Objectivity and Subjectivity in Halakha and in General – Lesson 8

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying—there’s a difference here, and that’s why the discussion is specifically about a vow. Because with ordinary actions that I did while asleep, it’s obvious those aren’t my actions. Except in the case of damages, where a person is always considered forewarned, so in tort law he is liable whether awake or asleep. But that’s the imposition of liability, of course—it’s not that he’s really guilty of something, but the responsibility is placed on him, and if you caused damage you have to pay. But clearly he’s treated as coerced—that is, it’s not really his act. With a vow, I think it’s not accidental that they discuss a vow here. Because a vow is some kind of thing that… excommunication, of course, isn’t relevant, because that’s not my act—they do it to me, they excommunicate me—so that has nothing to do with whether I’m coerced or not coerced. But a vow is an action that I do—I make a vow. But here, this vow in a dream really indicates, if it indicates—and that’s what they discuss—that this is in fact my will to vow this, otherwise it wouldn’t happen to me in a dream. So that’s why it’s called a vow. In other words, this has nothing to do with other areas of Jewish law where it’s obvious that if I did something and carried from one domain to another while sleepwalking, I don’t know, on the Sabbath, or I kindled a fire, yes, like in certain movies, some sleepwalker and so on, he runs off or carries from a private domain to a public domain. Fine, then obviously that’s not his act. By the way, on this point, in my opinion this isn’t even an exemption of coercion. It’s nothing. It’s not even a prohibition at all. It’s not his act to begin with. Coercion is something else. Coercion is when you’re forced to do something; here, you didn’t do anything at all. It’s like if someone grabs my hand, right, and hits you with it in such a way that he kills you. Is that called that I was a murderer under coercion? I killed you, but I was coerced? Obviously not. He’s the murderer. I’m not a murderer. The same is true, by the way, if the wind takes me and does this. There too I’m not a murderer under coercion. I’m a hammer. In other words, whoever holds the hammer is the murderer, whether it’s a person or whether it’s the wind—it makes no difference. I think that this isn’t called the act of coercion… it’s not called coercion. I think that in such a case there’s a discussion, after all, about the exemption of coercion: is the exemption because I’m not guilty, or is the exemption because the act isn’t attributed to me? But all those discussions are where I basically did an action and I did it under threat or under coercion, okay? But in a case where an action was done by means of me—not that I did this action—it seems to me that everyone would agree that this action simply isn’t my action. It’s not lack of guilt; it’s simply not my action. In Or Sameach on the laws of the foundations of the Torah, Maimonides says that coercion through illness is like other forms of coercion. And the Or Sameach there in chapter 5, responsum 1, from Manayim, says the same thing. They make a distinction there… I need to think about it; what I said before is not necessarily agreed upon. In other words, there are those who distinguish, claiming that there’s a difference between coercion where they threaten me with a gun, but in the end I decided to do it so they wouldn’t kill me—that’s my decision—versus coercion that simply isn’t in my hands: I was forced to do it against my will, not that I had a decision and because they threatened me I decided to do it, but rather coercion that doesn’t depend on me at all. And they relate to both of these as coercion, but still distinguish between them. I need to check that; I just don’t remember at the moment. All right, I think in logic that’s the most correct thing. The moment they use me, it’s a little similar to the chapter “Ha-Kones” in Bava Kamma 56. There the Talmud says: if one places his fellow’s animal in his fellow’s standing grain, then he is liable. So the medieval authorities there—there’s Rashba and Tosafot—they debate the question why he is liable, after all the animal isn’t his. And in damage caused by one’s property, you’re liable only for damage caused by property that belongs to you. Here you took your fellow’s animal; seemingly you should obligate the fellow, but the fellow isn’t guilty—someone else took his animal. So why do they obligate me? Tosafot says there, it seems to me, that he is liable because this is called his property. If you take the animal and place it in your fellow’s grain, then at least for the laws of damages it’s considered your property, like a pit in the public domain according to Rabbi Yehuda, where the Torah places it under his ownership so as to make him liable for it. And Rashba says this is called damage caused by a person, not damage caused by property—damage caused by a person. You are liable not because of responsibility for what the animal did; the animal didn’t do it—you did it, you used the animal. I think that expresses a little what I said before. In other words, if someone takes me and uses me like a hammer, it’s not that he is liable for the damage that I did or the murder that I did—he committed the murder, actually, not me. I’m serving here as a hammer. I don’t need exemptions of coercion to exempt me; it’s simply not my action.

