First-Order Ruling: The Wedding Ring as a Metaphor (Column 332)
What is actually disputed in the sugya of appraisal
The column opens with the "silk garments" passage in Kiddushin 7b: is a woman betrothed by an object of value whose price was not appraised beforehand. It lays out the two versions in the Gemara: according to the first, the dispute between Rabbah and Rav Yosef is mainly where the man stated a specific amount and the woman does not know whether the object is really worth that much, so the issue is her resolve; according to the second, Rav Yosef maintains in principle that non-money used for kiddushin must have a fixed and known value. Since the Gemara rules like Rabbah that "silks do not require appraisal," the column stresses that, at least on the plain sense of the second version, one cannot say Rabbah waives appraisal only in some of the cases: his view seems to be that no appraisal is required at all.
Rabbeinu Tam ties the custom to major uncertainty, but his innovation is shaky
From a linguistic difficulty in Tosafot, Rabbeinu Tam innovates that the lenient ruling was said only about items like clothing, whose value is more or less known, whereas precious stones and pearls, where appraisal errors can be large, do require appraisal; hence the custom to use a ring without a stone. The column lists a series of problems with this move: it has no real anchor in the Gemara, it is built on a weak question about wording, it requires strained readings מול other sugyot, and it fits the first version better than the second. It adds that some Rishonim hold that appraisal even after the fact works, and that Tosafot itself offers two other explanations of the Gemara that do not accept Rabbeinu Tam's distinction—so the very decision to worry about his view seems exaggerated.
The Rosh and the Tur narrow the concern sharply: a standard wedding ring is kiddushin "for whatever it is worth"
The Rosh explicitly rejects the rationale of the custom: in ordinary kiddushin the groom does not say how much the ring is worth, so this is a case of "be betrothed to me with this object," not of stating a price. On that understanding, even if one were to worry about Rabbeinu Tam where a price was specified, that has almost no practical bearing on the normal case of a wedding ring. Accordingly, when the Tur cites Rabbeinu Tam, he presents him only in the case where the woman was explicitly told that the stone was worth a certain sum, and immediately afterward brings the Rosh's objection; from the Tur's perspective, that already almost eliminates the practical concern.
The Shulchan Arukh and the Rema are more stringent, but even there the solution rests on the woman's intent
The column shows that the Shulchan Arukh broadens the concern and cites a view according to which even kiddushin with an unspecified stone requires appraisal, and therefore the custom developed to use a ring without a stone. The Rema goes further and is stringent enough to suspect kiddushin even when the ring turns out not to be gold but copper, yet he notes the custom under the chuppah to ask whether the ring is worth a perutah so that the bride will know what she is accepting. To the column this exposes another difficulty: if the problem is formal—namely that non-money used for kiddushin must have a fixed value—such a solution should not suffice; the fact that the Rema and later commentators keep returning to the woman's resolve strengthens the impression that the whole discussion ultimately rests on a factual presumption, not on a rigid principle.
The wedding ring is only a parable: the real problem is second-order ruling
After laying out the sources, the column says explicitly that almost all of this discussion is unnecessary for practical ruling today. In its eyes, this is a textbook case of second-order ruling: instead of first asking what reality is and what is actually relevant to the decision, people collect precedents, bind themselves to a strained lone opinion, and then invent after-the-fact explanations to justify a custom that has already become entrenched. That is why popular contemporary arguments—such as the fear that the woman intended to be betrothed by the stone and not by the ring—look to the column like late rescue theories that do not appear in the sources at all and are not problematic in themselves anyway.
In today's reality there is no serious reason to fear a lack of definite consent
The column argues that even if one accepts the whole framework of Rabbeinu Tam and the later decisors, the reality they were talking about is not ours. It is very hard to imagine a contemporary bride abandoning the kiddushin because it turned out that the ring was worth less than she assumed; usually she sees the ring, and often the couple even chooses it together and she knows in advance what it is. It also points to an internal tension in the conservative posture: one cannot simultaneously cling to the presumption of "better to dwell with a spouse" as though a woman will compromise on everything in order to marry, and at the same time claim that perhaps she would refuse kiddushin because of a difference of a few hundred shekels in the ring's value.
From the ring to conversion and SMS responsa: sources matter for learning, not always for decision
From here the column broadens the point: even in disputes over conversion, older precedents about a convert who came for marriage or about implied acceptance of mitzvot were born in a wholly different social world, so they cannot simply be copied into the present. In the same way, many contemporary questions do not need source-heavy, highly pilpulistic answers, but rather a short common-sense ruling, even if that makes it look like an "SMS responsum." The sources and the conceptual discussions remain very important as Torah study and for clarifying categories, but one must not identify that with practical ruling when reality has changed.
The practical conclusion: any ring worth a perutah works, but it is not always worth fighting
The column's bottom line is that, at least today, one can effect kiddushin with any item of known perutah value—a ring with a stone, without a stone, with engraving, with decorations, or even an object that is not a ring. At the same time, it notes the gap between halakhic truth and managing an actual ceremony: in practice he still advised his daughter not to get entangled and to follow the officiating rabbi's instructions. Precisely that gap sharpens the central claim: practical halakha should be derived first of all from relevance and present reality, and only afterward from the struggle with entrenched habits of ruling and long-standing customs.
Dedicated to my dear daughter Bruria and to Tomer, on their wedding
Ahead of last week’s kiddushin ceremony, my daughter (may she live) asked me about the halachic rules regarding the wedding ring. As is commonly assumed, one should not betroth with a ring that is not plain—that is, one set with a precious stone, or decorated and engraved. There are many views and learned debates on these matters, in one direction and the other. They themselves were unsure about a ring without a stone but with engraving and ornamentation: is it permitted/effective to effect kiddushin with such a ring or not? They were shown various disputes on the issue. I told her that, in my view, this is utter nonsense, and one may betroth with any item of monetary value one wishes—stone or no stone, engravings and ornamentation or not—so long as it is clearly worth a perutah (though in practice I recommended they not get entangled and follow the officiating rabbi’s instructions).
