First-Order Ruling: The Wedding Ring as a Metaphor (Column 332)

Dedicated to my dear daughter Bruria and to Tomer, on their wedding

Ahead of last week’s kiddushin ceremony, my daughter (may she live) asked me about the halachic rules regarding the wedding ring. As is commonly assumed, one should not betroth with a ring that is not plain—that is, one set with a precious stone, or decorated and engraved. There are many views and learned debates on these matters, in one direction and the other. They themselves were unsure about a ring without a stone but with engraving and ornamentation: is it permitted/effective to effect kiddushin with such a ring or not? They were shown various disputes on the issue. I told her that, in my view, this is utter nonsense, and one may betroth with any item of monetary value one wishes—stone or no stone, engravings and ornamentation or not—so long as it is clearly worth a perutah (though in practice I recommended they not get entangled and follow the officiating rabbi’s instructions).

I have long wondered about this silliness: what is the problem with a non-plain ring?! And how did this become a whole “issue” with sources and precedents, learned and scholastic analyses, most of which are irrelevant and almost all unnecessary. For me this has been a paradigmatic example of second-order halachic ruling that makes a mockery of the law. In honor of the young couple I told myself the time has come to touch on this weighty (or rather: non-)sugya—“weighty” with a cholam over the vav, of course.

The Talmudic Source

The Gemara in Kiddushin 7b brings the following ruling:

There was a certain man who betrothed with silk garments. Rabbah said: they do not require appraisal. Rav Yosef said: they do require appraisal. If he said to her, “for whatever [they are worth],” everyone agrees that no appraisal is required. If he said to her, “fifty,” and they are not worth fifty—well, they are not worth it. Where do they disagree? Where he said “fifty” and they are worth fifty. Rabbah said: no appraisal is required, since they are worth fifty. Rav Yosef said: appraisal is required, since a woman is not expert in appraisal and her mind does not rely on it. There are those who say they disagree even in the case of “for whatever [they are worth].” Rav Yosef said: an item of monetary value is like money; just as money is fixed, so too an item of monetary value must be fixed.

Here we find a dispute among the Amoraim regarding a man who betrothed with silk garments. Rashi (s.v. “bekhol dehu”) explains that their value is certainly more than a perutah, but their exact price is not clearly known. The Amoraim dispute whether an appraisal (shumah) is required, or whether the woman is betrothed even without appraising them (since in any case they are certainly worth a perutah).

The Gemara presents two versions (lishnayot) of the dispute:

Lishna Kama: There is no dispute in two cases: if he told her to become betrothed to him for whatever value they have (in Makneh it is brought that Rashi and Tosafot disagree where their value is less than a perutah; see however the Bach §31 who understood otherwise; see also Rabbi Shmuel’s notes here). In that case, according to all opinions she is betrothed. And if he quoted an incorrect value (higher than the real value), then according to all opinions she is not betrothed, since her intention was to be betrothed for a greater amount. The dispute is where he says “fifty” and they are indeed worth fifty, but the woman doesn’t know that: Rabbah holds that she is betrothed even without an appraisal, since factually they are worth a perutah; whereas Rav Yosef holds that an appraisal is required, for a woman is not expert in appraisals and may not have relied on the betrothal. Note that the Rishonim here dispute whether an appraisal performed after the fact would help, but I will not enter that here.

Lishna Basra: The dispute exists even where he said, “Be betrothed to me for whatever value these silks have.” Rav Yosef requires an appraisal even in such a case, because shaveh kesef (an item of monetary value) in kiddushin must have a fixed and known value to the parties in order to be effective (independent of the woman’s reliance).

In conclusion, the Gemara there on 9a rules like Rabbah that no appraisal is needed:

And the law is: silks do not require appraisal.

But it is unclear according to which lishna. I saw those who wrote that this has halachic ramifications: if we rule like the lishna kama, then an appraisal is never required. But according to the second lishna, Rabbah’s novelty is that betrothal with shaveh kesef does not require an appraisal (there is no need for a fixed value), yet it may still be that where he specifies a fixed sum, an appraisal is needed to ensure her reliance. But this is puzzling, for the second lishna states they also dispute “even in bekhol dehu,” i.e., in both cases. Thus, according to Rabbah no appraisal is required in either scenario; it follows he is unconcerned both with the woman’s reliance and with any requirement that the silks have a fixed value.