Okay, so up to now the discussion was about how to relate to dreams with respect to the person himself, both as actor and as acted upon. If they excommunicated him, then he is the recipient; and if he vowed, then he is the actor. What about the outward implications of the dream? Things that happen in a dream—how much significance do they have, halakhic significance, in objective reality, not with respect to the person himself? So that can be regarding prohibitions and regarding monetary law; there can be different discussions. And in fact this is a Talmudic passage in Sanhedrin. The Talmud in Sanhedrin, on page 30, says as follows: “The Rabbis taught: If one person said to them, ‘I saw your father hide money in a chest, box, or tower, and he said: it belongs to so-and-so, it is second tithe money.’ In the house he said nothing; in the field his words stand. The rule is: anything in his power to take, his words stand; not in his power to take, he said nothing.” Fine, that’s one stage less important for our purposes. “If they saw their father…” also less important for us. But this case is the important one: “If one was distressed over money that his father had left him”—that is, he remembered that his father had left him money, a certain sum, but he didn’t know where it was. He was distressed about it; he didn’t know where this money was, it was lost to him, he didn’t know where it was. “And the master of the dream came and said to him: so-and-so much there is, in such-and-such a place it is, and it is second tithe money. There was such a case, and they said: the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” In other words, I knew my father had left me money; I didn’t know where it was. Someone comes to me in a dream and tells me that this money is in a certain place. Fine. I wake up the next morning, go to that place, and find the money. But now what? In the dream they told me—not only revealed to me where the money was, but they told me this is your father’s money or this is second tithe money. Now the question is whether I need to take this money and eat in Jerusalem—that is, buy food in Jerusalem and eat food there with it—or whether I can use it as ordinary money. Seemingly this is exactly the question of the reliability of the dream, and here I have a very clear indication that the dream is a reliable one, because I confirmed it empirically, right? Something was revealed to me in the dream; I went and discovered that it was really true. So this certainly belongs to the category not of idle things in a dream but of something reliable. So then why shouldn’t I act here according to the laws of second tithe? Because the Talmud says: “There was such a case, and they said: the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” Meaning, you found the money, you can go buy Bazooka gum at the kiosk. You don’t have to worry that it’s second tithe. Why? Here there’s a clear indication that this dream was a true dream, a reliable dream. These things are also ruled as Jewish law in Maimonides, in the laws of second tithe, the laws of acquisition and gifts, in the Shulchan Arukh in Choshen Mishpat, and in other places as well—these things are ruled as Jewish law.