I have long wondered about this silliness: what is the problem with a non-plain ring?! And how did this become a whole “issue” with sources and precedents, learned and scholastic analyses, most of which are irrelevant and almost all unnecessary. For me this has been a paradigmatic example of second-order halachic ruling that makes a mockery of the law. In honor of the young couple I told myself the time has come to touch on this weighty (or rather: non-)sugya—“weighty” with a cholam over the vav, of course.
The Talmudic Source
The Gemara in Kiddushin 7b brings the following ruling:
There was a certain man who betrothed with silk garments. Rabbah said: they do not require appraisal. Rav Yosef said: they do require appraisal. If he said to her, “for whatever [they are worth],” everyone agrees that no appraisal is required. If he said to her, “fifty,” and they are not worth fifty—well, they are not worth it. Where do they disagree? Where he said “fifty” and they are worth fifty. Rabbah said: no appraisal is required, since they are worth fifty. Rav Yosef said: appraisal is required, since a woman is not expert in appraisal and her mind does not rely on it. There are those who say they disagree even in the case of “for whatever [they are worth].” Rav Yosef said: an item of monetary value is like money; just as money is fixed, so too an item of monetary value must be fixed.
Here we find a dispute among the Amoraim regarding a man who betrothed with silk garments. Rashi (s.v. “bekhol dehu”) explains that their value is certainly more than a perutah, but their exact price is not clearly known. The Amoraim dispute whether an appraisal (shumah) is required, or whether the woman is betrothed even without appraising them (since in any case they are certainly worth a perutah).
The Gemara presents two versions (lishnayot) of the dispute:
Lishna Kama: There is no dispute in two cases: if he told her to become betrothed to him for whatever value they have (in Makneh it is brought that Rashi and Tosafot disagree where their value is less than a perutah; see however the Bach §31 who understood otherwise; see also Rabbi Shmuel’s notes here). In that case, according to all opinions she is betrothed. And if he quoted an incorrect value (higher than the real value), then according to all opinions she is not betrothed, since her intention was to be betrothed for a greater amount. The dispute is where he says “fifty” and they are indeed worth fifty, but the woman doesn’t know that: Rabbah holds that she is betrothed even without an appraisal, since factually they are worth a perutah; whereas Rav Yosef holds that an appraisal is required, for a woman is not expert in appraisals and may not have relied on the betrothal. Note that the Rishonim here dispute whether an appraisal performed after the fact would help, but I will not enter that here.
Lishna Basra: The dispute exists even where he said, “Be betrothed to me for whatever value these silks have.” Rav Yosef requires an appraisal even in such a case, because shaveh kesef (an item of monetary value) in kiddushin must have a fixed and known value to the parties in order to be effective (independent of the woman’s reliance).
In conclusion, the Gemara there on 9a rules like Rabbah that no appraisal is needed:
And the law is: silks do not require appraisal.
But it is unclear according to which lishna. I saw those who wrote that this has halachic ramifications: if we rule like the lishna kama, then an appraisal is never required. But according to the second lishna, Rabbah’s novelty is that betrothal with shaveh kesef does not require an appraisal (there is no need for a fixed value), yet it may still be that where he specifies a fixed sum, an appraisal is needed to ensure her reliance. But this is puzzling, for the second lishna states they also dispute “even in bekhol dehu,” i.e., in both cases. Thus, according to Rabbah no appraisal is required in either scenario; it follows he is unconcerned both with the woman’s reliance and with any requirement that the silks have a fixed value.
In Tosafot s.v. “vehilcheta,” 9a, they write:
However, it is difficult: why does it not state explicitly, “the law follows Rabbah,” just as it says “the law follows R. Elazar” and “the law follows Rava,” said Rav Nachman?
And Rabbeinu Tam says that it comes to teach us that it is specifically silk garments that do not require appraisal, because their valuation is somewhat known and people are not accustomed to err in them so much; but other things, such as precious stones and pearls, where some are only slightly good and people commonly err by much more than their worth, do require appraisal, because she does not rely on it.
Tosafot ask why the Gemara didn’t simply state “the law follows Rabbah,” as elsewhere (“the law follows R. Elazar,” “the law follows Rava,” said Rav Nachman). Rabbeinu Tam answers that this teaches that only silks do not require appraisal, since their price is somewhat known and people don’t err much about it; but other goods—such as precious stones and pearls—where people are far more prone to error relative to their value, do require an appraisal because she does not rely upon it.
How does this resolve the difficulty? It seems he means that, in truth, we do not rule like Rabbah in principle (i.e., in principle shaveh kesef must have a fixed value), but only regarding silks, whose value is more or less known; hence the Gemara did not use the general formula “the law follows Rabbah.” Note that this is a bit odd, since just prior Tosafot explained that we generally rule like Rabbah over Rav Yosef (though they offered a few forced ways to avoid that).
Rabbeinu Tam now adds:
And therefore the custom of the world is to betroth with a ring that has no stone in it. As for that which it says later in the second chapter (48b), that he added his own gem to it—one may say that they appraised it; or alternatively, that gem was like silk garments, whose value is somewhat known. And that certain man who betrothed with a blue stone (12a), where Rav Chisda evaluated whether it contained the value of a perutah—that blue stone was not like other precious stones, but rather like marble stones, as we find in the fifth chapter of Sukkah (51b) regarding Herod, who built the Temple with marble, blue marble, and white marble.
He writes that, for this reason, people customarily betroth with a ring without a stone (even though this seemingly contradicts the sugyot on 48b and 12a), because a stone’s value is far more uncertain, and there an appraisal is required.
Tosafot then bring two further views, apparently disagreeing with him:
And some explain that for this reason it was necessary to rule like Rabbah against Rav Yosef, because Rav Yosef brought above (8a) several proofs for his opinion.
Another explanation: this is why it does not say “the law follows Rabbah,” lest you say that this means that Rabbah of the version in which they say that in the case of “for whatever [they are worth]” no appraisal is needed, but if he said to her “fifty” and it was indeed worth fifty, an appraisal is required. Therefore it ruled that under no circumstances is appraisal required. According to this explanation, it is settled why it was necessary to rule like Rabbah even though everywhere else we follow him.
