Platonism – Lesson 41 (Last in the Series)

Table of Contents

• [0:00] The connection between Platonism and Kabbalah
• [1:23] A systematic introduction to Platonism and Kabbalah
• [7:28] Duties, rights, and Hohfeld’s table
• [9:54] Ultra-kindness and going beyond the law
• [18:05] Extreme examples of kindness
• [20:37] Communism and capitalism: extreme law and extreme kindness
• [26:10] Platonic abstraction in Kabbalah
• [28:23] Scientific and mathematical Platonism
• [29:49] Physics versus metaphysics
• [31:13] Scientific Platonism and the electron
• [32:24] Mathematical Platonism and metaphysical structures
• [35:29] The Aristotelian approach to Kabbalah
• [47:51] Criticism of metaphysical conduct
• [50:54] The Hasmoneans and messianic Platonism
• [55:35] The Baal HaLeshem and Kabbalah as reality

Summary

General overview

Another lecture was added to the Platonism series, this time dealing with Kabbalah, out of an intuitive sense that there is a connection between Platonic abstractions and Kabbalistic thought. The claim is that almost every distinction that came up in the series comes back again in relation to Kabbalah. A systematic example is presented through the pair kindness–law: instead of understanding kindness as doing good and law as legislation, Kabbalah makes it possible to understand law as acting according to rules, and kindness as acting outside the rules, even when the action is not “good” in the simple sense. From there the discussion moves to the claim that Kabbalah abstracts concepts, and that the Plato–Aristotle dispute can be translated into the question whether Kabbalistic structures are existing entities or just a convenient language. Within Platonism itself, a distinction is then drawn between “mathematical Platonism” and “scientific Platonism,” depending on whether Kabbalistic language has practical implications for decisions in the world and in Jewish law.

The goal of the lecture and its connection to the Platonism series

This lecture was added to the series on Platonism in order to address Kabbalah, on the assumption that it contains both Platonic and non-Platonic aspects. The speaker mentions that he expanded on Kabbalah in other series as well, such as the series on mysticism, and here he focuses on the aspects that touch on the question of Platonism. He presents a “systematic introduction” that illustrates a broad picture through one concept, and sets kindness–law as the axis from which the Kabbalistic move of abstraction can be understood.

Kindness and law: moving from doing good and legislation to rules and outside the rules

Ordinary understanding identifies kindness with doing good, like charity and help, and law with Jewish law and rules of permitted–forbidden–obligatory, and at first glance there is no necessary connection between them. The broader understanding identifies law as acting according to rules, and kindness as acting beyond the rules. So repaying a loan is law, whereas giving something you are not obligated to give is kindness, and a loan is perceived as kindness because there is no obligation to give it, especially since interest may not be taken. The distinction becomes confusing because some acts of kindness are a halakhic obligation, but that obligation is not a legal obligation, and therefore the poor person cannot sue in a religious court, whereas a borrower or someone who was harmed can sue because “the money is owed to them.”

Legal obligation and halakhic obligation, and Hohfeld’s table

The speaker distinguishes between legal obligations that have corresponding rights, and halakhic obligations that do not have another person’s rights standing opposite them. From this he explains why the mistaken impression arises that Jewish law contains only a discourse of obligations. The legal part of Jewish law, Choshen Mishpat and Even HaEzer, functions like any legal system, with rights corresponding to duties according to Hohfeld’s table, whereas Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah include obligations that do not have corresponding rights of legal claim. Against that background, law is defined as legal law, and kindness is defined as an act that is not required by the legal rules, even if it is expected or even required on another plane.

Expanding the concept of kindness and the examples of Abraham and Rebecca

The speaker points to usages in the Torah where the phrase “it is kindness” appears in surprising contexts, such as one who lies with his sister, and explains that there kindness means something outside the accepted system of rules, not necessarily doing good. From here kindness loses its narrow meaning of beneficence and becomes an abstract concept of deviation from the rules, so that both exceptional good and exceptional evil can formally be viewed as kindness. The speaker quotes Rabbi Pinkus of Ofakim about slaughtering three head of cattle in order to serve “tongues with mustard” to the three guests, and about Rebecca, at the age of three, saying, “Drink, and I will also draw water for your camels,” as cases of kindness that represent an extreme deviation from what is reasonable. He even argues that this is not necessarily a practical educational model, even though it sharpens the meaning of kindness as the exceptional.

Absolute kindness and absolute law: communism, capitalism, and combining the attribute of justice with the attribute of mercy

The speaker suggests that the concepts of absolute kindness and absolute law parallel the poles of capitalism and communism. Communism is described as absolute law because it forces distribution through rules, and in that way “turns kindness into law.” Capitalism is described as closer to absolute kindness in the sense that there is no legal coercion to give, and giving remains voluntary. The speaker links these poles to right and left and to the Kabbalistic image of right–kindness and left–law, and argues that neither pole is practical, relying on the statement, “Jerusalem was destroyed only because they insisted on the law of the Torah,” and on the idea of combining the attribute of justice with the attribute of mercy in Genesis through “the Lord” and “God.”

Kabbalah as abstraction: a paradigm case for the question of Platonism

The speaker sums up that the conceptual move shifts the focus of kindness–law from doing good and not doing good to rules and outside the rules, thereby exposing an abstract skeleton that is almost detached from everyday meaning. He states that this is a paradigm case for what Kabbalah does: it takes concepts that have meaning in the Torah, in Jewish law, and in life, and abstracts them into abstract roots, so that the familiar meaning is only a particular case of a deeper structure. This gives rise to the question of Platonism: do Kabbalistic abstractions describe entities that exist “in some sense,” or are they merely human tools of classification and understanding?

Plato versus Aristotle in Kabbalah, and the distinction between mathematical and scientific Platonism

The speaker translates the Plato–Aristotle dispute into the question whether Kabbalistic structures like kindness and law and the sefirot are existing entities or constructs. He distinguishes between scientific Platonism, which relates to theoretical entities like the electron and the electromagnetic field as existing in this world and generating events, and mathematical Platonism, which asks about the existence of abstract entities like a point and a triangle in a world of ideas that does not generate events in our world. He suggests that Kabbalah is usually perceived as a kind of mathematical Platonism, in which the structures exist in a world of ideas and the language is a way of describing reality, but he argues that there are currents that treat Kabbalistic structures as scientific Platonism, where metaphysical considerations influence decisions in this world.

