A Look at Judaism and Jewish Identity: Part C (Column 338)
In the two previous columns I wondered what could serve as a definition of Judaism (as distinct from Jewishness). In this column I will continue and sharpen the meaning of these two concepts, beginning with methodological preliminaries presented as responses to claims that appeared in the talkbacks to those columns.
An incorrect definition that still holds water
The conclusion I reached is that the only parameter that can serve as a touchstone for Judaism is halakha. Following various comments in the talkbacks, I must reiterate that I am not hinging this on any particular definition or conception of halakha. Anyone who is committed to the halakha given to us at Sinai—whatever, in his view, its interpretations and ramifications may be—can claim he is Jewish. For all I care, he may adhere to an interpretation that halakha obligates him to stand on one foot or to go to church every Wednesday. He may be Conservative or Orthodox, believe in the absolute authority of the Talmud or not, believe in resurrection and individual providence or not—still, his definition of Judaism holds water. In some cases I will argue with his interpretation or position, both theologically and halakhically, yet I will still maintain that he is offering a definition that holds water. In contrast are definitions that do not include halakha (under any interpretation), such as the definitions common among Reform Jews (for whom there is no halakha), which do not hold water.[1] There is a difference between a definition that is (in my view) wrong or disputed and an empty definition that does not hold water.[2]
Thus, for example, I was asked in one talkback what I think of someone who underwent a Conservative conversion. Is he Jewish according to my definition? I do not know what a Conservative conversion includes, or whether they even have a single binding scheme, but let us assume for the sake of discussion that he converted in a way that is invalid according to halakha (as I understand it). I would still argue that according to the Conservatives’ own definition he is Jewish, and I agree that this definition, while in my opinion incorrect, still holds water. We have a real dispute about what conversion is, but that dispute has two sides. In contrast, someone who underwent a Reform conversion is clearly not Jewish. There, I argue, their use of the term “Jew” is not a respectable but mistaken position; it is simply an error and a confusion of concepts. Consider a disagreement (which in fact exists) about whether game theory is part of mathematics. Suppose I think it is not, yet I understand that someone who disagrees with me is offering a definition that holds water (though, in my view, a wrong one). By contrast, a person who uses the word “mathematician” to describe a cobbler is not presenting a defensible but mistaken position. It is a position that does not hold water at all.
The demand that a definition be unique and essential
I will say more (I noted this in a talkback to the previous column): even if there is a characteristic unique to Jews, if that uniqueness is merely accidental (that is, it could have appeared in another group), it still should not enter the definition of the concept “Judaism.” Suppose the entire world were racist except for the Jews. Would anti-racism be a good definition (a touchstone) for Judaism? In my opinion, no—because anti-racism is not essential to Judaism per se. There is nothing preventing other groups from opposing racism; even if, in fact, that were uniquely true of Jews, it would still not place anti-racism within our definition of Judaism. For example, only Jews eat cholent on Shabbat, but eating cholent is not part of the definition of Judaism (contrary to the way people always quote the Baal HaMaor on Perek Kira). I say this even assuming that Judaism indeed fundamentally and decisively opposes racism and was unique in that opposition. The Torah and our tradition also support the trait of humility. Is it reasonable to define Judaism through humility? That is absurd.
In several talkbacks people argued for various traits that are indeed characteristic of Judaism and even unique to it. I repeat: even if both requirements are met (being characteristic and being unique), that still is not enough. For the trait to enter the definition (to be part of the touchstone), it must be essential to Judaism—and to Judaism alone. One indication of essentiality is that it characterizes only Judaism; but that is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition.
Constitutive and targeted definitions
Quite a few respondents argued that there are groups within the Jewish population that define Judaism differently than I do, and who am I to decide who is Jewish and what counts as a definition that holds water?! I must clarify something I only hinted at previously.
In column 108 I showed that there are two kinds of definitions: a constitutive definition and a targeted definition (somewhat akin to the distinction between derash that creates and derash that supports). A constitutive definition “baptizes” a concept—that is, the concept is created by the definition (it constitutes it). In this case there is no point in arguing about the definition, because notions of “true” and “false” do not apply. What we stipulate is, by definition, the concept, and that’s that. It is an arbitrary matter, and in Saul Kripke’s terms, it is fixed by an act of “baptism.” A targeted definition, by contrast, attempts to capture a concept that existed prior to our formulation and conceptualization. Thus, people try to define what mathematics is, what philosophy is, or what poetry is (this is what I addressed in that series of columns). In such cases we are not dealing with an arbitrary constitutive definition. The definition attempts to hit the target of a preexisting concept, and therefore there is room for dispute among different positions about it. In such cases there truly are correct and incorrect definitions. The question under dispute is which definition best captures the content and essence of the concept at issue.
The claims against me mentioned above assume that the discussion about the definition of “Jew” is a constitutive one, and therefore they deny the possibility of arguing about it. Those claimants accept any definition someone proposes as valid simply because someone proposed it and thinks so, and thus they see no room for debate. In their eyes, these are merely different uses of the same linguistic term (expressing different concepts), and no more. I, by contrast, argue that there is a concept “Jew,” and our discussion seeks to capture its essence and core content. Therefore, I do believe there are right and wrong answers here, and there are correct and incorrect definitions. In fact, there are definitions that hold water but are wrong, those that hold water and are correct, and those that do not hold water at all.
From this you will understand that there is no place for the question “who appointed me” to determine the correct definition and who is a Jew. No one appointed me, and I am not decreeing the correct definition. I am stating my view regarding the true content of the concept. I am not arrogating to myself the authority to set the content; I am asserting what that content is—just as no one empowered a physicist to decide that bodies with mass fall to Earth. He is not the one who established the law of gravity; he merely claims that such a law exists and presents its correct description. If someone thinks otherwise, let him present his position with reasons, and we will argue. This is not a question of authority, paternalism, and the like—which all presume that the definitions under discussion (perhaps all definitions) are constitutive and arbitrary.
Descriptive vs. essential definitions
Continuing the above, I will add that I am also not attempting in these columns to describe the prevalent conceptions of the term “Jew.” Even a majority does not decide here, because a majority can be wrong—just as the majority is not necessarily right when defining the concept “mathematics.” The criterion of “following the majority” as a substantive claim[3] implicitly assumes a constitutive definition, and that is not the case. The discussion here is not a sociological-lexical description of how the term “Jew” is used, but an inquiry into the true essence of the concept (and it assumes that such an essence exists). This of course does not mean I am necessarily right; I am presenting a position, and whoever disagrees must also present a reasoned counter-position.[4]
Moreover, one should not infer from this that the essence is fixed and unchangeable. I accept the possibility that a concept can have a dynamic essence—that it may appear in different periods and circumstances in very different forms, yet still be a continuation of the same concept. In such a case one must persuade me that the later manifestation is indeed an authentic continuation of the earlier one—not merely on an ethnic basis (that the later manifestation is held by those defined as Jews according to the earlier definition. See, for example, here). Since the definition is targeted and essential (not constitutive and not descriptive), its use is not arbitrary and requires justification.
Disputes about concepts
I have noted in the past that many of our disputes revolve around the definitions of concepts. The debate over “who is a Jew” is one of the most prominent. But one can also argue about what democracy is, what anthropology is, or what the rules of morality are. Often, in the course of such a dispute, a claim or a sense arises that the matter is merely semantic. You call your concept “Jew,” I’ll call mine “Israeli,” and we will part as friends (what I once called “semantic separation”). Why fight over the right to use a word?!
My claim is that the very existence of a dispute indicates that both sides agree that the concept has real content; they disagree about what that content is (or what its core and essence are). Otherwise it would be a convention—i.e., a constitutive definition—and then there would be no point or possibility of arguing about it (one would simply separate semantically). The dispute over the concept “Jew” testifies that all sides agree on at least one point: that it has some content; that is, it is a targeted, not a constitutive, definition. Sometimes the dispute is about this very issue—whether there is such a definition: one side will say there is and propose it; the other will say “you have no monopoly on _,” meaning that in his view it is a constitutive definition and several different definitions may be proposed (so there is no dispute). To my judgment this is not the state of affairs regarding the concept “Jew.” True, there are sides that use the “you have no monopoly on _” type of argument, but they hide beneath it a concrete proposal—or at least the illusion of one (cf. Inbari and yoga in the previous column).
In this sense, between me and Buchdahl there is no real dispute. We are talking about different concepts and are not arguing about the same one. By contrast, with the Conservatives (under the assumptions above—that they have a different definition of halakha and of conversion) I have a real dispute. We are arguing over the targeted content of the concept “Jew,” or “conversion.” Moreover, even with Rabbi Brandes—who is a wise and learned man (and also a friend of mine)—I seemingly had a sharp dispute regarding conversion (see my article here). He proposed dispensing with acceptance of the commandments in the conversion process (and rightly noted that even in the state conversion apparatus this is done with winks and turning a blind eye), and I wrote an article arguing that acceptance of the commandments is the essence of conversion (and of Judaism). But note that in light of what I have written here, this is not a dispute at all. I explained there that he is essentially proposing conversion to Israeliness instead of standard halakhic conversion to Judaism (he himself does not see it that way), which is a different concept from halakhic conversion. Because there are no halakhic components in that “Judaism,” then even if circumcision and immersion are performed during the process, as long as there is no acceptance of the commandments, this is not Judaism (perhaps Jewishness), and therefore there is no conversion.[5]
Open/complex concepts
Another claim raised in the talkbacks is that the concept “Jew” is flexible and cannot be defined. The punctilious will add that the very existence of such sharp disputes about it is proof of that. I say that the existence of a dispute proves nothing. If indeed we are dealing with a targeted, not a constitutive, definition, then in such a dispute there is a side that is right and a side that is wrong. That’s all. When there is a scientific dispute over quantum theory, does that mean there is no correct answer and that everyone is right? Likewise for any factual dispute. So too for the dispute over the definition of Judaism. When one treats the existence of a dispute as evidence that there is no correct answer, one implicitly assumes a constitutive definition; but as noted, that is not our case. The same happens in disputes over whether G-d exists (see, for example, columns 294, 247, and 53).
So how do such polarized disputes arise on such topics? In some cases, such a dispute indicates that the concept is open and flexible. There are concepts for which it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to offer a sharp definition. In some sense, all the concepts in our everyday language are like that (unlike mathematical concepts—though even there there is room for debate, but this is not the place). Some will declare that if there is no definition, the concept simply does not exist; it is a linguistic fiction not worth discussing. I certainly do not belong to that camp. In my view, many existing concepts (not necessarily in the Platonic sense, but only in the sense that they precede their definitions—which are targeted, not constitutive) are difficult or even impossible to define sharply. I am fully aware that we cannot always offer a clear and sharp definition of our concepts, and I do not see that as a principled problem. We should try to overcome that difficulty, but it is part of life and of the limits of our thought and expression.