In Tosafot s.v. “vehilcheta,” 9a, they write:

However, it is difficult: why does it not state explicitly, “the law follows Rabbah,” just as it says “the law follows R. Elazar” and “the law follows Rava,” said Rav Nachman?

And Rabbeinu Tam says that it comes to teach us that it is specifically silk garments that do not require appraisal, because their valuation is somewhat known and people are not accustomed to err in them so much; but other things, such as precious stones and pearls, where some are only slightly good and people commonly err by much more than their worth, do require appraisal, because she does not rely on it.

Tosafot ask why the Gemara didn’t simply state “the law follows Rabbah,” as elsewhere (“the law follows R. Elazar,” “the law follows Rava,” said Rav Nachman). Rabbeinu Tam answers that this teaches that only silks do not require appraisal, since their price is somewhat known and people don’t err much about it; but other goods—such as precious stones and pearls—where people are far more prone to error relative to their value, do require an appraisal because she does not rely upon it.

How does this resolve the difficulty? It seems he means that, in truth, we do not rule like Rabbah in principle (i.e., in principle shaveh kesef must have a fixed value), but only regarding silks, whose value is more or less known; hence the Gemara did not use the general formula “the law follows Rabbah.” Note that this is a bit odd, since just prior Tosafot explained that we generally rule like Rabbah over Rav Yosef (though they offered a few forced ways to avoid that).

Rabbeinu Tam now adds:

And therefore the custom of the world is to betroth with a ring that has no stone in it. As for that which it says later in the second chapter (48b), that he added his own gem to it—one may say that they appraised it; or alternatively, that gem was like silk garments, whose value is somewhat known. And that certain man who betrothed with a blue stone (12a), where Rav Chisda evaluated whether it contained the value of a perutah—that blue stone was not like other precious stones, but rather like marble stones, as we find in the fifth chapter of Sukkah (51b) regarding Herod, who built the Temple with marble, blue marble, and white marble.

He writes that, for this reason, people customarily betroth with a ring without a stone (even though this seemingly contradicts the sugyot on 48b and 12a), because a stone’s value is far more uncertain, and there an appraisal is required.

Tosafot then bring two further views, apparently disagreeing with him:

And some explain that for this reason it was necessary to rule like Rabbah against Rav Yosef, because Rav Yosef brought above (8a) several proofs for his opinion.

Another explanation: this is why it does not say “the law follows Rabbah,” lest you say that this means that Rabbah of the version in which they say that in the case of “for whatever [they are worth]” no appraisal is needed, but if he said to her “fifty” and it was indeed worth fifty, an appraisal is required. Therefore it ruled that under no circumstances is appraisal required. According to this explanation, it is settled why it was necessary to rule like Rabbah even though everywhere else we follow him.

According to both, there is another explanation for why the Gemara didn’t write “the law follows Rabbah,” and it sounds like they do not differentiate as Rabbeinu Tam does between different levels of uncertainty; hence, in practice, no appraisal is required in any case, contrary to Rabbeinu Tam.

Note that distinguishing between greater and lesser uncertainty seems more relevant to the woman’s intent/reliance than to a formal requirement that shaveh kesef have a fixed price. If so, it is more reasonable to say this within the lishna kama, since in the lishna basra even Rav Yosef is not concerned with her reliance but only with the formal requirement. Therefore, according to the lishna basra as such, Rabbeinu Tam’s distinction is problematic—though one can, of course, push back.

In summary, Rabbeinu Tam indeed holds that one should not betroth with a ring that has a stone when there is great uncertainty about its value. But his claim is difficult on several counts: (1) It is a major novelty with no hint in the Gemara. (2) Moreover, its basis is a rather weak difficulty (the Gemara’s phrasing—why not say “the law follows Rabbah”). (3) It seems to be contradicted by two other sugyot, which then require strained readings. (4) Furthermore, his words appear to fit only the lishna kama. (5) Additionally, one can appraise the object after the fact, and the woman would be betrothed according to many Rishonim. (6) Above all, two further views in Tosafot themselves disagree with Rabbeinu Tam. Therefore, in my opinion, it is implausible to be stringent for his view in practice.

