Notes on Hiddur in the Hanukkah Lamp (Column 430)
In a question that reached me today I was asked about hiddur (enhancement) in the Hanukkah lights. I answered briefly, and in honor of Hanukkah I thought to bring here a more expanded version of what I wrote (the source is here).
Hiddur Mitzvah
The Gemara in Shabbat 133b (and parallels) brings a derashah regarding hiddur mitzvah:
It was taught: “This is my God and I will beautify Him (anveihu)”—beautify yourself before Him with mitzvot: before Him a beautiful sukkah, a beautiful lulav, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzit, a beautiful Torah scroll, and write it for His sake with fine ink, with a fine quill, by an expert scribe, and wrap it in fine silks. Abba Shaul says: ‘anveihu’—be like Him: just as He is gracious and merciful, so you too be gracious and merciful.
Both views are ruled as halakha, though walking in God’s ways is generally associated with another verse, “and you shall walk in His ways.” See Rambam, Hilkhot De‘ot 1:6 and in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment 8. These matters are brought in the Talmud and poskim regarding “threads that do not invalidate” in circumcision (Shabbat there), the rule of binding the lulav (according to the opinion that lulav does not require binding; Sukkah 33), and more.
People think hiddur mitzvah is voluntary, but it is not. Plainly, the rule of hiddur is a full obligation, a biblical positive commandment. However, the hiddur does not invalidate the mitzvah; meaning that even if one performed the mitzvah without hiddur, he fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah. But he has nullified the commandment of hiddur.[1] A similar confusion exists regarding tekhelet. The Mishnah in Menachot says that tekhelet does not invalidate the white threads, and therefore people think tekhelet is voluntary. It is not. The mitzvah of tekhelet is a positive commandment; it simply does not invalidate the white. A simple proof is that the continuation of the Mishnah there states that the white does not invalidate the tekhelet, and the white is certainly obligatory. The rule in halakha is that every mitzvah is obligatory unless there is a clear source that it is not (as opposed to the realm of kodashim, where the default is that a detail does not invalidate unless there is a source that it does—for example, it is repeated or it says “chukah,” etc. See my article here for the reason).
The Gemara in Bava Kamma 9b speaks about the measure of hiddur:
Rather, R. Zeira said: with hiddur mitzvah—up to a third in the mitzvah. And further there: in the West they said in the name of R. Zeira, up to a third from his own; from then on—from the Holy One, blessed be He.
The obligation of hiddur is up to a third of the price of the mitzvah (whether internally or externally—see the sugya there).
R. Ḥananel writes there:
In the West they said: up to a third from his own—i.e., he is warned to adorn the mitzvah up to a third. From then on, if he adds more than a third, he is doing an extra measure, like one who supports a pauper and adds for him more, thereby showing favor—and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not withhold anyone’s reward, but pays his recompense: “from the Holy One,” as it is said, “He who is gracious to the poor lends to the Lord”—and this is straightforward. Another explanation: from then on—“from the Holy One,” i.e., if he wishes to enhance the mitzvah by more than a third of its cost, he is not obligated to do all this from his own earnings, for his life takes precedence over hiddur mitzvah; but if the Holy One, blessed be He, arranged money for him not from his own earnings, and he wishes to enhance beyond a third, he has permission. And one who enhances a mitzvah is praiseworthy—as we learned regarding the Hanukkah lamp [Shabbat 21b]: “the mehadrin—one lamp for each and every person; and the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin,” etc.
We see that up to a third is an obligation we are warned about, but there is also value in going beyond, as we learn from the Hanukkah lamp.
The Uniqueness of the Rule of Hiddur in the Hanukkah Lamp
The source of hiddur in the Hanukkah lamp appears in the sugya in Shabbat 21b:
Our Rabbis taught: The mitzvah of Hanukkah is “a lamp for a person and his household.” The mehadrin: a lamp for each and every person. The mehadrin min ha-mehadrin: Beit Shammai say—on the first day one lights eight; from then on, he decreases. Beit Hillel say—on the first day one lights one; from then on, he increases, etc.
So it is ruled as halakha by Rambam, Hil. Hanukkah 4:1, and in the Tur/Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim §671, like Beit Hillel.
