well as the person actually responsible for the provision of the product or public service, or for operating the public place or entry into it. (Amendment No. 2) 2011 (c1) For the purposes of this section, discrimination also includes setting conditions that are irrelevant to the matter. (d) The following shall not be regarded as discrimination under this section – (1) when this is required by the character or nature of the product, the public service, or the public place; (2) when this is done by an organization or club that is not for profit, and is done for the purpose of advancing the special needs of the group to which the members of the club or organization belong, provided that such special needs do not conflict with the purpose of the law; (3) the existence of separate frameworks for men or women, where the absence of separation would prevent part of the public from receiving the product or public service, entering the public place, or receiving service at the public place, provided that the separation is justified, taking into account, among other things, the nature of the product, the public service, or the public place, the degree of its necessity, the existence of a reasonable alternative to it, and the needs of the public that may be harmed by the separation. Civil Wrong 5. (a) An act or omission contrary to sections 3 and 4 is a civil wrong, and the provisions of the Torts Ordinance [New Version] shall apply to it, subject to the provisions of this law. (b) The court may award compensation for a civil wrong under this law in an amount not exceeding NIS 50,000, without proof of damage;
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Preliminary Discussion
As the judge wrote, there is here a clash between two values: equality and the prevention of discrimination on the one hand, and freedom of religion on the other. But if you pay attention, then even apart from this specific discussion, the anti-discrimination law itself contains a similar clash: on the one hand, a person's right to sell and provide service to whomever he wishes (perhaps this falls under freedom of occupation? not exactly), and on the other stands the value of equality and preventing discrimination. The law clearly decides that in such a situation the prevention of discrimination prevails. What, then, is so precedent-setting about this judgment? As I understand it (although I am not a lawyer, and I have not invested too much thought and study in these matters), there are at least four aspects to it:
- What came before the Be'er Sheva court was a case in which the conflict was between the law and freedom of religion (and here that is plainly true), not freedom of occupation or the right to sell or not to sell to someone. As far as I can tell, such a case is not explicitly addressed in the law, and therefore it seems to be left to the court's interpretation. I think one can perhaps even learn something about it from the exception the legislature made regarding separate events for women and men (Amendment No. 2, section d3). Why was such an exception accepted? (Beyond Haredi political pressure, of course.) Ostensibly, in order to allow religious people to conduct themselves in accordance with their values. Yet nevertheless, as noted, the judge ruled that even in such a case the prevention of discrimination is the dominant value, overriding freedom of religion.
- The print shop's lawyer argued that this was a one-off product, made specifically for the customer, and not a serial product sold to the public en masse in a store (like a loaf of bread or a garment). Here we are dealing with a sign produced especially for the event in question. In such a situation, he argued, there is room for an exception to the provisions of the law above. The judge, as noted, did not accept this.
- In this case, the product itself contributes directly to activity that runs contrary to the producer's values. The print shop is not engaged in selling clothes for personal use, food, or refreshments for the event. In such a case, withholding service would be not because of the prohibition but because of the recipients of the service. That is the discrimination prohibited by the law, because it is none of his business what their worldview and lifestyle are. But here we are dealing with a sign announcing the event, and thereby constituting an active part of it. The refusal to sell is not because of the identity and worldview of those requesting the service, but because of the content of the requested sign. Incidentally, selling food for the event is a more borderline case, because there it is harder for the producer to claim that the matter contradicts the producer's values, and there is a concern that he is refraining from doing so only because he does not want to provide service to the requesters because of their worldview. By contrast, a sign announcing the event is an active component of the event, and here there is certainly room for the claim that the act itself (producing the sign) is forbidden by Jewish law (this is not entirely clear, but that is what the defendant and the rabbis whose opinions were presented to the court argued. I will not go into that here). The judge apparently did not accept this distinction either (I did not see that it was even raised at all).
- In this case there is a clear asymmetry between the plaintiffs (the customers) and the defendant (the print shop owner). They can order the sign from any other print shop, especially one whose owner is not morally troubled by Pride parades. By contrast, the defendant cannot provide the sign with different content or to a different party. From his perspective, they are the customers, full stop. Moreover, if he is fined, this harms his source of livelihood, whereas if the suit is dismissed, the plaintiffs suffer no harm whatsoever. After all, they have no reason to order the sign specifically from someone whose conscience is offended by it. And once they approached him and it became clear to them that this was indeed his view, they could have respected it and turned to someone else (which is what they ultimately did). But they preferred to sue him. It is worth noting that separate events, which are permitted by law, are more severe than this case. For example, at a singer's performance (as in the case of the Haredi singer Moti Steinmetz in Afula), it is completely inaccessible to couples who want to sit together. Similarly, a performance by a Haredi female singer is completely inaccessible to male listeners. They have no other option. By contrast, here the plaintiffs could have ordered the exact same sign from another source (and, as noted, they in fact did so), so this refusal causes no real harm, neither to them nor to the public.
These distinctions are important against the background of a very well-known case (which was also alluded to in the article) that reached the American Supreme Court, concerning a Christian baker named Phillips who refused to prepare a wedding cake for a gay couple in Colorado. His argument to the customers was highly relevant to our discussion: "I can make you a birthday cake, cookies, or brownies," he told them, "but I cannot make a cake for a same-sex wedding." Note that here too we are dealing with a unique product prepared especially for the event (a cake). The baker was willing to prepare generic products for them (cookies or brownies) that are sold off the shelf. In addition, even if we are speaking about preparing a cake, that is still not comparable to preparing a sign that announces the event. Unlike a cake, the sign takes a more essential and active part in the event, and usually the producer's name also appears on it. The sign contributes to the occurrence of the event, while the cake merely accompanies it. Therefore, one can certainly see our case as a far more severe injury to the values of the religious producer than what happened in Phillips's case.
Phillips's story moved through the courts for about three years (from 2012 to 2015). At the beginning of the process, the baker was ordered by the court in Colorado to bake cakes for such events and to change his policy. This was later reaffirmed by the Colorado Court of Appeals. But in the end, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision and recognized the baker's right to freedom of religion (and also freedom of expression. If that is true of a cake, then all the more so of a sign), and held that it overrides the value of preventing discrimination.
To be sure, in her ruling the judge stated that here in Israel the situation is different, because here we have an anti-discrimination law, and it obligates her to rule as she did. But as I have explained here, to the best of my judgment the law does not really say that. This is a rather sweeping interpretation of the judge herself, and in that sense it is certainly relevant to note the American precedent. I am not persuaded that the situation here is materially different from what happens there.[1]
The Implications for the Judgment
After presenting these four distinctions, it is worth noting two conclusions (which are really one) that follow from them.
First, it must be remembered that all these distinctions, even if we conclude that they are plainly incorrect, still make the case precedent-setting. One implication of that novelty is that the print shop owner could not have known that this was an offense, since it is not something that is straightforwardly included in the provisions of the law. He is not a lawyer, and there is room for the argument that it probably did not occur to him that there was any need to clarify the matter legally. This is admittedly not an argument that exempts him from responsibility (ignorance of the law…), but it is certainly a mitigating circumstance, at least regarding the penalty (the payment imposed on him was punitive, not compensatory. No damage was proven there).
Second, it is well known that in cases where the court reaches the conclusion that formally this is indeed an offense, but understands the circumstances, the offender's considerations, and the precedent-setting nature of the case, there is always the option of imposing a symbolic penalty and treating him leniently. In this case, in principle, the judge could have ordered the print shop owner to pay NIS 1 (remember that there was no damage here. This was a punitive payment). But the judge chose to impose on the defendants the maximum penalty set by law (see section 5b above), fifty thousand shekels. In this she implied that this was a gross offense that ought to be treated severely, and ignored all the distinctions presented above.
Summary and Discussion
At first glance, it seems that her remarks regarding the clash between the values present in this case, as well as all the considerations and distinctions regarding the precedent-setting nature of the case, did not really find expression in the judgment. It seems that from the judge's point of view this was a clear case, ugly discrimination that should be punished (and especially deterred). She completely ignored the interpretive novelty and the mitigating and problematic circumstances of the case, and this is reflected not only in her decision itself, but also in the penalty imposed on the defendant in the judgment. I think she is wrong in this, and that her remarks are based on a personal hierarchy of values in which she prefers the value of equality over freedom of conscience and religion in a wholly disproportionate way. That conception is legitimate in itself (even though in my opinion it is plainly mistaken), but its implementation in the interpretation of the law, which itself admits several other interpretations (see the distinctions above), is unacceptable in my view.