Messianism and practical decisions based on metaphysical considerations

The speaker describes “messianism” as a phenomenon in which decisions in our world are made on the basis of Kabbalistic-metaphysical considerations even when realistic or halakhic considerations would have led in a different direction. He identifies something shared by Religious Zionism and extreme anti-Zionist Haredi society, in that both may draw practical conclusions from metaphysical diagnoses such as “the beginning of redemption” or “the Other Side.” He distinguishes between using halakhic values like the commandment of settling the Land of Israel in a realistic way, and deciding to go “with your head through the wall” out of certainty that the metaphysics will somehow arrange the outcome. As a possible example, he mentions the call to settle Gaza as a case in which religious considerations may go beyond considerations of security and strategy.

A practical rule: not mixing metaphysics into decisions; dreams, Joseph, and Hezekiah

The speaker argues that even if the metaphysical analysis is correct, there is a tradition of not mixing metaphysical considerations into practical decisions, and he presents this as a justification for criticizing messianism that does not depend on the question whether the metaphysics is true. He brings Maimonides’ view regarding dreams as a model of ignoring dream-information even if there are indications that it is true, because it has no place in decision-making. He cites Nachmanides on Joseph, who did not inform Jacob because he wanted to realize the dreams, and the criticism, “What business have you with the hidden decrees of the Merciful One?” He also mentions Hezekiah, who refrained from having children because of Manasseh, and was answered with that same principle.

Trust regarding livelihood as an example of scientific Platonism in everyday life

The speaker states that conduct of the form “I won’t make a living because I trust in the Holy One, blessed be He” is also taking non-realistic considerations into account, and that it illustrates Platonism in the scientific sense, because it assumes metaphysical intervention as a condition for managing one’s life. He distinguishes between realistic self-limitation for the sake of Torah study and relying on the idea that “the Holy One, blessed be He, will help” even though the resources are insufficient, and places that too in the same type of thinking.

A Kabbalistic map of worlds and sefirot: Hasidism versus the Baal HaLeshem

The speaker describes a Kabbalistic system of concepts—sefirot, partzufim, and worlds—as a map of spiritual worlds, and presents a dispute about its nature. He says that the Baal HaLeshem writes that Hasidism sees the Kabbalistic map in an Aristotelian way, as a language that describes the structure of the soul and not a reality of actually existing spiritual worlds. At times this also finds expression in views that dissolve the duality between our world and higher worlds. He presents the Baal HaLeshem, Rabbi Elyashiv’s grandfather, as someone who forcefully opposes this and argues that the Kabbalistic description is a description of existing spiritual reality, and that a psychological reading is “psychology in Kabbalistic language,” not the study of Kabbalah.

The danger of multiplicity and the accusation of idolatry, and the early Shomer Emunim

The speaker says that the question whether there is a religious problem of multiplicity or polytheism arises mainly when one adopts a Platonic position that understands the sefirot and the structures as existing entities and not just as language. He raises a difficulty from Maimonides in the laws of idolatry regarding the worship of intermediaries even if they are emissaries of the Holy One, blessed be He, and argues that there are accepted answers, such as “the Kabbalists owe Maimonides nothing,” and that there is no worship here of entities, but worship of the Holy One, blessed be He, who appears in different aspects. He attributes this answer to the early Shomer Emunim and says he does not have time to elaborate further.

Kant, Wittgenstein, New Age, and the question of the dominance of Platonism

The speaker does not give a statistical answer to the question of how dominant Platonism is after Kant and Wittgenstein, and says it depends on whom you are measuring, while mentioning New Age as a broad phenomenon. He says that Kant and Wittgenstein are in some sense an antithesis to this view, but stresses that the early Wittgenstein says, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent,” without saying that it does not exist. He adds that the later Wittgenstein shows how that about which one cannot speak may nevertheless take part in the way people actually think, to the point of coming close to scientific Platonism.

Halakhic rulings according to Kabbalah: Magen Avraham, the Arizal, and Maimonides

The speaker argues that if one uses Kabbalistic considerations to issue a halakhic ruling where they contradict the regular rules of Jewish law, that is scientific Platonism, because one is bringing the Kabbalistic plane into practical decision-making. He quotes the Magen Avraham in the laws of tefillin, section 32, who says that one does not follow Kabbalah where it contradicts Jewish law, and interprets this not as denying the truth of Kabbalah but as a practical rule not to mix it into rulings. He brings a story about the Arizal, who related to Maimonides as a halakhic decisor to whom he adhered, in order to show that one can be deeply rooted in a Kabbalistic world and still arrive at the same conclusions as a straightforward legal scholar. From this he defines it as mathematical Platonism, which does not change rulings but at most provides a language for description.

Soft and hard Platonism in Popper, and an internal comparison

The speaker is asked about the connection between the “scientific/mathematical” division and “soft/radical Platonism,” and admits that there is an intuitive connection but does not claim a full identity. He describes hard Platonism in Popper as clinging to a utopia that crushes reality, and soft Platonism as seeing a vision without crushing reality, while examining realistic ways to realize it. He says he still needs to think about whether it is really the same thing.

Comparison to secular criticism of Jewish law and moral norms

The speaker agrees that there is a similarity between criticism of messianic-metaphysical decisions and secular criticism of religious people who cling to Jewish law against accepted norms, especially when there is a contradiction with moral norms. He notes that the religious tradition does not accept the demand to subordinate religious values to “humanistic” values, and it obligates the realization of religious values even at a moral cost sometimes. He concludes by saying that the series has ended and signs off with, “Shabbat shalom.”

Okay, let’s begin. There was a request to add one more lecture to the series on Platonism, one that would deal with Kabbalah, because at least intuitively it seems that there’s some connection, or some aspect of the Platonic/non-Platonic discussion, in the context of Kabbalah as well. And in fact I think it really is appropriate to give some attention to that too. I’ll just remind you that I’ve spoken about Kabbalah in a few other series, the series on mysticism and also in other frameworks, and really the fuller treatment appears more there. Here I want to touch on the aspects that relate to the question of Platonism, and I think we’ll be able to see that almost every issue that came up throughout this series on Platonism also comes up in questions relating to Kabbalah. Meaning, we’ll see all kinds of distinctions and claims that arose in the context of Platonism also in the question of how to relate to Kabbalah.

So maybe I’ll start with some kind of introduction. In philosophy they sometimes call it a systematic introduction. A systematic introduction means not to present the whole picture, but to demonstrate it systematically through one aspect or one concept. There is a basic division in Kabbalistic thought between kindness and judgment. Kindness, yes, is depicted symbolically as being on the right side, and judgment is on the left side. I think the Kabbalistic attitude toward this pair of concepts, as opposed to the ordinary attitude we’re used to, highlights very well the aspect I want to discuss here.

So what are kindness and judgment, basically, when we ask a regular person in our everyday context? Kindness means doing good, giving charity, helping one another, and so on. Judgment means there are laws, Jewish law, there are rules: what’s permitted, what’s forbidden, what’s obligatory. On the face of it, if we just asked a person whether he sees a connection between the concepts of kindness and judgment, not so much. Maybe something rings a bell that there’s some kind of affinity or overlap between them, but basically these are just two concepts that don’t seem to have much connection.