From R. Ḥananel it seems that the hiddur in the Hanukkah lamp is an additional rule beyond “This is my God [and I will beautify Him],” and therefore there is no obligation to do it; it is voluntary, from surplus funds a person has. But the plain sense of the Gemara here does not read that way. It would appear that in the Hanukkah lamp there is a special rule of hiddur beyond the general rule of beautifying mitzvot—both in its quantity and in its form. In the Hanukkah lamp there are several specific levels and modes of hiddur detailed in halakha, which we do not find elsewhere; and each level has a particular and defined form. The very fact that precisely here the Sages spelled out the form and measure of hiddur indicates a special rule. This is especially true regarding the measure of hiddur.
In Chiddushei Riz ha-Levi, Hil. Hanukkah 4:1, he asks in the name of one of the sages of the Holy Land: how is it that for Hanukkah the mehadrin (and certainly the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin) spend more than a third of the mitzvah? For the mitzvah itself is “a lamp for a person and his household” (one lamp), the mehadrin is “a lamp for each person,” and the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin is “increasing and going” (a total of at least 36 lights). That is, even the simple level of hiddur is more than a third of the mitzvah. Indeed, R. Ḥananel wrote that this is true for all mitzvot—that it is proper to add beyond a third—but the simple sense is that here there is a special rule of hiddur, in quantity and in quality. The Brisker Rav himself cites R. Ḥananel there and forces the reading; this is not the place to elaborate.
However, in the Mishnah Berurah §671:7 he writes:
And if oil is expensive, it is better to light with wax candles and to be “increasing and going,” as written inside, than to light with olive oil only one lamp each night.
Its sources are the Chayei Adam (Klal 153) and responsa Binyan Olam §34. The rule of “increasing and going” is the special hiddur of Hanukkah, and the other rule (superior oil) is from the general “This is my God and I will beautify Him” of the entire Torah. We see that the hiddur of the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence. According to R. Ḥananel this is certainly not correct, for in his view the regular hiddur is a biblical mitzvah, while the second is only optional for one who wishes. We see that the Hanukkah hiddur is a different rule, and it is apparently also obligatory (though it does not invalidate the basic mitzvah).
Explanation
In Netivot Yehoshua by my teacher, Rav Yagel, of blessed memory, vol. 1, “Kuntres ha-Mo‘adim,” §12, he explained this by first citing the question of the Pnei Yehoshua on Shabbat 21b:
There [the Gemara asks], “What is Hanukkah?” It was taught… “they defiled all the oils in the Temple… and they found only one cruse [etc.], and a miracle occurred…”—and one can wonder: what was all this miracle for? For we rule that impurity is permitted for the community (tum’ah hutrah b’tzibbur), and they could have lit with impure oil. And granted, according to the opinion that [impurity] is overridden for the community (d’chuya b’tzibbur; Pesachim 79a), this is somewhat understandable here; but according to the opinion that it is permitted for the community—even to seek out [pure oil] we do not seek, as it says in Yoma 6b—this is very difficult…
The question is why a miracle was necessary, since they could have lit in impurity. The main difficulty is for the opinion that impurity is permitted in a communal setting; for the opinion that it is only overridden, one might say the miracle came so that they could light with hiddur, with pure oil.[2] Yet even so, according to this, even for the opinion that impurity is permitted b’tzibbur it is still better to light not in impurity.[3]
Ultimately he resolves:
Therefore it seems that the essence of the miracle was done only to make known to them the affection of the Omnipresent for them—as we find that such a miracle occurred constantly (Avot 5:2), that no flaw was found in the Omer or the Two Loaves. And since a miracle occurred for them in the principal matter—that they were redeemed with a complete redemption from the rule of the wicked Greek empire, who told Israel to write upon the horn of an ox that they have no share in the God of Israel and decreed many persecutions—and now that they were redeemed and a great miracle was done for them, that they prevailed over their enemies—therefore a miracle was also done for them in the matter of the lamps, which are a testimony to Israel that the Shekhinah rests among them, as is also expounded regarding the western lamp. But after the death of Shimon ha-Tzaddik even the western lamp would sometimes go out; therefore a miracle was done for them in this very matter in those days that were an auspicious time, to make known that they returned to their former affection. So it seems correct to me.
That is, the purpose of the miracle was to make known God’s affection for them.
Rav Yagel there explains that the entire miracle was that they were enabled to light with hiddur; therefore, the ordinance in commemoration of that miracle includes the element of hiddur within the very ordinance. That is, this hiddur is not from the general rule of “This is my God [and I will beautify Him],” but a special rule in the Hanukkah lamp—commemorating lighting with pure oil in hiddur.