The Practical Ruling

The Rosh there (§8) disagrees with Rabbeinu Tam and challenges him:

However, this reasoning is not clear to me—why the custom of the world is to remove the stone from the ring—for we say that in the case of “for whatever [it is worth]” they do not disagree according to the first version, and it is not customary to set an appraisal for a ring of betrothal..

He writes that in typical kiddushin people do not fix a price for the ring; we are dealing with “bekhol dehu,” and according to the lishna kama all agree she is betrothed in such a case. He assumes that here even Rav Yosef does not dispute and agrees no appraisal is required. Apparently, he means that Rabbeinu Tam’s words do not apply to this scenario (which, under the lishna basra, is precisely the point of dispute). It is possible, with difficulty, to claim that even this holds only where the uncertainty is small. In any case, this argument joins the six above: one who betroths with a ring does not state its value, and it is certainly the intention of both parties to betroth for whatever value the ring has (“bekhol dehu”).

The Tur (the Rosh’s son), Even Ha-Ezer §31, writes:

One may not betroth with less than the value of a perutah. However, if he betrothed her with an unspecified object, it need not be appraised first to determine whether it is worth a perutah; rather, if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed. And even if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this object, which is worth fifty zuz,” and he betrothed her with it without appraising it first—if it is later found to be worth fifty zuz, she is betrothed. Rabbeinu Tam wrote that this applies specifically to an object whose valuation is somewhat known, such as garments, where people are not accustomed to err so much. But precious stones and pearls and the like, where people are not expert in their valuation and at times err by a great deal, and he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this stone, which is worth fifty zuz,” require appraisal, because she does not rely on it. Therefore the custom of the world is to betroth with a ring that has no stone. And my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote: However, this reasoning is not clear to me—why the custom of the world is to remove the stone from the ring—for we require appraisal only when the sum is mentioned, and it is not customary to mention the sum with the ring of betrothal..

At first glance he brings both views. But not exactly: he cites Rabbeinu Tam only for the case where the man told her that the stone is worth fifty zuz. If, however, he says “be betrothed to me for whatever it is worth,” then according to him no appraisal is needed and she is betrothed according to all opinions (including Rabbeinu Tam). And as the Rosh wrote, one who betroths with a ring ordinarily does not state its value, and therefore in practice no appraisal is required even according to Rabbeinu Tam. This already, it seems, decisively removes the concern regarding a ring with a stone.

Both opinions are also brought in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha-Ezer §31:2:

There are those who say that if he betrothed her with something whose valuation people are not expert in, and they sometimes err in it by a great deal—such as precious stones and pearls and the like—and he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this stone, which is worth fifty zuz,” an appraisal is required, because she does not rely on it. And there is one who says that even if he betrothed her with an unspecified stone and did not tell her that it was worth fifty zuz, it requires appraisal. Therefore the custom is to betroth with a ring that has no stone.

Here he adds (“there are those who say”) Rabbeinu Tam’s view even regarding one who did not state the value of the ring.

On this the Rema further writes:

Gloss: And if he betrothed her with a ring that has a stone in it, or with an unspecified ring, and it is found to be copper, even though it is not customary to betroth with such a thing, we are concerned for the validity of the betrothal (Beit Yosef in the name of the responsum of R. Shimon b. Tzemach and Mordechai, first chapter of Kiddushin). And even if the witnesses said under the chuppah that it was gold, and it was found to be copper—even though according to the strict law it appears that she is not betrothed—nevertheless one should be stringent in practice (Teshuvot Maimoniyot, end of Hilkhot Nashim). Nonetheless, the custom under the chuppah is to ask the witnesses whether the ring is worth a perutah, so that the bride should know that he is betrothing her only with a perutah’s worth (Orach Chayim). It is also customary to cover the faces of modest brides, and they are not particular about what they are being betrothed with (as explained in the responsum of the Rashba).