Or for example, if someone reveals to me that this money belongs to so-and-so—it’s a deposit that so-and-so deposited with my father. Again, this is monetary law. Now I discover the money. I wake up and go to the place and discover the money that the dream told me about and described to me. Okay, do I have to return it to so-and-so? The answer is no. The words of dreams neither raise nor lower. You can take the money and buy Bazooka with it. Was there no one to claim it? Yes, of course. No, he can’t claim it because he doesn’t know, but I can tell him and then he’ll claim it. But never mind—even if he has some other information and he claims it, no, apparently that’s how it comes out here: it changes nothing. So here there are really quite clear indications that this dream is a reliable dream. So why, why don’t I accept the halakhic information that this dream gives me? Here there is also prohibitory information—that it’s second tithe—and also monetary information—that the money belongs to so-and-so who deposited it with my father. So why indeed don’t we accept it? One could say that still, since you can’t have grain without chaff, you can’t have a dream without idle things. What does that mean? The fact that there’s money there turned out to be reliable, what the dream told me. But who says that this detail, that this money is second tithe, is also reliable? After all, dreams are mixed with idle things too. You can’t know. But it’s not so simple. In monetary law, all right—here there’s a difference between monetary law and prohibitions. In monetary law, you say this money is mine, you claim it’s yours—one who wants to extract money from another bears the burden of proof. You have a doubt. With doubt you can’t extract money. But second tithe is a doubt about a prohibition. A Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. So the fact that you’re in doubt—maybe it is reliable, maybe it isn’t. Fine, let’s say it’s a doubt. Why shouldn’t we apply the laws of doubt here? Here they don’t understand anything that way; they say the words of dreams neither raise nor lower. The expression is “neither raise nor lower,” meaning don’t be concerned—it’s not even a doubt, it’s nothing, ignore it. All right? It carries no weight whatsoever. Why? Especially in a dream like this, where it’s proven that at least one component of it is true. I once saw, by the way, someone who wanted to say: since a dream always has to be mixed, then specifically when it’s proved that one element is true, that’s an indication that the other thing is probably the chaff. As if, if this is the grain, then probably the other thing is the chaff. Well, I don’t know whether that… In any case, it really is a question, really not a simple question.

So there is… yes. And of course this also needs to be checked against the Talmud in Nedarim that we saw, where someone was excommunicated in a dream, or someone who vowed in a dream according to Rashba. Right? So you see that at least they do treat it under the laws of doubt, as we saw earlier. So why here is there not even a doubt? So the Tashbetz, in part two, section 128, says there—he’s speaking generally about dreams, also about the theory of dreams, that there is a reliable part, grain and chaff and so on, bodily vapors and all sorts of things like that—and then he indeed says that one must distinguish between monetary law and prohibitions. In terms of prohibition, we are supposed to relate to it by the laws of doubt, and that’s also how he explains the Talmud in Nedarim. In Nedarim, when they excommunicated you in a dream, then you are in doubt whether you are excommunicated, and you need release. If you vowed in a dream, then maybe it’s a doubtful vow or not—I don’t know how Tashbetz holds against Rashba, like the Ran; it’s not a Talmudic text, only the medieval authorities discuss it. But regarding excommunication, fine, then you have a doubt. So he says: regarding second tithe, in principle you should have to act according to the laws of doubt. Regarding monetary law, out of doubt you do not remove money from its present holder, and therefore once the money is with me and the other person claims it, out of doubt he won’t be able to take the money from me. But what about tithe, where the Talmud says that even regarding second tithe the words of dreams neither raise nor lower? So how, how can that be? Tashbetz argues that there they are speaking about money that was not hidden. The money… when the Talmud speaks about hidden money, that is where the dream revealed to me the existence of the money. But with second tithe money, he says they are speaking about money that was already with me, that I knew about, and the dream only says: this money that you have, that you know is there—know that it is second tithe.