And the fact that we still call it “hiddur” does not mean it is not an obligation. Indeed, one fulfills the basic obligation with “a lamp for a person and his household,” but that is the duty of the very lighting. Beyond that there is a duty of hiddur, and one does not fulfill it if he does not enhance. And indeed it was not possible to establish the hiddur as an absolute legal obligation—otherwise it would not be “hiddur”; and the Sages wished to leave it as an act of enhancement in commemoration of the miracle, as above. Similarly regarding the mitzvot “You shall be holy,” which Ramban explains as an obligation not to be a scoundrel within the permission of the Torah, and “You shall do what is right and good,” to go beyond the letter of the law. These two are not counted in the enumeration of the commandments (even according to Ramban himself), and simply because if they were counted, deviating from them would not be beyond the letter of the law but a full prohibition of the law itself.
And the Sages left us a hint of this by fixing several levels of hiddur—to show that the matter is not voluntary as one might think. The Sages determine a very specific form to do this, and that is a hint that it is part of the essence of the ordinance (I presented a similar reasoning in the article here regarding the measures for separating terumah and the definition of “the will of God”).
When Was the Hiddur Ordinance Enacted?
According to our conclusion, it seems the ordinance of hiddur was part of the original ordinance of lighting the lamp. But if the hiddur was in fact obligatory in the very original ordinance commemorating the Hanukkah miracle, it is unclear how Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai could dispute the hiddur (whether to increase or to decrease). Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel were not long after the miracle,[4] and in such a short span while Israel was in its land it is unlikely that such a great distortion in the tradition would occur.
One could suggest that they did not dispute the definition of the original ordinance but rather a hiddur that was added to that ordinance at a later period. When the lighting was ordained by the Hasmonean court, they did not fix a binding hiddur, and the entire hiddur ordinance was enacted by Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel themselves. Therefore it is no wonder that there is a dispute between them as to how to enhance. According to this, until the hiddur was enacted, there was an obligation to enhance only from the rule of “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” and Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel decided to add a special hiddur. In particular, if one accepts the common claim that the miracle of the cruse of oil received special status only after the Destruction (when the military victory was less central), then it is reasonable that at that stage they also decided to add a special hiddur in commemoration of the miracle of the cruse of oil.[5] This does not contradict the claim that the hiddur is a special rule, part of the ordinance of lighting the lamp. Even if it was added later, one can still say they added a special hiddur. On the contrary, the regular hiddur existed from the outset, as with all mitzvot of the Torah, and the special hiddur was added later.
Perhaps this can be inferred from the Rambam’s wording, Hil. Hanukkah 3:2:
Because of this, the Sages of that generation ordained that these eight days, beginning on the 25th of Kislev, be days of joy and praise, and that lights be kindled in the evenings at the entrances of the houses on each and every one of the eight nights, to show and make known the miracle. And these days are called Hanukkah, and eulogies and fasts are forbidden during them like on the days of Purim. And kindling the lights on them is a rabbinic mitzvah, like the reading of the Megillah.
His wording requires explanation in two respects: (a) Why does he add at the end that the kindling of the lights on these days is rabbinic, when at the beginning he already brings all the laws of the ordinance? (b) His wording is not entirely clear. One could read that the ordinance was to fix days of joy and praise and lighting of lights—yet there is a shift in his wording: he moves from describing the ordinance in the past (“they ordained that the days be…”) to the present (“and we kindle the lights”). The simple sense is that the ordinance was days of joy and praise, and we also kindle lights. Is that not part of the ordinance?
It seems that according to him, indeed the kindling of lights was not from the core of the Hasmoneans’ ordinance; therefore he adds that this law too is rabbinic, like the reading of the Megillah.[6]
So too it emerges from the text of “Al ha-Nissim” and many other sources (Books of Maccabees, Josippon, and Pesiqta Rabbati) that do not include the miracle of the cruse of oil. It follows that in the days of Mattathias and the Hasmoneans, when their text was enacted, they indeed did not ordain the lights that commemorate the cruse of oil.
However, in the Megillat Antiochus it appears in this language:
Therefore the sons of the Hasmoneans established a permanent ordinance, and the Children of Israel together with them as one, to make these eight days days of feasting and joy, like the festival days written in the Torah, and to light lights in them, to make known the victories that the God of Heaven did for them.