According to both, there is another explanation for why the Gemara didn’t write “the law follows Rabbah,” and it sounds like they do not differentiate as Rabbeinu Tam does between different levels of uncertainty; hence, in practice, no appraisal is required in any case, contrary to Rabbeinu Tam.
Note that distinguishing between greater and lesser uncertainty seems more relevant to the woman’s intent/reliance than to a formal requirement that shaveh kesef have a fixed price. If so, it is more reasonable to say this within the lishna kama, since in the lishna basra even Rav Yosef is not concerned with her reliance but only with the formal requirement. Therefore, according to the lishna basra as such, Rabbeinu Tam’s distinction is problematic—though one can, of course, push back.
In summary, Rabbeinu Tam indeed holds that one should not betroth with a ring that has a stone when there is great uncertainty about its value. But his claim is difficult on several counts: (1) It is a major novelty with no hint in the Gemara. (2) Moreover, its basis is a rather weak difficulty (the Gemara’s phrasing—why not say “the law follows Rabbah”). (3) It seems to be contradicted by two other sugyot, which then require strained readings. (4) Furthermore, his words appear to fit only the lishna kama. (5) Additionally, one can appraise the object after the fact, and the woman would be betrothed according to many Rishonim. (6) Above all, two further views in Tosafot themselves disagree with Rabbeinu Tam. Therefore, in my opinion, it is implausible to be stringent for his view in practice.
The Practical Ruling
The Rosh there (§8) disagrees with Rabbeinu Tam and challenges him:
However, this reasoning is not clear to me—why the custom of the world is to remove the stone from the ring—for we say that in the case of “for whatever [it is worth]” they do not disagree according to the first version, and it is not customary to set an appraisal for a ring of betrothal..
He writes that in typical kiddushin people do not fix a price for the ring; we are dealing with “bekhol dehu,” and according to the lishna kama all agree she is betrothed in such a case. He assumes that here even Rav Yosef does not dispute and agrees no appraisal is required. Apparently, he means that Rabbeinu Tam’s words do not apply to this scenario (which, under the lishna basra, is precisely the point of dispute). It is possible, with difficulty, to claim that even this holds only where the uncertainty is small. In any case, this argument joins the six above: one who betroths with a ring does not state its value, and it is certainly the intention of both parties to betroth for whatever value the ring has (“bekhol dehu”).
The Tur (the Rosh’s son), Even Ha-Ezer §31, writes:
One may not betroth with less than the value of a perutah. However, if he betrothed her with an unspecified object, it need not be appraised first to determine whether it is worth a perutah; rather, if it is worth a perutah, she is betrothed. And even if he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this object, which is worth fifty zuz,” and he betrothed her with it without appraising it first—if it is later found to be worth fifty zuz, she is betrothed. Rabbeinu Tam wrote that this applies specifically to an object whose valuation is somewhat known, such as garments, where people are not accustomed to err so much. But precious stones and pearls and the like, where people are not expert in their valuation and at times err by a great deal, and he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this stone, which is worth fifty zuz,” require appraisal, because she does not rely on it. Therefore the custom of the world is to betroth with a ring that has no stone. And my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote: However, this reasoning is not clear to me—why the custom of the world is to remove the stone from the ring—for we require appraisal only when the sum is mentioned, and it is not customary to mention the sum with the ring of betrothal..
At first glance he brings both views. But not exactly: he cites Rabbeinu Tam only for the case where the man told her that the stone is worth fifty zuz. If, however, he says “be betrothed to me for whatever it is worth,” then according to him no appraisal is needed and she is betrothed according to all opinions (including Rabbeinu Tam). And as the Rosh wrote, one who betroths with a ring ordinarily does not state its value, and therefore in practice no appraisal is required even according to Rabbeinu Tam. This already, it seems, decisively removes the concern regarding a ring with a stone.
Both opinions are also brought in the Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha-Ezer §31:2:
There are those who say that if he betrothed her with something whose valuation people are not expert in, and they sometimes err in it by a great deal—such as precious stones and pearls and the like—and he said to her, “Be betrothed to me with this stone, which is worth fifty zuz,” an appraisal is required, because she does not rely on it. And there is one who says that even if he betrothed her with an unspecified stone and did not tell her that it was worth fifty zuz, it requires appraisal. Therefore the custom is to betroth with a ring that has no stone.
Here he adds (“there are those who say”) Rabbeinu Tam’s view even regarding one who did not state the value of the ring.
On this the Rema further writes:
Gloss: And if he betrothed her with a ring that has a stone in it, or with an unspecified ring, and it is found to be copper, even though it is not customary to betroth with such a thing, we are concerned for the validity of the betrothal (Beit Yosef in the name of the responsum of R. Shimon b. Tzemach and Mordechai, first chapter of Kiddushin). And even if the witnesses said under the chuppah that it was gold, and it was found to be copper—even though according to the strict law it appears that she is not betrothed—nevertheless one should be stringent in practice (Teshuvot Maimoniyot, end of Hilkhot Nashim). Nonetheless, the custom under the chuppah is to ask the witnesses whether the ring is worth a perutah, so that the bride should know that he is betrothing her only with a perutah’s worth (Orach Chayim). It is also customary to cover the faces of modest brides, and they are not particular about what they are being betrothed with (as explained in the responsum of the Rashba).
His language suggests that in such a case there is only a concern for betrothal (i.e., like the Mechaber, he seriously takes Rabbeinu Tam’s view into account even in our situations). Certainly so where a ring that looks like gold turns out to be copper.
But the Rema adds that therefore the custom is to ask the witnesses under the chuppah whether the ring is worth a perutah, in order to create the bride’s reliance to be betrothed for a perutah regardless of the ring’s market value. This is puzzling, since the problem is not only the woman’s reliance but also (per the lishna basra) the formal requirement that shaveh kesef be fixed. The Beit Shmuel and other commentaries there also speak about the woman’s reliance, though under the lishna basra that is not the issue. This fits our approach that, on the lishna basra, there are actually two disputes between Rabbah and Rav Yosef.