[Speaker B] But he himself knows what money this is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He knows that this money here is one hundred shekels, but it could be that he missed the fact that it came from second tithe. But he knows about the existence of these hundred shekels in the drawer. It’s not that the dream told him there were a hundred shekels there and he really found them. So first of all, there’s no indication of the reliability of the dream, because okay, this is something I know—the dream comes from me—so that’s not strong evidence. The situation where the money was unknown to me and I discovered it because of the dream—that is of course much stronger evidence. Absolutely. But beyond that, he’s not speaking on that level. He’s speaking on the level that once the money is visible money, then basically the presumption is that it’s mine. As maybe we said earlier, I also know—it’s just that I don’t know there’s second tithe there—so the presumption is that this is ordinary money and mine, and I can do with it what I want. So since the dream comes and says that it is second tithe money, that too is considered monetary law. It’s basically like extracting money from me. And in order to extract money from me you need proof; you can’t extract money from me based on doubt. By the way, this is a big novelty in monetary law, because seemingly such a thing is simply a prohibition, not money. But Tashbetz argues that this is a monetary dispute, as though the domain of second tithe is another domain, like the domain of Heaven, and it is disputing with me whether this is ordinary money and therefore belongs to me, or whether it is second tithe money and therefore belongs to the domain of Heaven. Therefore this is really a monetary dispute, and it is judged like “one who wants to extract money from another bears the burden of proof.” There are questions about this in those discussions—whether there is legal standing for charity, in the beginning of Bava Kamma, one who damages gifts to the poor or things like that—there is a Rashba there and other medieval authorities who discuss how to view it: do we view it as a prohibition or do we view it as money? Tashbetz here in any case argues that something like this is called a monetary discussion. And therefore one really doesn’t need to worry about doubts. But if it were hidden money, where it has no status, because hidden money has no presumption that I know this money is ordinary money and can do with it as I please, and the dream comes to remove it from its status—no, it’s hidden money, it had no status at all, and when the dream comes and says there is money there and this money is second tithe, we would have to be stringent. It’s a doubt concerning prohibition, and with a doubt concerning prohibition one must be stringent. And that fits very well with the picture we discussed earlier.

But in Maimonides, Maimonides writes differently. First of all, Maimonides brings this in the laws of second tithe, chapter 6, law 6. There are those who infer from the very placement of the law in Maimonides that this is not a monetary dispute, it’s a discussion in the laws of second tithe. I’m not sure that’s right, because the Meiri brings it in Choshen Mishpat. Even if philosophically I see it as a monetary dispute, but after all even the second tithe—I’m the one who ultimately eats it in Jerusalem—it’s not really a dispute between two people, so I’m not sure the placement of the issue in the laws of second tithe is enough to say that he disagrees with Tashbetz. But look at the wording: “If they said to him in a dream: the second tithe of your father that you seek is in such-and-such a place, even though he found there what he was told, it is not second tithe; the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” And here he is certainly not speaking about visible money but about hidden money, and the dream revealed to him where the money was and also said to him: know that this is second tithe. And according to Tashbetz he should have had to be stringent because of a doubt concerning prohibition. What?

[Speaker H] It sounds even more like he says that he knows that his father has second tithe money, like the Rabbi read.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Even much stronger, right. “They said to him in a dream: the second tithe of your father that you seek is in such-and-such a place.” That is, the person knows that there is second tithe money of his father and doesn’t know where it is. The master of the dream comes and tells him—who is this “master of the dream,” by the way? That’s also an interesting question. Rabbi Margaliot talks about it: what is the “master of the dream”? Some say it is the person in question; maybe his father appeared to him in the dream. There is also an angel appointed over dreams; maybe that’s the master of the dream, I don’t know. In any case, here it is really even stronger. He knows there is second tithe money of his father, and the dream says to him, listen, go there, dig, and you’ll discover it—it’s there, and it’s the second tithe money you’re looking for. “The words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” That is much more extreme than Tashbetz. This basically says that here, really, even if you wanted to say that you can’t have a dream without idle things, at least I would expect the laws of doubt to apply here. Tashbetz is speaking where he knows there is second tithe money, and the dream only reveals to you where it is, and there’s no prior presumption here—it’s money you didn’t know about. Fine? “The words of dreams neither raise nor lower”—that’s a categorical ruling. He also says this in the laws of acquisition and gifts; Maimonides brings it there too. So that’s already monetary law, not the laws of second tithe; it’s not in the book of Seeds, it’s in Maimonides’ Choshen Mishpat, acquisition. “If one was distressed over money that his father had left him and did not know where he had hidden it, and they said to him in a dream: there is so-and-so much, in such-and-such a place, and it belongs to so-and-so, and it is second tithe money, and he found it in the place that was told to him and in the amount that was told to him—there was such a case, and the sages said: the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” Here once again he brings this issue of second tithe. But here it’s not money that he knew in advance was second tithe; here it’s money he didn’t know about, that he was seeking in the first place, as you correctly inferred. In the laws of gifts to the poor there, in the laws of second tithe, it was talking about a case where I knew it was second tithe money, and that’s much stronger. Even so, he doesn’t need to be concerned.