It implies that the kindling of lights was indeed part of the original ordinance of the Hasmoneans. However, the form of the kindling and the forms of hiddur are not detailed there; therefore, our assertion stands that the hiddur was enacted later, not the very mitzvah of kindling. Similarly, in Mo‘adim u-Zemanim, vol. 2, he entertains whether the ordinance that each person lights at the doorway of his home is not from the Hasmoneans; see there his proofs. And what he himself objects to his words, according to our approach here—that these matters speak only about the hiddur—fits well.
[1] As for why the mitzvah of hiddur is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, see my article on the Tenth Principle, in the book Yishlach Shoreshav, that we do not count general rules that pertain to all mitzvot (like “half-measure”).
[2] However, here it was oil of a miracle, which is plainly prohibited to use for lighting; therefore one must consider why this would be preferable to impure oil—certainly according to the opinion that impurity is permitted b’tzibbur.
[3] See Column 404 (and also here and here) regarding the lack of a practical difference between d’chuya and hutra.
[4] There is broad discussion, in the beit midrash and beyond, as to how long these two schools lasted. Some wished to say that since the heavenly voice that the halakha is like Beit Hillel issued in Yavneh, therefore the schools lasted until then; but this is not at all necessary. See Dorot Rishonim, vol. 2, p. 294, where he proves extensively that the main disputes between the two schools were in the time of Hillel and Shammai themselves, and what reached the Yavneh period were only those who followed in their paths. See also the book Binu Shenot Dor va-Dor.
[5] However, see Maharatz Chajes to Shabbat 21b, who cites in the name of the Pesiqta Rabbati that the enactment of eight days was not on account of the miracle of the cruse of oil but because of eight spits they found; see there.
[6] And in the book Chasdei Avot, printed at the end of Yakhin Da‘at §17, he wrote that the ordinance of the lamp was after the Destruction. So too R. Yehuda Gershuni in Or ha-Mizrach 22 (issues 79–80), p. 43. See also Binu Shenot Dor va-Dor, where he raises strong objections to their words. Their difficulties are resolved by our words here: that the ordinance was in the time of the Temple, but later than the Hasmonean era. And indeed, in the Rambam himself, in Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Principle 1, he explicitly writes that the Hanukkah lamp was enacted in Temple times; see there.
Discussion
May his radiance shine forth,
1. That is the accepted view. When something is derived from a verse, the assumption is that it is de-oraita unless there is good reason to say it is merely a rabbinic asmachta.
2. It seems obvious to me. Whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted in the pattern of Torah law. In any case, in Rabbeinu Chananel it is explicit that this is an obligation and that is not.
3. It is explicit that this was permitted even with oil. See the Pnei Yehoshua there.
4. Not in the halakhic code, perhaps in the Sefer HaMitzvot.
5. In any case, it is a kind of hiddur in publicizing the miracle.
2. Which sentence in Rabbeinu Chananel are you referring to?
4. The Behag agrees that the Sages enacted it, and nevertheless counts it as de-oraita. And if I remember correctly, in the Rambam’s letter he presents this as a central error of the Behag that led him to write the Sefer HaMitzvot anew. Isn’t this worth a line and a half in the Mishneh Torah for total clarification? (Indeed, I would perhaps have been surprised had he not troubled himself to stress it in order to exclude the Behag.)
3. I did not find proof in the Pnei Yehoshua. He brings that the continual lamp is kindled even in impurity, but from where do we know that it is speaking of impure oil and not an impure person? There is a reference there to the Rambam without a source, and I will look for it tomorrow.
1. Is hiddur de-oraita? I searched and am puzzled. Here https://tinyurl.com/2p9b2apv the view of Tosafot in Menachot, the Ritva, and the Maharshal is brought—that hiddur is rabbinic—and it is stated there that this is how the Shulchan Arukh rules. And apart from their halakhic considerations, another “good reason” to say this is only an asmachta is that one cannot derive de-oraita obligations from the song of Moses and the children of Israel. One may infer the obvious—that it is a good thing to beautify oneself before God in mitzvot (and even without mitzvot, such as singing before Him and dancing before Him), all the more so from a flesh-and-blood king, to whom one presents the choicest things; but one certainly cannot infer a de-oraita positive commandment. (And by the way, if so, then all the more so there is no reason to say that Rabbeinu Chananel disagrees with the Mishnah Berurah.)