If I still insist with someone—think anyway, do you see some connection between the concepts of kindness and judgment?—it seems to me that in the end he can put his finger on a relationship between them. And basically, if you look at it a bit more broadly, though still in a completely revealed and ordinary way, then judgment means what one ought or ought not to do according to the law, according to Jewish law, the law, whatever the context may be—let’s speak in the halakhic context—so from the standpoint of Jewish law, that is judgment. Kindness is something I do beyond the rules of Jewish law. What the rules of Jewish law do not obligate me to do, and I do anyway, beyond the rules—that is called kindness.

For example, if I repay a loan after borrowing from someone, I haven’t done the lender a kindness—if anything, maybe he did me one. I’m fulfilling my obligation according to the law. I borrowed, I have to repay. That’s judgment. In contrast, if I were to give him charity—I don’t owe him money, there’s no legal aspect that obligates me to give him money—so the fact that I give it is not according to the rules, it’s beyond the rules, and that’s why this is kindness.

Giving a loan, on the other hand, is regarded in Jewish law as kindness. Why? For exactly the same reason: because even if you give me a loan and not a gift, even then you’re giving me something you are not obligated to give me. Especially since Jewish law forbids taking interest, so in fact to lend me money is a kind of kindness, because you won’t receive compensation for leaving the money with me; you’re not allowed to take payment for the waiting period of the money. Therefore, a loan is really the clearest act of kindness in halakhic thought. But why is it an act of kindness? Because it’s the giving of money that I’m not obligated to give; there is no halakhic rule, no judgment, that requires me to do so. That is to say, kindness is the opposite of judgment.

From that perspective, kindness is the opposite of judgment in the sense that judgment is acting according to rules, and kindness is acting beyond the rules—what the rules do not explain or do not require, and I do it anyway.

Now, why is this a bit confusing in the Torah-halakhic context? Because in the halakhic context, at least some acts of kindness are obligatory. You could say: there’s an obligation to give charity to the poor in a certain context, in certain amounts, not important now—there are rules, but there is some obligation to give charity to the poor. So then that’s no longer outside the rules; the rules are the halakhic obligation. The rules themselves say that one must give charity.

That’s true, but those rules are rules that don’t belong to Choshen Mishpat. They belong to Yoreh De’ah. The laws of charity appear in Yoreh De’ah, not in Choshen Mishpat. And therefore I still assign this to the realm of kindness, because there is no legal obligation on my part to give you the money, unlike, say, if I damaged you, in which case I have to give you the money because I have a legal obligation toward you. I have a halakhic obligation to give him money, but it’s not a legal obligation.

Where do we see the difference? If I don’t give money to a poor person, he can’t summon me to religious court for not having given him money. Why not? The court will tell him: you have no legal claim against me. Meaning, you can’t sue. He has to give you because the Holy One, blessed be He, obligates him, but you have no right to claim it from him, because it’s not really yours by right. He has an obligation to give; you have no right to receive. In contrast, a borrower or an injured party who claims money from me can go to court if I don’t pay them. Why? Because the money is due to them. Not only am I obligated to give it, but it belongs to them by right.

So this is the difference between obligation—I’ve spoken about this in other contexts as well—there is a difference between a legal obligation and a halakhic obligation. The difference between Jewish law and other legal systems is that Jewish law includes obligations that are not legal obligations. The obligations found in Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah, as opposed to Choshen Mishpat and Even HaEzer, are obligations that are not legal obligations. You can’t bring them to religious court, even though Jewish law still imposes those obligations. Meaning, I am obligated to do it.

I once explained that legal obligations are obligations that have corresponding rights. Every first-year law student knows that there is what’s called the Hohfeld table. The Hohfeld table means that corresponding to every obligation there is a right, and corresponding to every right there is an obligation. That is, if you have a right against me, meaning a right in relation to me, then I have an obligation in relation to you. Say I harmed you—you have a right to receive the money, the compensation. Corresponding to that, I have an obligation to give you the compensation. An obligation always stands opposite a right, even if the other side is not a private person but society. So society has a right to receive something from you; you have an obligation toward society. Or vice versa: you have a right to receive something from society, and society has an obligation to give it to you. That’s the Hohfeld table.

And what confuses people is that in Jewish law there is often the feeling—you always hear that in Jewish law there is a discourse of obligations, not a discourse of rights—and the reason is that this is a mistake, it’s not true. There is a discourse of rights in Jewish law. What causes the confusion is that unlike ordinary legal systems, in Jewish law there is also a discourse of obligations—but there is also a discourse of obligations that have rights corresponding to them. The legal part of Jewish law is built exactly like the legal part of ordinary legal systems. Rights correspond to obligations. The Hohfeld table is there. That part is Choshen Mishpat and Even HaEzer.

There are parts of Jewish law that consist of obligations without corresponding rights, such as giving charity to a poor person, the obligation to pray, the obligation to observe the Sabbath—Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah—which are obligations imposed on me without anyone else having a corresponding right. So that’s why people think there is no discourse of rights in Jewish law, only of obligations, but that’s not true. There are parts of Jewish law in which there really is a discourse of obligations without corresponding rights, but there are also parts that are legal parts, which exactly like any other legal system are obligations that correspond to rights.

So that basically means that when I speak about kindness—I’m returning to the concepts kindness versus judgment—when I speak about this pair of concepts, then when I speak about judgment I mean judgment in the legal part of Jewish law. That is, if there is something the laws obligate me to do, then when I do it I am acting according to judgment. If I do something that the legal rules of Jewish law do not obligate me to do, then I am doing an act of kindness.

There are certain areas that are ultra-kindness. Those are areas in which even the non-legal part of Jewish law does not obligate me to do it. There are obligations of going beyond the letter of the law. Obligations of going beyond the letter of the law sometimes mean obligations beyond the legal part of Jewish law, beyond Choshen Mishpat. Sometimes it means beyond all four sections of the Shulchan Arukh—and that’s things like “so that you may walk in the way of good men,” or “you shall be holy,” or “you shall do what is right and good,” and things of that sort, which are some kind of expectations of me—let’s call them not obligations but expectations—to behave in a way that goes beyond what the law obligates. And here, judgment is no longer only the legal part but all parts of Jewish law; to do something beyond what Jewish law in general expects of me.