Up to this point, the discussion has been conducted on the legal plane. But all the distinctions made above also apply on the moral plane. The question is whether this is really the society in which we would want to find ourselves. Is it reasonable that a person be legally required to provide a service that plainly violates his conscience? And even on the legal plane, was this really the purpose of the law? I have serious doubts. Perhaps you will say: let the defendant refuse to provide the service, as a matter of conscientious objection, and bear the consequences as required (see Column 287 and more). But the consequences here are plainly disproportionate. That person will not be able to maintain a print shop and earn a living. Especially if those terrorists continue ordering more and more signs from him, and he is fined NIS 50,000 every time, the results are entirely clear. Incidentally, under cover of the law (or rather under cover of the unreasonable interpretation given to it in this judgment), they can do this to any business run by people who are unwilling to provide services for such purposes, thereby destroying their possibilities of employment and livelihood.
Another important note. There is an obvious concern about abuse of these exceptions. A person can always take shelter behind them and present himself as someone who conscientiously objects to something and therefore will not provide service, even though he does not really object. But these concerns are groundless. Either way, if he does not really object, why would he refuse to provide the service? He loses money In this. Moreover, here his position on the matter can be clarified quite easily. He did not present a new and surprising stance, but expressed a known religious worldview, which was also backed by rabbinic opinions in Jewish law. Therefore it is clear that this was authentic opposition to providing the service, and not a false display meant to cover racism or a desire to discriminate for its own sake.
One might perhaps worry about a situation in which that person objects to the people (gay people), but the service itself does not involve a prohibition from his standpoint; and if we create an exception for providing service of that type, he may exploit it in order not to serve them (see the third distinction above). For example, suppose that even in his own view there is no prohibition in Jewish law against baking a cake for such a wedding, and he does not want to do so only because the customers are gay (that is, because of the people and not because of the service in question), and therefore the law requires him to do so. The necessary exception to the law concerns only a situation in which the act itself involves a prohibition in the opinion of the service provider (as in the case of the sign), and not his attitude toward the people requesting the service (such as selling a garment or some food product to a gay person). In such a case there is a concern that he will create the false appearance that even an act like baking a cake is contrary to the dictates of his conscience, and thus he really wants to evade providing service to people whose way of life he disapproves of (something the law forbids, and rightly so). In other words, such an exception opens the door to hidden discrimination under false pretenses. But this is a remote concern, especially when rabbinic opinions are presented on the matter. Clearly, there is a widespread rabbinic position of this kind, and it was not invented ad hoc in order to evade providing the service. If, set against these remote concerns about slippery slopes, there stands a direct and devastating injury to the person's livelihood and freedom of religion, it seems to me that the answer should be obvious.
That concludes the discussion of the case and the judgment. But one cannot escape a brief discussion of the discourse and the biases reflected in it.
The Discourse and the Biases
The discourse surrounding the case, as is customary in our parts, seems astonishingly biased. One can easily guess in advance what each side will say (including the judge, apparently) about the issue. We are not at all surprised that the religious side protests vehemently and sees the judgment as a scandal, part of LGBT-liberal terror and secular coercion, while the LGBT camp and their liberal fellow-travelers speak about darkness, racism, and the like. But in my opinion the bias here appears mainly on the liberal side.
To clarify this, I need to preface the matter with a short introduction on bias in argument and discussion. Not every ideological claim is biased. When a person raises arguments that stem from his worldview, that is not bias. On the contrary, nothing could be more natural. By its very nature, it is obvious that a person argues in favor of the positions he espouses and believes in. Therefore, the fact that LGBT activists and liberals support the judgment and present those who oppose it as benighted is not necessarily bias. And the same is true of those attacking it from the religious-conservative side.
The bias that exists in the discussion (?) of this case and similar ones is twofold: 1. A biased or partial presentation of the other side's position. 2. Raising irrelevant arguments and ignoring relevant arguments raised by the other side. Since this is a principled discussion that touches on many such disputes, I will elaborate on it a bit more here.
Biases of the First Type: Presenting Half the Picture of a Conflict
Presenting the position of the print shop owner and those who support him as racist or discriminatory is a clear bias of type 1. As I explained here, the print shop owner can be sensitive to LGBT rights and yet at the same time committed to Jewish law, which in his view forbids him to provide them with the service. Does that necessarily mean that he is racist or that he does not accord equal treatment to every person? Certainly not. From his point of view there is a conflict here between equality and the religious value. Any decision in such a conflict harms one of those values (it is impossible to uphold both). Presenting such a decision as though it completely ignores the value that is being harmed is a demagogic bias.
The same applies to someone who supports the print shop owner's position, that is, someone who criticizes the judgment, like me. Here it goes even further. I can be a pronounced liberal, even a secular liberal who loathes Jewish law and is not at all committed to it, and still criticize the judgment for ignoring the print shop owner's freedom of religion. Does that make me a benighted racist or a homophobe? Not at all, and again because opposite the negative value of racism stands the positive value of freedom of religion and consideration for the religious person. Even if I think the second value prevails, that does not mean I am unaware of the first.
There is hardly any public controversy in which you will not find a biased presentation of value conflicts. A person prefers value X over value Y, and is immediately accused by his opponents of being disloyal to value Y. For example, in the debate over abortion, people raise the value of a woman's right over her own body, but tend to ignore the dimension of murder that stands opposite that right. Presenting only half of the picture of a value conflict, something very common in our parts, is a clear bias. The straightforward way to discuss such conflicts is to present both sides of the dilemma in full, and then explain how one reaches an informed decision. But it is more convenient for people to present the half that suits them, and then their decision appears astonishingly justified and self-evident, while the other side appears plainly benighted and immoral. This is, of course, demagoguery.
Biases of the Second Type: Distinguishing Between an Argument and Its Conclusion
First and foremost, it is important to understand that even if some argument supports a correct conclusion, it still has to hold water logically. One cannot evaluate an argument through the prism of its conclusion. It is well known that not every argument that supports a correct conclusion is valid. This follows from the nature of logic (the lack of connection between the truth of claims and the validity of the arguments that prove them). This can also be linked to the distinction I made in Column 52 between derush and pilpul. I defined there that derush is a failed proof for a correct conclusion, whereas pilpul is a valid proof for a failed conclusion. Biases of the second type discussed in this section are really types of derush: failed arguments that support correct conclusions (in your opinion). Even if some conclusion is correct in your view, that does not mean that every argument that strengthens it is valid or reasonable.
In the controversy I have described over this judgment, in my opinion it is actually the liberal-LGBT side that is biased in this sense as well. If one reads the arguments I have presented here, one can see that this is a very problematic and unreasonable judgment. Automatic and sweeping support for such a judgment, while ignoring all the distinctions presented here, is a biased position. Even an enthusiastic supporter of equal rights for LGBT people, like me, and even a person who opposes the religious position grounded in Jewish law that was presented by the defendants in court, according to which there is a prohibition in Jewish law against producing the sign (which in my opinion is not entirely clear), must be prepared to listen to relevant arguments, and to recognize the other's right to hold a different position (even if he regards it as mistaken). Especially if you espouse a liberal worldview, as those who support this problematic judgment claim to do. In this case, even if you support LGBT rights, there may still be good arguments on the other side, and in certain circumstances it is right to accept them (this is the first type of bias discussed in the previous section).
In short, one cannot say that everyone who expresses a value position and argues for it is biased merely by virtue of his position. Even if his position fits his a priori commitments (a religious person who opposes the judgment, or a liberal who supports it), it is still important to examine the matter and the arguments on their merits. Without this, every value dispute is emptied of content, since by definition it is nothing but a collection of biases. As noted, in my opinion, precisely as a liberal who supports rights and equality for LGBT people, as well as the right of every person to act in accordance with his conscience and values, this judgment is plainly unreasonable. Let the reader see and judge the arguments on their merits, and discern who is right here and who is biased.
[1] An interesting question is what role the separation of religion and state, which as is well known is customary in American law, plays here. Ostensibly, in such a legal system one should not recognize religious rights and protect them. But it seems to me that the opposite is true. When there is separation of religion and state, this means that the right to freedom of religion and worship is reserved to every person, and precisely for that reason it should be protected more carefully, and the legislature should not be allowed to interfere with it.
Discussion
I don't see why one shouldn't tell someone that something they do is, in my eyes, an abomination, if that is indeed how I see it.
But that's a discussion about manners and etiquette. That's not what I was dealing with here.
Adam Gold on Telegram: @Adam_Gold
Ugh, I just can't anymore. Everything is idiotic.
An appalling ruling, devoid of foundation and anti-liberal. There is absolutely no basis—legal, moral, or analytical—to compare a discriminatory refusal to *provide* a product or service because of the customer's identity (an act prohibited by law) with a refusal by a business owner to *create* a product or service because of the nature of the product.
Does anyone have any doubt that this is not discrimination "because of… sexual orientation" on the part of the customer?
Is there anyone who claims that a straight person would not have encountered the exact same refusal?!
By the way, that doesn't mean he should do it, or that it is proper. If someone thinks the refusal is extreme and tasteless, they can certainly object, demonstrate, shame them, explain, troll, or take any other step. But the state cannot and should not force a private business to sell a certain product or service.