First-Order and Second-Order Ruling
Having laid out the main points (and sparing you assorted responsa and pilpulim in the superfluous and ridiculous way “Torah” is sometimes done), any reasonable person understands that all of the above is entirely irrelevant—at least for our reality. Resorting to precedents and sources in this matter is a textbook case of second-order psak, which ignores the question of the sources’ relevance. Second-order psak uses sources as though they speak directly to today’s reality, ignoring common sense, historical and circumstantial differences, and the very necessity of sources for deciding the practical question.
The first problem with such rulings is the very stringency for Rabbeinu Tam’s view. Even if one clings to precedent, as is common in second-order ruling, we saw that taking Rabbeinu Tam’s view as a concern is far-fetched for the reasons above. So a major authority once wrote something from his own reasoning—are we all henceforth enslaved to that opinion, however odd, puzzling, and unfounded it may be? Why?! You can hear today claims that one should not betroth with a ring with a stone because perhaps the woman’s intent is to be betrothed by the stone rather than the ring (I have heard this more than once). Whence does this come? It is not even Rabbeinu Tam’s argument or that of those who follow him. And besides, what is wrong if she wishes to be betrothed by the stone? Then we betroth her by the stone and the ring (no worse than betrothing with a loan plus a perutah; see Kiddushin 46). These are post-hoc rationalizations attempting to justify a puzzling view, by means no less puzzling.
You will surely tell me that the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema were concerned for Rabbeinu Tam’s view, and therefore rule like him or at least are stringent for it, even though it is a lone opinion. But that, again, is the same phenomenon of clinging to an odd view just because an important figure said it. So it’s not Rabbeinu Tam but the authors of the Shulchan Aruch. So what?! Their approach here is highly strained, and I see no reason in the world to adhere to it. This exemplifies what I described in my article on autonomy in halachic decision-making, my essay on autonomy in psak, namely that the authors of the Shulchan Aruch entrenched adherence to precedent and thereby opened a very problematic period in halachic ruling. Not for nothing did their contemporaries sharply criticize them (the Maharshal, the Maharal, the Maharal’s brother, and others). See also Column 304 and the third volume of my trilogy.
My main critique here is of the very approach of second-order halachic ruling and blind adherence to precedent; the question of the ring is merely a parable and example. Even according to those who are stringent for Rabbeinu Tam, we saw that their concern is the woman’s reliance; thus, covering her face or asking the witnesses whether the ring is worth a perutah resolves the problem and validates the betrothal. Does anyone seriously think that nowadays a woman conditions her consent to kiddushin on the question of how much the ring is worth? Especially as she sees the ring under the chuppah, and any doubt is at most about its market value. It is simply absurd. I can scarcely imagine a woman today who is particular about the medium of betrothal; certainly not a woman who would forgo the kiddushin because the ring’s value doesn’t look high enough to her (even if she cares at all). If such a woman exists, she is most unusual, and I see no reason to be concerned about that case. Moreover, nowadays the bride usually knows the ring even before the act (often they buy it together), and so she knows its value and agrees to it.
In short, all the precedents and arguments raised in the preliminary discussion are simply irrelevant. They address the same formal question, but due to differing circumstances and realities they become beside the point. In practice, there is no doubt that a woman has full intention to be betrothed with any ring of any kind—stone or no stone, engravings or not.
So what were those precedents talking about? The great halachists were not fools. I cannot answer that. What I do know is today’s reality, and all other questions neither add nor detract. Perhaps those authorities addressed a strange reality unfamiliar to me, in which a reasonable woman’s consent to kiddushin did depend on the ring used. That is an odd reality, and it also contradicts the very presumption of “tav le-meitav” which these same conservatives guard as the apple of their eye.
Here we reach another contradiction in the conservative outlook: on the one hand, the presumption “tav le-meitav” tells us a woman desires partnership and is willing to compromise on anything to obtain it (which is not true nowadays, of course, though conservatives cling to it as if Sinai taught it). And yet those very conservatives explain that perhaps the woman does not consent to betrothal because the ring is not worth 1,000 shekels but only 100. Even if that assessment of women were once true (and I doubt it greatly), today it is certainly not. In our times I have no doubt there is no concern regarding any type of ring, and one may betroth with any ring one wishes (and, of course, with any item worth a perutah even if it is not a ring).[1]
This is an example of the degeneration of a halachic ruling from its original sources—through scholastic discussions and explanations—down to our day: adopting a lone, odd, and baseless view, while along the way entirely forgetting that today’s reality is such that, even according to that lone view, the sources and arguments are no longer relevant.
It reminds me of my notorious essay on conversions today. There I showed that the halachic discussions about leniencies in modern conversions are anachronistic second-order rulings. They cite precedents where courts accepted converts whose motive was marriage (wishing to wed a Jewess) or other aims, and try to derive from there for our times. But that is nonsense: in the past, even a convert who came with other motives still understood clearly that he would need to be part of a community that keeps the mitzvot. Thus, de facto, he knew he was accepting the yoke of mitzvot, even if not out of pure love of God. Therefore, there was room to accept him after the fact. But today the convert knows he will have no need to keep even a single mitzvah. Jewish society in Israel today is secular, and as Foucault (so to speak) foresaw—look what happens with converts nowadays. Is it serious to think that today a convert whose motive is marriage nevertheless has an assumed acceptance of mitzvot?! Moreover, precedents that speak of waiving explicit acceptance of mitzvot at conversion are also irrelevant to our times. They rest on the fact that in the past someone who came to convert clearly accepted mitzvot—why else would he come? Israel was hounded among the nations, and he still wanted to join them—so he must be a true believer. That is a reasonable presumption that there was acceptance of mitzvot in his heart. But today, even if he says he accepts mitzvot, there is no such presumption, for he has obvious interests in converting (Israel is no longer particularly hounded, and there are even absorption benefits and a pretty good standard of living compared to many countries). In our reality, inferring acceptance of mitzvot from the mere fact of conversion is absurd. What can all the precedents in the world help if today’s reality is different from the past?!