But this situation opens the door to intellectual anarchy. People tend to exploit the flexible margins of a concept to claim it has no truly defined content, and therefore no definition; from there they conclude that one can say whatever one wants about it and define it in any way that seems fit (cf. “Inbari” in the previous column). I disagree. To me, this is usually intellectual laziness. Instead of investing the mental effort needed to define or at least clarify the concept, one prefers to flee into the warm embrace of vagueness. Such an argument rests on an unnecessary logical leap (though a very characteristic one in postmodern narrative thinking). There are concepts that precede their definitions (targeted definitions), and yet one cannot find a sharp definition for them. In such cases our task is to clarify them, bring examples, persuade that they can be better understood, and also point out what is not included in them (again, see the previous column). Identifying every open concept as if it were empty of content and purely conventional—that is, as if it were arbitrary and merely descriptive—is a mistake. For example, the concept “democracy” is complex and hard to define exhaustively; no wonder disputes arise about it. Does that mean there is no right and wrong? Are we not obligated to clarify and sharpen it even without a sharp definition, and thereby try to indicate what it includes and what it does not? Although in such disputes the call for semantic separation always arises, I think that is wrong. Even here there is right and wrong and an obligation to reason.
This is why in psychiatric diagnostics (where this is almost always the case)[6] and in medicine (in certain cases), one sometimes uses a complex criterion. For example, there can be a disease with 13 symptoms, and the clinician’s guidance is that a person who has at least five or six is diagnosed with the disease. What does this mean? Apparently the disease cannot be defined and characterized univocally, so a complex definition is proposed. Does that imply there is no real disease? Is it correct to infer that each subset of symptoms refers to a different disease, and we are merely labeling them all with the same name? Obviously not. There is a defined disease and sometimes a defined treatment, but its presentations are complex and vary from person to person (depending on circumstances such as age, environment, general health, and more). A complex definition does not imply an empty concept that can be defined however one likes. A good example of such a concept is “poetry,” and my discussion in the series of columns devoted to it (107–113) revolves around defining complex concepts and the proper methodology for such cases.
Back to Judaism: is it a complex concept?
So too with the concept “Judaism.” Even if it is complex, as some respondents claimed, that does not mean there is no point in discussing its features and definitions and using them to examine what belongs to it and what does not. At most, one might seek a complex characterization or definition like the one described above. This is, however, only a theoretical remark, because, as I argued in the previous columns, in my view the concept “Judaism” is relatively simple: Judaism is a principled commitment to halakha. That’s all. All other traits may be true (and perhaps even unique) and may characterize Jews, but they are not essential.
The definition according to which whoever is committed to keeping halakha is Jewish (this is the Sinai covenant) is the definition in the substantive-religious-value sense. But there is, of course, also “Judaism” in the national sense, which is related to the religious sense but not identical to it. In the national sense of the concept there are certainly various complexities (including dependence on race and ethnicity, types of culture, etc.), and I wish to touch on them and on their relation to the definition I proposed for the religious-value sense of “Judaism.” I will do so through another set of questions that appeared in the talkbacks to the previous columns.
Why does this even matter?
People asked me why such a discussion is important at all. What are its implications (what’s the nafka mina)? I answered there that I never claimed the discussion is important. Whoever is not interested—good for him. There need not be any practical implications (a nafka mina for a woman’s kiddushin). Practical ramifications are not a necessary condition for a discussion to be well-defined or important (contrary to the logical positivist view). But now I must add something important about the relation between facts and values.
Discussions about Jewish identity also take place in the academy, in departments that study political science or the study of religions. Those discussions are descriptive: they attempt to characterize the sociological-historical phenomenon called “Judaism.” There, naturally, one deals with facts (sociological facts), and the starting point is descriptive: characterizing the approaches present “on the ground.”[7] By contrast, there are other discussions of Jewish identity that take place also—and perhaps primarily—in social discourse, opinion writing, and various batei midrash. There one does not engage in descriptive research of the sociological phenomenon called “Judaism.” There, the search is for the targeted definition of the concept, not the constitutive one. Hence, in those debates about the essence of Judaism, factual description does not determine the outcome. Even if there are groups that think this or that, as a participant at the table I am not obliged to accept that their definition is correct or even legitimate. Here there is room for positions and for arguments on their merits—not just for descriptions of approaches extant in the field.
The main difference is that public discussions do not deal only on the factual plane; they are no less interested in values. Those debates proceed in an atmosphere that assumes a Jew ought to behave as a Jew. There is a demand upon people to be Jewish, and therefore all are searching what it means to be Jewish. From here you can understand why people are so offended when told they are not Jewish. Seemingly, that is a neutral factual statement. So even if, in your view, I am wrong and you are indeed Jewish, why are you offended? The offense, the angry claims, and the emotions that often accompany these debates (as with Inbari in the previous column) attest to the value-laden dimension. If someone sees me as not Jewish, then he is saying I am not okay. As noted, the subtext is that this search aims to direct my behavior and values. The goal of these discussions is not merely to present the fruits of empirical-sociological-descriptive research into the concept “Judaism,” but to argue how a Jew ought to behave. Those who define a Jew as someone who opposes racism, and those who define a Jew as someone who supports the State of Israel and serves in the army, or as one who studies Torah and is committed to the commandments—all are making value claims: that this is what one ought to do, and whoever does not is “not Jewish.” It is not merely a descriptive statement; there is some demand in the air—a kind of censure.
The clearest example of this was, of course, Rabbi Shach’s “Rabbits and Pigs” speech (see also my remarks here). Without entering the details, I saw with my own eyes how many of the cynics who mocked the debates over who is a Jew and proclaimed openly that the ancient Jewish tradition and heritage interest them as much as the peel of a garlic were deeply offended when Rabbi Shach dared to say they were not Jewish, or dared to ask in what sense they were Jews. It is worth seeing an instructive example from the last few days of Ben Caspit confronting a question posed by Yinon Magal (I mentioned this in footnote 5 of the previous column). Following those remarks there was an awakening of many people to repent (I personally met several such people, and I also read heated debates in the press and heard them in the media). It turns out the debate over who is a Jew and what Judaism is touches many people deeply, and not only as a nafka mina for a woman’s kiddushin.
Between facts and values
The upshot is that the claim “I am Jewish” or “you are not Jewish” is not perceived among us as a mere description. For many of us it carries a value-laden demand. People assume there is value to “Jewish” behavior, and when you speak of “Judaism” you are speaking of values, not only of facts. As I mentioned above, when there is a dispute, both sides share some common ground. In this case, both sides agree that Judaism is a set of values and not only a description; the dispute is about what that set is. Hence, in the two previous columns my remarks dealt with Judaism in the value sense rather than with factual descriptions of it.
One could feign innocence and claim that the mere continuity of Jewish heritage is itself the value at issue. That is, perhaps Judaism really is not a set of values but a fact (either you are Jewish or you are not), and yet people see value and obligation in continuing the heritage by virtue of being members of this people. A Jew must behave as a Jew—not necessarily because of the lofty value-content of the concept “Judaism,” but because of his duty to continue the heritage of his ancestors (and therefore a Belgian or a Saudi should likewise continue the heritage of their ancestors). According to this proposal, perhaps there is indeed no value definition of the concept “Judaism,” and still it is clear why the debate over who is a Jew carries a value charge.
But that may describe the approach of some participants, and in my opinion it is a negligible minority. The fact is that people search in Jewish heritage for the “right” values (in their eyes). They are not satisfied with empty repetition of our ancestors’ rituals. There may be a difference here between secular Jewish identity (which has completely abandoned rituals) and Reform Jewish identity, which has not abandoned them (indeed, it left only them, alongside a set of liberal-universal values; see in the previous column the continued discussion of “Judaism according to Buchdahl”). But discussions of secular Jewish identity (the overwhelming majority of what takes place in Israel, at least) certainly purport to deal with values, not rituals.[8] Beyond the factual claim that for most people this is not the entire meaning of “Judaism” and its value charge, I claim that, on the merits, this conception is also unreasonable. Why should the fact that I was born Jewish obligate me to behave like Abraham our father? And if Martin Luther (or Martin Luther King) seems more attractive to me, why should I not follow his path? Is it because I was born to a certain people that I must behave in a certain way? This is, to me, an unreasonable value conception on its own terms; and in any case, it is not the prevalent one.
The conclusion is that the concept “Judaism” is value-laden—that is, Judaism is first and foremost a set of values. Beyond and prior to the descriptive discussion of what “Judaism” is, we must conduct the essential discussion about it. That is what I did in the previous columns. But of course Judaism is also a nation, and as such it certainly has factual-descriptive dimensions, not only value-laden ones. Here there is room to ask who is a Jew in the descriptive sense. For that question it is very relevant to look at Jews and Jewish groups as they are, and not only at essential questions (what ought to be done and why). This brings us to Judaism as religion and as nation, and to the relation between the two.
Judaism as religion and as nation
Up to now I have dealt with Judaism as a religion. I assumed it involves some value content, and concluded that this content is nothing other than commitment to halakha. All other values are, at most, ornaments and not part of the core of the concept “Judaism.” But Judaism as a nation is a far more complex and open concept, and here the definitions are much less sharp. There is a connection between Judaism as religion and Judaism as nation, but that connection is not so sharp and clear.
The root of the matter is that the very concept of nation is exceedingly elusive. Not for nothing has it been under heavy assault in recent generations, with many seeing it as a fiction. The Marxists among us claim it is a concept created to advance domination and the exercise of power against other “peoples.” I dealt with this at length in my article on Jewish identity, whose title included the famous line from the poet Amir Gilboa’s “A Poem in the Morning, in the Morning”: “A man suddenly rises in the morning, feels he is a people, and begins to walk.” There I mentioned Shlomo Sand’s book Who Invented the Jewish People? (I cannot help noting again that it is an insult to the intelligence), which argues that the definition of the Jewish nation is very complex, and from this concludes that it is empty: there is no such people. Beyond the foolish conclusion, the underlying intellectual foundation is indeed worthy of discussion. The concept of a nation and its definition are among the most elusive topics in human sociology. Every nation is characterized by many features, and many individuals who compose it do not possess them all. The definition of a nation includes ethnic, cultural, religious, and other components, in different mixes from people to people. The Jewish people is no exception. The claims that there are people who are not members of the Jewish religion but belong to the Jewish nation are, in my view, quite compelling. The Jewish nation is a historical phenomenon, and as such it should be discussed with the tools of sociological-historical research. One should look at those who define themselves as Jews and see what the features of their Jewishness are, and from that distill how this people sees itself. Here—and only here—there is room for all the claims I mentioned above: the diversity of Jewish conceptions and cultures, and the “who made you king to decide” type of argument. In the sociological-factual context, that is, in the discussion of the Jewish nation, I am prepared to accept them. Here a flexible and complex definition of the diagnostic type described above is also appropriate.