A. The Rambam’s wording is: “And the lighting of the lamps overrides Shabbat and impurity, like offerings that have a fixed time, as it says: ‘to kindle a continual lamp.’” It is not explicit here that lighting with impure oil is also permitted. And the reasoning to distinguish seems clear to me: there is no impurity for the community because God does not reject all Israel from serving Him (or the witticism that the community does not die and therefore does not become impure), and “as a father has compassion on his son, so He favors him.” But if the products are impure (and presumably there is a source that one may not light with impure oil), that is like there being no lambs but only camels, and it is impossible to serve in the Temple because of the circumstances. [And this requires clarification: what would the law be in an unusual case where all the priests were blemished?]
B1. The Pnei Yehoshua asks only according to Rav Nachman, who holds that impurity is permitted for the community; and according to the “some say” version in Yoma, “even where there are pure and impure priests in that same patrilineal family on duty, Rav Nachman disagrees and says the impure ones also serve,” meaning one need not be concerned at all to seek out and bring pure ones, and from this the Pnei Yehoshua says one also need not beautify matters by using pure oil. So what does Rav Yagel answer? That God performed a miracle for them in order to show His affection in something where there is absolutely no need in the world to beautify at all? Then what is the connection to their not finding pure oil? Even if they had found plenty of pure oil, He would still have performed a miracle to show His affection. Or He could have performed a miracle that the ground would sprout lambs for the daily offering.
B2. According to the Gemara in Yoma 6b cited in the Pnei Yehoshua in the article—that according to the one who says impurity is permitted for the community, there are those who say that impure priests in the family on duty serve even when pure ones are available (and perhaps even the first version, that if there are pure ones in that same family on duty then specifically they should serve, is only a rabbinic stringency)—again, I do not understand where your reasoning came from that in life-saving on Shabbat, if one can very easily save without desecrating Shabbat, then it is forbidden to desecrate Shabbat.https://mikyab.net/posts/72809#comment-53962
A. That is the accepted view, and logically I see no basis at all to distinguish. I do not have time to check right now. And certainly if one ties this to impurity in the public domain (I did this in the past), then certainly it is speaking about the object itself. In any case, that is the Pnei Yehoshua’s assumption, and I believe that is the accepted way to think. I see no reason to distinguish.
B1. I commented on this. The miracle was to make hiddur possible even according to the view that it is permitted. There is still hiddur involved, and that is certainly enough to make known His affection—that although they did not need it, they were enabled to light in purity.
B2. Because with impurity there really is no impurity for the community. But with life-saving, there still is Shabbat.
I did not see the Shulchan Arukh there. But now I do indeed see that there is a dispute about this. The view that it is de-oraita seems more reasonable to me. First, in my opinion hiddur is also indispensable, except that it does not invalidate the mitzvah itself, only the hiddur aspect (as I wrote in the article). And with that, the Ritva’s proof falls. Moreover, according to Abba Shaul, they learn from here to walk in the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He—and that is certainly a de-oraita law (which in practice is learned from “and you shall walk in His ways”).
The Shulchan Arukh there later, in סעיף ג, rules leniently that the extra third is measured internally, not externally, because in a rabbinic doubt one rules leniently. How is it plausible to derive a de-oraita law from a song?!
B1. ? But the Gemara says (at least according to the second version) that even if it is easy for the pure members of that family on duty to perform the service, one need not seek hiddur.
A, B2. In my opinion, as I wrote.
Why not? It is a law that emerges from the Torah. Admittedly, it is not necessarily literally a positive commandment, because it is not written as an imperative, but it is written in the Torah. That is certainly no worse than the prohibition of the sciatic nerve, which is written as a description of the custom of Jacob’s sons, or a half-measure, which is derived from reasoning (“it is fit to combine”) or from the inclusion of “all fat”; and the same is true of all derashot. And so too regarding God’s will concerning the measures of terumah in the article you referred to in the post.
By the way, the uncertainty whether the extra third is measured internally or externally is not necessarily a de-oraita doubt even if the law of hiddur is de-oraita. It could be that there is a Torah law of hiddur, and the Sages fixed its measure at one third.
As for the Gemara in Yoma, it is not conclusive. First, there is a dispute there as to Rav Nachman’s view. According to the side that only when it is difficult is there no obligation, it implies that when it is easy there is an obligation, even though impurity is permitted. And that is explicitly like my view. And according to the side that even when it is easy there is no need for hiddur, the meaning is that one fulfills the basic mitzvah but not the obligation of hiddur. (Though according to this, when it is easy and they do not do the hiddur, that would also invalidate the mitzvah itself, otherwise what is the dispute about? Perhaps this follows Tosafot in Sukkah, that if one did not act as the Sages instructed, he has not fulfilled the de-oraita obligation.)