We are so accustomed to thinking that halachic rulings must cite sources and precedents, analyze the views of Rishonim and Acharonim, and align them with Talmudic sugyot, that we do not allow ourselves to rule with common sense. If I am asked whether one may betroth with a ring with a stone, I should answer: the woman certainly has full intent, and therefore she is betrothed. That’s it. There is no need to lay out the corpora of views and scholastic debates that have accreted around this. In fact, a one-line responsum would have sufficed. Yes: the derided genre of “SMS responsa,” which gets so much criticism undeservedly. Many answers to questions of this kind ought to be given in a single line, and the criticism should be directed at those who pen learned answers thick with irrelevant sources out of habit and to impress. Most questions that touch on current reality receive irrelevant second-order discussions and answers, instead of a short, sharp, common-sense ruling (see a clear example in my piece on an orphan’s Kaddish).
In short, leave aside the debates about rings. They are irrelevant anachronisms—scholastic pilpulim (which I am the last to disparage), whose value lies in Torah study lishmah (understanding the principles of kiddushin and intent, even if the application is in a different reality). But they have nothing to do with the practical halachic ruling about a wedding ring—at least in our day.
[1] Admittedly, this contradiction already appears in the Talmud. But I do not know that reality, and perhaps a ring that lowers a woman’s “value” truly counted as a disgrace then, which in the eyes of reasonable women justified forgoing the partnership. This requires further thought.
Discussion
I am not dealing with the question of what is useful and what is harmful, but with the question of what is correct. If you want to issue an erroneous ruling because it is useful—health to you.
Many thanks.
But that is part of the halakha, that it contains rules that do not really say this is the truth—and would you not heed them?
By the way, how do you explain the fact that there are almost no decisors who deal in an orderly way with the methods of halakha? (Of course, this is a broader question, about engaging with the rules and philosophy of fields in general, etc., but still it seems to me that the neglect here is exceptional.) Or are there such people?
“And at the same time they say that perhaps the woman did not consent to the betrothal because the ring is not worth 1,000 NIS but only a cubit”
Presumably it should read one hundred…
The writers of the Shulchan Arukh? Were there several writers? Or is this about criticism of halakha?
Why shout. To sum up, the decisors were concerned for Rabbeinu Tam’s view, and you are basically leaving him (and them) unresolved, with difficulties, most of them obvious, and you do not know how to answer what the precedents were talking about, so it is not reasonable to rule like him. Even in courts of law, it seems to me, they do not wave away precedents like this.
But if so, then these are rulings that fit perfectly for Independence Day, the holiday of the national-Zionist barbecue.
It is accepted: a. to attribute it jointly to the author and the glossator—the Rema. b. to speak in the plural…
(Some of the section headings, or part of them, were written by his student.)
Mazal tov!
Agnon has a beautiful story called “The Ring / A Story Without End” (in the volume Takhrikh of Stories)—about the symbolic meanings of the circular ring:
“And there is in this a deep secret in the manner of imagery, concerning the cause of concealment and the revealing of concealment, for such is the nature of the ring, that it embraces and envelops, in the mystery of that which surrounds and embraces”
May you merit abundant joy from them!
Of course I will not heed them. We are not speaking about something that is not the truth but about something that is not the halakha. What rule is there here that I must heed? The invention regarding a ring with a stone? Where does that rule come from? And why do you assume it is the halakha? That is precisely what is under discussion.
In most disciplines, people who work in them do not engage with the basic assumptions and philosophy of their field.
Stone, corrected.
Indeed, the authors of the Shulchan Arukh are R. Yosef Karo and the Rema. The Shulchan Arukh as we have it before us was composed by both of them.
I did not understand. I hope you did.
Thank you. Indeed, the mystics too elaborated on the matter of betrothal with a ring, and especially one of silver or gold, but this is not the place to elaborate.
The article is an example of the quality of first-order halakhic ruling:
Because of irrelevant arguments you dismiss the view of the Rishonim. There is a confusion here between a general desire to be married to this man, or to a man in general, about which it was said “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone,” and consenting to be betrothed with the specific object. According to your approach, even if it was gold and turned out to be copper, a normal woman would not invalidate the betrothal, and yet it is still not the object with which she consented to be betrothed, and therefore according to the halakha there is a deficiency in the betrothal procedure. There is a need for consent to be betrothed with this specific object, and the general desire to be betrothed neither adds nor detracts if there is no consent to “this ring” as it really is and not as it is in the woman’s imagination.
Women, even in Rav Yosef’s time, wanted marriage more than they wanted the ring, and still he held that the betrothal would not take effect if she did not truly rely on it. And the source of the custom, which the Mordechai comes to justify, is that we do not multiply disputes, and even Rabbah does not disagree with the principle that there must be consent to the object of betrothal.
And the reason the decisors mention this (though they do not decide this way, because in truth it is an isolated opinion brought only to justify a custom) is not because they are thinking of the case of the rabbi’s daughter, who, God willing and with mazal tov, everything will be fine with, and the discussion of what to betroth with is not really critical, but because of a situation in which another man comes and betroths her, and the woman too says that she did not want to be betrothed with a fake diamond. In such a situation, would the second man require a bill of divorce? To you it is obvious not, because the object does not matter; to the decisors it is apparently not so easy to release a married woman to the marketplace.
With God’s help, 26 Elul 5780
A Jewish home founded on halakha is built on the basic knowledge of both spouses in the necessary laws. When both spouses have before them a clear and agreed-upon halakhic book, such as Kitzur Shulchan Arukh or Mekor Chayim or Peninei Halakha or Yalkut Yosef and the like—then most halakhic questions are “closed” and are not in constant dispute. Only in cases of lack of clarity or situations of pressure do they turn to a halakhic authority, who also rules according to a recognized and known school of decision.