Even so, as I wrote above regarding open and complex concepts, we are not exempt here from attempting to offer a definition or features that will clarify the concept. Quite a few intellectually lazy people try to dispose of the issue with circular definitions, such as: a Jew is anyone who defines himself as a Jew. That is, of course, nonsense that says nothing beyond the fact that defining Judaism is a complex task. A definition of a concept should clarify it using other concepts already known to us. A definition cannot make use of the very concept being defined.[9]
It is commonly thought that the Jewish nation is defined on the basis of the Jewish religion. From time immemorial, conversion—a religious act—has also constituted entry into the Jewish nation. Even the secular State of Israel (and many of its secular citizens, contrary to what our universalists try to sell us) recognizes this. Traditionally, the Jewish ethnos was created by the Jewish religion. Whoever joined the latter joined the nation as well. But on the national plane, as distinct from the religious one, there is indeed room to argue that the definition can change. If the Jewish people—once defined on the basis of religion—now chooses to define itself differently, that would be the relevant definition of the Jewish nation. Again, I am not here making a constitutive claim that the concept of nation is arbitrary and everyone defines it as they wish. No. Even if I were a dyed-in-the-wool fascist, even if I believed in the spirit of the nation and its metaphysical-ontic existence, I would still argue that a nation can choose for itself a culture entirely different from that of its forebears and yet remain the same nation. Questions of values and essential content play a lesser role on the national field; they belong to the religious-value plane.
The claim of many Jews today that the definition of the Jewish nation in recent generations has separated from the definition of the Jewish religion seems to me entirely legitimate (though, in my estimation, a large majority of the Jewish public still does not agree). Hence, one can define entry into the Jewish nation (and certainly into the State of Israel, and perhaps into the Israeli nation?) not on the basis of entry into the Jewish religion. Today there are quite a few citizens of the State of Israel who, nationally and culturally, are Jewish in every respect—no different from a typical secular Jew—yet are not part of the Jewish religion (gentiles who did not convert). They speak the Jewish-Hebrew language and slang, eat Jewish foods, consume Jewish culture (and perhaps also study Jewish sources in pluralistic batei midrash), celebrate the holidays in one form or another, and, more generally, there is no cultural difference between them and a secular Israeli Jew. In my view it is very hard to argue that they do not belong to the Jewish nation, even though it is clear that they do not belong to the Jewish religion (because they are not obligated in halakha—unlike a secular Jew, who is obligated). In the accepted definitions of nationhood around the world, they certainly form part of the Jewish nation. Only those who insist on grounding the nation exclusively in religion (as was once the case) do not accept this. But even they will have to admit that such a definition is unique and does not match the accepted notion of nationality. But that is already a dispute that is almost entirely semantic.
Incidentally, a fascinating example of such complexity is Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger. He was born Jewish and at age 14 converted to Christianity. He then climbed the Catholic hierarchy until he became the highly influential and popular archbishop of Paris—one of the most important positions in the Church in France and in the Catholic world. Lustiger defined himself as Jewish in the ethnic-national sense, spoke Hebrew and Yiddish, and never disavowed his Jewish origins. Moreover, after his death his Jewish cousin recited Kaddish at his grave and said this was at Lustiger’s own request. But his religion, of course, was Catholic (a Jew of the religion of Jesus). Furthermore, he claimed that this was the fulfillment of his Judaism (that is, he claimed to be Jewish also in the religious sense, not only the ethnic-national one). Ironically, from what I wrote above it follows that his definition of Judaism (as committed to the Christian religion) holds water, even though I disagree with it—certainly more than those who try to argue for a purely secular or purely ritual Judaism. Of course, on the national plane it is difficult to accept his words, whereas the secular claim (regarding belonging to the Jewish nation) is certainly plausible.
Summary
Returning to our discussion: the claims that the concept “Judaism” is complex, that there are different conceptions of it, and that I have no monopoly, etc., are apparently dealing with Judaism as nation and culture, not with Judaism as religion and value framework. On the religious-value plane the picture is rather simple: Judaism means commitment to halakha.
In the next column I will turn to Ehud Luz’s book (see the beginning of the column before last), which attempts nevertheless to connect the national and religious planes and to create a secular Judaism that would be a continuation of the Judaism of previous generations. He ties those two planes together, and we now have the tools to examine his claims critically.
[1] Of course, one can offer clever arguments, such as: if someone says that in his view halakha obligates standing on one foot every even-numbered day, or going to the beach every morning, would that also be a definition of Judaism? My answer is twofold:
- I am not dealing with sophistries. No one actually believes such things. By contrast, there are very many who sincerely believe, like Buchdahl and her like-minded colleagues, that Judaism is defined on the basis of values without halakha. Do not forget that my claim is also directed at many Orthodox and traditionalists who think that Judaism is defined on the basis of values in addition to halakha. As noted, I disagree with both of these positions, and they are indeed widespread (in my estimation this is the view of the overwhelming majority of the Jewish public in all its shades).
- If there is someone who truly and sincerely believes an interpretation according to which the commands we received at Sinai imply an obligation to stand on one foot or go to the beach (not as a mere clever quip, but from an actual interpretation of our sources and of that thesis in general), then yes—this too would be a definition of Judaism that holds water. I, of course, would not agree with it, but it would still fall within the framework I have described here.
[2] For a similar distinction between what is wrong and what is illegitimate, see my article on tolerance.
[3] The claim that one must adopt the majority view can come from two different directions: (a) the majority is an indication of proximity to truth (the majority is right, as in a court), as in columns 69, 79, and many more; (b) in column 66 I discussed situations where the majority decides (even if it is not right, as in a democratic majority). Questions of the first sort deal with facts and truth, and there the majority has no substantive standing (unless one believes the majority view is closer to truth). Questions of the second sort are constitutive: the majority is “right” by definition (because it decides).
[4] There is a strange tendency in today’s discourse (a sad influence of postmodernism) to brand anyone who presents a position as necessarily paternalistic (“who made him king,” “he has no monopoly,” “he has no authority to disqualify others,” etc.). All these claims are based on mere confusion—or testify that the speaker has run out of substantive arguments.
[5] On the practical plane I agree with him entirely. Since, in my view, religion and state must be separated, I definitely support having the law recognize a civil “conversion” that contains Jewish components, instead of requiring a religious conversion. I just am not prepared to see it as a substitute for halakhic conversion, and such a “convert” is not Jewish in my eyes.
[6] See, for example, here on diagnosing clinical depression, and many other places.
[7] And by their lights it is also justified to view this search as a pursuit of a constitutive, descriptive definition. From the researcher’s standpoint it is very reasonable to take what people regard as Judaism and assume that that is Judaism, and from there to offer a definition. See, for example, here and elsewhere on the site.
[8] Even rituals such as the offering of first fruits on a kibbutz were not perceived there as exhausting their Jewish identity, but as one expression of it.
[9] One criterion for a good definition—and why a circular definition is not good—is this: if we take the definition and change the word that names the concept being defined, nothing in our understanding of the concept should change. For example: a triangle is a shape with three sides, each pair of which meets at a common vertex. If I call that triangle X, nothing changes. I thoroughly understand the concept, and only afterwards will I be told that the Hebrew word for it is “meshulash” (triangle). So too, the definition of a Jew should be intelligible even if we call a Jew “X.” Now consider the definition: a Jew is one who defines himself as a Jew. Replace “Jew” with “X,” and we get: X is one who defines himself as X. Does that give you any understanding of the concept “Jew”? See here, section C.
Discussion
There are opinions that something done on Shabbat inadvertently is permitted, and according to that view there is of course no problem with something done by a secular person. According to the views that something done inadvertently on Shabbat is forbidden, I am uncertain whether one can permit something done on Shabbat by a secular person. In general, there may even be reason to be stricter with a secular person, because there is more concern that one may come to tell him to do it (that is one of the reasons for the prohibition of ma’aseh Shabbat).
As for someone who follows the position that this act is permitted, reason suggests that there should be no prohibition here at all according to either approach. True, there is a concern that you may come to tell him to do it (since according to his position it is permitted), but it seems that when the act is not a transgression they did not decree against it.
Hello Rabbi,
I do not believe in God, and this matters to me. In my view it is a value that people should not waste their time on this nonsense.
Therefore I fight for the Jewish state, which belongs to my nation, and I try to show everyone that the Sinai covenant is bogus. It is important to me that Jews become enlightened atheists like me.
Ideologically I am in favor of as many people as possible driving on Shabbat.
I try to prove my point from the instruction of the Bible and by breaking it down into its components, and from astrological sayings, and I show how pagan their words are. About today’s rabbis and their stupidity, I need not say much.
For my purposes I will use Hebrew and Yiddish literature for pedagogical and demagogic purposes.
Would I not be considered Jewish in your eyes?
The words of Hazal, for pedagogical purposes.
On this occasion, if the rabbi could ask God to destroy Google’s autocorrect, I would be very grateful.
Does the rabbi’s definition of “Judaism” also apply to First Temple Judaism?
(Most of the Kingdom of Judah and the entire Kingdom of Israel practiced idolatry, although of course the term “Judaism” had not yet been invented.)
Look at the second line, the distinction between Judaism and Jewishness
If I understand correctly, then studying Genesis, and in general a considerable part of the Torah, is not the study of Judaism? That sounds absurd. The fact that people’s hands have had their way with the Written Torah does not mean that these studies are not studies of Judaism.
What is “Jewishness”? (second line)
The rabbi spoke about this in the previous column (337)
A Jew is someone who believes in Moses our teacher as the one and only leader of the people of Israel.
Halakhah is the result of the sin of the Golden Calf and the breaking of the first tablets, and should not be seen as an essential principle but as a kind of remedy.
I liked the Zion column very much. Two comments.
1. Regarding the issue of Judaism as a nation and the connection between Judaism as a nation, which is first and foremost subordinate to the religious definition: as you said, at least in the State of Israel most of the public does not accept the separation. Certainly not the public called “traditionalists.” And in my opinion also most secular people. Although they have (as a generalization)
no connection to religion, they would still define who is a Jew according to how halakhah defines him. And there is also the issue of immigrants who are not Jews, who perhaps according to national-ethnic definitions could be considered part of the Jewish nation.
It is not for nothing that those immigrants feel the need to undergo conversion. That is because for most people (also from personal encounters with some of these people), the partner who is completely secular, or that partner’s mother—even if he eats non-kosher food, desecrates Shabbat, has relations with menstruant women, and in some cases is a complete heretic—still raises an eyebrow and feels the need to receive confirmation from the highest possible religious authority that his partner, his children, and his children’s children after him will be considered Jews in the religious sense. In my opinion this is another point illustrating that the attempt at secularization and at creating an original Jewish ethnic-cultural framework that is not connected to religious commandments or religious obligations has not succeeded—certainly not completely.