How do you define things that legally you’re not obligated to do, but morally you are obligated? Even for example—take despair of recovery. A person finds a lost object and the owner has despaired of recovering it, and you mentioned a few times that according to Jewish law you’re not obligated, but from the standpoint of kindness or morality you are. That’s exactly the definition of kindness, what I just spoke about. That is the concept of kindness: what goes beyond what the law obligates me to do. Yes—the law, the Torah, doesn’t obligate me, but morally I am obligated. Meaning, it’s not only kindness where I’m not even morally obligated but— No, no, the expression “morally obligated” is misleading. Because “morally obligated” is not really obligated in the sense in which “obligated” appears in the legal context, but rather: it is fitting to do it. The things we are obligated to do are usually the things we don’t leave in the realm of morality but already fix as an obligation in Jewish law or in law or whatever. Usually. Of course one can use the concept differently, but that’s what I mean when I speak about obligation.

Meaning, when you speak about being morally obligated, what you really mean is kindness. That is, society, say, doesn’t impose sanctions on someone who doesn’t do it. For example, because you didn’t do it, people may look at you askance, but you’re not obligated. If you do it, you’ll get a commendation, a President’s Medal for volunteering, but if you don’t do it—fine, then not. In that sense it is not an obligation. So that is what is really called kindness.

So in effect, if you look at it that way, it turns out that the difference between kindness and judgment becomes much broader. Kindness, from this perspective, is action according to rules—sorry, judgment. Judgment is action according to rules. Kindness is action beyond the rules.

For example, the Torah writes in a few isolated places—I think two or three places—it uses the concept of kindness in ways I wouldn’t expect. For instance, I think one who lies with an animal or one who lies with his sister—I no longer remember which of the two. His sister. His sister. So the Torah says: “it is kindness.” There, I think it says “it is perversion,” but here the Torah says “it is kindness.” What do you mean kindness? What kindness is there in sleeping with your sister? The point is that it is kindness in the sense that the regular system of rules does not grasp it. That is, this is some kind of act outside the system of rules—in this case, human rules, or human inclinations, or the accepted norms in human society. It is something outside the rules, and therefore it is called kindness.

Now in this sense, notice that kindness has lost its meaning of doing good. Usually, if you asked someone what kindness means, he would say: doing good to another person, that is called kindness. From this perspective, doing good is only a private case of kindness. The concept of kindness is broader; it is a concept of operating outside the rules. Doing good is operating outside the rules, because according to the rules, if I repay a loan I have not done you good; I did what I was obligated to do. When I do good to you, it means I do something for you beyond what I owe you. But now we come to an expansion of the concept of kindness, and the claim is that kindness means action outside the rules. Even if it is an act that is not doing good at all, but perhaps even doing harm—some excessive or unimaginable wickedness—that too can be called kindness. It is kindness in the sense that it is not grasped by the accepted rules; it is not operating according to the accepted rules, and therefore it is called kindness.

Is idolatry kindness? Can it be considered kindness? I think in the formal sense, yes. In the formal sense, yes, because you are violating Jewish law, so certainly it is outside Jewish law. But I don’t think that is the accepted definition of kindness, because Jewish law itself deals with that issue. Jewish law says that idolatry is a prohibition, meaning an prohibition. Kindness is often something that is beyond what one must or must not do.

Now it’s true that in the context of lying with one’s sister, that too is a prohibition, so in that sense that’s why I say you can call it kindness. I think in common usage— But on the fundamental level, yes. There is in Jewish law, for example, the case of a loan. The Torah writes: “Let there not be a base thought in your heart, saying…” Meaning, he is base, one who does not lend to his fellow before the Sabbatical year is considered base. That is, the Torah sees kindness as something obligatory. Like charity. Also in the example of charity, the opposite example: if a person gives more than one-fifth of his assets, that’s not kindness, that’s foolishness. The Torah defines the boundary very sharply.

You’re mixing together a few things. First, “let there not be a base thought in your heart” speaks about someone who does not want to lend because he won’t get the money back. I’m talking about a loan where you do get the money back. A loan where you don’t get the money back—there, seemingly, were it not for the Torah saying it, I wouldn’t think there was any problem at all. What, to give someone a loan when I know the Sabbatical year will come and he won’t repay it to me? Why should I do that? If I want to give a gift, I’ll give one. It’s speaking about the Sabbatical year. No, “base” is speaking about the Sabbatical year. Right, the Sabbatical year cancels debts. Right. So in effect you’re giving a gift here, not a loan. And nevertheless the Torah says “base,” don’t say that. Don’t say that—meaning the demand here is very, very high. One who doesn’t do so—the Torah doesn’t say, fine, do your brother a favor. But that’s only because the Torah says it; the Torah forbids it. But without the Torah—if not for this Torah rule—on the moral level, would I look askance at someone who doesn’t lend you because you won’t return the money? If someone lends you money and you don’t return it, he sues you in religious court, right? Is he wrong to sue you in religious court? He lent it, he wants his money back. So why, if someone estimates that you won’t return the money and therefore he doesn’t lend to you, do you think he is in the wrong? On the contrary—even if you don’t return it, he can sue you in religious court. It’s only specifically regarding the Sabbatical year. Specifically regarding the Sabbatical year there is this innovation of the Torah that commands you to give the loan even though the debt will be canceled.

But I’m saying again: I already mentioned that there are halakhic obligations that are not legal obligations, and you can call that kindness because the obligations are not legal, but that still doesn’t mean there is no obligation. There is an obligation in Yoreh De’ah, like charity. So I talked about that category.

In any case, what comes out is this: the distinction between kindness and judgment stops being a distinction between doing good and not doing good, and becomes a distinction between acting according to rules and acting outside the rules. And acting outside the rules can be exceptionally bad or exceptionally good, yes? Exceptional. The boundary is the rules. The rules are what define something, and exceptional means going outside the rules.

And from this perspective, kindness and judgment become much more abstract concepts. For example, I once heard from Rabbi Pinkus of Ofakim—he once spoke about kindness and judgment, and he brought two examples. He says: the three angels come to Abraham, and our sages tell us that Abraham slaughtered three calves in order to give them tongues with mustard. A tongue with mustard for each one. Now, in a period without refrigerators, and with meat from an animal you just slaughtered—I don’t know how long you can preserve it—and Abraham takes three Arabs who came to his tent, that’s what it looked like to him, three Arabs who came to his tent, and slaughters three calves just so that each of his guests can have tongue with mustard. It sounds a bit absurd, not something I would recommend or educate people to do. No, give him a drumstick, you don’t have to give everyone tongue.

That’s one example. The second example is Rebecca. Eliezer comes with the camels, and she—according to the sages, she was a three-year-old girl—says: “Drink, and I will also draw water for your camels.” Meaning, a three-year-old girl goes and draws water for dozens of camels and for Eliezer. Fine, help him a bit, show him where the well is, but why do you need to do all the work for him? A three-year-old girl should do all the work for him?