If both spouses are scholars on the level of the Rishonim, able to derive halakhot from the Talmud on the “first-order” level, all the better and more pleasant 🙂 If both are not a “Rishon” and a “Rishonah,” then both will need a halakhic decisor of the first order, and for them themselves the halakhic ruling will be “second-order,” but with a major deficiency. They will have no basic idea what the halakha is on contemporary issues, for the contemporary questions are not explicitly mentioned in the Talmud. The two spouses will not be able to take a step in their lives without a closely attached first-order decisor, and usually even after the ruling they will not understand its parameters and reasoning because of lack of knowledge of the Talmud.
Therefore, in my humble opinion, R. M. A. did well in directing his daughter and son-in-law to act according to the words of the “conventional decisor” who conducted the betrothal ceremony.
With the blessing, “May this be a year of uniform halakhic ruling,” and mazal tov to the young couple, Shatz
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…in cases of lack of clarity or in situations of pressure…
Simply not correct. We are not speaking about consent to the object of betrothal but to the betrothal itself. After all, we are talking about a case where she consented to the object of betrothal, except that perhaps she did not know its value. Would it even occur to you that the woman wants to give up the betrothal and the whole ceremony because the ring is not worth what she thought it was worth? That is absurd.
I briefly mentioned the sugya of a loan and a perutah, and there are other places too (such as one who fell upon a found object—an effective acquisition and an ineffective one); examine this carefully.
If I understand correctly, you are saying that consent to the act of betrothal with an object as the object by which the act of acquisition is performed is sufficient, and value is an additional matter, whose deficiency is something external and unrelated to the essence of the betrothal. But perhaps the reasoning is that one is not betrothed with the object but with the monetary value of the object, because the source of betrothal by something of monetary value is acquisition by money. At least in Rav Yosef’s opinion it is comfortable to say such a thing, and then consenting to the object at a different value is in fact not consenting.
The desire for the ceremony and to be married in the macro sense is not enough, in my humble opinion; there must be consent to the act of betrothal. But I can accept that in Rabbah’s opinion, the value is not the betrothal.
And one can distinguish between betrothal with two things, one of which is fine—a loan and a perutah—and one thing that is not as it should be.
I hope that in a case like the one I mentioned, where she was subsequently betrothed to another man, you would not permit her without a bill of divorce as a stringency if the betrothal was based on an incorrect valuation.
Thank you for the article and mazal tov, but it is possible to judge the decisors more favorably too, even in your view they were not fools.
I would not require any bill of divorce. If she was betrothed on the basis of an incorrect valuation, that is something else, because according to the first formulation, there indeed we require appraisal. That is in the second order. But even there I am doubtful whether I would require a bill of divorce because of the first order.
“Stone, corrected.”
It should indeed have been corrected 😉
In any case, a very fine column that raises a lot of thought about halakhic ruling today!
Even my corrections require correction. Haste comes from Satan 🙂
With God’s help, 26 Elul 5780
From Rabbeinu Tam’s words, “and so the world has the custom,” it appears that this was an old custom which in Rabbeinu Tam’s time was already widespread, and he tries to give it an explanation through the concern that the betrothed woman would think the stone’s value was higher than its true value.
As is the way with ancient customs, there is room to think that the proposed explanation is not necessarily the reason for the original custom. It may be that the custom was to betroth with a simple ring without a precious stone in order to prevent a “trend” that would create wild competition, with everyone wanting to display the honor of his wealth or his love by purchasing the most expensive and dazzling diamond.
To prevent wild competition that would create a spiral of rising ring prices that most people could not withstand—they instituted betrothal with a simple ring, creating a uniform threshold without luxurious and expensive exceptions. This would be similar to the enactment of the sages that the dead be buried in simple garments, to prevent competition that the poor could not afford.
With the blessing of a year of noble simplicity, Shatz
Prof. D. Sperber (Minhagei Yisrael, vol. 4, pp. 143–149) cites a custom that was widespread in Ashkenaz and Italy beginning in the 14th century, of decorated and ornate wedding rings, some of them with a precious stone, on which there was the form of a magnificent house engraved with the words: “Mazal Tov,” and sometimes also a date.
It is clear to Prof. Sperber that these rings could not have served as betrothal rings, since the custom was that the ring should not have a precious stone or engraving. Therefore he conjectures that these rings served as a memorial to the destruction or as engagement rings.
But in my humble opinion this is not necessary, for it may be that after the Rosh wrote of the custom, “it is not clear to me,” Jews in Ashkenaz and Italy began to betroth with ornate and decorated rings and were no longer concerned for the custom, and this requires investigation.
With blessing, Shatz
It seems to me that the discussion in many examples you bring in this article and others does not relate only to a principled dispute about first-order or second-order ruling, but is connected to a prevalent hidden assumption, which you also often bring to the surface: that every new situation, or any change from existing practice, is forbidden until proven otherwise. Under this assumption there is no choice but to examine the entire chain of halakhic ruling in order to discuss the reasoning of the prohibition and see whether there is room to permit. Under the opposite starting assumption, it is easier to approach first-order ruling. Am I mistaken?
Where do first-order principles come from? From the Gemara?
What is special about the Gemara?
Here it seems that even to the Gemara you do not want to cling.
In the Gemara it comes out that an error in the value of the ring invalidates the betrothal, and you claim that she is betrothed because she certainly consented to the betrothal.
Anything is possible, but in the Shulchan Arukh you can see that, from its and the Rema’s perspective, there is a problem with the very validity of the betrothal itself. That is, it is not only about preventing competition.
In any case, if you are right, then that strengthens my point that there is really nothing here on the halakhic level.
What many examples did I bring here? But you are right that I do not accept the assumption you mentioned, and that this is connected to first-order ruling.
These matters were explained at length in the third book of the trilogy. I accept the authority of the Gemara because it is a text with formal authority. Everything after the Gemara has no authority, and therefore I do not see what was written after the Gemara as binding, but at most as a source of inspiration.
That is not what emerges from the Gemara. In the Gemara it comes out that there is no problem at all, because the halakha follows Rabbah. Rabbeinu Tam decided otherwise, so this is Rabbeinu Tam, not the Gemara. Beyond that, even if the Gemara did imply that the woman lacks firm intent, that is a factual determination and not a halakhic one, and therefore there is no obligation whatsoever to cling to it. Facts are determined by observing the reality of our own time. Even if women then did not firmly resolve in their minds, does that mean women in our time also do not firmly resolve in their minds? Must every assessment of reality in the Gemara necessarily be correct in our day too? That is nonsense.