2. I’ll approach this from another angle based on my experience. People who talk so much about secular Judaism and secular national obligation often inflate simple statements, completely simple statements, entirely understandable ones, into whole articles and books. Prominent examples of this genre are people like Yaakov Malkin and Menachem Froman. I once tried to go through their books (“The Secular Way” and “What Secular Jews Believe*”). And all that was there was either an attempt to say: I want my children and me to live like any normal person in Canada or Denmark, but with the consciousness that we supposedly draw our humanism from Jewish writings (and in order to honor Grandpa’s or Great-grandpa’s home we’ll also light a candle and have a sufganiyah), or because a Jew happened to write them. Or claims in the style of: Einstein and Freud were also enlightened Jews! You see that it’s possible?
Statements that in themselves contain nothing bad. Most likely, if I were an atheist Jew, I too would feel some desire and some moral commitment to defending the continuity of Jewish genetics in the world, and perhaps also some affection for texts that my forefathers practiced. But trying to turn such statements into something deep, cultural, and immensely unique—a real wonder phenomenon—is ridiculous and sad. It mainly shows that once again there really is no clear positive-unique definition or content that Jewish humanists/liberals/secularists can provide. Not because the Jewish people are a fiction or some other ridiculous nonsense, but simply because historically, until not long ago, what shaped the Jewish people (both in terms of conditions for entry and being in the club, and in terms of “culture”) was halakhah and religious obligation.
Ben,
I didn’t understand this silly pilpul. If you do not believe in God and His commandments, then you are not in the game. So you think and want and believe all sorts of other things—so what? Good for you. What does that have to do with our discussion?
The one that exists, or the one that doesn’t?
What does that have to do with it? Even today most of us fail in gossip and neglect of Torah study.
I elaborated on this in the second book of the trilogy, and quite a few columns and responsa on the site were devoted to it, and this is not the place for it.
1. All the columns are from Zion. I live in Lod. 🙂
I have no disagreement with you about the reality.
2. Completely agree. See the fourth column (the next one).
I think there is an escalation from what I had understood until now. Up to these columns (I admit I have never read the books, but I have read many columns on the site), I understood the rabbi’s view to be that one can hardly learn anything from the Written Torah, that a person brings his prior views into the learning, etc. Now, if I understand correctly, there is an escalation: someone who reads Genesis on the night of Shavuot and, to his sorrow, does try to understand, is not defined (within the elusive definition, but you yourself admitted that it occupies many people) as studying Judaism. And especially a rabbi (particularly if he is one of the rabbis of Eli) who expounds on Genesis in the synagogue is not giving a Jewish sermon, since that is the context of the first column in the series. I think in general that the idea that one cannot learn the Written Torah ultimately leads to the absurd conclusion that someone reading Genesis is not studying Judaism—and therefore perhaps there is an error in the basic assumption.
If I understood you correctly, you are trying to separate among three questions:
“Who is a Jew?” – a descendant of Jacob our patriarch through the mother + converts and their descendants = someone obligated in the commandments.
“What is Jewishness?” – the history, culture, language, foods, customs, and traits of the Jews (“form” and not “content”).
“What is Judaism?” – a collection of factual and normative claims (a worldview, “content” and not “form”), which in your opinion boils down to the obligation to observe halakhah.
(By the way, ostensibly there is nothing to prevent a complete gentile in the personal sense from being Jewish in the cultural sense or from believing in Judaism in the ideological sense, even if he himself is not obligated in the commandments.)
What I did not understand, however, is why in your view the definition of Judaism includes only things that are unique to it, and not things that it shares with other faiths. Is the prohibition against eating pork not a Jewish value because it also exists in Islam? Ostensibly it is a Jewish value and also a Muslim value, and the two are not at all contradictory. And what about belief in the existence of the revelation at Mount Sinai? Does the fact that other religions also believe in it deprive it of being a Jewish principle of faith?
On second thought, perhaps one should distinguish between a “definition” that comes to distinguish a given entity from others, and a “description” of the entity itself. If I need to define so-and-so, a good definition would be “a person with a triangular birthmark under his right shoulder,” because that definition is unique to him and distinguishes him from everyone else. But clearly that definition is very superficial and not at all essential to him. A much more essential description would be: “a Jew, father of twins, bus driver, science-fiction enthusiast.” Even if each of these characteristics is shared by many people, and perhaps there are even several people who share them all, that does not prevent them from being an essential description of that person. Accordingly, universal morality, or family values, or various theological principles can certainly be Jewish values. The only exception is someone who believes only in universal morality and the like and nothing additional or unique. Such a person simply believes in universal morality, and there is no point in calling it by a special name like “Judaism.”
You claim that as long as an incorrect claim is coherent, you accept it.
Therefore a Conservative conversion, which you claim is coherent, counts as a conversion, and the Conservative convert would be considered Jewish in your eyes.
Does it seem to you that a person’s conception of what a doctorate is—not according to the rules known to you for defining a doctorate—as long as it is coherent, that person would be considered a doctor?! It seems that there you would say that theoretically yes, except that no definition would be coherent. What counts as coherent is the heart of the dispute; that is, who determines the parameter for a claim to count as coherent.
The answer is simple: what was accepted, and whoever innovates must bring proof. And if you insist and want to change the rules for who is a doctor, tafaddal, just don’t force me to treat your university doctor as a doctor. Likewise with Judaism: Judaism is a concept whose source is in the Torah, and it and it alone defines who is a Jew, and it defined a Jew as someone born to a Jewish mother, and Judaism is anything done because of God’s will delivered to us at Sinai, and according to the rules transmitted to us by tradition about how to learn this book. Moses received the Torah from Sinai and transmitted it to Joshua, etc.
And therefore, sadly, Ben Caspit is a Jew, and dear Bukhdal apparently remains Asian forever.
B. You referred to the issue of Conservative conversion (of course you preferred to reply to Rational, who copied his question from me, but that’s okay, you’re not autistic). And again it seems that your conceptions of what halakhah is involve a certain patronizing attitude, that only what seems halakhic to you is what holds water. From the Reform perspective it is like an explicit halakhah in the Shulchan Arukh that one must adapt the religious spirit to the times and to the accepted populist morality. Why is that not a halakhic interpretation? How is that different from the teddy-bear parable in summer?
C. As for nationhood: indeed, a nationality is nothing but patriotism, unlike Judaism—and perhaps unlike the seven nations as is conspicuous among our Arab cousins. A Frenchman who takes citizenship in the United States will become an American, until after a few generations nothing at all of his French origin will be remembered. The only ones who remain by their name no matter where they are and how many generations pass are the Jews, and unfortunately also the Arabs (there is no need to mention those whose appearance proves their origin, such as African Americans and the like).
And just a question out of curiosity: is the commenter named Ben Caspit really him? Or someone using his name? Because he whines like a hurt baby. Reminds me of the whining after the rabbit speech. (Which I also mentioned and got scorn from you for, but I forgave. . ).
The problem is that it’s a bit hard to check who is like a Reform Jew (holds that he is not bound by halakhah) and who is like a Conservative Jew (interprets halakhah in one way or another). In your opinion, how should secular people today be defined, or is it an individual matter?
Michi,
Great column. I agree with most of the analysis and with the methodological comments. As a fully secular person (at least in lifestyle), I very much remember my embarrassment at my secular brothers’ “offended” reactions to Rabbi Shach’s speech. A serious disgrace for those secularists.
And yet you yourself evade the elephant in the room—“the Jews’ gold,” which Shnerb spoke about.
Every principled philosophical discussion is grounded in this point, and any denial of it is, in my opinion, willful blindness.
Could one perhaps suggest, based on your words, an expanded definition of what Jewish thought is? I would define it as any thought that either justifies the observance of halakhah or whose center is the observance of halakhah is Jewish thought. Thus I include many parts of the study of the Guide for the Perplexed, and likewise the Zohar and the Kuzari, as Jewish thought. These are Jewish thoughts because either they come to justify the observance of halakhah, even if they are very different kinds of thought, or they come to give reasons for the commandments, and thus halakhah is central to them, whether those reasons are metaphysical, human, or process-oriented. That is, dealing with the question of the unity of God, for example, or with political science in the Guide for the Perplexed, can be both a general discussion and not necessarily a Jewish one, and also a Jewish discussion if the goal of the learner and teacher is to justify or explain observance of halakhah. The same applies to rabbinic midrashim, Hasidism, etc., which ostensibly come to teach something general or something for their time—psychological, scientific, historical—if their purpose in the end is to justify or explain halakhah (not in terms of human motivation but on the intellectual level), these are still Jewish thoughts. It follows that the same discussion can be considered Jewish or general according to its purpose or what lies at its base.
I still do not fully understand the claim.
The ‘Jewish religion’ also has demands in the context of the ‘Jewish nation.’ You can argue: ‘There is no essential connection between the Jewish religion and the Jewish nation, only there is a halakhic requirement to marry (and to have relations?) only with people obligated in the Jewish religion, in the sense that they were either born to a Jewish mother or converted according to halakhah.’ But is it not simpler to argue that the ‘Jewish religion’ also contains within it a (deliberate) definition of ‘Jewish nationhood,’ and therefore that the ‘Jewish religion’ also contains a dimension of ethnic identity (fluid and complex, since one can join it also from another ethnos)?
That is: you devoted the column to the constitutive definition of Jewish national identity, and even emphasized that there is indeed such a constitutive definition. But does this negate the possibility that alongside this there is also an intentional definition, and that it is directly connected to the Jewish religion, and perhaps even constitutes an important and central component in it?
This returns to my criticism (which I did not fully understand your answer to) from the previous column.
Happy festival!
Nothing to be done. One has to read before raising objections.
I wrote several times that I am engaged in searching for a criterion, not just characteristics. I think that was explained quite well.
Read my words again. As usual, you quote things I did not say and that never entered my mind.
The diagnostic question is not my concern here. As far as I’m concerned, what the person says is what determines it. I do not delve into the secrets of his heart. There are secular people who believe in everything and do not observe. There are secular people who do not believe. Neither behave as Jews, and both are obligated in the commandments. For our purposes there is no difference between them. Only regarding the question of how much they are offenders from a halakhic perspective is there a difference. The traditionalist or secular person who does not observe is of course much more of an offender than the atheist.
And you continue to ignore what I answered you. The gold in the room is not relevant to the discussion at all.