That is of course true for everyone.
A reservist is allowed to refuse to print anti-Zionist pashkevilim, a vegan seamstress is allowed to refuse to sew a shtreimel made of fox fur,
an Arab is allowed to refuse to print "Kahane was right" T-shirts,
a private chef may refuse to come to your house and fry pork for you, a photographer may refuse to photograph a woman in lingerie, etc., etc.
(not to mention that in the print-shop case we're talking about a generic business with alternatives and commercial competitors, not a monopoly or a semi-public body, where one could perhaps sometimes adopt a stricter interpretation).
It's as if they're looking for something to fight over here.
And if you like, two paragraphs that point to the low level of the ruling and the built-in paradox in the court's odd argument. (Notice how the judge slides from the plaintiff's 'identity' to the plaintiff's 'character.' In fact, דווקא the defendants' response emphasizes that there is no dispute that they object to printing certain materials, regardless of the consumer's identity.
The argument is so flimsy: how are they supposed to know the plaintiff's identity? Is there any dispute that there is no discrimination here because of the plaintiff's sexual orientation? Would the print shop have sold an identical product to a straight couple who came to the store? Would the print shop have prevented the plaintiff from doing some random non-ideological printing?
Everything is idiotic.
"You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abomination" (Leviticus 18:22).
A simple question: within your remarks (toward the end) you wrote: "Even an enthusiastic supporter of equal LGBT rights, like me,"
Can a religious person be an enthusiastic supporter of the rights of those whom the Torah regards as an abomination?!
With God's help, 28 Nisan 5780
Discrimination against a person means treating him as second-class, viewing the gavra as 'unworthy' of receiving what others receive. In the present case, had the LGBT people ordered an ad for the sale of an apartment or the like—an action involving no halakhic prohibition—there would have been no obstacle for the print shop to print such an ad for them. Their refusal was not because of the 'gavra,' who is unworthy, but because of the 'cheftza' of the action, which in their view is unworthy.
Let us imagine the reverse case: a religious person approaches a printer to print an ad against LGBT people, and the printer refuses because he objects to the content of the ad—would it occur to anyone that a court would accuse the printer of discrimination? Clearly the court would dismiss such a claim out of hand and say that the printer's refusal is not because of the customer's religiosity but because of his unwillingness to participate in printing an ad that violates his conscience. There is no personal disqualification of the customer in such a refusal.
There are cases where refusing to fulfill the order stems from respect for the customer. For example, if a nazir enters a bar and orders a glass of wine and is refused because of his elevated status as a 'Nazirite of God.' Likewise a kohen who orders a taxi to the cemetery or a hall for his marriage to a divorcée. In such a case the refusal would stem from the commandment "You shall sanctify him," which obligates the service provider to preserve the kohen's sanctity.
In short:
Discrimination is when the 'gavra' is defined as unworthy of receiving the service. Not when the action ordered is unacceptable to the service provider, and only for that reason he refuses to take part in it. Therefore, the judge's ruling is utterly absurd from a legal standpoint as well.
Regards, Sh. Tz.
A contradiction between the law and religious belief might perhaps arise in a case where halakha forbids providing a certain service because of the identity of the 'gavra,' such as: the halakhic prohibition on selling a house in the Land of Israel to a gentile. Though even there one may say that the reason for the prohibition is concern lest "they cause you to sin," which is a problem of refusing to cooperate with an action contrary to the Torah.
What would your view be if that print shop really were the only one in the whole area—would the harm caused to the event organizers justify the ruling?
That is, how far can one go with the religious value?
In any case, since the Honorable Court has ruled that even a refusal because of the nature of the act counts as prohibited 'discrimination'—RMDA can now sue all the publishing houses that refused to publish the 'trilogy' for 'discrimination in providing a service' and make good money.
If for one page they refused to publish they paid 50,000 NIS—then for 1,000 pages that were refused, the refused author is entitled to compensation of 50 million NIS, at least 🙂
Regards, Samson Latz the adviser
By the way, notice the irony in the name of the print shop
I think there is another reason, and in fact the main one, why the anti-discrimination law does not apply in this case.
Simply put, there is no discrimination here at all.
The business owner's policy applies to everyone regardless of religion, race, sex, etc., etc.
If someone decides he is against eating tomatoes and therefore does not sell tomatoes to anyone, is that discrimination?
The print-shop owners simply decided that they do not sell signs for such purposes to *anyone*. On the face of it, their refusal has nothing to do with the identity of the customers, and therefore there is no discrimination here.
And another reason, which may just be another formulation of what I mentioned, is this:
It is very reasonable to interpret the law as intending to prohibit only arbitrary discrimination. Reasoned discrimination is not prohibited.
For example: forbidden: "I won't sell to you because you're an Arab." Permitted: "I won't sell to you because I have reasonable grounds to fear that you will use the product to carry out a terrorist attack" (and indeed there are reasonable grounds for such fear, and indeed in every such case the business owner refrains from selling).
In our case, of course, we are dealing with very well-grounded discrimination, and therefore it is permitted.
It may be that Rabbi Michael Abraham, as a learned Jew, a man of Torah and God-fearing, presumably sees himself as committed to defining male homosexual intercourse as an abomination to the same degree that he identifies with commandments such as "Love your fellow as yourself" and the like. However, he believes that since the Torah also commands us to take into account the moral and conscientious imperative of enlightened human society as such, the attitude toward adherents of male homosexual intercourse as an abomination should apply specifically only after they receive the full legal and judicial mandate to exercise their free choice in this matter; and against that background one may come to them and try to persuade them to accept the yoke of Torah and mitzvot out of free choice and without coercion
In my opinion that is why they approached them in the first place, and were astonished by the response…
One Who Does Not Know How to Ask, my dear.
Indeed, I did not bring the continuation of the verse:
"If a man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them."
Regarding what you wrote, quote: "However, he believes that since the Torah also commands us to take into account the moral and conscientious imperative of enlightened human society as such, the attitude toward adherents of male homosexual intercourse as an abomination should apply specifically only after they receive the full legal and judicial mandate to exercise their free choice in this matter; and against that background one may come to them and try to persuade them to accept the yoke of Torah and mitzvot out of free choice and without coercion"
I'll begin with this: the term "the act of Sodom" is commonly used in many places in connection with sexual relations between men, so plain common sense, even before the Torah, indicates that this is not something belonging to the normative sphere irrespective of the yoke of mitzvot.
By the way, the Sefer HaChinukh writes that the reason for this Torah prohibition is that it is repulsive in the eyes of any intelligent person, and I will append a quote: "The blessed God desires the settling of His world which He created, and therefore He commanded that they not destroy their seed through lying with males, for it is truly destruction from which there is no fruitful benefit nor the mitzvah of marital duty, besides that this matter is filthy, revolting, disgusting, and very ugly in the eyes of any intelligent person. And a man who was created to serve his Creator is not fit to wallow in such ugly deeds."
Maimonides wrote that the above prohibition is one of the prohibitions incumbent on the Noahides, so there is seemingly no connection between the yoke of mitzvot and this abomination.
The prohibition of male homosexual intercourse is among the seven Noahide commandments that Adam was commanded at his creation by God, and later the descendants of Noah were commanded as well. Thus Maimonides wrote in the Mishneh Torah:
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings and Wars, chapter 9, halakha 5.
Adam was commanded concerning six matters: idolatry, blasphemy, bloodshed, forbidden sexual relations, theft, and laws… Six sexual prohibitions apply to the descendants of Noah: mother, father's wife, a married woman, his maternal sister, a male, and an animal. As it says: "Therefore a man shall leave his father"—this is his father's wife; "and his mother"—literally; "and cling to his wife"—and not to another man's wife; "his wife" and not a male; "and they shall become one flesh"—excluding an animal, beast, and bird, for he and they are not one flesh. And it says, "She is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father, but not the daughter of my mother; and she became my wife."
And therefore the simple question arises: what is this, wtf?! (in the vernacular).
From Wikipedia:
From the fifth century, the term "the act of Sodom" became associated with describing any sexual behavior that is not vaginal intercourse, and in particular homosexual relations. Justinian I, emperor of the Byzantine Empire, referred to the term in his law code and interpreted that the acts of Sodom were sexual relations between men, or even the desire for them, and that they bring famine, earthquakes, and plagues. The association between the biblical city of Sodom and homosexual relations became widespread in European society—both Christian and Jewish.
Even if in today's permissive society this has become routine, the day is not far off when pedophilia too will become routine. By the way, it is not clear what the difference is between a male attracted to a male and a person attracted to a child, especially if the child is aware! And gave consent.
That is exactly what I asked: how can a person who defines himself as religious be an enthusiastic supporter of LGBT rights.