Who decided that the Gemara has formal authority, and where was this decided? Does the Gemara declare somewhere that it has formal authority? And perhaps דווקא the Jerusalem Talmud does. And perhaps דווקא the halakhic or aggadic midrashim. And perhaps the ancient custom of the Land of Israel?
That may perhaps be nonsense. But your position will leave no more than a tiny remnant of halakha. Who decided the laws of doubts? Hazal did not know statistics. Who decided the laws of defects in kosher slaughter? Who decided absorption in utensils? Who decided the interpretation of the Torah—today we have better interpretive tools, so why should we rely on their interpretation? Who decided what a niddah is, based on what medical knowledge? And so on and so on.
With God’s help, 27 Elul 5780
To R. M. A.—greetings,
Rabbeinu Tam raises the halakhic problem that arises in an atmosphere of wild competition over “who will bring the most dazzling diamond ring.” In such an atmosphere, a situation can indeed arise in which a bride who did not receive the most beautiful diamond, the most dazzling “brand,” feels cheated and demeaned.
You simply do not know the mentality of the “high society” of the wealthy, for whom not buying the most dazzling “brand” is an unforgivable insult; fortunate are you that you grew up and lived all your days among select circles of people for whom money, pride, and ostentation were not central in life.
But Rabbeinu Tam was also familiar with the society of the wealthy, and in such a society there is a real concern over the bride’s family’s terrible insult at not having been given the most expensive diamond ring; the dreadful feeling that they were cheated and not given a ring befitting their honor could certainly lead to lack of firm intent in the betrothal.
With the blessing, “May this be a year of noble simplicity,” Shatz
The case discussed by the Rema is well known: a wedding on Friday evening that was delayed until Shabbat began because they could not agree on the ketubah. In our circles this phenomenon is almost unknown. I encountered it in my youth when I came to a wedding that was delayed for hours because the bride’s father refused to give his daughter for less than a million shekels or dollars. For people with a lot of money—money matters a great deal.
With the blessing: may this be a year of true proportion, Shatz
This is an example of a discussion of marginal things (if at all) that turns the means into the end. Without entering into the halakhic pilpulim, it is clear that a woman can be betrothed with any object worth a perutah, and not specifically a ring, just as if a kohen betroths a divorcée (contrary to halakha! with a Torah prohibition!!!), she is nevertheless betrothed, etc. The custom of betrothing with a simple ring developed from the desire to “equalize” the daughters of Israel, so that one would not boast over another. Similar to the daughters of Israel in the vineyards, who wore simple white garments…
To me—greetings,
You did well to mention the custom of the dancing girls, all of whom wore white garments so that there would be no difference between rich and poor. And perhaps that was also the reason for the custom that the groom and bride wear white.
With blessing, Equal White
The public at large decided this. Just as at Mount Sinai there is a possibility of conferring formal authority from below (like Maimonides’ reasoning regarding the renewal of ordination). If you think the Gemara has no such authority—then it does not.
How much of halakha my position leaves is not an important question. The question is what is correct, not what the results of this or that position are.
As for the questions of statistics and absorption, indeed these are facts, and if I discover a factual error then the halakha in question is null and void like the dust of the earth. As for interpretive tools, that is another matter, since because of the formal authority of the Gemara there must be a demonstrable error in order to overturn a talmudic ruling. See, for example, here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A0%D7%9F-%D7%96%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A8-%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%91-%D7%9C%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%93%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%90-%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%91
What here is an example of what? I did not understand a single word from this collection of words in that message. And what I did understand is both nonsense in itself and irrelevant to the discussion by even a hair’s breadth.
You decided that the custom of betrothing with a simple ring is in order to equalize the daughters of Israel. A wonderful proposal, except that it has one small defect: it is not true. Rabbeinu Tam explains his words, and he does not need your pilpulim to explain him. Moreover, in the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema they are concerned that these may not be valid betrothals, and that certainly is not because of a desire to equalize the status of the daughters of Israel. In short, nonsense.
For our purposes, my discussion is on the halakhic plane and not on the plane of cheap scholarly speculations about the roots of customs.
With God’s help, 27 Elul 5780
To R. M. A.—greetings,
A. If you are permitted to disagree with Rabbeinu Tam in his ruling, why are we forbidden to interpret the custom of which he testifies—one that was widespread in his time (and presumably was an ancient custom)—differently from Rabbeinu Tam, and to propose a plausible explanation that the original reason for the custom was to prevent jealousy and wild competition over who would betroth with a more expensive ring?
B. Rabbeinu Tam’s concern that the bride would feel cheated if it became clear that the ring was not as expensive and prestigious as she thought is very understandable against the background of a wealthy “high society” in which money and prestige occupy a decisive place. A bride (or her family) who feels cheated at the most elevated and exciting moment will never forgive the “humiliation.” Think, for example, of a groom who was promised an expensive Pierre Cardin suit and discovered that they gave him an ordinary Bagir suit. Surely his world would collapse…
With blessing, Tzvish the Nouveau Riche
Who said it is forbidden? Health to you.
And this is especially true in the Jewish communities of France and Ashkenaz, whose foundations were wealthy merchants who settled there by special privilege granted by the authorities in order to promote trade, and most of the community was of high socio-economic status.
The troubles of French-Ashkenazi Jewry began in the late 11th century, when Christians too began to enter commerce and compete with them, until the Jews were pushed into moneylending at interest, which only intensified the hatred and persecutions against them. The growing power struggles between the Church and the emperors, and later the rise in status of the Christian burghers, also led to the weakening of the Jews’ status.
With blessing, Shatz
And this Rabbeinu Tam, who lived in the same place and at the same time, did not know? You wrote that you were proposing a different interpretation of the custom from Rabbeinu Tam’s.