That is an interesting definition, and I hadn’t thought of it. But when one examines it deeply, one discovers that it contains almost nothing. Reasons for the commandments are not the reason for keeping the commandments, and therefore they are not important for halakhah. Perhaps this is important for understanding what I am doing, but that is already a somewhat overbroad definition in my opinion. Ultimately, almost all such reasons are universal values, and if not—then they usually will not constitute reasons. So in the bottom line, still very few questions or claims can enter the definition you proposed.
Unfortunately I do not understand the question.
Could you provide a reference to the light/responsum?
The fact that reasons for the commandments are not necessary for observing halakhah does not make them unimportant to one who follows the path of halakhah. And the very fact that a great many rabbinic thinkers dealt with this, in my opinion, shows that there is substance to this expanded definition. In addition, this is also a uniquely Jewish occupation.
In my opinion you hold a completely confused position. The gold (meta-halakhah) is highly relevant, even according to your own method about the “tiles” (halakhah itself). For you keep making meta-halakhic claims such as “the essence of Judaism is halakhah.” Indeed, according to your own method there is great normative justification for holding this meta-halakhic position.
Put more pictorially, faithful to this image: more important than the gold in Judaism, and more important than the tiles covering it, is what is written on them.
I wanted therefore to inform you that I followed the findings of an archaeological expedition that examined this very matter (among its members, of course, were you as well—you simply forgot this..).
On the tiles it was written in the following language:
“There is no gold here.”
And therefore even a discussion of universal values can be Jewish, if its purpose is to explain or justify observance of the commandments
If one compares, for example, to columns 134/5, one sees exactly the escalation. From treating Bible study as boring, unclear, holy in some inherent sense but not clear—now it has become something that is not Judaism at all, and there is no difference between someone expounding it in a synagogue and a sermon in a church.
It is enough to read the columns here. I wrote that it does not define Judaism (a criterion), because the content is universal. At the end I also spoke about Torah in the subject and in the object. The full elaboration is in the second book of the trilogy in the chapter on Torah study.
Whether it is important or not is a matter of taste. It has no practical significance and also adds nothing new. At most it connects a universal value to some commandment (and even that is usually sheer speculation). So what was added? That one should be humble or help others? I knew that before too. I am supposed to keep the commandment even without that (in fact, we do not derive the reason of the verse). So what value is there in this?
See above
A. Everything I said was in the context of the discussion of the “intentional definition” of the concept of Judaism. My arguments are that, judging from a great deal of Jewish thought, much of it is justification and explanation of the commandments. Nothing I argued concerned the value of this occupation, but rather the fact that Judaism deals with it. In addition, this is a unique occupation of Judaism, because it deals with commandments that are unique to Judaism. That is, my expanded definition answers both requirements of an “intentional definition”: 1. Judaism deals with it a great deal, that is, many writings of rabbinic thinkers deal with it; 2. This occupation is unique to rabbinic Jewish thought.
B. If you ask what I find in this occupation, my answer is that in my opinion the main thing is to walk in God’s ways. That is, studying what God’s ways are, and knowing how the commandments bring us closer to the goal of walking in His ways, is in my view itself a commandment.
As I said, that is an interesting claim. But a few comments: 1. Reasons for the commandments deal with Scripture, and as such Christians too can engage in them. 2. I also do not think this is a significant part of the occupation of Jewish thought. 3. Everything I wrote above. 4. As long as this is connected to halakhah and to our religious obligation, it can be essentially Jewish. But it is not essentially different from what I wrote.
But I am willing to accept that there is such a worthless field of occupation that is essentially Jewish.
Do you think that a transgression by a secular person nowadays is defined as inadvertent? That sounds strange to me, because at least in the secular society around me there is great awareness.
Absolutely not. In my opinion it is less than coercion. At least when מדובר in an atheist. See my article on causing a secular person to sin.
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94
Knowledge is not what matters here, but rather awareness that he is obligated (and not that I think he is obligated).
“From the Reform perspective it is like an explicit halakhah in the Shulchan Arukh that one must adapt the religious spirit to the times,”
I think this is where your mistake lies regarding the Reform. By and large they do not believe in Torah from Heaven at all, but rather in “Heaven in the Torah”—that is, that the Bible had divine inspiration and some unique historical role (what divine inspiration without revelation means, and what historical role means, is a huge pilpul that the early Reform thinkers dealt with. I’m saying in advance: don’t ask me what these words mean)—but in any case the point is that the Reform are not obligated at all to any halakhah or divine command. In their consciousness the concept of religious or halakhic obligation simply does not exist, certainly not obligation to the Oral Torah.
They do indeed derive their determination that a Jew ought to behave according to modern, accepted, evolving morality (and also to excel and be the most moral in every field)
from this or that verse in the Bible. But at most this is simply a different biblical interpretation, similar to Muslim and Christian interpretation, whose function is to create an internal dynamic that allows them to hold onto the idea of a “natural universal religion” in Jewish garb (in cases where they believe in God; some rabbis there are declared atheists or declare that God is irrelevant).
Therefore I think it is clear why Conservatives, who are indeed obligated to some kind of halakhah, even if their interpretation is completely mistaken, can be considered part of the game, whereas Reform, who are not obligated at all to the Oral Torah or the Written Torah (except at best to a certain very progressive interpretation of the Written Torah), cannot be considered part of the game. Because the criterion for Judaism is halakhic obligation to the Oral Torah and acceptance of its authority. Commitment to one interpretation or another of the Bible you can also find in groups of people who believe in aliens inspired by the Bible, and I still assume and hope that you would not define any person attached to such groups as Jewish (even if they declare themselves Jews)
By the way, in my humble opinion, even to define a Conservative convert of the left-wing type who observes halakhah according to a very liberal interpretation (for example, permitting certain sexual relations with a man or driving on Shabbat in order to get to synagogue—even if he acts according to his rabbi’s interpretation, and even if his rabbi really tried to arrive at the correct halakhic interpretation) would be an incorrect definition. In my view he is not Jewish, but at most a God-fearing gentile. In the previous post where I wrote this as a response to your comment, I did not “copy the question from you,” but rather presented a position related to your question.
Hello again, Rational. First of all I’ll say that it’s all in good humor, and on the contrary I’d be happy for you to bring things in my name with cosmetic additions, so that my words will receive an answer . .
Regarding the Reform, I am not well versed in their doctrine, and perhaps you are right. I simply saw that Bukhdal the Reform rabbi has so far gotten three columns, whereas if you, for example, were to argue about a famous concept—as I gave as an example the matter of academic ranks—you would apparently not merit any relation beyond the relation a common annoying fly gets.
As far as I am concerned, the Conservative and the rest of the vegetables, too, like Ben Caspit and Inbari, should not get any more regard than that same fly. The very fact that people address and discuss their arguments from outside about what Judaism is grants them legitimacy, and they thereby become a side in “these and those are the words of the living God.” If university concepts were open to dispute by every leper and outcast, and they would discuss the doctrine of every barking mute, I would have kept quiet.
One additional and final point: suppose you reached the conclusion that only halakhah determines it, and someone else reached the conclusion that specifically Jewish folklore—hraimeh and gefilte fish—determines it. Who says he is not right? Suppose indeed that a gentile too can eat gefilte fish—so what?! If a person beheads someone else, would we say that ISIS also beheads people?! Clearly such a thing is less a defining essence and more a behavioral category—but who said there is anything beyond gefilte? Ask dear Mrs. Bukhdal.
1. Is there a difference between what you said and the statement that a Jew is someone whom halakhah determines is a Jew? (According to you, a secular Jew is Jewish because halakhah determines that he is obligated by it; it is easier to say that he is Jewish because halakhah determines so.)
2.
A. One can define a Jew as someone who performs Jewish rituals and uses Jewish books and cultural contexts, provided that he be committed—that is, that he not be some isolated Jew all of whose ancestors and descendants are French—since Judaism is a historical phenomenon, and therefore belonging to it must have a historical context.
(B. One can also understand the halakhic definition of a Jew this way—either a son of a Jewish mother, because the mother raises the child and usually the child will receive his mother’s culture, or someone who converted and accepted the commandments upon himself, in which case we assume he will assimilate into Judaism, or a person who is the end of a historical chain of people with Jewish culture, or a person for whom there is reason to assume he is the beginning of such a chain—where by Jewish culture I mean what was described in A.)
C. It seems to me that this is the dispute between Kobi Arieli and Assaf Inbari, when Arieli says that the use of Jewish texts and an unmistakably gentile language is not Jewish. That is, in his opinion the Jewish cultural context is broader than books and includes the smell of cholent (a certain language, a certain mode of thought, a higher degree of commitment—though not full—to observance of commandments). By contrast, Inbari thinks that the new language can enter and create a new Jewish culture that will be unique to Jews and will use Jewish tools like festivals and books and so on, as he claims happened in the period of Hazal.
P.S. Above there is a comment by Ben Caspit—it seems to me really unfair to use someone else’s name, and perhaps it should be deleted.
Interesting. Thanks!
Judaism, or ioudaismos, is originally a Hellenistic term that came to denote the cultural identity of the Jews, and which many generations later was used by the founders of the “Science of Judaism” as a synonym for the people of Israel or for the Torah. Just as the Torah is “longer than the earth in measure, and broader than the sea,” so the uniqueness of Israel as a whole transcends any restrictive definition.
The midrash says: “‘The fruit of a beautiful tree’—these are Israel. Just as the etrog has taste and fragrance, so Israel include people who have Torah and good deeds. ‘Branches of palm trees’—these are Israel. Just as the palm has taste but no fragrance, so Israel include people who have Torah but no good deeds. ‘Boughs of leafy trees’—these are Israel. Just as the myrtle has fragrance but no taste, so Israel include people who have good deeds but no Torah. ‘Willows of the brook’—these are Israel. Just as the willow has neither taste nor fragrance, so Israel include people who have neither Torah nor good deeds. And what does the Holy One, blessed be He, do with them? It is impossible to destroy them. Rather, says the Holy One, blessed be He: let them all be bound together in one bundle, and they will atone for one another. And if you do so, at that moment I am exalted, as it is said: ‘He who builds His upper chambers in the heavens…’”
1. What I said is something else. I claimed that other definitions do not hold water. That I think they are incorrect is obvious.
2. I did not understand what “committed to rituals” means. Not committed to halakhah? And what does this have to do with his children?
(I think it is clear to everyone that this is not the real Ben Caspit. People here occasionally take the nicknames of well-known personalities.)
Thanks for the reply.
1. I meant to ask whether there is a difference between defining a Jew as someone obligated in halakhah and defining a Jew as someone whom halakhah determines is a Jew.
2. I define Jewishness as Jewish culture, meaning a connection to a certain type of rituals, texts, behaviors, mode of thought, language, and so on; and a Jew as ‘a person who is part of a phenomenon of ongoing Jewishness.’ It seems to me that whether this is right or not, it is a valid definition.