[Speaker B] Here, I think second tithe is attached to the money. That is, if I obligated myself to give second tithe, it has to be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You didn’t obligate yourself to give second tithe. What? Second tithe money means money onto which I redeemed produce of second tithe, it’s—

[Speaker B] specific coins.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s specific money, not a vow to give something. Yes, it’s specific money. So here too Maimonides says the words of dreams neither raise nor lower. In other words, very clearly, Maimonides does not go with Tashbetz. According to Maimonides, a dream has no significance whatsoever. The dream is of no interest at all. It doesn’t even raise a doubt. Nothing. And then of course the question arises: so what about excommunication? And excommunication in a dream—Maimonides brings that as Jewish law: if one was excommunicated in a dream, he needs release. So if, as I said before, this is only to free you from the psychological burden, from the psychological distress, and it’s a kind of therapy—possible, maybe, I don’t know. And it seems to me that what… there’s just one more remark I’ll make perhaps. In Yad Malachi, for example, he says that even in prohibitions the words of dreams have no status. The Zivchei Tzedek brings this from various sources; he goes on at length about this matter of Maimonides’ view. In other words, there are other halakhic decisors who say that according to Maimonides the words of dreams have no significance whatsoever; they don’t even raise a doubt, nothing. The Perishah writes that the Tur omitted the case of second tithe, and Mordechai also distinguishes between prohibition and money, and he omitted the case of second tithe because in his opinion regarding second tithe one really should be stringent—a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. How he explains the Talmud, I don’t know, but he omitted it. And then he brings: “And what Mordechai brought is specifically with tithe or money of that kind, but not with a deposit, where it reaches theft from others.” But Maimonides, chapter 10, at the end of law 3, also wrote that even with a deposit it is like our teacher said: also regarding a deposit, the words of dreams neither raise nor lower. Meaning, if the things are hidden and they tell you that it is a deposit, the fact that this is monetary law changes the picture a bit, because if the money is hidden then it is not in my possession, we don’t know about it, it’s something hidden. Even if it’s not in my house but in a field, it doesn’t matter—it’s not something in my established possession. And now it appears in a dream and they tell me this belongs to so-and-so; one can take it, but that would be theft. This is not like money that was in my possession and the dream says no, no, it’s a deposit, or it’s second tithe money, and so they’re trying to extract money from me that is in my possession. Here no, the money isn’t in my possession at all. So here, on the contrary, I would expect that in monetary law it would be more stringent than in prohibitions. With a prohibition I might say it doesn’t matter, the words of dreams neither raise nor lower—you can take the money and use it for whatever you want.