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…were pushed into moneylending…
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…and later the rise in status…
Rabbeinu Tam “lived among his people” and knew the society in which he lived, a society of wealthy people that was no different in character from the days of the Talmud and is no different in character today. And the concern that an error in the value of the “betrothal ring” would lead to an explosion and to lack of firm intent in the betrothal is entirely reasonable.
You are the one who lives in a “bubble” of knitted-kippah yeshiva boys in socks and sandals, for whom “the vanities of this world” are not really significant, and therefore Rabbeinu Tam’s concern that an error in evaluating the stone would blow up the betrothal seems strange to you. Get out of the “bubble”! 🙂
With blessing, Shatz
1. I am not speaking about a specific mistake. The whole conceptual framework of the laws of uncertainty—double doubt, presumptions, and the like—that does not contain probabilistic discussion is strange. We would not do it this way today.
2. When did the public decide to accept the Gemara? It seems to me that what we have here is simply custom. And from here there is a basis for the superiority of custom over written halakha.
3. The truth here is really not clear, and you are trying to hold onto it nonetheless by grounding the authority of the Gemara without a source.
A more plausible truth is that halakha is the existing halakhic practice, and that includes later precedents as well.
The consequences of a position are relevant when they lead to unreasonable results; that is an indication of the truth of the position.
The “Corrections” refer to the response “And this is especially true of French and Ashkenazi Jewry,” from which other comments have meanwhile separated it.
1. Simply not true. The conceptual framework is very logical. A legal system today as well does not operate with statistical calculation but with heuristic rules, and that is exactly what halakha does.
2. This is acceptance, not custom. “They accepted it upon themselves” in a court is not a custom but a contract with binding force. And here there is apparently an element beyond contract, but this is not the place to elaborate. From here follows nothing about the superiority of custom. Where did you draw that strange idea from? When there are several legitimate halakhic options, custom has standing.
3. I did not understand. There are clear rules of authority in halakha. There is “you shall not deviate,” and it applies to courts of ordained judges and not to anything after them (except for the Gemara by virtue of “they accepted it upon themselves”).
1. The heuristic rule of double doubt is patently unreasonable. Is there an example of such a rule in a legal system today?
2. Where are you drawing these concepts from—”they accepted it upon themselves”? You want to pull the ground out from under accepted halakha, while preserving the concepts that for some reason are convenient for you, and on that basis construct your halakha.
The idea that halakha is the existing halakhic practice is very natural, and it is not clear to me why you are surprised by it.
3. Nothing is clear if you do not accept prior authority. If I am not bound by the precedents of the Rishonim and of the Gemara, then I can give another interpretation of “you shall not deviate.” Certainly there is no basis at all for the status of the Gemara, and that is why later authorities had to engage in pilpul to explain why we are bound by the words of the Gemara and the Tannaim.
1. Apparently my logic is very different from yours. To me it seems quite a logical rule. Unless you are looking for proof in the statistical sense. But a legal system (not only halakha) does not look for proofs that are necessarily statistical, but for decision rules. And double doubt is an astonishingly natural rule.
I have no idea what happens in other legal systems, but one must remember that they deal with legal and not halakhic questions. There it is much less relevant (in halakha too).
2. I am not drawing these concepts from anywhere. The Torah itself obligates by virtue of “they accepted it upon themselves.” It is a logical reasoning that serves us in other areas too (such as law and society).
3. I have nothing to do with general declarations of this kind.
With God’s help, 4 Tishrei 5781
And besides the tremendous greatness of our master Rishonim and the great decisors in Talmudic analysis—there are two great advantages in their rulings:
A. They lived among their people; difficult halakhic questions and complex Torah laws came before them, and what they ruled came out of deep knowledge and understanding of reality, something sometimes lacking in “study-hall dwellers” who are not experienced in leading a community.
B. The words of the decisors, Rishonim and Acharonim, were published and studied in all the study halls, and discussed deeply by halakhic authorities and judges, and thus passed the rigorous scrutiny of hundreds and thousands of examining eyes, who questioned, analyzed, and debated their words. Thus their acceptance in the Jewish people came through exacting criticism.
Therefore their words require much study, and one should not dismiss them with a straw on a wheat stalk; and as R. Chaim of Volozhin said, “hevei mit’abek” is from the language of “struggle,” meaning there is room to argue and raise difficulties against the ancients, but the argument must be “in the dust of their feet,” out of great humility before their greatness, a humility that brings one to tremendous toil to understand their reasoning.
With blessing, Shatz
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…and one should not dismiss their words with ‘a straw on a wheat stalk’…
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…to argue and raise difficulties against …
And here is another quotation from R. Chaim of Volozhin on this matter:
“Indeed, concerning Torah, of which it is written ‘truth,’ surely our eyes are directed only to the truth… And I have already been warned about this by the mouth of my teacher, the holy one of Israel, our great rabbi, the pious gaon R. Eliyahu, of blessed memory, of Vilna, not to show favoritism in ruling, etc….” [And in the book Aliyot Eliyahu, note 62, this responsum is cited, and it adds here: “not to show favoritism in ruling even to the decisions of our rabbis, the authors of the Shulchan Arukh.” In the printed editions this addition was omitted.]
And see further sources on this matter in my article here: https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%90%D7%95%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%A1%D7%9E%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94
It requires investigation whether the rabbi’s silence = agreement, or whether he simply ignored it because he was not convinced.
One has to take into account the effect of precedents on their surroundings, i.e., if the author wants to render rulings in a halakhic code for most of the public, he will not ignore those who follow prominent decisors. And then it becomes circular, except for those who rely on the Shulchan Arukh, etc. The rabbi should take this into account, because in my humble opinion this is one of the foundation stones of halakhic ruling.
Besides that, I seem to recall that some argue (Soloveitchik or another scholar) that as observance of the commandments weakened, people began looking for the custom (!, not the halakha) in books, and from here came the path of the Chazon Ish and others…
And of course it is clear that this was taken to completely absurd extremes, but it is not certain that moving to first-order reasoning will not create many problems.
And to God and Michi, many blessings on your joy; may you hear only good tidings, and of course—may your wellsprings spread outward, and may you continue to benefit us