The logic behind this definition is that when one wants to associate a person with a historical phenomenon, one cannot measure only him separately. Just as if a defective child is born who does not meet basic definitions of humanity, he would be considered an exceptional instance of a human, and if an intelligent, hairless monkey were born it would be considered a clever monkey and not a human—so too a Frenchman who behaves like a Jew is a strange instance of Frenchness, unless he has truly become Jewish—and that is measured by a change in continuity (as opposed to a discrete point), for example if it is likely that his children too will be Jews. (By ‘committed’ I meant to say that if his children will not be Jews, then probably he too was not really connected to Jewish culture, but there is no need to go that far.)
This definition fits the intuitive sense that there is content in Judaism that is not only obligation to halakhah (traditionalists, for example, are perceived as more Jewish than secularists, and not only because of their very partial observance of commandments).
1. What is the difference? Whoever halakhah defines as a Jew is obligated in the commandments.
2. This is an unclear mixture of the national-cultural definition and the religious-value definition.
Hello Rabbi,
The distinction between Judaism as a religion and Judaism as nationality/culture/identity (which you defined as “Jewishness,” if I understood correctly) seems to me to remove much of the sting from the argument about secular Judaism. From what I read, hear, and understand from conversations, secular Judaism does not claim to be part of the service of God, but rather sees Judaism and engagement with it as a significant component of identity—just as family and community can be significant components of identity without commitment to a specific norm. They call it Judaism, and you call it Jewishness. Fine. We can part as friends as long as it is clear what we are talking about. The argument then narrows to the claim that there is a non-halakhic but uniquely Jewish way to serve God (incidentally, isn’t “a transgression for its own sake” exactly that?).
I get the impression that some of the speakers in the debate who purport to represent Judaism as a religion (Kobi Arieli and Yinon Magal, for example, whom you mentioned) are claiming, at least implicitly, a broader claim, according to which Judaism also defines and constitutes the criterion for Jewishness. Therefore, an important question in my view, regarding the various circles of identity of the communities making up the Jewish nation, is the content of “Jewishness” and its relation to “Judaism.” In my view this is the field on which the non-religious batei midrash focus.
A question about the definition itself: if I understood you correctly, then Judaism is the norm that obligates the Jews, as they are defined by that same norm. Is there not here a circular definition in which halakhah plays a double role, as both defining and defined?
Thank you, and happy holiday.
More power to you for the column, thank you very much!
(I must say I was really surprised; I did not believe the rabbi would devote three columns, and perhaps more, in order to convince us once again that there is no such thing as Jewish thought.)
I have two central questions regarding the principled discussion of defining concepts:
A. It is hard for me to understand, for example, what the meaning is of the argument over what democracy is. As if there were some scriptural decree that a state must run a democratic regime, and we are trying to investigate what that regime is. In fact, at a certain point in history people reached the reasonable conclusion that the people are entitled to take part in decisions made by the government that affect them, and that this is proper, and the question is how best to realize this in the face of other requirements that exist. In practice there may be a dispute over what the proper system of government is, but I don’t think anyone is trying to understand what the person who first coined the concept intended. In my opinion the concept of democracy does not really exist, despite the fact that people argue about it (what you called semantic separation). A dispute over a concept can exist, perhaps, only in a world of authority. As I see it, that is the only way to prevent semantic separation. (Authority = a kind of monopoly over the matter).
B. How exactly do we define a concept (assuming we have overcome the hurdle of intellectual laziness)? We collect the known instances of the concept and try to find their narrowest common denominator. But wait—what are the known instances of the concept? Doesn’t the rabbi think that in many cases this point is the root of the dispute?
In this context I must mention something nice I heard from Rabbi Gopin in the past. He claimed that real Mitnagdim no longer exist today; today everyone is Hasidic. In the past, if you asked a Mitnaged what the difference is between a gentile and a Jew, he would answer: a gentile does not impart impurity in a tent and does not obligate his brother’s wife in levirate marriage. Today they would say all kinds of things about a superior soul, etc.
How would the rabbi deal with separating the definition of nationhood from the definition of values in a discussion of the value—intermarriage?
After countless arguments with left-wing secular people, you finally pushed me to look from their point of view. For us believers, it is easy to see Jewish history as a history of faith or commitment to Torah and halakhah. A secular person who thinks all this is nonsense looks back at his ancestors and what distinguishes his people in his eyes is persecution, and therefore non-aggressiveness. The ability not to compromise on your faith against the prevailing thought in the world. Study (of Torah in the past), but the secular person sees in this a preference for education over comfort or amassing wealth. He sees in his ancestors a cohesive people with values of helping the weak and the miserable, all this while the peoples around him generally prefer their own good (of course there are exceptions). Every such exception, like the Righteous Among the Nations in the Holocaust, is exactly the one fit for conversion. The State of Israel too arose on an ethos of refugees from the sword, educated people creating a unifying army in which the value of fraternity and help stands בראש. Today, now that science has advanced, he believes that heresy itself is the true Judaism: helping the refugee and the miserable, work and not idleness, a people of slaves that goes out to freedom, a people that smashes idols. In his eyes, engaging in old and dark texts is not Judaism. Therefore, although the religious person, certainly the ultra-Orthodox one, definitely looks like his great-grandfather, he does not represent his ancestors at all in essence. For his ancestors were like that when it was progressive and revolutionary, whereas today precisely observance of outdated halakhah is irrational. Therefore it is precisely keeping halakhah—which in your eyes defines Judaism—that in his eyes is anti-Judaism. This is why such secularists detest Haredim; in their eyes it looks like the complete opposite of Judaism. They want a state that cares for the weak (a welfare state), that helps the refugee, that does not conquer another people, a progressive state whose citizens do not engage in nonsense studies in their view and do not practice old rituals. All this more or less describes the Jews in history among the other nations (or at least that is the ethos the Jews created for themselves), at least the relation between them and the other nations according to the knowledge people had in the past. Of course not every person in the world has to be like this. Whoever wants to be at the spearhead of humanity in compassion, education, and innovation is welcome to join, convert, and be Jewish. And so such secularists often relate to religious people as idol-worshipers (which sounds far-fetched to religious ears)—at least they do not behave like Jews. Of course I, as a religious person, disagree with this, but why can it not be argued that this is the definition of Judaism?
I do not know what it means for something to be a significant component of identity. As I said, I do not enter into disputes about national identity. My claim is that this has no value dimension, as I explained.
I did not understand your question at the end. You introduced a circular definition, and then it came out circular. I wrote nothing of the kind. Halakhah is what we were commanded at Sinai. Commitment to it is Judaism (in its value sense). I see no circularity here whatsoever.
Just an update: I did not come to convince anyone that there is no such thing as Jewish thought. Here I assume it and do not prove it. The discussion is about Jewish identity.
A. Regarding democracy, there is no scriptural decree about it, but many people see it as a value (moral, human, social). The question is how to understand and conceptualize that value. Moral values too have validity, and therefore one can argue about them as well. Just as one cannot resolve a moral dispute by semantic separation (you will call helping others morality, and I will call it Yekum Purkan, and I will call killing Jews morality).
B. Therefore I referred to my series of columns on poetry. Looking at the instances and analyzing them sharpens intuition (direct cognition of the concept). That is when the definition is intentional and not constitutive.
The Litvak who would answer you that way misses an important point. That is an implication of the difference, not the difference itself. As with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that offerings of lesser sanctity are the owner’s property—you cannot explain why they are the owner’s property by saying that one can betroth a woman with them. That is an implication, not the meaning of the statement itself.
There is no such value. It is a halakhic prohibition.
Ethos belongs to national characteristics. I am speaking about the value dimension. As a Jew, am I obligated to behave in a certain way such that if I were a gentile I would not be so obligated? Is there some non-universal value that obligates me only because I am a Jew? In my view there is not. If I favor forcefulness, I will do so as a Jew or as a gentile, and if not—again, I will do so as a Jew or as a gentile. My being Jewish obligates me to nothing; at most it characterizes me. I will address this in greater detail in the next column.
If you are trying to define a Jew as someone who has a non-universal value obligating him only because he is Jewish—then you shot the arrow and then drew the target around it. Only a law that obligates Jews alone will define Judaism that way. In my opinion there is no reason whatsoever to define Judaism like that (even a secular person would not dispute that a definition that obligates only Jews is Jewish halakhah). Many see the definition of Judaism as a set of values that has characterized the Jewish people throughout the generations (and of course there can be disagreements about exactly what characterizes the Jewish people). Their desire to be Jews is to continue the tradition of the people by acting according to those values, even though they obligate no one else. Mutual responsibility at a high level, exceptional compassion, education, and the like are probably characteristics of the Jewish people as a people. And a secular person can think that a gentile who wants to be a partner in that mutual responsibility and act together with the people “converts” and ties his fate and aspirations to this people. (That is why secularists see someone who comes to serve in the army or volunteer on a kibbutz as someone who “converts” and joins the Jewish people, and they wonder how a Russian who served in the army is buried outside the fence.) This is actually a good example: a secular person sees value-obligation in burying such a Russian together with everyone else, and sees it as a desecration of Judaism to bury him according to halakhah outside the fence. There—an example of a value that obligates you as a Jew (according to their conception). Similarly in relation to the refugee: perhaps we, as former refugees, are more obligated in this than other nations. Or as a people that was liberated from Egypt, and in the ethos (which perhaps the secular person does not really believe in, but this is the people’s conception) that the Creator delivered us from Egypt, therefore we are more obligated than others not to enslave a foreign people (the Palestinians). This has nothing to do with halakhah at all, and is not mentioned in the sources, but it is a value by which we are more commanded because of the history and preservation of our people’s path.
“Our nation is a nation only by its Torahs” (R. Saadia Gaon). Even so, Hazal were wise and said: “Moses received the Torah from Sinai,” and did not say, “Israel received the Torah from Sinai,” for halakhah is a criterion for Judaism only if it stems from humility; and the man Moses was “very humble, more than any person,” for only Torah that stems from humility can be accepted by all Israel. Otherwise, excessive commitment to halakhah may, God forbid, contradict the Torah. For example, the day on which the disciples of Shammai outnumbered those of Hillel was as grievous to Israel as the day on which the calf was made. Rabbi Eliezer says: on that day they overfilled the measure; Rabbi Joshua says: on that day they erased it. Therefore Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: the world stands on three things—on justice, on truth, and on peace.
I’ll add one more thing. In the past, someone who emigrated to America to make a life for himself was treated with disdain and reproach as a yored, almost like someone who had apostatized. No one thinks there is anything universally wrong with making money. But a Jew who gives up mutual responsibility in the Land for the sake of hedonism is considered someone doing something un-Jewish (even though it is not formally obligatory). Whether one can persist in these values is another question, but I assume that many secular people aspire to this kind of Judaism, and therefore it is important to them to define Judaism that way.