So Rabbi Pinkus said that these two cases are cases meant to illustrate the concept of kindness. The concept of kindness is being outside the rules. It’s something that doesn’t sound reasonable, doesn’t sound logical. In this case it really is exceptional beneficence, but it’s so exceptional that I don’t think it’s right to educate according to that. I wouldn’t educate a three-year-old girl to do such a thing. With all due respect, a three-year-old girl. Let that servant with his camels help her a bit; she doesn’t need to do all the work alone. And likewise with the tongues in mustard and the calves. But still, when you want to demonstrate or represent the concept of kindness, you take something that deviates greatly from the rules, even in a way that is unreasonable, because that is in fact the meaning of kindness. Kindness is something completely outside the rules. It is not grasped by the rules. That does not necessarily mean it is a good thing in the practical sense. Meaning, it does not necessarily mean it is the proper model to behave by.

There are also some implications. When I once spoke about these things, I said that concepts of absolute kindness and absolute judgment can be seen in capitalism and communism. Communism, incidentally, is left. Capitalism is right. And that really fits the Kabbalistic picture. Because communism, contrary to what people think, is absolute judgment. It is not absolute kindness. Kindness—usually the perception is that communism is absolute kindness, maybe not realistic, like Rebecca with the camels and Abraham with this—giving everything you have, not taking into account at all to what extent the money is yours, distributing it to all who need it, and so on. That is a mistaken understanding. Communism is absolute judgment, not absolute kindness. Why? Absolute kindness means to give charity as much as needed, without limit. That is called absolute kindness. But communism tried to force me, to set rules that force me to give that thing—so then it is no longer charity. The law says that the money does not belong to me at all; it is divided among everyone according to their needs and not according to their rights. And in that sense, kindness is turned into judgment. Communism is really absolute judgment, and perhaps capitalism is closer to absolute kindness. There are no rules at all. Give as much as you can, as best as you can, whatever you want, but there are no rules obligating you to give. In that sense it is absolute kindness.

And I think indeed those two conceptions—and therefore absolute judgment and absolute kindness are really poles of right and left; even in everyday language this is literally right and left—and I think that fits the Kabbalistic outlook very well. And both of those things are really impractical. “Jerusalem was destroyed only because they insisted on strict Torah law.” Meaning, if you want to determine everything by strict law, the world cannot function. If you want all kindness to be done because the law obligates people to distribute their property, and you leave nothing to people’s voluntary desires, you make everything according to law, then in effect you’ve abolished kindness from the world. You’ve established everything on the line of strict judgment. And ostensibly you’re doing tremendous good here; this is a really good, enlightened, considerate society. No, it’s not a good model. It’s not a good model because the world needs, just as the Holy One, blessed be He, combined the attribute of judgment with the attribute of mercy—chapter 1 and chapter 2 in Genesis, when one moves from the Tetragrammaton to “God.” The Tetragrammaton is the attribute of kindness, “God” is the attribute of judgment, and “the Lord God” is the combination of kindness with judgment. The world cannot endure, as Rashi brings at the beginning of Genesis, unless you neither abolish judgment entirely nor abolish kindness entirely. Neither complete communism nor complete capitalism. You need both the left and the right in some mixture—what today they might call social democracy, in varying proportions.

But Rabbi, Rabbi—yes. Maybe one could explain, Rabbi, that what really comes out is that the difference between kindness and judgment is not normativity, that is, not the existence of an obligation to do it. Rather, judgment is the cultural obligation, it’s what’s accepted, what everybody understands must be done, and maybe it’s even fixed in law, or it’s a cultural rule—everybody does it and no one departs from it. But when you do kindness, you do something beyond that. Here you make a genuine decision, attentive to some norm that you create for yourself, or that you hear, or feel, you have compassion, and then you advance that kindness. Completely. Definitely. And that’s a big innovation—that the difference here is not really about obligation, it’s not that you’re less obligated there. If you’re on a high level like Abraham or like Rebecca, maybe you’re more obligated. You feel more obligated, but it’s a deviation from the culture. I think that somewhat empties the concept of obligation of content. If everyone is obligated, then there’s no difference at all; then each person is obligated at his own level. I call that not an obligation, just labels. I call that no obligation, rather you do it because that is the proper way to behave. Fine, that’s a matter of names, not—

In any event, for our purposes, what I really want to claim is that from this perspective we suddenly transformed the concepts of kindness and judgment—as beneficence and a notion like “what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours,” that is the conception of judgment, as opposed to the conception of kindness—we turned them into concepts that are not connected to beneficence at all. Communism is ostensibly ultimate beneficence, but no, it is absolute judgment. Why? Because it turns everything into action according to rules. Meaning, I shifted the focus from beneficence and non-beneficence to rules and outside the rules, or rules and no rules.

So you suddenly see that we made some interpretive move, or some abstraction, of the concepts kindness and judgment, which have a meaning in ordinary accepted discourse, and suddenly we saw that their logical roots, their skeleton, are something completely abstract. It’s not connected to beneficence and non-beneficence; it’s almost indifferent to the concepts of beneficence and non-beneficence. It’s a completely different concept. And this is a paradigm for what Kabbalah basically does. Kabbalah takes concepts that have meaning in the Torah or in Jewish law or in life, and looks at their abstract roots—one could perhaps say their mystical roots—and in effect transforms the concept from what we know into some abstract concept, of which what we know is maybe one specific expression, one private expression. It’s a kind of abstraction.

And now indeed the question arises: is this basically a kind of Platonism? Because what this means is, as we spoke about Platonism, I take all the horses, extract from them the concept of horseness, because it is common to all horses, and I build an Idea of horseness that exists in the Platonic world. And now the argument between Aristotle and Plato is whether horseness is an entity that exists in the Platonic world, the world of Ideas, or not—whether it is only an abstraction we make because it is convenient for us to think of all the group of horses as expressing the same Idea that we call horseness, but this is a category we created; it is not really something that exists somewhere. So these are exactly processes of abstraction of the kind Plato and Aristotle speak about, and therefore in the Kabbalistic context too we can now begin to discuss the meaning of this abstraction.

Does this abstraction actually describe concepts or entities? Are these concepts some kind of entities that exist in some sense? Or is it only an abstraction that is intellectually convenient for us in order to deal with phenomena, occurrences in the world, types of people, types of behavior—we classify them as kindness and judgment—but not that we understand that there are structures in the world, in the abstract metaphysical world, structures that I call kindness and judgment, and in a moment I’ll elaborate on them a bit more.