Is there not a confusion of concepts here? “This is my God and I will beautify Him” uses hiddur in the sense of splendor/beauty, where the discussion is that up to one third is obligatory. But here “mehadrin” means those who seek out or pursue, as Rashi wrote, “those who are meticulous in pursuit of mitzvot,” and it seems this is taken from the Aramaic usage for “to seek out,” where perhaps there is no obligation at all.
The comparisons do not seem strong. Regarding the sciatic nerve, following the Rambam one assumes it was re-prohibited at Sinai (and this they presumably received by tradition, or from the meaning of the verses in the Torah: “therefore the children of Israel shall not eat,” etc.). As for “fit to combine,” surely you are not saying that every good practice one ought to follow by reason alone is also a de-oraita obligation. I did not understand the comparison to the measures of terumah, because with hiddur the discussion is about the obligation itself, not its measure; and after all, you did not come there to generalize from God’s will regarding the measures of terumah that every good practice grounded in reason is a de-oraita obligation.
If hiddur is de-oraita, then why, and on what basis, think that the measure is rabbinic rather than like other measures that are a halakhah to Moses from Sinai? They bring there that the Sdei Chemed raises this possibility, and I did not mention it because I thought it implausible.
Indeed, but it is not quite that explicit. According to everyone, one need not bring pure priests from another family on duty, and therefore it seems more plausible to me that even the side that requires pure priests from the same family on duty means only a rabbinic stringency (like something that will later become permitted—where I also, of course, hold that relying on the majority and eating is a fully legitimate leniency, as seems clear to me from drinking milk, which entirely relies on the majority).
When you say that one does not fulfill the obligation of hiddur, do you mean that in practice, according to everyone (and according to your view that hiddur is de-oraita), there is a de-oraita obligation to bring the pure ones, and the Gemara in Yoma deals only with the basic law of the mitzvah, so that this is not the practical halakhah? (If so, I dimly recall that in the Chazon Ish’s glosses he commented sharply on the Gr"ch in a similar case.)
Rabbi, I think I saw that Rabbi Yitzchak Adler (from America) connects the question of whether the extra third is measured externally or internally to the conceptual inquiry whether hiddur is part of the mitzvah (external) or an independent category (internal). If I am not mistaken, he mentioned Rabbi Soloveitchik in this connection.
With God’s help, second day of Chanukah 5782
It may be said that considering “hiddur” as part of the mitzvah is tied to likening Chanukah to Sukkot, which is likewise an eight-day festival on which the Hallel is completed. The Four Species taken on Sukkot also have a category of “hiddur” that is one of the conditions of the core mitzvah. And perhaps one may say that “hiddur” is especially important in the Four Species, whose purpose is “and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God,” and so too with the Chanukah lights, hiddur is important in order to intensify the joy, for lights are a clear expression of joy.
Sukkot has the mitzvah of the sukkah, which constitutes a dwelling—“you shall dwell as you normally live”—and Chanukah too has the mitzvah of lighting as “a lamp for each person and his household.” But Sukkot also emphasizes each individual’s personal action in taking the lulav on the first day, when each person is commanded to take his own, and so too on Chanukah—the mehadrin light one lamp for each and every individual.
Likewise, Sukkot has a marking of the counting of the days, with expression given to the ordinal number of each day, as reflected in the festival offerings, which express the fact that the peak of the joy is “on the first day,” when the victory over the accuser is celebrated. Similarly, Beit Shammai hold regarding Chanukah that the main joy is on the day of victory over the Greeks, the twenty-fifth of Kislev.
But Sukkot also has an element of turning toward the future, of prayer for rain, which intensifies especially toward the end of Sukkot, on Hoshana Rabbah and Shemini Atzeret, which are the peak of the prayer for rain. In the same way, Beit Hillel emphasize more the aspect of anticipation and prayer for the future, which grows stronger with each additional day. If on Sukkot we ask for water—on Chanukah we ask for light, the light of Torah, that it should be “increasing and continuing” from day to day.
With blessings for a radiant Chanukah, Yaron Fish"el Ordner
So “the mehadrin among the mehadrin” means “those who seek out among those who seek out”? Rashi only means to explain why the term hiddur is applicable here. Fine, this is a law of hiddur. Is it the ordinary hiddur or not? That is what I discussed in the article.