With God's help, 28 Nisan 5780
To Tam and OYDHTA—greetings,
Indeed, your disagreement parallels your roles in the Haggadah. The simple son's education is based on a person's obligation to the will of his Creator. We left Egypt 'with a mighty hand,' whether we wanted to or not.
In contrast, to the 'one who does not know how to ask' we say, 'because of "this"'—because of our choice to fulfill the commandment of the Paschal sacrifice we merited redemption; we open gently for him, "You shall open for him," like 'a mother who coaxes him with words,' that it is worthwhile for a person, for his own good, to do the will of his Maker.
Both approaches also exist in interpreting the word 'abomination.' In its simple sense, 'abomination' is something loathsome, 'kept far from before God,' but according to Bar Kappara's explanation, 'abomination' is explained as 'you are straying in it'—your desire to do what God forbade is a mistake; it will not bring you happiness but wandering and loss of direction.
It seems to me that one should not speak of 'rights' but of gentleness and non-coercion, and also that we should not be forced to recognize them.
Regards, Sh. Tz.
Does the honorable prayer leader, or "the just questioner," whatever it may be, Sh.Tz., not see a difference between the quote: "It seems to me that one should not speak of 'rights' but of gentleness and non-coercion, and also that we should not be forced to recognize them"
and the rabbi's words, "an enthusiastic supporter of LGBT rights"? I am astonished…
After all, the distance between non-coercion and enthusiastic support is as far as east is from west… unless perhaps here too I am mistaken in it.
Racheli, should one also treat politely the lifestyle of a person who is attracted to children—a pedophile, in the vernacular—and not call him deviant or say that his acts are an abomination (in the vernacular)? Would someone who defined the fellow as a deviant also be considered, in your eyes, an impolite person?!
And if here you understand that there is room to distinguish, because your scale of values says, "there are jokes and there is enough already," then the religious scale of values puts the "enough already" a bit earlier. Especially since on the religious scale of values there is no impediment whatsoever to an adult having relations with a minor girl of 14 and even younger than that; there are countless sugyot dealing with the matter, without any mention of it as, God forbid, a vile act. By the way, our forefather Isaac married a girl of three…
So the believer has the right to use the words dictated to him by his Creator as operating instructions for how to conduct ourselves in this world, and what is considered an act of depravity and what is considered a legitimate act!
Too bad a discussion that could have been fascinating deteriorated and got hung up on the word "abomination"
as though impoliteness among God-fearing Jews in this country were such a rare phenomenon; it is well known that his lips do not drip honey (without getting into judgment as to whether that is good or bad)
As for the issue itself:
Indeed, a ridiculous ruling—do I really have to assist an event that contradicts my values?
Just as one would not expect a religious Jew to prepare a printed flyer for a conference of Messianic Jews or for a conference of the Reform movement in Israel (I hope), so one should not expect any religious person to prepare a flyer for the Pride Parade (perhaps if this were a flyer for the funeral of someone murdered in the anti-LGBT square, there would be something to analyze casuistically )
What about a devout Catholic Christian who refuses to rent an apartment to a Jew, out of religious belief? That happened to two good friends of mine, a homosexual couple, when they came to rent an apartment and the landlady changed her mind the moment she understood what it was about. So the law does well to rule clearly that in such a situation preventing discrimination overrides freedom of opinion. It is a proper law, despite its known and regrettable costs, and its purpose is to create a comfortable public atmosphere for every person as such. Let every person who serves the public know that this is the price of the profession he chose. Here, the end justifies the means.
With God's help, 28 Nisan 5780
It seems to me that you exaggerated greatly in defining RMDA as an 'enthusiastic supporter' of LGBT rights. RMDA is an enthusiastic supporter of state non-interference in matters of worldview and belief, and therefore he thinks they should be given what they see as their 'rights,' because otherwise this would involve state interference in their private lives.
In my remarks I took issue with RMDA's words, and in my opinion we should not speak of 'their rights' or grant them any public recognition. What is this comparable to? To desecration of the Sabbath. We will not persecute someone who wants to drive on Shabbat in his private car, but the state, as a Jewish state, is not supposed to ensure the realization of his right and organize public transportation for him on Shabbat…
So too with LGBT people—in my opinion the state should not recognize their 'marriages' and certainly should not arrange 'surrogacy' and the like for them. They cannot demand that a Jewish state recognize and support what Judaism strongly opposes.
Regards, Sh.Tz.
And the difference between me and him stems from the difference in our names. One who is named after the angel who advocates for Israel thinks the state should give everyone their rights. But I think the state is in the category of a 'public emissary,' and 'an agent cannot be sent to commit a transgression' 🙂
,
There is a difference between discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin and unwillingness to cooperate with acts that contradict my values
so the example with the Jew and the Catholic is not really a good one
The best thing is not to refuse but to say: we are very overloaded with orders; unfortunately we will only be able to supply it after the event….
What is this nonsense?
I disagree. Ethnic origin and sexual orientation are one and the same. You don't choose either of them.
Regardless of the discussion itself, and as a former religious guy,
I'm glad that state institutions tend in the liberal direction.
If in another ten or twenty years views like Smotrich's are still legitimate, we'll become a state that resembles an Arab state more, and a Western state much less. That is definitely not the kind of place I wish for my children and grandchildren to live in (full disclosure: I have something against gays).
To Amichai, as a Jew of Israel you ought to aspire that the people of Israel live and conduct themselves according to God-fearing Jews faithful to the Torah, and not issue rulings against the Torah. Rather, the line that should guide the leaders and judges of the children of Israel is loyalty and aspiration to be a "kingdom of priests and a holy nation," not an Arab state and not a Western state (insofar as its Westernness and modernity do not serve the covenant made at Mount Sinai )
R. Happy Rejoicer (I enjoy the humor of this particular prayer leader).
When you come to defend the stature of his honor, RMDA—or by now, perhaps his force—I would be glad to hear why his honor does not also support child-lovers, i.e. pedophiles; after all, one should not interfere in their outlook or in what they see as their rights..
With God's help, 28 Nisan 5780
It is worth remembering that the rainbow also reminds us of the Torah's opposition to a state of unrestricted sexual freedom, which was one of the causes of the Flood. The rainbow does indeed express the Omnipresent's patience toward behavior contrary to His will, but patience meant to allow correction through choice and will is very far from granting legitimacy.
Regards, Sh.Tz.
The rainbow also symbolizes the power of prayer, as Onkelos translated the verse "with my sword and with my bow" as "with my prayer and with my supplication." The bow directed upward expresses a person's ability, through strong willpower, to break through glass ceilings and overcome natural tendencies, and from this there is hope for the possibility of changing a natural tendency even if it appears very strong.
To the guileless and upright man, may he live long: it is true that the Torah makes this punishable by death, and that the matter is forbidden to all the nations of the earth as well. Yet judging from the state of the people of Israel today, the covenant made with us at Mount Sinai is meant to receive renewed force through Israel's return to their Father in Heaven not by "holding the mountain over them like a barrel," but through free choice based on loyalty to natural human morality and conscience—and reason requires us to grant equal rights to the LGBT community as well (so long as it has not taken upon itself the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, which we all hope will happen even before victory over the coronavirus)…
The point is that sexual orientation is bound up with an act that contradicts my values, so it is completely understandable that as a religious Torah Jew I would not want to rent an apartment to a couple from the gay community (because by doing so I am helping them commit a transgression). And if this stems from such a line of thought and not from irrational hatred of people with a different sexual orientation, then in my opinion it is entirely legitimate (even though I also think it is mistaken, because that same religious person would have no problem renting an apartment to secular people who violate sexual prohibitions or things like that). But there is no room to compare this to a situation where one refuses to help a person because of his ethnic origin—there one rejects him because of who he is and not because of what he does.
Yes
because the religious and ultra-Orthodox in this country really represent a model society of a kingdom of priests and a holy nation
come on, do me a favor
One Who Does Not Know How to Ask, my dear, may he live long,
If your reason and Michi's reason require granting equality also to the LGBT community, that does not mean that the reason of the owner of the print shop requires him to grant equality to that community. After all, freedom of free choice gives rights also to one who recoils from such behavior—see the act of Sodom that I already mentioned above, which until not long ago referred mainly to ugly acts of this kind (male intercourse).
If for some reason you have come to understand that this is the moral and correct thing, that is no reason to punish those who have not yet reached that understanding. By the way, it is not certain that your understanding is the correct one, and therefore perhaps one who has not reached it will also not reach such an understanding—and hopefully you will reach the correct understanding.
And I'll give you an example that I used here in the comments: suppose, for argument's sake, I think there is no problem with relations with minors as defined by law, but rather each case should be examined on its own to what extent the minor understood what was involved (of course, with consent). Will you cry out here too that "the covenant made with us at Mount Sinai is meant to receive renewed force through Israel's return to their Father in Heaven not by 'holding the mountain over them like a barrel,' but through free choice based on loyalty to natural human morality and conscience—and reason requires us to grant equal rights to the LGBT community as well"?