What I meant, of course, was commitment to this halakhic prohibition.
That is, it is hard to see how one can separate the definition of nationhood from the value content of Judaism.
Just as “German of the Mosaic faith” did not hold water, so too a Jewish nation without the Jewish religion cannot hold water.
From what I understood, the definition of Judaism here is not an obligation that distinguishes the Jew, but religious obligation as such.
There are religious people like the priests of Baal, Christian bishops, Karaite rabbis, and Jewish rabbis; all are bearers of religious obligation.
From the secular point of view (I speak for myself, but I think there are other secular people who agree), the problem lies in the religious nature of the obligation, not in obligation that is non-religious.
Third Time, I answered all this. All the values you listed are universal. They are not connected to Judaism in any way. One could also define trouser-wearers as Jews, for after all they do wear trousers. Shared fate with the Jewish people also cannot, of course, define that people, because that is a circular definition. Shared with whom?
At most you are speaking about a national definition, whereas I am speaking about Judaism in the value sense. And indeed you are right: my words are necessarily true. Is that an accusation?
“Love your neighbor as yourself”—this is a great principle in the Torah. Mutual responsibility, mercy, kindness and charity, education in order to benefit the collective—these are universal values that spread through the world after the nations learned them from Israel. The words of Third Time seem more persuasive to me than those of Rabbi Michi.
Akiva, your words are a confusion of concepts. The question is not who holds the copyright to these values, but whether they can serve as a criterion for Judaism (today). I do not understand what is so complicated, and why one must repeat the same thing over and over.
The source of postmodernism is the thought of every person that his words are necessarily correct—the solution, in order to allow shared life, is postmodernism. (More correctly, each person should teach himself to say “I do not know,” that is, to be a little less confident in the rightness of his path, and then he could get along with his fellow, which is also a kind of postmodernism.) Your method is well known: every value is necessarily universal (this is the reason you think that the commandments cannot express values, because a value is necessarily universal). Everything stems from a desire for pure rationality; the problem is that every person has his own rationality. In truth this is the root of free choice (I read your column on the subject, but in my opinion you did not descend to the depth of the matter of free choice, because I can always ask why so-and-so chose the choice he chose. And if I am able to answer that question, then it turns out that his choice is not free. Divinity is located in the place that man does not understand, and the unintelligible is also what separates people and grants each person his independence). You (and probably I as well) are captive to your own definitions of what a value is, what the commandments are, and what faith is. I will end only with a question according to your view: you wrote, “I am speaking about Judaism in the value sense,” yet in many columns you toil to explain that Judaism is not value-based, and that values are universal. So how are you suddenly looking for “value-based Judaism”? And a question that truly interests me: where do you think one should bury a Russian who served in the army? There is halakhah and there is a value (you will say it is universal); there is a clash, and a secular Jew can say that burying him outside the fence is counterfeit Judaism. And therefore, as a “Jewish value,” he sees an act against halakhah. Another case as well: returning a lost object to a gentile (when there is no desecration of God’s name). The talmudic answer is probably clear, but there is a Jew who will say that returning a lost object to any person is a Jewish value (I am not sure that the effort involved in returning lost property is a universal value). One can also speak about the prohibition of lending at interest (not sure that this is a value), but it is a Jewish idea, and the complex question is how you behave in lending to a gentile. Jews can arise and claim that a Jewish value for them (not obligatory, of course) is not to lend to any person at interest. But clearly this is not at all a universal value.
The question, in my view, is not who has the copyright, but who has the obligation/right to be the one who pushes for creating and promoting the values. Some define Judaism as a nation that aspires to and educates toward integrating and advancing the world, to repair the world (tikkun olam)—for the religious person, “under the kingdom of the Almighty,” and for the secular person simply to repair the world. Whoever wants to join this banner is welcome. And that can be the “criterion,” since until today the Jews have had such an important role in history, and we aspire to continue being such (and the secular person will add: and not begin to degenerate)
Rabbi Michi, the Torah was and will remain the general criterion for Judaism. Since the commandment “Love your neighbor as yourself” is a great principle in the Torah—that is, it includes the whole Torah—it is a criterion for Judaism. And it was already said of the people of the Second Temple: “We know of them that they toiled in Torah and were careful with commandments and tithes and every good custom was among them, except that they loved money and hated one another with groundless hatred.” I am sure that the people of the Second Temple defined themselves as Jews, God-fearing, obligated to halakhah, careful in light and severe commandments alike, and nevertheless the main thing was missing from the book.
By religious-value definition do you mean a value that exists for Jews and does not exist for gentiles? If so, what is the value in halakhah? (If it is the value of fulfilling God’s commandments, gentiles too have that.) And if you mean behavior (halakhah) that is appropriate for a Jew and not for a gentile, why is culture not such a kind of behavior? In short, why assume that the cultural definition and the religious definition are separate?
Because halakhic values are obligation, whereas cultural “values” are custom. Culture describes; it does not obligate.
Rabbi Michi, a note/insight regarding the use of the word “obligation,” which seems to me to create confusion for quite a few people. When you write “obligation to halakhah,” it seems to me that most people interpret it in the following sense:
“An obligation that the person voluntarily took upon himself to obey halakhah.”
Whereas in practice you mean (if I understood correctly):
“Halakhah (as a kind of object in itself) sees that person as obligated to ‘obey’ it” (even if he does not recognize this obligation or does not want to obey it, as in the case of a secular Jew).
A kind of difference between active and passive (but not exactly).
I think that specifically when it comes to a gentile who converted, this lack of clarity does not show itself, because the two meanings more or less coincide.
Therefore, perhaps it would be better to replace “obligation to halakhah” with “someone whom halakhah obligates” or something in that style, when you refer to the definition of Judaism; and “someone who decides to obligate himself to halakhah / to act according to halakhah” when you refer to someone who decided to obey halakhah even though halakhah does not see him as obligated (for example, a gentile who observes commandments but did not convert according to halakhah).
A clarifying question: does your definition of ‘Jew’ relate to ‘Judaism’ or to ‘Jewishness’? That is, does an individual who constitutes part of Judaism get called by you a Jew? And if so, what is the noun for an individual who constitutes part of Jewishness?
Thank you.
Indeed. And I pointed this out and clarified it in my words.
The definition of conduct (obligation to halakhah in the sense that the person actually observes it) refers to Judaism. By contrast, Jewishness is belonging to the Jewish people, and for that it is enough to be born to a Jewish mother, even if you do not actually behave as a Jew. But obligation in the commandments in the sense that a person is required to observe them obviously refers to Jewishness.
Words like goads (as is your sacred custom).
I commented on the previous column, and what a pity…
Then I came to read this column, and things are much more illuminating. Many thanks to the rabbi 🙂
After our rabbi has taught us that all of Judaism is the observance of halakhah, it follows that when there is a dispute over what the halakhah is—one decisor rules stringently and another leniently—then according to the stringent one, the lenient one is not observing halakhah, and it follows that he is not part of Judaism 🙂
With blessings,
the bouncer of Judaism
And another question:
What is different about an antisemitic gentile who meticulously fulfills the “halakhah” that “it is a known law that Esau hates Jacob”—is such a gentile considered part of Judaism?
With blessings,
the aforementioned bouncer
I think I came out a bit more confused 🙂
I will try to define the concepts a bit more explicitly, and I would be grateful if you could please confirm/correct my understanding:
Jew – anyone who meets one of the following definitions:
A. The group of men and women who were physically present at the covenant at Sinai (does this include only the descendants of Jacob and the women married to them, or also the mixed multitude?).
B. A man or woman who converted according to halakhah.
C. A descendant of a woman belonging to group A or B.
Judaism – obedience to halakhah.
Essentially, can we say that a person who “practices” Judaism is a person who obeys halakhah / conducts himself according to halakhah, even if halakhah does not see him as obligated to obey it (as with a gentile), correct?
Jewishness – belonging to the group of Jews, in the sense that halakhah sees such a person as obligated to act according to it (even if he does not recognize this).
Jew. In my opinion this is not entirely precise on the logical level, but your intention is correct. I think the logically precise way is recursively: Sarah was Jewish. Whoever converted according to halakhah is Jewish. A child of a Jewish mother is Jewish.
Regarding the mixed multitude, I have no information. Anyone who underwent the Sinai covenant is Jewish.
Judaism: living according to halakhah.
Jewishness: whoever according to halakhah is obligated to observe it (that is, every Jew). Therefore this is a definition equivalent to “Jew.”
A gentile who observes halakhah indeed behaves and lives in a Jewish way, but he is not a Jew. A Jew who does not behave according to halakhah is a Jew, but does not behave and live in a Jewish way.
All this, of course, concerns Jew and Judaism in the religious-value sense, not in the ethnic-national-cultural sense.
Thank you very much.
Indeed, I was aiming at a recursive definition, and that slipped by me.
One more point about the distinction between the religious sense and the national/cultural sense. Here too it seems to me that confusion is created because we use the same term (“Jew”) to describe both concepts (members of the Jewish religion and members of the Jewish people). Usually there are different terms, like the French people but adherents of the Christian religion (or any other religion). Another example similar to Judaism might be the Druze.
Do you agree? Or is there nevertheless something unique in Judaism that links the two concepts, so that someone who departs from one of them in effect departs from the other as well (for example, an atheist Jew)?
Could you please sharpen the distinction among peoplehood/nation/culture/ethnos? Are these entities that exist in themselves and define whoever belongs/is obligated to them, or are they defined by the individuals and therefore can change rather freely according to consensus (or some other method)?
If I understood you correctly, you are basically saying that in the last decades (perhaps few hundred years), a split really began between the two senses within Judaism, and therefore this dissonance arose (which perhaps leads secular people to feel more “Israeli” than “Jewish”)?
In any case, Judaism is a ‘religion.’ Just as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism are not merely a dry collection of laws, but an entire complex of beliefs and ideas, worldview and ways of life, liturgy and customs—so too in Judaism, although the ‘laws’ and practical commandments occupy an important and central place, its sources are full of all the aspects that characterize any religion—faith and custom, beliefs and ideas, and ways of cultivating an emotional bond with God.
‘Religion’ is concerned with creating and nurturing the connection with God on all levels, in thought, speech, and action. One cannot isolate one aspect from the overall wholeness.
With blessings, Shatz
“So that someone who departs from one of them in effect departs from the other as well (for example, an atheist Jew)?”
I made a mistake here; I meant, say, someone born to a Jewish father but not a Jewish mother, and who therefore exited the religious sense.