So the dispute between Plato and Aristotle is now translated into the question of how I understand the Kabbalistic structures, the Kabbalistic abstractions. More than that: even when I am a Platonist in the Kabbalistic context, and I understand the Kabbalistic structures as some kind of entities that exist in the world, there is room to deliberate about what kind of Platonism this is. I remind you that in the series—you’ll see that almost all the distinctions we made throughout the series will appear here as well. We saw, in the last two chapters or so, I think, scientific Platonism and mathematical Platonism. And I said there is a difference between scientific Platonism and mathematical Platonism.

Scientific Platonism is basically treating the theoretical entities in science as entities that really exist—say, an electron, an electromagnetic field, the force of gravity, a quantum wave function, all kinds of concepts or entities born in physical theory. The question is whether these are only thought-constructs that I use because it is convenient for me to arrange phenomena through them, or whether I understand that I have grasped something here, or certain entities that exist in reality. I don’t see them; I see only their practical consequences, but I assume that they are what exist behind the practical consequences, they are what generate those practical consequences. So that is the question of scientific Platonism.

The question of mathematical Platonism is how I relate to mathematical entities: triangle, point, line, set, group, vector space, Hilbert space, doesn’t matter, all kinds of such things, ring, all mathematical concepts, number, yes? How do I relate to them? Are they entities, or are they mental constructs that I created for myself?

But I said there is a difference between mathematical Platonism and scientific Platonism. Because scientific Platonism—scientific Platonists speak of theoretical entities as entities that exist in our world. This is physics, not metaphysics, not the Platonic world of Ideas. They claim that an electromagnetic field or gravitational force exists here in the world, and that is what causes masses to attract one another. That force of gravity is what produces the phenomena here in the world. Horseness does not produce horses. The physics or physiology of the horse will not use the Idea of horseness in its scientific theory. Meaning, the Idea of horse exists—if, according to Plato, it exists—in the Platonic world of Ideas; it is not an abstract entity existing in our world.

Now mathematical Platonism is connected to Plato himself, the original one—it resembles horseness. When I ask whether a point is an existing entity or a triangle is an existing entity, I mean whether it exists in the Platonic world of Ideas. It is not adding more entities to our science or our world. It has no effect on our world; these are not entities that take part in occurrences. They are certain abstractions that have different expressions in our world. Horseness appears through various horses that are entities in our world. But it is not that horseness now influences the horses and produces events in the world.

By contrast, Platonic entities in science—scientific Platonism—is a Platonism that speaks about entities that generate events in the world. These entities are part of physics, not metaphysics. If you ask a scientific Platonist, he will tell you that an electron does not belong to metaphysics; electron is a concept dealt with by physics. And he claims that this concept is an existing entity and not merely an abstract concept. In that sense it is called Platonism. But the Platonism here does not deal with the Platonic world of Ideas; it deals with physics, with our world. The question is whether these abstract entities for which I have indications of existence really exist, or whether this is speculation and I cannot assume they exist; I just use them because it is convenient.

So you understand that there is a difference—I spoke about this—between scientific Platonism and mathematical Platonism. Now I return to Kabbalistic Platonism and ask: which of the two types of Platonism is it? One could come and say that all kinds of phenomena in the world I see as phenomena, as expressions of a general phenomenon called kindness or judgment. Now that is already much broader than everyday usage, so I have made it into some categorical abstraction. What is the nature of this categorical abstraction? I think that simply speaking, the intention here really is Platonism in the mathematical sense, not the scientific sense. Mathematical Platonism means that behind all these things sit certain abstract metaphysical structures in the world of Ideas that I call kindness or judgment, or worlds and configurations and sefirot and all the abstract Kabbalistic concepts. But that does not necessarily mean that I need to use them when I describe what is happening here in the world. It is only another language for describing what is happening, so I call it that, I describe it in terms of those concepts. Those concepts do not exist here; they exist in the Platonic world of Ideas.

Later I want to argue that perhaps some of the people who incline more toward mysticism—sometimes they call it messianism; in our media language today they sometimes exaggerate or cheapen the concept a bit—but often what is meant by the concept of messianism is those who see those Kabbalistic entities, or those abstract entities, in the scientific sense and not in the mathematical sense. That is, one who looks at them as structures that exist in the abstract mathematical sense is a Platonist. Meaning, he thinks there are abstract structures—kindness versus judgment and sefirot and configurations and everything—but still, in terms of his relation to the world, he can use that language without it having consequences. Meaning, he can understand a little better what is happening in the world in terms of that language, but it won’t have consequences. It is only a language for describing things.

In contrast, there are those who will make decisions in our world, in their daily lives—individuals or groups—based on such metaphysical considerations. These are people who see those abstract entities as Platonic in the scientific sense, not in the mathematical sense. That is, like the electron, wave function, and electromagnetic field—they operate here in the world and influence it. Therefore I no longer really take into account realpolitik considerations, considerations of how one should act on the realistic level, because I have these kinds of abstract demons, so to speak, which are the real picture, and I live there. Meaning, my analysis of reality is in that language, and that has consequences. Meaning, I take it into account, and therefore I sometimes act unrealistically. I act unrealistically because I say: metaphysics tells me this is the right thing, even though physics tells me it is not. The realpolitik considerations say it is not right, but I stubbornly push ahead because I know that Netzach in Hod became mixed with Hod in Yesod, and in the end I will lead the world to its redemption. Okay, I’m just using terms randomly. What I only want to say is that Kabbalistic Platonism too can be understood as scientific Platonism and can be understood as mathematical Platonism. Both are Platonism.

Because one might have said: all these things are only a language for describing reality, they do not really exist. That is the approach we’ll call anti-Platonic, the Aristotelian approach to Kabbalah. There is—in a moment I’ll basically identify it. So that is the Aristotelian approach to Kabbalah. The Platonic approach to Kabbalah says no, these entities are not our constructs, they really exist. Only now the question is that there are two subgroups within Kabbalistic Platonism—the scientific group and the mathematical group, I’ll call them. That is, there are those who see these entities as existing in the world of Ideas. If you want to explain phenomena here in the world, you can be helped by those entities because they will help you understand the phenomena here in the world. But you will not think in that language in order to make decisions here if that contradicts the decisions that would have been made from realistic considerations, from Aristotelian considerations, let’s call it that. Then this is a kind of theoretical Platonism. Meaning, in effect, you act like Aristotle. You make your judgments as any normal person does. You just understand that behind it there are also all kinds of Kabbalistic structures, and one can describe it in that language as well.

And you can be Platonic in the scientific sense. What does that mean? You basically say no—the Kabbalistic forces are the very forces operating here in the world. That is the electromagnetic field, that is gravity, that is the electron, and the events and entities we see here in the world are façades. What stands behind them are the Kabbalistic forces.