Did Chazal assume this following the Rambam? This is a tannaitic dispute in the chapter on the sciatic nerve. Still, according to all views there is no command here, only that verse.
And indeed, anything derived from pure reasoning is, in a certain sense, de-oraita. It is not rabbinic. Admittedly, this is not a mitzvah in the full sense, because there is no command, but it is still a de-oraita law. I compared it to a half-measure and to derashot.
And by the way, this may also explain why in case of doubt one rules leniently (as appears in the Shulchan Arukh), even though it is not literally rabbinic.
Just as in prayer there is a de-oraita obligation, while the details of how to do it are rabbinic. And just as with terumah, one grain of wheat exempts the whole heap, and the Rabbis fixed a measure (according to the accepted view that this measure is rabbinic).
Sounds to me like mere wordplay.
And perhaps the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel about the category of “mehadrin min hamehadrin”—whose meaning is that “mehadrin min hamehadrin” enters into the framework of halakhah—stems from the situation in their days, when the Hasmonean kingdom had declined, and in its place arose the kingdom of Herod, a vassal of the Romans.
Precisely in this situation, which showed that the achievement of the Hasmoneans was fading and that it seemed they were falling into harsh foreign subjugation, it was especially important to remember that there is hope, and that few and weak people can stand for their freedom and preserve the spirit of Judaism even against a mighty empire. Against the darkness that keeps intensifying, one must increase light as “mehadrin min hamehadrin.”
With blessings, Amiuz Yaron Schnitzler
I was not familiar with what is said in the chapter on the sciatic nerve.
If it is from pure reasoning, independent of the verse “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” then fine.
See chapter Gid HaNasheh, Mishnah 5, and the Rambam’s commentary on the Mishnah there.
I do connect it to the verse. The verse does not command, but it implies that there is value in this. That is no worse than reasoning we arrived at ourselves.
The hiddur of the “mehadrin” is not hiddur built as “beautifying oneself before Him in mitzvot,” but rather the hiddur of “In the multitude of the people is the King’s glory.” Each member of the household who lights adds “In the multitude of the people is the King’s glory,” for in this house there are “many performing the mitzvah.”
So too the hiddur of the “mehadrin min hamehadrin” is connected to increase—the emphasizing of the increasing number of days of the festival, clarifying that this is not a one-time event but an ongoing process—whether a process of remembering the past according to Beit Shammai, or a process of anticipating the future according to Beit Hillel.
The connection to the past and to the future creates “in the multitude of the people” on a far higher plane. Not only are the members of the household joining here to serve God, but the entire “axis of time,” all the generations of the people of Israel, those that were and those that will be, join together into an infinite “multitude of the people.”
With blessings, cf. there
According to the explanation that the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is whether one lights corresponding to the days yet to come or to the days that have passed, one may find a parallel to the dispute between Shammai and Hillel regarding preparation for Shabbat.
According to Shammai, from the beginning of the week a person’s orientation is already toward Shabbat, which is the week’s purpose; whereas according to Beit Hillel, “Blessed is the Lord day by day”—even each weekday has intrinsic value as a stage on the way to Shabbat, which is built layer upon layer from the weekdays, with each day “increasing and continuing” beyond its predecessor.
With blessings, Pedatzur Fish"el Pri-Gan
To Pedatzur Fishlita, I am sure you know that Rabbi Zevin already preceded you with his well-known article on the approaches of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
I did not get into the questions of “potential and actual” and “action and intention,” which Rabbi Zevin discusses in LeOr HaHalakhah. What I suggested concerns the relation between the path and the goal: Beit Shammai are focused on the final objective, whereas Beit Hillel emphasize the importance of every stage along the way.
I have now found that Rabbi Zevin went somewhat in this direction in a Chassidic essay, where he suggested that according to Beit Shammai the Chanukah lamp is in the category of “fire,” which utterly destroys evil, whereas according to Beit Hillel the Chanukah lamp is in the category of “light.” For Beit Shammai, “turn away from evil” is primary, and for Beit Hillel, “do good.”
With blessings, P.P.G., may he live long and well
“Granted, we are speaking of miracle oil, which on the face of it is forbidden for lighting, and therefore it is not clear why this is preferable to impure oil, certainly according to the view that impurity is permitted for the community.”