What does this whole thing mean? It seems to me that what Maimonides says—and here we come to the question of subjectivity, which is our message—it seems to me that what is written in Maimonides is some kind of categorical determination. Maimonides says categorically, entirely irrespective of the reliability of the dream: even if the dream is reliable as evidence, information that reaches me in a dream has no standing in the objective halakhic world. A categorical determination: it has no such standing. Therefore even if you have whatever indications that this dream is telling the truth—not because of the problem that you can’t dream without idle things, that’s what I want to argue. Even if this dream does not contain idle things, if it really is second tithe money and the dream turns out to be reliable, it doesn’t matter. Once the information came to me through the medium of a dream, I am not supposed to relate to it in the halakhic world. Which is a very interesting determination. In other words, it belongs to the subjective world. In the subjective world it has some kind of bubble that functions only within it. Outwardly it has no standing at all, even though—again—it is perceived as reliable. In contrast, with excommunication, where they excommunicated me, then yes indeed, in my own conduct, in my subjective world, if I am excommunicated in a dream it may be that I am excommunicated and I need release. But the moment you assign some status—say, money of second tithe or money belonging to so-and-so or whatever—that is an objective question. If it’s second tithe money then it has laws also with respect to other people, not only with respect to me. For that, dreams have no standing whatsoever. In other words, in the objective world dreams have no standing—not because of the fear that perhaps they contain idle things. That is the great novelty of Maimonides’ view. Dreams have no standing in the objective halakhic world not because of the fear that perhaps they contain idle things, even if they don’t. The very fact that the medium is a dream removes it from the objective world. In other words, it says nothing; it has no standing at all. And that is the meaning of “the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” “Neither raise nor lower” not because they are unreliable—that is a different statement from “just as grain cannot be without chaff, so there is no dream without idle things.” Maybe they are idle things, maybe not. Here we say: “the words of dreams neither raise nor lower.” That means: neither raise nor lower—ignore them. Why not? At least the laws of doubt. That’s what they want to tell you. Because the point is not the doubt—maybe it’s reliable and maybe it isn’t. Even if it is reliable, a dream as such inherently neither raises nor lowers in Jewish law. In other words, it is a subjective medium. Regarding excommunication, then fine, I was subjectively excommunicated, so I have to behave like someone excommunicated. But what would the implication actually be—others? When I ask myself how others are supposed to relate to me—I tell them I was excommunicated in a dream—that relation I’m now talking about changes nothing; it doesn’t obligate them. I need to behave as someone excommunicated. There are laws about how an excommunicated person is supposed to behave. But others are not supposed to relate to me as excommunicated, because on the objective plane a dream has no standing. Not because they don’t believe it, but because it has no standing. If it happened in a dream, it is only a matter within my own domain. It concerns only me. The dream is my own personal subjective domain. What that means for… maybe it means—if there are outward implications, that’s irrelevant. Not because it isn’t reliable.

[Speaker C] Wait, about that—you’re saying that yes, there is? Why with respect to me, legally, is it something? He has to behave as excommunicated?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, it may be that the dream—precisely because the dream is perceived as a reliable medium—so in terms of reliability, yes, it is reliable.

[Speaker C] But legally, why? Categorically, shouldn’t this not be a legal issue?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s my tithe, then it’s my tithe. What do you mean? Then I should act accordingly; it’s just that for others, from their perspective, it isn’t my tithe. Because the proof that it’s my tithe was proof from a dream, and proofs from a dream obligate no one except the dreamer. In other words, they tell you: this is a bit like the admission of a litigant in a place where it harms others. I’ll get to that in a moment. That’s why I’m saying this is the essence of the law. In other words, my claim is actually the opposite: according to Maimonides, it may very well be that a dream is completely reliable. Not that it’s unreliable. It may be completely reliable. And however the dream came to you—whether it was sent to you or arose within you, I don’t know exactly what—you are obligated to behave in accordance with what the dream says. At least in a case where there are indications that it’s telling true things. Again, this is only in a dream of that kind—we’re talking here about dreams where there are some indications that there is something true in them. Like where you discovered the money after waking up in the morning, or things of that sort. I don’t know whether one can infer from Maimonides that if some dream comes to me with no indication at all, just some random dream, then I would also have to act on it—that would be a novelty; it isn’t written in Maimonides. But so long as it seems like something true, the novelty is that although it is true, it obligates only you, only the dreamer, and not anyone else.