After all, just as the outlook that rejects males who love males is, in your view, anachronistic, so the day is not far off when 'child-lovers' will get an in-depth feature… in the headlines, and perhaps even host television programs, as affirmative action. (The reason I think the day is not far off is: ask your parents whether they thought the permissiveness found today was the stuff of fictional fantasy, or something that had any chance of ever happening—and no need to elaborate.)
Therefore we little people have nothing but to rely on the values written in the Torah.
And I believe that this Torah will not be replaced, and there will be no other Torah from the blessed Creator.
Relative to what?
I did not read the ruling (usually you link to the source of the reports you cite. Did you link and I missed it?).
I read another short post by Tomer Persico – https://7minim.wordpress.com/2020/04/22/stt/#respond. From it I understood that the issue was what motivated the print shop. The conviction was because the court was persuaded (perhaps mistakenly) that the refusal to print the job was because of the identity of the customers and not because of the content of the ad. That's a dispute about facts.
"Look, the court ruled that the defendants, who refused to print a poster for an LGBT association, discriminated against the customers because of their sexual orientation, and that is explicitly contrary to the law. The defendants had not seen the poster they were supposed to print at all, so ostensibly they did not refuse because of its content but because of the identity of the customers. If that is so, it is indeed reprehensible and legally forbidden (Smotrich already wants to change the law), and it is good that the court ruled as it did."
That is not how I understood it from what you wrote.
I didn't follow the whole discussion. My view of the phenomenon is described in several places here on the site, including in the interview on the site "Kamocha" and in my book Moves Among the Standing in chapter 35. In my view there is no moral abomination here, and the Torah also did not necessarily mean a moral abomination. The term "abomination" in the Torah does not refer only to moral problems. Examine and forget.
Far from it. In my opinion, under no circumstances should the print shop be compelled to print for them. But when there are other options, that only strengthens the point even more.
That is not precise. "I won't sell to you because you're an Arab" is also a reason. And yet it is forbidden.
Hayuta, I didn't understand. The refusal was because they were homosexuals and not because they were Jews, no? In my view there is a difference, because with homosexuals it is legitimate to refuse (there is a halakhic prohibition on renting one's apartment to sinners), whereas with people of some national or religious identity that is an irrelevant argument (unless in Christianity there is a proven principle not to rent to Jews; then perhaps it is debatable).
You don't need to see what the poster is if the LGBT association is ordering it. It is connected to its activity.
I referred to the article in Globes that described the matter.
I completely agree with you; I only said that the court disagrees with you on the factual question, not on the legal and/or moral question.
Right, because they were gay. It was an example for the sake of identification, on the assumption that most of your site's readers would be outraged by not renting to a Jew, and less so by not renting to a homosexual. In my eyes, not renting to a Jew (if you are a racist or a Catholic or a Nazi) and not renting to a homosexual are one and the same. I bless the state for legislating such a law, despite the personal costs people pay for their beliefs and religious commandments because of it. I said that theoretically a Catholic too could claim that a Jew must live in a low place because of the commandment to humiliate the Jews—because that exalts Christianity—and his own apartment is too elevated, or something of that sort. And by the way, there was a story in Safed about refusing to rent an apartment to Arabs… it's all the same thing: an irrelevant refusal, because of a person's race, religion, or sexual orientation, is an invalid refusal, and thankfully, also illegal.
And what about a contradiction between religious belief and morality? Well, you've written quite a bit about that.
The word "because" is not enough to turn this into a reason. Being Arab is not a reason not to sell.
It could be that what he means is, "because you are Arab and I hate Arabs," and then there is indeed a reason here—but a reason that everyone agrees ought to be prohibited by law. In my humble opinion, the law was originally enacted only against such reasons (of baseless hatred).
It is incomprehensible how a person who defines himself as a religious Jew can say that refusal by virtue of the commandments of the religion of Moses and Israel should, God forbid, be regarded as "irrelevant"!… How can a God-fearing Jew bless laws that include anti-religious components (as far as Judaism is concerned)?!
I would be glad for an explanation from the learned Rebbetzin Dr. Hayuta Deutsch.
Thank you for the response, and your opinion will delight our souls!
Here we have a reasoned post—short and to the point—that will calmly set things in order for us, so that the anti-religious progressive madness may not strike us hip and thigh (morally-democratically, and all the more so from a Torah perspective):
https://facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=10158349199134312&id=617419311
Hayuta, what is so hard to understand? He is not discriminating against them because they are gay; the reason for the discrimination is that he is not willing to print material that contradicts his religion and conscience as he understands them. Especially since they can get the product elsewhere.
Should I bring straw into Ephraim?
Relevant = financial questions, a transaction that does not suit a person for reasons connected to the body of the transaction, and not, as Rabbi Michi likes to say, ad hominem, because of the person and the color of his eyes or the color of his beliefs.
If the printed material called for murder and rape, that would be understandable. But if it calls for gathering for a study day or a demonstration or another assembly connected to LGBT society, there is no reasonable justification to refrain from that, and that means "because they are gay."
Excellent! One does not reject a person because of sexual orientation; every person has the right to refuse material that contradicts his values.
Apparently I did not succeed in explaining myself properly, so I will try again:
As Jews who keep Torah and mitzvot, we are obligated, among other things, not to assist propaganda on behalf of what our Torah defines as an abomination. We have not yet received a mandate from the Creator of the world to separate in these matters between the 'business' and the 'religious,' or "be a Jew at home and secular when you go out and in your business," and the like.
Yet despite all this, you insist on defining such reasons as "irrelevant"! Now, fair enough: if a person has not yet merited to accept upon himself the yoke of Torah and mitzvot, it is understandable why he would define this as an irrelevant argument and therefore illegitimate and illegal. But you, ostensibly, seek to educate in light of this secular worldview even those for whom Judaism is a guiding light. So then you are asked to explain how these things are consistent from the Jewish point of view?
I hope now my error is clearer.
Thank you for the response!
In the eyes of the religious person according to the Torah, at any rate, male homosexual intercourse is more severe than rape
With God's help, eve of Rosh Chodesh Iyar 5780
To Hayuta—greetings,
Everyone knows that a Jew who tries to buy or rent a house in an Arab village will be persecuted relentlessly by his neighbors until he is forced to flee, and no legal authority will protect him; rather, it will see the Jew who wishes to realize his right as a 'disturber of the public order.'
The legal authorities make a point of enforcing 'principles of justice and equality' only in order to protect the 'right' of an Arab to live in a Jewish neighborhood. 'Justice' that lacks reciprocity is not 'justice' but hypocrisy. And as Maimonides explained in chapter 11 of the Laws of Robbery, dina de-malkhuta is valid only when it is equal for all.
Moreover. What can be done—here too in our land the Jew is at high risk and threatened by people waging a war of annihilation against us. When representatives of the Arab public praise the heroic 'shahids,' one should 'be at least somewhat concerned' that among their electorate there are some people who might exploit living in a Jewish neighborhood for violence and harassment toward their neighbors in order to drive them out of the area. After all, the learned Dr. Ahmad Tibi said that this land belongs to them.
Here too in our land Jews are threatened by missionaries trying to entice people in distress; here too there are people who lure young women into marriage and afterward they become captives in a hostile village. So it is worth trying to check to whom one allows to drive a stake in the neighborhood, in order to rule out the danger that the nice seller or renter may not be so nice to his future neighbors.
It has already been said that among Jews there is a high percentage of paranoids, but there is a justified reason for that 🙂
Regards, Sh.Tz.
As I wrote, I will not open here the philosophical-religious discussion in which my position is clear; I will only say again that 'relevant' means things concerning the transaction itself and not the ideology of those carrying it out.
Wonderful indeed.
I agree that the Arab-security issue is a bit more complicated.
I agree with the moral analysis.
I disagree with the legal analysis. The law is very clear, and prohibits discrimination in the supply of a product on the basis of sexual orientation. There is no exception for products that are not mass-produced.
The only exception is that the discrimination is relevant and required by the nature of the product (and note well: not by the nature of the producer). It is quite clear that the exception does not apply in this case. A reasonable ruling and plainly not precedent-setting. There are lots of rulings that present exactly the same principle, but they involve a less sexy subject so they are not "precedents"
"Study day"
I really don't understand why the defense did not use an argument reminiscent of the Christian baker case. Namely: I am not preventing you from obtaining the product because of your sexual orientation—for if you ask me to print you a SpongeBob hat or an end-of-basic-training shirt, I'll do it without a problem. The obstacle is related to the content of the product (and in fact, if a straight person were also to request printing for that same demonstration, I would refuse him as well) and not to the identity of the customer. The judge unjustifiably linked the content of the order and the customer's sexual orientation as one package, and therein lies her error.