Why did you decide that miracle oil is forbidden for lighting?
Because it has to be olive oil.
See for example here: https://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/29937
The need for olive oil in the Chanukah lamp is not based on “This is my God and I will beautify Him”.
Wax candles burn with the same beauty and quality.
What people seek out olive oil for on Chanukah is because it is a remembrance of the miracle in the Temple.
Consequently, your difficulty from the Mishnah Berurah falls away.
There are various kinds of hiddur in halakhah. Not all hiddurim are physical beauty. There is halakhic beauty. Some are meticulous to bind the lulav, or to burn the chametz (like Rabbi Yehudah, though the halakhah does not follow him). And hiddur on the plane of remembrance of the Temple is also hiddur.
(By the way, I did not raise a difficulty from the Mishnah Berurah, nor against the Mishnah Berurah.)
With God’s help, fourth day of Chanukah 5782
To R. Ze'ira of the aforementioned group—abundant peace,
In the Gemara (Shabbat 23) it appears that the preference for olive oil is because “its light is clearer.” The halakhic decisors added the reason that the miracle occurred with olive oil, and the practical difference is regarding a wax candle or stearin candle, whose light is also clear. Either way, this is only hiddur.
With blessings for a radiant Chanukah, Hasdai Betzalel Dovdavni Kirshen-Kvas
To our rabbi, may he live long—regarding the words of the Mishnah Berurah, you wrote: “The law of increasing and continuing is a Chanukah-specific law of hiddur, whereas the second law (superior oil) is from the law of ‘This is my God and I will beautify Him’ that applies to the whole Torah.” And that is not correct with regard to wax candles.
Wax candles are clear, and perhaps even better than olive oil.
“And hiddur on the plane of remembrance of the Temple is also hiddur”—to bring this under a Torah law because of “This is my God and I will beautify Him” sounds a bit Chassidic…
For dessert:
Once a young married scholar came to Rabbi Padwa of London to ask about the kashrut of an etrog. When the rabbi answered that it was kosher, the man added and asked whether it was also beautiful for the sake of hiddur. He told him: that, ask your wife—she understands beauty better than I do.
I know what I wrote. There is no difficulty here. I repeat once more that this is a law of hiddur. Your story only proves that.
And according to the Maharal of Prague, a wax candle is not defined as a “lamp” at all, because a lamp is a vessel filled with combustible material. Though nowadays there are “tea lights,” in which the wax is placed inside a vessel.
With blessings, Ch.B.Tz. of the holy community
To his honor, may his light shine out and blaze,
A. From where is it obvious that hiddur is de-oraita and not a rabbinic asmachta? It may be correct, but it is not obvious.
B. You wrote that according to Rabbeinu Chananel, using superior oil on Chanukah takes precedence over adding more lights, because it is a general de-oraita law. Meaning, even in a law that is entirely rabbinic, the general de-oraita hiddur still applies and has special importance because its root is de-oraita (perhaps somewhat like “the more frequent takes precedence”). This needs proof, and without that it is not “obvious,” unlike the Mishnah Berurah.
C. The Pnei Yehoshua’s question: I do not know it, but perhaps impurity is permitted for the community specifically when the people are impure (and they will defile the offering after slaughter), but not when the oil itself is impure from the outset? That is what would seem to emerge from the derashah on “If a man shall be impure…” etc., where they expounded: “a man” is deferred, but not the community—that is, it speaks of deferral because of the person.
D. The Rambam’s wording: perhaps, for the sake of peshat, one could suggest that the Rambam emphasizes that lighting is a commandment of the Sages in order to exclude the view of the Behag, who multiplied such cases. And by the way, one needs a source that the Rambam knew of him (him and his work) in order to suggest that in his opinion the enactment of lighting was late.
E. Rav Yagel says that they enacted hiddur in the number of candles as a memorial to the hiddur of pure oil. One can object, with some strain, that although more lighting is indeed more honorable than less, on the face of it these are different types: this one is quantity and that one is quality. Hiddur mitzvah means a beautiful etrog, not an etrog plus a third; and similarly pure oil is “fine oil,” and is not a matter of quantity of oil. If he is right, then seemingly it would have made more sense to enact lighting specifically with olive oil and in golden vessels. If the hiddur on Chanukah is simply to beautify the mitzvah, then it is more understandable that they did not seek similarity to the hiddur of the oil’s purity, but rather to publicizing the miracle.