[Speaker C] So the Talmud there, “just as grain cannot be without chaff”—what is that talking about? Which law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who was excommunicated in a dream. Someone who was excommunicated in a dream. So the Talmud speaks there about my being excommunicated in a dream and also released in a dream. So since in a dream there are idle things and non-idle things, and you don’t know which is which, it could be that the excommunication is the real thing and the release is the… fantasy, chaff. Then you can’t know; it’s the laws of doubt.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand why Maimonides does obligate in the case of excommunication.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s a subjective matter. I really am excommunicated from my own perspective. My relation to myself has to be as to someone excommunicated, because I’m the dreamer. The dreamer himself is obligated by what was in the dream because there is no problem with the reliability of the dream. It’s not that…

[Speaker B] Wait, but Maimonides says generally that he doesn’t take dreams into account.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t take dreams into account on the objective plane. Exactly—that’s how I reconcile the passages according to Maimonides. Excommunication in a dream is indeed excommunication, but second tithe and money belonging to so-and-so and all the other things—nothing. The words of dreams neither raise nor lower. Why? If you say it’s second tithe or that it belongs to so-and-so, that’s an objective halakhic determination that also has implications for other people. On the general objective plane, a dream has no standing whatsoever. Not because it isn’t true. Even though it is true, it has no standing. But on my own plane, in things that concern me personally, yes. If I dreamed it, then it is part of my world.

[Speaker H] How does excommunication take effect? The Holy One, blessed be He, excommunicated me. But Maimonides says the environment doesn’t care about that. For the dreamer himself, from his own perspective, that is the Jewish law. It’s like self-imposed prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For the dreamer himself, that is the Jewish law—and the true Jewish law. It really is second tithe. Not that you have to behave as if it is… it really is second tithe, but it really is second tithe only from my perspective.

[Speaker B] Not from the perspective of others. Once it’s something that also affects others, second tithe, then even from my perspective it isn’t. Because second tithe can’t be second tithe for me and not second tithe for others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the status is determined according to the objective status.

[Speaker B] But with excommunication, which is relevant only to me… I didn’t really understand this whole distinction, why they change… I understood from Maimonides that he—leave aside for a moment from my perspective or from an external perspective. I understand that he isn’t saying that, because after all with excommunication, he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re arguing with Maimonides; you claim that’s not the interpretation of Maimonides. Fine. Well, that’s what Maimonides says. One can agree, one can disagree, but I think that’s what is written in Maimonides. It says the words of dreams neither raise nor lower—meaning on the objective plane of Jewish law. But subjectively, the dreamer himself, so long as there is an indication that the dream is reliable, is supposed to relate to that dream—yes—as if it gave you reliable information, and act accordingly.

[Speaker B] Logically speaking, nowadays when we analyze such a thing, does that seem reasonable? A person is now going to start busying himself with his dream?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe not reasonable—how am I supposed to analyze whether it’s reasonable? What, I—

[Speaker B] He’s now going to run to get a vow released, to get an excommunication released that he dreamed about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This law has been ruled. This law has been ruled. Yes.

[Speaker C] And the question is about things not mentioned here. Meaning, according to the Rabbi’s principle, if we, if say every—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything that has objective implications on the objective halakhic plane, that’s not—

[Speaker C] But if everything—if I receive, say, if I see in a dream, say, that I know—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, for example a vow in a dream—the Rashba’s responsum that the Ran brought, that we cited earlier, says that someone who vows in a dream needs release. The Ran disagrees; it’s a dispute between the Ran and Rashba. And on this point there is room to say that Maimonides is like Rashba, because a vow obligates only me. The vow that I vow, forbidding something to myself, binds only me. If in a dream I prohibit it to others, that’s another matter, but if I prohibit it to myself, that concerns only me.

[Speaker C] Whoever gets affected by this vow? What? Whoever gets affected by this vow?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I affect others, then maybe yes; the question is if in this vow I vow something that also applies to others, how are they supposed to relate to that?

[Speaker C] Yes, say I see in a dream something that has a direct prohibitory implication on me in my daily life, something else. Let’s say, I don’t know, I dream that a week ago I touched a human bone without noticing. Today that doesn’t matter much, but in Temple times he—

[Speaker B] would have to purify himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? He would have to purify himself?