Maybe I’ll give you an example of this. One of the things—I once wrote about messianism, and it’s also on the website—it’s some work of my daughter’s, I didn’t write it, she wrote it, but no matter, it’s something we worked on a bit together. I said there that what both Religious Zionism and the anti-Zionist Haredi world, the more extreme part at least, have in common is something that seems to me to be a new phenomenon in the Jewish world: taking metaphysical considerations into account in making real-life decisions.

That is, Religious Zionism is a movement that decided it has a diagnosis of where the world is now going—the footsteps of the Messiah, the beginning of redemption is arriving—and it derives practical conclusions from that. Meaning, based on that it decides what it should do here in the world in practice. Anti-Zionism says no, no, this is the other side, this is Satan’s work, and therefore again it derives practical conclusions from that. So what these two extreme poles have in common is that when they examine what is happening in the world, they examine it in terms of the Kabbalistic, mystical, Platonic Ideas standing behind the events. And not only do they describe it in that language, but those processes are what lead them to their decision. In realpolitik terms they might have made a different decision, but the metaphysical considerations tell them no, we have to join this process of redemption, or oppose this process of the other side, or whatever it may be, even though in practical considerations—and when I say practical I mean not only politics and what is realistic or unrealistic to implement, but from my perspective Jewish law too is part of realpolitik.

So this is something new—what about Shabbetai Tzvi and all the false messiahs? Exactly. This is something new as a phenomenon that is not messianic in the sense of being pushed outside the camp, but as a phenomenon that takes part in mainstream religious thinking. Obviously.

Can I ask a question? A sociological question: when religious people begin and plunge into Kabbalah, are they more likely to be associated sociologically with mathematical Platonism or scientific Platonism? There are such and such. I think that what today is called messianic tends more in the scientific direction. Okay? Because what does messianic mean? It means that he does something which, when I look at it through realistic lenses, seems to me not right to do, but he does it anyway. So why does he really do it? He too understands that realistically it is impractical or not right to act that way, because he understands that metaphysically this is what is required of him to do.

Now notice, this is a bit delicate. Because for example, if I were to join the Zionist movement and there is the commandment of settling the Land of Israel—that for me is Aristotelian, not Platonic. What do I mean? It’s not a realpolitik consideration in the sense of I want a homeland for the Jews just as the Belgians want one. No, there is an ideational consideration here. But I am not making decisions that are unrealistic decisions. The values I want to realize are also values of Jewish law, not only political values or a desire for sovereignty or independent life in a land with my people, which are, say, universal values that every people has. In my arsenal of values there are also halakhic values, like conquering the land or settling the land or whatever it may be, and that’s fine. I don’t call that messianism. As long as the way I implement it is realistic. But if the way I implement it is because I have a commandment, then obviously this is the Messiah and obviously they’ll help me even if I bang my head against the wall—that already starts becoming messianic.

I am not claiming that everyone who is Religious Zionist is messianic. I’m claiming that being Religious Zionist only means that in his arsenal of values he has additional values, including halakhic values, not only national values. But messianism, when I speak in this context, is the question of how you realize those values. Is the direction you choose derived from mystical metaphysical considerations, or are you dealing with matters as they are?

I’ll again give perhaps the example of Zionism. Suppose someone had come to the conclusion that Zionism is not a realistic project, yes, as Ben-Gurion said, anyone who does not believe in miracles here in Israel is not realistic. So suppose I had come to the conclusion that Zionism is not a realistic project. Or alternatively, that even though it is realistic it is forbidden, because it means joining heretics who raise a hand against the Torah of Moses, and so on. That is one halakhic consideration and the other is a political consideration. A person who is not a Platonist would not join the Zionist movement for either of those two reasons. But there are Platonists who joined it anyway. Why? Despite the fact that it is forbidden—that is already almost like Sabbateanism—despite the fact that it is forbidden, but this is the path to bring redemption, because the Messiah is approaching and we must act in this way. Once that overrides the halakhic consideration and also the realpolitik consideration, it means that there is some kind of scientific Platonism here. Meaning, the Platonic concepts take part in your decision-making.

The same with opposition to Zionism. Someone who says: look, basically one could come to the Land of Israel, everything is fine, but we identify at the base of this movement a terrible heresy, a raising of the hand against the Torah of Moses, and therefore we will fight it with all our strength—like Satmar and all the nonsense he writes there in Vayoel Moshe. He takes midrashim and interprets them in a ridiculous way and draws from them enormously far-reaching conclusions. That is Platonism in the opposite direction. You take some metaphysics opposite to Religious Zionism, metaphysics that says: this is the other side. Now in the plain halakhic considerations and in the realpolitik considerations you might say one can join the Zionist movement, but I identify here the other side and therefore I go out on a Don Quixote war or jihad against this process. That too is scientific Platonism, just in the opposite direction.

And the antithesis to those two movements—what I think, where at least I feel I am located, and I think there are quite a few people who, once they understand there is such an alternative, will also find themselves there, maybe connected somewhat to the third path—is that one can relate to halakhic values and realpolitik considerations and believe that one should realize the halakhic values as well, and still preserve an Aristotelian mode of action. That is, I think Platonically, but it is mathematical Platonism, not scientific. I don’t use Platonic considerations in my decision-making. I can describe the processes in a language of Messiah and redemption and so on, but I don’t use redemption as a consideration when I make decisions. I am bringing redemption with my own hands—fine, I can relate to it that way. But the considerations I use in deciding how to bring redemption are the same considerations Ben-Gurion used.

As the rabbi of Ponevezh said: just as Ben-Gurion does not say Hallel and does not say supplication prayers on Independence Day, so I too do not say Hallel and do not say supplication prayers on Independence Day. And in that sense I think there is something here—it really is not a joke to me. That is a very serious statement, something people in Bnei Brak don’t understand. It’s a very substantive statement with which I personally identify deeply. I am Zionist like Ben-Gurion. Even though it may bring redemption, I as a religious person think—unlike Ben-Gurion—that it also brings redemption. But that does not take part in my considerations. I am not interested in what is happening behind the curtain. I am not interested in the plane of practical considerations. In practical considerations I am exactly like Ben-Gurion, exactly like a secular person.

Do you have an example? It’s not a decision of Religious Zionism. I said: within Religious Zionism there are different currents. There are people— You mean in the current you’re referring to, what decision— What? I didn’t understand. In the current you mean, what decision— Someone who says, for example—just for argument’s sake—someone who says that we need to settle Gaza today. Again, I’m not expressing an opinion right now whether that is correct or not. But let’s assume for the sake of discussion that it is not the right step in realpolitik terms. Let’s suppose. Okay, we can argue about anything here. But suppose it isn’t. Yet someone who says nevertheless this is our obligation, and conquering the land, and this is an opportunity because now we already control it, let’s settle there—that, for example, is a case of this kind of thinking.