His language suggests that in such a case there is only a concern for betrothal (i.e., like the Mechaber, he seriously takes Rabbeinu Tam’s view into account even in our situations). Certainly so where a ring that looks like gold turns out to be copper.

But the Rema adds that therefore the custom is to ask the witnesses under the chuppah whether the ring is worth a perutah, in order to create the bride’s reliance to be betrothed for a perutah regardless of the ring’s market value. This is puzzling, since the problem is not only the woman’s reliance but also (per the lishna basra) the formal requirement that shaveh kesef be fixed. The Beit Shmuel and other commentaries there also speak about the woman’s reliance, though under the lishna basra that is not the issue. This fits our approach that, on the lishna basra, there are actually two disputes between Rabbah and Rav Yosef.

First-Order and Second-Order Ruling

Having laid out the main points (and sparing you assorted responsa and pilpulim in the superfluous and ridiculous way “Torah” is sometimes done), any reasonable person understands that all of the above is entirely irrelevant—at least for our reality. Resorting to precedents and sources in this matter is a textbook case of second-order psak, which ignores the question of the sources’ relevance. Second-order psak uses sources as though they speak directly to today’s reality, ignoring common sense, historical and circumstantial differences, and the very necessity of sources for deciding the practical question.

The first problem with such rulings is the very stringency for Rabbeinu Tam’s view. Even if one clings to precedent, as is common in second-order ruling, we saw that taking Rabbeinu Tam’s view as a concern is far-fetched for the reasons above. So a major authority once wrote something from his own reasoning—are we all henceforth enslaved to that opinion, however odd, puzzling, and unfounded it may be? Why?! You can hear today claims that one should not betroth with a ring with a stone because perhaps the woman’s intent is to be betrothed by the stone rather than the ring (I have heard this more than once). Whence does this come? It is not even Rabbeinu Tam’s argument or that of those who follow him. And besides, what is wrong if she wishes to be betrothed by the stone? Then we betroth her by the stone and the ring (no worse than betrothing with a loan plus a perutah; see Kiddushin 46). These are post-hoc rationalizations attempting to justify a puzzling view, by means no less puzzling.

You will surely tell me that the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema were concerned for Rabbeinu Tam’s view, and therefore rule like him or at least are stringent for it, even though it is a lone opinion. But that, again, is the same phenomenon of clinging to an odd view just because an important figure said it. So it’s not Rabbeinu Tam but the authors of the Shulchan Aruch. So what?! Their approach here is highly strained, and I see no reason in the world to adhere to it. This exemplifies what I described in my article on autonomy in halachic decision-making, my essay on autonomy in psak, namely that the authors of the Shulchan Aruch entrenched adherence to precedent and thereby opened a very problematic period in halachic ruling. Not for nothing did their contemporaries sharply criticize them (the Maharshal, the Maharal, the Maharal’s brother, and others). See also Column 304 and the third volume of my trilogy.

My main critique here is of the very approach of second-order halachic ruling and blind adherence to precedent; the question of the ring is merely a parable and example. Even according to those who are stringent for Rabbeinu Tam, we saw that their concern is the woman’s reliance; thus, covering her face or asking the witnesses whether the ring is worth a perutah resolves the problem and validates the betrothal. Does anyone seriously think that nowadays a woman conditions her consent to kiddushin on the question of how much the ring is worth? Especially as she sees the ring under the chuppah, and any doubt is at most about its market value. It is simply absurd. I can scarcely imagine a woman today who is particular about the medium of betrothal; certainly not a woman who would forgo the kiddushin because the ring’s value doesn’t look high enough to her (even if she cares at all). If such a woman exists, she is most unusual, and I see no reason to be concerned about that case. Moreover, nowadays the bride usually knows the ring even before the act (often they buy it together), and so she knows its value and agrees to it.

In short, all the precedents and arguments raised in the preliminary discussion are simply irrelevant. They address the same formal question, but due to differing circumstances and realities they become beside the point. In practice, there is no doubt that a woman has full intention to be betrothed with any ring of any kind—stone or no stone, engravings or not.