And yet, although Judaism is a complete whole, which it is not right to break down into components—there is still value in preserving connection to the part to which one is connected, because when one disconnects, one may drift away entirely with no remedy; but when an emotional connection to a certain part continues, the chance is greater that this connection will expand to the other layers as well.
And as the Baal Shem Tov lamented the apostasy of the Frankist sect: despite the severe corruptions in that sect, the Baal Shem Tov believed that as long as the limb is attached and has not been completely severed, there is still a chance for the tear to heal.
With blessings, Shatz
The question whether there is something unique in Judaism depends on one’s worldview. A person can say that the Jewish nation can be defined without any connection to the Jewish religion: Hebrew speakers and falafel eaters. There is no way to decide regarding definitions of nation and culture. Certainly all these do not obligate and have no value dimension. They are descriptions.
As a matter of fact, such a split has certainly arisen. Many Jews who are undoubtedly part of the Jewish nation have no connection whatsoever to halakhah and Jewish religiosity.
BS"D, 28 Tishrei 5781
It should be noted that Rabbi M. Abraham’s definition of Judaism—commitment to fulfilling the Torah’s commandments out of belief that God commanded them in His Torah—is exactly the definition of the ‘pious among the nations of the world,’ who accept upon themselves the seven Noahide commandments because God commanded them in His Torah.
More is demanded of Israel than that. Not only to fulfill the 613 commandments, but also to engage in Torah and cleave to God with love and awe. All these are far broader than mechanical and dry obedience to practical commandments. And in truth even Noahides have a connection to Torah in those commandments in which they are obligated, and in that part of the Torah it also belongs to a Noahide to engage and elevate himself.
With blessings, Shatz
Still, commitment to the commandments is the necessary basis.
Commitment to the commandments together with all the beautiful and important things you mentioned—that is possible. But only the addition without commitment to the commandments—that will not hold. It seems to me that this is what the definition is talking about.
(That is, commitment to the commandments occupies not merely an important and central place, as you noted, but a necessary place, without which there is nothing. Without it, the limb may perhaps still be attached a bit longer, but not categorically and not over time.)
BS"D, 28 Le-Eitanim 5781
To P.S. – greetings,
In Judaism, body and soul are joined:
The practical commandments, the ‘duties of the limbs’—they are the body of Judaism; faith in God, love of Him and awe of Him, the ‘duties of the heart’—they are the soul of Judaism.
Just as the soul must find expression in the body, so the body needs a soul to enliven it. Without strong faith and an emotional connection to the Holy One, blessed be He, the dry performance of commandments becomes a torment of the soul, causing a person to loathe it. One who has already become accustomed to observing commandments may continue them without faith and feeling out of inertia, but his children will already sense the father’s lack of desire and be more liable to abandon the path altogether.
And as the Torah warned, the service of God must be ‘with joy and gladness of heart’; and when the prophets explained the destruction by saying, ‘Because they have forsaken My Torah,’ Hazal explained, ‘because they did not first recite the blessing over the Torah.’ Observance of commandments without faith and emotional connection to the One who commanded them does not endure in the long run.
When Judaism is not fragmented and dismantled, but rather encompasses all layers of personality—intellect and emotion, thought and deed—then it is a ‘Torah of life’ that has stable endurance.
With blessings, Shatz
True. Mere technical observance of commandments may be deficient.
But still, love of God, knowledge of God, intuition, consciousness, comprehensive intellectual understanding—however you call it—can be grounded and refined to high levels only מתוך observance of commandments. (Including, of course, Torah study.)
In addition, the fact that some of us still have a certain connection or certain consciousness without the commandments is only because the other parts still observe commandments.
Paragraph 2, line 2
… the performance of…
Paragraph 3, line 2
… ‘Because they have forsaken…’
Of course, the interdependence of these things can be found in the basic verse: “And you shall love the Lord your God… and these words that I command you today shall be…”
How will you love? By means of the commandments that I command you.
(And beyond that, the emotional, conscious connection etc. is itself also a commandment. So we have returned to the same definition.)
This is not a nice homiletic. It is the essence of the matter.
Even though the verses can be interpreted otherwise.
BS"D, eve of holy Shabbat, Bereishit 5781
To P.S. – greetings,
According to Hazal’s interpretation, the paragraph of Shema precedes “And it shall come to pass, if you surely heed,” to teach us that a person must first accept upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of heaven—faith in God and love of Him—and from that accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments.
Likewise, the Torah does not begin with “This month shall be for you” but with Genesis, in which the foundations of Judaism are embedded: faith, love of God and awe of Him, and the good traits we inherited from our forefathers. “Two thousand years of Torah” begin from Abraham’s fifty-second year, when he began to preach faith in Haran, 23 years before he received from God the command “Go forth,” and about 500 years before the revelation at Mount Sinai..
With blessings, Shatz
It seems to me that this does not contradict what I said, but complements it.
Acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of heaven starts the process, but without the commandments there will be no process.
So too with the general process that Abraham initiated..
And perhaps we are really saying the same thing.
I have several questions, of course. But one practical one in particular. I have an uncle whose father is Jewish and who converted with the Liberals in France. He behaves like a traditional Jew in every respect (and even looks like them).
By contrast, the wife of a friend of my family converted with the Orthodox and behaves, to the best of my knowledge, like a traditionalist. I feel that my uncle is more obligated to halakhah and closer to Judaism, and despite that he is less Jewish, as it were.
What is the value of conversion? I do not understand. (I think he was circumcised; I do not know whether he immersed in a mikveh.)
A gentile who observes commandments remains a gentile until he undergoes conversion according to halakhah.
BS"D, Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan 5781
The way of God that Abraham spread—is that not Judaism? The Ten Commandments—all of which are ‘universal values’—are they not Judaism? The people of Israel received the role of being a ‘kingdom of priests’ that would spread throughout the world the faith in divine unity and its values, embodied in the seven Noahide commandments.
As priests, Israel were commanded in the 613 commandments, which bring about the constant presence of God in every step of life, so that at the end of the day we may bequeath to the entire world the universal values of Judaism.
With blessings, Shatz
The question is what the difference is between a conversion “according to halakhah” on condition that one not keep it, and a liberal conversion (assuming he was circumcised and immersed in a mikveh) on condition of observing halakhah in the way of traditionalists.
A conversion not undertaken for the sake of observance is not “according to halakhah.” Conversion is done only for the sake of observing everything.
That is obvious. In practice it is not obvious; sometimes in the rabbi’s eyes they are “according to halakhah,” or he prefers such a conversion (he rightly guesses in advance that they will be traditionalists) to leaving a Jew with a gentile (lest one of Israel be lost entirely).
BS"D, 1 Cheshvan 5781
Although Abraham goes from place to place and calls in the name of God, even he understands that true influence will come through a community of worshippers of God. When God consults him as an expert in education—“For I have known him, so that he may command his children…”—whether there is hope for Sodom and Gomorrah, Abraham agrees that there is a need for a minimum of ‘ten righteous within the city.’ Real spiritual influence on the surroundings can come only through a ‘congregation’ that lives normal life while remaining faithful to the way of God.
Likewise, the strongest spiritual influence of the people of Israel on the gentile world was specifically in the days of the Second Temple. Even though the people of Israel had no independent political standing, the nations saw in every city and village a special and ‘strange’ community of people who lived around a Temple without idols, while refraining from labor one full day every week and gathering in the synagogue to study the sacred writings that were the center of their lives.
Many gentiles reacted with hatred and revulsion, but many of them looked with interest at the wondrous ‘nation of philosophers’ in their vicinity. Some came to hear the Torah reading, and some accepted upon themselves part of the commandments or all of them. Among the converts were even royal and noble families, until it was claimed that there was no family in Rome without a Jew in it.
This process stopped near the Bar Kokhba revolt, when the Romans decreed against circumcision. Even when they again permitted Jews to circumcise, the prohibition of circumcision for gentiles continued and prevented mass conversion. But the ‘Jewish germ,’ which had already penetrated deeply into Greco-Roman culture, was exploited by Christianity, which offered a ‘thin Judaism’ without circumcision and without practical commandments, and its influence toppled paganism, until the Roman emperor Constantine accepted Christianity and made it the state religion.
A similar process happened in Arabia. The Jewish tribes influenced Muhammad to accept monotheism and to imitate Judaism in establishing a weekly day of prayer and study. And as with the Christians, the ‘student’ thought that his Jewish ‘teachers’ had finished their spiritual role, and that they should evaporate or submit under his feet.
Let us hope that the decline of Christianity will also signal the decline of Islam, and that seekers of monotheism will return to draw directly from the source—from Judaism.
With blessings, Shatz
I did not understand the comment. Consequentialist considerations are irrelevant. This is not a question of what is preferable. A conversion without acceptance of the commandments is not a conversion. True, the convert does not need to know all of halakhah or intend every detail, only a principled commitment. And afterward, if he observes nothing, that does not matter, as long as the court assesses that his intention was to accept the commandments.
BS"D, 1 Cheshvan 5781
The intensification of communal life sustained intensive Jewish life and made existence possible even in a state of exile and dispersion. But on the other hand it could cause the problem of splitting the nation into ‘pieces and pieces.’
This concern was solved by preserving the centrality of the Temple in Jerusalem. Not only did they strive to make pilgrimage three times a year even from faraway places, and participate in the Temple service through the half-shekel; even in the daily worship in the synagogues, a central place was given to the Land of Israel, to the Temple, and to expectation of redemption.
The prayers instituted by the Men of the Great Assembly correspond to the daily offerings (and on Sabbaths and festivals—to the additional offerings), and even the direction of prayer is toward Jerusalem, as described in Daniel, whose windows were open toward Jerusalem on the three occasions he prayed each day.
Even the daily blessings of the prayer—about half of them deal with the aspiration for the redemption of the nation, the ingathering of the exiles, the restoration of the kingdom of the house of David, and the return of the Divine Presence to Zion. Likewise, the haftarot accompanying the Torah reading focus on prophecies of redemption.
Another problem liable to arise from division into communities is estrangement of hearts that may arise between one group and another, as Haman warned: “There is one people, scattered and divided.” The problem of division truly led, when it intensified in the period of the Greek and Roman decrees, to destruction. Against the danger of division of hearts, they emphasized the prayer for peace at the climax of every prayer.
With blessings, Shatz
I once had an argument with friends about ma’aseh Shabbat: if another person holds that according to halakhah it is permitted to do such-and-such on Shabbat, am I allowed to benefit from it?
At the time I argued that if you permit benefiting from it because, after all, from his perspective the act was done without desecrating Shabbat, then what is the difference between him and a secular Jew who thinks it is permitted to desecrate Shabbat? Would it also be permitted to benefit from his actions, since according to his own view it is also “permitted by halakhah” (he simply thinks halakhah is irrelevant or something like that, but that makes no difference, because he too is offering some conception within halakhah).