[Speaker B] Yes. Or for example that I did something that obligates me to bring a sacrifice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I dreamed it? No. If you did it in the dream, that’s nothing. If you dreamed that you did it—if you did it in a dream then you didn’t commit a transgression. But to dream that I desecrate the Sabbath—that is not desecrating the Sabbath. Why on earth would you bring a sin-offering for that? But if I dreamed that in fact I’m obligated to bring a sin-offering for a transgression I committed in real life, only I didn’t remember it, and the dream tells me that I did it—okay, then maybe I really do have to bring a sin-offering, I don’t know.

[Speaker B] But then it’s the same thing with excommunication. If with excommunication I dreamed that they excommunicated me, but it’s not something connected to reality—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but with excommunication it’s not that I do it. The Holy One, blessed be He, excommunicated me, as I said at the beginning of the class.

[Speaker B] Fine, but therefore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He excommunicates me in the dream. How will He convey the excommunication to me? In a dream He tells me about it.

[Speaker B] So basically I come and say that everything that happens to me is something the Holy One, blessed be He, is saying?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not everything that happens—the excommunication. With second tithe it’s not from the Holy One, blessed be He. The dream revealed to me—I don’t know who—Elijah the prophet, I don’t know who—that it’s second tithe. So I should apparently be concerned that it’s second tithe. Where it has implications for other people, they don’t give this money the status of second tithe. But things that concern only me—then indeed even a dream has standing. As I said, even with a vow it could be that Maimonides really could go with Rashba. A vow concerns only me. Fine.

There are—well, I won’t manage to get to this now, so I’ll just say in one sentence—there are other things that are basically subjective dimensions in Jewish law. The banal examples are of course a vow and an oath, the simplest examples. A vow and an oath are things that in themselves are not forbidden at all. You can create prohibitions for yourself once you vow or swear, and in principle that’s only on yourself. An oath really is only on yourself. But a vow, once the property is yours, once something is yours, you can prohibit others from it, you can forbid it. But again, that’s only because the property is yours and you can do with it what you want. So the fact that there’s some implication for others doesn’t matter so much; it still remains within your territory, and whatever is in your territory you can do with as you please. All right? Therefore a vow and an oath are also some sort of halakhot of subjectivity, and of course these are things that the Torah itself introduces. So the Torah itself said that there is such a category of subjective Jewish law in vow and oath. The excommunication in a dream and the second tithe and all the things we spoke about earlier—there is no clear source for that; it is basically reasoning of the sages. But I’m just saying that the fact that there is such a thing as vow and oath means that there is such a category as Jewish law that is subjective Jewish law, that concerns only me. This thing is a novelty. And with a vow this is a prohibition on the object, unlike an oath, which is a prohibition on the person. It’s a prohibition on the object and yet only on me. In other words, that’s not a simple category at all. Usually the accepted view among the later authorities is that a prohibition that depends on time, a prohibition that depends on someone—that is forbidden to one person but not forbidden to another—those are personal prohibitions, not objective prohibitions but subjective prohibitions on the individual. But a vow is an exceptional example, because on the one hand a vow is a prohibition on the object, it’s on the thing itself. The simple understanding of the Mishnah is that a vow is a prohibition on the object, a prohibition on the thing itself, but only with respect to me, not with respect to other people. So that is an example of subjective Jewish law that is indeed real Jewish law, meaning reality itself is such—but only for me; for others, not. But again, of course this is not proof for Maimonides’ view regarding dreams. It’s an example, not a proof, because here the Torah itself said there is such a category of a vow that can create a prohibition for yourself. All right? The Torah said that. But from where do we derive a general principle like this, that things that happen to you in your private domain and in your dream have some kind of halakhic implication, but only for you? About that we’ll speak next time—about “sit and be punished,” and the admission of a litigant, and a few more things of those kinds.