Regarding rape it says:
Deuteronomy, chapter 22, verses 28–29: "If a man finds a virgin young woman who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered, then the man who lay with her shall give the young woman's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall become his wife because he violated her; he may not send her away all his days."
Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, siman 177, סעיף ג'
One who rapes a virgin is obligated to marry her, provided that she and her father consent, even if she is lame or blind, and he may never divorce her except with her consent… and if he transgressed and divorced her, they compel him to take her back.
Regarding male homosexual intercourse it says:
"You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a woman; it is an abomination" (Leviticus 18:22).
"If a man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them" (Leviticus 20:13).
Indeed, wonderful indeed, Mrs. Hayuta!
A point for thought: some time ago, when certain organizations came out with the signs "A father and a mother equal a family," and a situation arose in which they could not advertise because everyone refused them, that was not defined as discrimination, even though real harm was indeed caused. (By the way, I really do think it was legitimate to refuse to publicize them, but it's interesting that then no one thought it was discrimination
As far as I read, the defense did use it, and the judge did not accept it.
With God's help, 29 Nisan 5780
To Hayuta—greetings,
And forcing a professional to do a project that is not to his taste is not a 'complex issue'?
I will open with a parable of my own: suppose Ms. So-and-so did the language editing for some series of books. Readers saw it and praised her as an excellent language editor, truly a H.D. in the DR"A, and immediately job offers from every direction swirled around the outstanding editor.
Yankel the Chabadnik requests her editing services for his wondrous pamphlet in which he will prove with signs and wonders that the Rebbe lives and endures and is the King Messiah; against him comes Chatzkel the Lithuanian, with a fundraising propaganda book for the charity fund that alone is the cure for all troubles;
Reuven comes with his monumental book proving how much "Kahane was right" and that all the troubles of the people of Israel come only because we did not dispossess the inhabitants of the land; against him comes Shimon with the masterpiece proving that all the troubles of the nation come because people do not ascend the Temple Mount; and opposite him Levi from "HaKav" with abundant proofs from all the treasures of Torah of how forbidden ascending the Temple Mount is.
And towering above them all is our friend Rabbi Moshe Ze'ev the Kohen Petschgeber, may he live long, who has decided to gather the honey-sweet nectar of his sayings from all over the web into the holy book Pninei HaRMZ, for which good language editing will surely benefit him and his readers 🙂
—————————–
Before this present precedent-setting ruling, the much-sought-after editor could excuse herself from responding to the many offers with the polite claim that she has no desire or interest in dealing with these weighty subjects—or with the less polite claim: "It is repulsive to me" 🙂
Now that a new halakha has been innovated in this 'precedent-setting ruling,' each of the above-mentioned authors can sue the refusing editor for 'discrimination' for rejecting the job offers, and win compensation of 50,000 NIS for every page she refused.
The holy people of Israel are quick to mobilize to compensate the fined parties, but facing dozens of lawsuits from every direction—I fear that even the most well-oiled 'Headstart' system will struggle to finance all the lawsuits that pop up from every direction 🙂
Therefore it seems to me that professionals should be given the right to choose in which projects they are interested in investing their talent, and in which projects they are not interested.
Regards, Shatzam Chanakhal
The difference is simple: those signs are perceived as offensive (they offend gays). True, there is room to put a question to the legal authorities whether this is indeed offensive in their eyes, in which case it would have been forbidden to produce those signs even if the print shop had agreed; or whether there was only a concern of offending LGBT people, in which case again there is discrimination here stemming from an ideological motive.
Since I am not a lawyer, it is difficult for me to argue with you. But on the face of it, this seems absurd to me legally as well. Do you know of other rulings that force a person to act against his values in such circumstances? The fact that there is only an exception connected to the nature of the product does not mean that no further exceptions should be recognized. Or from another angle: the question is whether they should be included in the language of the law or whether it is proper and correct to exempt them by reasoning. Every exception is created in some way (through some precedent, or through legislation). So now the relevant precedent has arrived, and that is how it ought to have been ruled.
I would be glad to hear of similar rulings, if you can provide them.
It's not clear to me how you are able to write a post in such a calm and analytical style without exploding at the injustice of the ruling.
As though distilled water flows through your veins.
Actually there is also evidence that rape is an offense as severe as murder according to the plain meaning of the verses:
But if in the field the man finds the betrothed young woman, and the man seizes her and lies with her, then only the man who lay with her shall die. But to the young woman you shall do nothing; the young woman has committed no sin deserving death, for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.
The verse ostensibly equates rape and murder.
In addition there is a mishnah in tractate Sanhedrin:
These are the ones whom one saves even at the cost of their lives: one who pursues his fellow to kill him, and one who pursues a male, and one who pursues a betrothed young woman. But one who pursues an animal, or desecrates the Sabbath, or serves {idolatry}—one does not save them at the cost of their lives.
One can see that pursuit for the sake of rape is, in a certain respect, more severe than idolatry.
In addition, as is well known, one may not save oneself with another person's money; that is, where a person must harm another in order to save himself, it is forbidden. But where he must commit a transgression between man and God, aside from the three severe ones, in order to save himself, it is permitted. From this go and learn that it is forbidden to rape a girl even where one is threatened with death if he does not do so (and that is even if we are speaking of an unmarried, ritually pure girl, so there is no forbidden sexual relation involved). From here too we see that there are halakhic aspects that equate the severity of rape with the act of male homosexual intercourse (both are "be killed rather than transgress").
I stopped following this long ago. I'll just make two comments:
1. The law of the pursuer in rape is learned from that same verse that equates rape to murder. These are not two different sources but one built on the other.
2. The rape under discussion is the rape of a betrothed young woman, not rape in general. The problem is not the rape but intercourse with a betrothed woman.
With God's help, eve of Rosh Chodesh Ziv 5780
To Oren—greetings,
Both from the story of Shechem and from the story of Amnon, it appears that rape, even of an unmarried woman, was considered something requiring blood vengeance by the brothers of the raped woman. Thus Simeon and Levi avenge their sister Dinah by killing Shechem and all his helpers, and thus Absalom avenges his sister Tamar by killing Amnon.
The Torah seeks to restrain blood vengeance, carried out in a storm of emotion by the relatives of the victim. In murder, the Torah accepted the demand for revenge of 'life for life' and did not allow redemption by ransom, but transferred the execution of judgment to the court, which examines carefully whether there is strong evidence of guilt and knows how to distinguish between accidental and intentional acts.
In bodily injury that did not lead to death, the Torah allowed the fitting bodily punishment of 'eye for eye' to be replaced by ransom, which is indeed weaker in deterrence and punishment, but on the other hand makes it more possible for the injured party to recover.
And so too in the severe bodily and emotional injury of rape, the Torah preferred the path that would better help rehabilitate the victim by forcing the rapist to marry her if she is interested in that. One must remember that it was very difficult for a raped woman to find a suitable match, and the possibility that the offender himself would become the repairer could be preferable for the woman to lifelong loneliness.
The amount of compensation too—fifty shekels of silver, the price of a field for 50 years—added effectiveness to deterrence. When a person has to pay an enormous sum and also 'eat the fish' and remain stuck for life with a woman he does not desire—that is really unpleasant, but preferable to an endless chain of revenges and counter-revenges.
Regards, Sh.Tz.
It is worth noting that in homosexuality as well, very often there is exploitation close to rape, when lustful people exploit confused youths and draw them into wild parties of sex and drugs that trap those miserable youths in a vicious cycle of pleasure followed by emptiness, which does not allow them to think about trying to 'get out of the mud,' so that the demonstrations and 'study days' are often only the 'tip of the iceberg' leading to a plunge into an inescapable abyss.
Punishing rape often runs into the problem of the inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at the level of 'witnesses and warning' required in capital cases, and therefore it was preferable to create a kind of 'plea bargain' combining punishment of the offender with rehabilitation of the victim.
Regards, Sh.Tz.
Fortunately for us secular people, there is a judiciary, and it decides. Rabbi Michi's arguments are indeed nice and interesting to read, but many times they are devoid of basic human feeling and perhaps above all rely on halakha—and how shall I put this delicately—even though you get very excited about it, it is not all that brilliant. I read here quite a lot and often do not understand the great enthusiasm for the Gemara and its casuistry. True, it takes a brilliant mind to argue such complex arguments, but the final conclusion is always very simple, and any sensible person with compassion and a basic understanding of human feelings will arrive at it quite easily. In Buddhism they defined the good very simply, and it is a winning definition: what is good for me and for you is good. Any other version of this idea is unacceptable. In your view the LGBT community is an abomination, and it is not good for me that you think that, so your opinion is not a good one, no matter what you rely on or how much you quibble over it. Very simple.