So what were those precedents talking about? The great halachists were not fools. I cannot answer that. What I do know is today’s reality, and all other questions neither add nor detract. Perhaps those authorities addressed a strange reality unfamiliar to me, in which a reasonable woman’s consent to kiddushin did depend on the ring used. That is an odd reality, and it also contradicts the very presumption of “tav le-meitav” which these same conservatives guard as the apple of their eye.

Here we reach another contradiction in the conservative outlook: on the one hand, the presumption “tav le-meitav” tells us a woman desires partnership and is willing to compromise on anything to obtain it (which is not true nowadays, of course, though conservatives cling to it as if Sinai taught it). And yet those very conservatives explain that perhaps the woman does not consent to betrothal because the ring is not worth 1,000 shekels but only 100. Even if that assessment of women were once true (and I doubt it greatly), today it is certainly not. In our times I have no doubt there is no concern regarding any type of ring, and one may betroth with any ring one wishes (and, of course, with any item worth a perutah even if it is not a ring).[1]

This is an example of the degeneration of a halachic ruling from its original sources—through scholastic discussions and explanations—down to our day: adopting a lone, odd, and baseless view, while along the way entirely forgetting that today’s reality is such that, even according to that lone view, the sources and arguments are no longer relevant.

It reminds me of my notorious essay on conversions today. There I showed that the halachic discussions about leniencies in modern conversions are anachronistic second-order rulings. They cite precedents where courts accepted converts whose motive was marriage (wishing to wed a Jewess) or other aims, and try to derive from there for our times. But that is nonsense: in the past, even a convert who came with other motives still understood clearly that he would need to be part of a community that keeps the mitzvot. Thus, de facto, he knew he was accepting the yoke of mitzvot, even if not out of pure love of God. Therefore, there was room to accept him after the fact. But today the convert knows he will have no need to keep even a single mitzvah. Jewish society in Israel today is secular, and as Foucault (so to speak) foresaw—look what happens with converts nowadays. Is it serious to think that today a convert whose motive is marriage nevertheless has an assumed acceptance of mitzvot?! Moreover, precedents that speak of waiving explicit acceptance of mitzvot at conversion are also irrelevant to our times. They rest on the fact that in the past someone who came to convert clearly accepted mitzvot—why else would he come? Israel was hounded among the nations, and he still wanted to join them—so he must be a true believer. That is a reasonable presumption that there was acceptance of mitzvot in his heart. But today, even if he says he accepts mitzvot, there is no such presumption, for he has obvious interests in converting (Israel is no longer particularly hounded, and there are even absorption benefits and a pretty good standard of living compared to many countries). In our reality, inferring acceptance of mitzvot from the mere fact of conversion is absurd. What can all the precedents in the world help if today’s reality is different from the past?!

We are so accustomed to thinking that halachic rulings must cite sources and precedents, analyze the views of Rishonim and Acharonim, and align them with Talmudic sugyot, that we do not allow ourselves to rule with common sense. If I am asked whether one may betroth with a ring with a stone, I should answer: the woman certainly has full intent, and therefore she is betrothed. That’s it. There is no need to lay out the corpora of views and scholastic debates that have accreted around this. In fact, a one-line responsum would have sufficed. Yes: the derided genre of “SMS responsa,” which gets so much criticism undeservedly. Many answers to questions of this kind ought to be given in a single line, and the criticism should be directed at those who pen learned answers thick with irrelevant sources out of habit and to impress. Most questions that touch on current reality receive irrelevant second-order discussions and answers, instead of a short, sharp, common-sense ruling (see a clear example in my piece on an orphan’s Kaddish).

In short, leave aside the debates about rings. They are irrelevant anachronisms—scholastic pilpulim (which I am the last to disparage), whose value lies in Torah study lishmah (understanding the principles of kiddushin and intent, even if the application is in a different reality). But they have nothing to do with the practical halachic ruling about a wedding ring—at least in our day.

[1] Admittedly, this contradiction already appears in the Talmud. But I do not know that reality, and perhaps a ring that lowers a woman’s “value” truly counted as a disgrace then, which in the eyes of reasonable women justified forgoing the partnership. This requires further thought.