What many commenters here do not understand is that your opinion and your belief are over… They have indeed existed for thousands of years, but it is impossible not to see that most of the Jewish people are becoming increasingly secular. In the recent past, say 150 years ago, most Jews were traditional or religious, whereas today the majority are secular. Views like those of Rabbi Michi and of many of the commenters belong in the trash heap of history, and it amazes me that a sharp and educated person like the rabbi does not see this clearly. All these casuistries are of no interest to the reality in which we live. Life (reality) is much stronger than any belief whatever, and fortunately courts stand by a person's rights and not some halakha or other—and that is not going to change in your favor no matter who controls the courts.
I do not understand at all the idea of conservatism, in which many pride themselves and make a career of it. What exactly are you preserving? Delusional ideas that are not suited at all to the time in which we live? And this is happening every single moment: every conservative idea is gradually disappearing from the world (it will still take time before my prophecy is completely fulfilled, but it is a stable fact that it is being fulfilled little by little).
The idea of a Jewish state too is an illusion of which you boast, when in fact it is not true at all. On paper, perhaps, but it is not worth the ink and so on. You engage in pseudo-serious halakhic casuistry while the fourth commandment has been violated roughly since the establishment of the state, and in the very near future there will remain no meaningful trace of it apart from a day off, which everyone needs. And I will not mention the other commandments, of which there is no trace at all in everyday life in the State of Israel.
Rabbi Michi may indeed be careful to say that he is an enthusiastic supporter of this or that, but in the end he also holds dreadful views. It amazes me that a brilliant man like you believes in the Jewish religion, when the core of the faith is based on the Sinai revelation. As though 600,000 people are an example of truth. Give me a few hours and I'll arrange a million Indians who say Krishna visited them at home and danced a dance with Shiva and they will swear that this is the absolute truth.
The Jewish religion is full of very grave injustices, and to my mind the fact that the Sages discussed the laws of slaves with utter seriousness proves it. A slave—no matter who, why, how many, and in what era—is a terrible idea that only someone lacking basic morality would fail to understand. And the fact is that there always were and always will be people who oppose this idea by virtue of what it is, regardless of their religion or belief.
By the way, I am quite an enthusiastic reader of the blog, because I enjoy reading such complex and precise arguments, but I am often astonished by the burning faith and uncompromising conservatism. Let go—they're just ideas. Like mine… just a lot of words that are not truth and never will be truth. Ideas about reality, but never reality itself. Live your lives and let others live theirs. Without imposing your ideas on others, because it is quite clear that this doesn't work very well; otherwise the situation in a Jewish state, by your lights, would have been completely different.
And I strongly suggest that anyone who loves to learn and investigate read the book "I Am That" 🙂
It's a shame, honorable rabbi, that you did not read the ruling in full before writing the article
The ruling appears on the court spokesperson's website
You should read it!
Dear Indy,
I'm glad you enjoy reading the site, but it is not clear to me how much you have gotten out of the reading. Throwing around New Age slogans and preaching natural Buddhist living are not a substitute for arguments. You wrote quite a few foolish things here, but I really see no point in discussing slogans.
Just don't forget that the belief and claim that the Jewish religion already belongs in the trash heap of history and that in another second no believers will remain is itself a blind belief
after all, people have been claiming this since Methuselah's time, and I still haven't seen a situation where that's it—there are no believing Jews left in the world at all
That is not a belief but a fact. Once most human beings were supposedly religious, whereas today the majority are secular. My grandfathers and grandmothers were traditional, my parents less so, and my sisters and I no longer take the Jewish religion seriously. So too all my friends, some of whom come from very religious family lineages. This is an existing fact: religion is losing its grip on the world, and that is blessed, in my opinion. I have no problem at all with religions, and I very much like to read and take an interest, which is why I am here, but I do have a problem when people impose on me ideas that are not mine. Live your life and let go of the idea of a Jewish state. A state is a state and nothing more. And even that is only an idea. To determine for others that such-and-such a day is sacred, or that one may not sell such-and-such meat, is blatant coercion. Let other people go; live your lives in your communities and be content with your lot.
I am not claiming that no religious believers will remain, but I do believe that your views about the world and its order will no longer be accepted as truth. Once the Church ruled the Western world, and today it no longer does. Once the State of Israel had a Sanhedrin and a Temple, and today it does not. And in my belief, it will not again. And you are right: everything is beliefs, blind if you wish. I agree with you very much. So too your belief…
It's all written in Rabbi Michi's note no. 2.
Just don't get confused and use demagoguery, consciously or not: saving oneself at another's expense is forbidden even if it is a bottle of water, and just as regarding stealing a bottle of water in a life-threatening situation you see no room to compare it to the prohibitions of murder, so too in rape, if it is a matter of saving oneself at another's expense, it is forbidden anyway, and not because of the rape!!
And again, the sources you brought speak of a betrothed young woman, whose status is like that of a married woman in every respect, and have no connection at all to the act of rape!
Indy, this theory, which you presented as a fact, is called in academia "the secularization thesis," and in recent decades there has been a consensus in the social sciences that the secularization thesis is factually mistaken.
The owners of the print shop forgot the main principle of all principles—political correctness (in Talmudic language: "and the truth shall be lacking")
Instead of declarations like "we are Jews," it is preferable to give a price quote 30 percent higher than the market price.
See the story of Elisha Ba'al Kenafayim, or of R. Moshe Feinstein, who advised building a kosher swimming pool for a mikveh in order to circumvent the decrees of the Communists (I heard it several times but did not find an authoritative source—if it is tradition, then…)
In the end, the defendant was punished for his declaration and not for his actions. The legal system, which sees itself as an educational authority in addition to its other roles, wanted to neutralize his declaration by means of a ruling that expresses the opposite declaration.
The viewpoint that anyone who makes a living thereby becomes a "public servant" is ridiculous. I try to imagine someone coming to a female columnist whose partner holds a certain political office and trying to recruit her to write a journalistic article against his party (and suppose she engages in articles of this kind)—is she really obligated to provide the service?
And if I am a singer or lecturer, am I obligated to provide a service at an evening they organize? And leave aside same-sex couples—at a lust party, am I also obligated to provide a service? And to rent to an escort agency?
A comment regarding 2: it is true that the case under discussion is the rape of a betrothed young woman, and only there is there a unique fine, but the comparison the verse makes is not between "rape of a betrothed young woman" and murder, but a comparison between rape and murder, regardless of the identity of the young woman who was raped. The verse comes to explain why the young woman bears no capital guilt: she was helpless, and blaming her for what happened is similar to blaming a murder victim for the murder. Therefore, although the verse refers to the case of a betrothed young woman—because of the fine unique to that case (aside from payments for humiliation, pain, and impairment that exist in every rape)—the comparison to murder is detached from the legal case and describes the moral event that took place. Therefore the verse is relevant to every rape: the Torah could have compared this to someone who attacked a man and stole his property, a much more plausible comparison if one looks at the issue merely as a kind of theft (she belongs to another man and he stole her), but it chose to compare it to murder, and that has significant meaning in my view. And not for nothing did the sages derive many significant laws from this verse.
All the aggression was used up in the post about Rabbi Kanievsky…
Lev, I do not support the secularization thesis and I am not claiming that religions will disappear in the future. I am claiming that their public-political standing and influence will continue to diminish and perhaps even disappear, in accordance with my aspiration.
My late grandmother kept the tradition of her forefathers, but we, her 20 grandchildren, no longer do. Some of us a little bit, but that too is disappearing. That is a complete fact. And so too, as I mentioned, with most of my friends. Once religion occupied a central place in the lives of most people in society, and today that is not the case. Most people are secular. That survey claiming that fifty to sixty percent of the residents of the State of Israel are traditional is mainly wishful thinking on the part of the respondents. My mother and father are a good example of this. Supposedly they celebrate the holidays, supposedly they believe in God, but in the end they are completely secular, preserving some mini-traditions from their parents' home. Only what is convenient for them, nothing more. That way a significant religion cannot exist.
There will always be those who believe in one or another fairy tale, but fortunately most human beings understand that what was the case 3,500 years ago does not apply today…
Dear David.
The reason the Torah compared it to murder is that lying with a married woman is an offense for which one must die rather than transgress, because forbidden sexual relations are one of the three grave sins whose rule is "be killed rather than transgress."
In order not to kill the betrothed young woman, whose status is like that of a married woman in every respect, the Torah explains that she was coerced, and is considered like the passive ground, and is not part of the act of forbidden sexual relations.
The reason they did not compare the above to theft is that theft is not included in "be killed rather than transgress," but is a rule learned only by implication. Besides, even about that there are those who disagree; see the discussion at length in column 291 and also mention of it in column 293.
The message the Torah comes to convey in the rape of a young woman is not the severity of rape, but our attitude toward the rape victim! Unlike rape by gunpoint, for example, where in simple terms the young woman would be obligated to die and not agree to intercourse, even though gunpoint is considered coercion in every respect!
If the offense of rape as such were so severe, then its law would also have been stated regarding an unmarried woman.
It is important to clarify: I do not at all think that rape is something that could ever be contemplated. The discussion began from Mrs. Hayuta's worldview, according to which male homosexual intercourse is preferable to rape, and therefore I brought the point that in the view of the holy Torah, male homosexual intercourse is far more severe, for it is punishable by death, whereas rape is punished financially.
And for that reason a religious person absolutely cannot support something regarded as an abomination and carrying a death penalty.
I completely disagree. The comparison is because this is coercion and that is coercion, and therefore the victim should not be blamed. What does that have to do with the severity of the matter? The severity of the matter lies in the transgression involved, and the transgression is intercourse with a betrothed woman.
"for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter"—the Written Torah is not only halakha but also aggadah. This is an explicit and existential statement beyond its halakhic function—the absence of any ability to accuse.
(a response to Rabbi Michi, to his response to Oren)
The magic word: aggadah and not only halakha. Now one can say whatever one wants, even if it has no connection to the text whatsoever. That is exactly what I claim all the time.
The verse speaks of a betrothed young woman. Is that just because it felt like it? Is it really speaking about any woman or any young woman? Come on…
The secularization thesis also does not claim that religions will disappear, but rather that they will have no public influence, and that is precisely the thesis that is considered problematic and doubtful today (and with all due respect, the stories about your late grandmother are, all in all, just old wives' tales. That is not how one builds a research thesis).
Hayuta, you can also quote this statement: "and you shall turn aside and serve other gods and bow down to them." It too is written in the Torah, except that it would be a distortion because the full verse is: "Take heed lest your heart be deceived, and you turn aside and serve other gods and bow down to them."
The same applies to rape. There, admittedly, you are not running away with the text itself but with its meaning. What Rabbi Michi meant is that the comparison to murder is not because of the severity of the matter but in order to exempt the young woman from the sin of forbidden sexual relations.
This has nothing to do at all with the Oral Torah, but with reading comprehension!
How is it not connected? How? Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; I cannot attain it. Who said this is a halakhic instruction and not a description of the victim's feelings? The severity of the act?
Hayuta, later in the thread there is a response of mine to David; everything is explained there as to why the comparison is connected to her being betrothed and not to rape itself
Since there is some confusion in the comments here, I will emphasize that this was my response to the statement—"…even if it has no connection to the text whatsoever."
Let me clarify—I am not denying the halakhic dimension (the victim's status), but arguing that fortunately the Torah was written in such a way that it has additional possible understandings that do not contradict the first halakhic understanding. Both and both.
Indy, I'll join Lev in saying that your personal stories are very interesting, but you cannot base claims on the basis of your amazing family, and of course your wishful thinking.
I'll attach some links with serious studies about our future: are we headed for secularization or for growth of the religious/ultra-Orthodox/religious Arabs?
No one has ever predicted the future, so I am not excited by these studies. The present is here, and it is reflected in my grandmother stories far more than in studies about the future shrouded in fog. The Jewish people are a drop in the sea of humanity, and the other religions in the world are losing their grip. I really don't understand how one can argue with that. There are very few serious religious people in the world relative to the population. The rest of the supposedly religious are merely traditionalists, nothing more. I don't know how much you travel around the world, but I do so a lot and meet and talk with many people. To my mind, that is worth more than the sometimes detached research of one academic or another. For example,
once the Japanese were religious; today most of them have no idea what Shinto is.
once Buddhism ruled East Asia; today it is only a statue of a plump man.
once South America was Christian; today the churches are rather empty on Sundays. The same in the U.S. and in Europe. And Islam has long belonged to ignoramuses and boors. Arab society in Israel too is undergoing very deep secularization processes, and their birthrate has dropped dramatically in recent decades.
Let me add again that I have no problem, not even the slightest, with believing people, so long as they do not impose their beliefs on others. I greatly appreciate serious belief, and therefore I read and take an interest—but denying the present, as you are doing, seems very strange to me. We apparently live in different societies, but the secular are the majority, all over the world.
Indy,
You touched on a very important point, while at the same time displaying enormous ignorance regarding the Jewish religion.
Indeed, fabricated religions disappear as suddenly as they came, whereas the Jewish religion survives against all odds and despite hardships and exiles, because it is a true religion.
I would be happy to hear your grandmother stories, but I too have other grandmother stories, and I am not sure you would be happy to hear them—about how they preserved their Judaism at the cost of life itself despite the terrible Holocaust, and there is much more that could be said.
Apparently you travel a lot around the world, but here in Israel, in the strongholds of religion, you do not set foot, and you do not investigate. I am inclined to assume that you have not tried spending a week in a serious yeshiva and considered their faith and worldview. The world in which you see the religious of the Jewish religion is probably through television and other media in a distorted and mistaken way. That is not how one examines a worldview, and on that basis one does not draw conclusions about the present.
Indy, you remind me of the joke about the shoemaker who thinks everyone is barefoot. Sure, keep hanging around Tel Aviv University and north Tel Aviv and of course you'll barely meet any religious people.
Go to Bar-Ilan, Jerusalem, Petah Tikva—you'll find them in numbers you never imagined…
A mild troll—can an obstetrician refuse to deliver a baby if the parents are unable to support the child financially and it will become a burden on the taxpayer?
He can claim that this is against the dictates of his conscience and so on, and that he is not discriminating, even though de facto he will be prevented from delivering Haredim (he can of course claim that he gladly delivers employed Haredim …)
Would that fall under freedom of occupation or antisemitism?
And please don't hide behind the physician's oath or something like that.
If it is legitimate for a person to exercise conscientious judgment before providing a service, then the rule has to be universal.
If there are cases where yes and cases where no… then we agree on the profession; we just need to settle the price (Bernard Shaw, I believe )
Again, the specific law of the fine is stated regarding a betrothed woman. But the comparison to murder is clearly about *the rape itself*—and it is stated in the Torah only regarding the act of raping a woman. Therefore it takes more than a trace of disingenuousness to say that the Torah compared only the rape of a betrothed young woman to murder, and that supposedly rape of an unmarried woman is not awful in the Torah's eyes. The context is clear; it is not even subtext, it is explicit text: the Torah did not suffice with saying that the young woman did not want the act and that she was coerced, and therefore she is exempt. It went out of its way to compare it to murder, and the comparison to murder is unrelated to her personal status. The Torah could have compared it to other things; it could have made the comparison elsewhere; it chose to compare it here. So apparently it had a reason. Far more significant things are derived from some extra vav; here this is plain and unequivocal meaning, and honestly I do not see the point of arguing about it.
Dear Mr. David,
I see that apparently you are not sufficiently familiar with the laws of "be killed rather than transgress." Let me ask you: in your opinion, when a man comes with a gun to a betrothed young woman and forces her, under threat, to have intercourse with him, and she agrees, has she, in your opinion, transgressed the prohibition of illicit relations? Or because she is a rape victim under threat of a gun, is there no basis for coming to her with claims?
And to sharpen the point: the example I presented, according to halakha, requires her to be killed rather than consent to the relations, despite the fact that this is still considered coercion. The Torah requires giving up one's life even in tragic cases of this kind. And therefore precisely here, where there might have been room to say that she is a partner to the act of harlotry, and perhaps she too is a transgressor, the Torah emphasizes that she did all she could and even cried out. And just as the murder victim is not guilty of the prohibition of murder, which is also one of the three grave sins—after all, without him the murderer could not carry out his scheme—so too in this matter.
In other places where the rule of "be killed rather than transgress" does not apply, there is no room to invoke examples like murder because they are simply not correct.
And I repeat my recommendation of the columns mentioned; I understand that apparently you did not read them, and that is a pity, because otherwise you would understand that there really is no room for argument here.
I suppose that reading this blog can be considered checking out a worldview. Your other assumptions, and Reuven's below, are completely mistaken. I am not from Tel Aviv, I did not hang around Tel Aviv University, and I am not a typical leftist. These thought patterns do not allow for real and fruitful discourse
Indy,
We prefer to think that you do not recognize the facts, rather than think that you have a problem understanding reality.
David, I simply cannot understand your argument. Clearly they compared the rape to murder for the purpose of exempting the victim, but the severity of the transgression is because the young woman is betrothed.
As stated, nothing can be extracted from the Torah, and your conclusion here is good evidence of that. You are simply saying what seems right to you, and then hanging it on the verses. The fact that rape distresses the victim is obvious. You don't need the Torah for that. The question in the discussion is what severity the Torah sees in rape. I do not see how that can be hung on these verses.
I find it hard to believe that the judge would have issued the same ruling in a case where a vegetarian business owner refused to print an ad for a mass barbecue event or a fur sale. On the other hand, the response the print-shop owners sent the inquirers was spiteful and offensive. You can refuse politely too, without referring to other people's lifestyle as an "abomination."