By contrast, if someone says it is worthwhile to settle there because that way we will deter the Palestinians or achieve more security—that is not—meaning, the bottom line is the same bottom line. The whole question is what considerations you use to ground it. All right? That is one example.

And the feeling—the fact is, just one more second, the fact is that all those who say to settle Gaza, almost all of those who say to settle Gaza, are people associated with Religious Zionism. Even the secular right has almost no support for settling Gaza. That is at least suspicious, that some of the considerations here are not only considerations of security and political strategy. Otherwise the secular right would also join it. There is apparently something here in the religious way of thinking—or call it messianic—that is taking part in this process. Fine, I’m not being judgmental here, only descriptive. I’m trying to describe the phenomenon. Yes.

Rabbi, after all, if a person lives with the consciousness that he sees redemption unfolding before his eyes, and we are indeed at the beginning of redemption, and we really do have to continue tirelessly and settle every part of the land that we conquered, including Gaza—then to come and say to him no, here withdraw, here treat this according to realpolitik considerations, and the fact that you believe that it will be—why should that become secondary? If he really and sincerely sees before his eyes the Messiah knocking at our door, then we need to promote that and do it without fear; everything will be fine.

And I’ll tell you: first of all, as I said two or three times, my claim is not judgmental. I’m not telling him anything; I’m simply characterizing him. I’m simply saying this is his mode of thought, and you can agree or disagree, and maybe I myself might agree with him. But first one has to recognize that there are two different modes of conduct here. One expresses religious Platonism, the second expresses mathematical Platonism, and the third is Aristotelianism—that’s secularity, let’s call it that, or something like it. Okay?

Now regarding the evaluative dimension, I also tend to think that it is not right to act that way. But when I say it is not right to act that way, it is a subtle point, and I spoke about it in other contexts as well—not necessarily because they are wrong, but because both in our tradition and, I think, because that is simply the correct way, we do not mix metaphysical considerations, even if they are true, into our practical decision-making.

There are some examples, and I can’t get into it too much here. There are some examples—for instance, I once brought Maimonides’ approach to dreams. The Talmud says in several places that dreams have some sort of standing, and elsewhere it says they have no standing. Yes, one who sees in a dream that he was excommunicated needs release—the Talmud in Nedarim. On the other hand, the Talmud in Sanhedrin 30 says dreams neither help nor harm. You have a dream about second tithe money and so on, and it turns out the dream is true—you ignore it. And in Maimonides it appears clearly—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but in Maimonides it appears clearly—you simply ignore what happens in a dream, even if there are clear indications that the dream is a true dream. And the explanation is that things that happen in dreams, even if they are true, are not supposed to take part in your decision-making. This is a rule of guidance in religious thought. Not because it is untrue. Again: messianism, from this point of view, is not criticized because it is not right. It may be that in the metaphysical processes you are right. But you are not supposed to take part in that. It is like what Joseph said—the well-known Nachmanides—that Joseph wanted to help the Holy One, blessed be He, fulfill his dreams. That’s why he did not reveal to his father that he was still alive. Nachmanides asks why Joseph did not send messengers to his father to tell him he was alive; he knows his father is mourning him. So one of the answers—there are two answers there, I think—one of the answers is that he wanted to realize the dream he had received. And the criticism that usually arises against Nachmanides is that this is very strange: it is not your role to realize dreams. Leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He, to make sure—You should inform your father that you are alive, because otherwise he is mourning you and you are causing him great pain. You should do—“What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?”—you should do what you are commanded, “what you are charged with,” as the Talmud says, and not factor in metaphysical considerations and what you want to bring about. There are roles for—

And the conduct was always conduct on the realistic plane. The metaphysics he leaves to the Holy One, blessed be He; He is the one supposed to realize it, not us. And in that sense I do see here an innovation both in Zionism, in certain sectors of Religious Zionism, and in certain sectors of Haredi behavior toward Zionism. Namely, they now take dreams, metaphysical visions—regardless of whether they are true or not—as a consideration in the question of how to conduct oneself in the world. That is the point. And this is not a criticism that they are mistaken in their metaphysical analysis, but that even if they are right, that is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, and not ours. We are supposed to act realistically. That is my personal position, but that is already another discussion. Here I am dealing only with description, and on the descriptive level I am trying to illustrate what the meaning of Platonism is in this context.

Now I want also— In your view, were the Hasmoneans Platonic messianists? The Hasmoneans, or Mordechai the Jew who said “if you remain silent at this time, relief and deliverance will arise for the Jews from another place”—in your opinion, are these two examples examples of Platonism? One can interpret it either way. Look, “relief and deliverance will arise for the Jews from another place” really is some kind of prophecy. I don’t know where Mordechai got that from, but if he is in the category of a prophet, then fine—a prophet does act on the basis of—that is the difference between a prophet and someone who is not a prophet. If he is a prophet, he takes his visions and is also supposed to implement them in the world; he acts on another authority, not ours. But he wasn’t a prophet. He wasn’t trained— Again, if he was a prophet, I don’t know where he drew that idea, that insight from.

And the Hasmoneans? The Hasmoneans—that is really a big question. It may be that the Hasmoneans said: the alternative is that we will violate our religion and undergo forced apostasy, so we must go out to war even if it has no chance. Then that is an entirely halakhic consideration, unrelated—not because they knew the victory would be theirs and they made unrealistic calculations. Sometimes you give your life because Jewish law says that in such situations one must give one’s life or one’s mind, not because you are sure you will succeed due to metaphysical considerations despite the fact that realpolitik considerations say you won’t. That is different. It’s not the same thing. So here it’s a question of interpretation.

I think that in traditional conduct one can also see throughout the generations, even when we were not sovereign, that overall they always practiced some sort of intercession and did not build on metaphysical forecasts, even if there were such forecasts. And once there were those who acted on the basis of metaphysical forecasts, it was immediately classified as a messianic movement and somehow pushed outside the camp in most cases.

But what about trust? There are people who say: come on, I study Torah and I won’t go earn a living now because I have trust in the Holy One, blessed be He. That too means you’re working on a metaphysical basis. Completely, completely, absolutely. Absolutely, that is a kind of messianism in the Platonic sense—not messianism in the sense of bringing the Messiah, but a kind of taking non-realistic considerations, Platonic considerations, into account in your practical life. Definitely. It is part of that same conception. Even though, again, here it’s not in the contexts of redemption and Zionism but in the context of personal conduct, it is exactly an example of this. Exactly.

So if someone says: look, I live frugally, I have my allowance and I can live on that—that’s fine. That isn’t Platonism, it’s a realistic conception: I am willing to live frugally for the value of Torah study. But someone who says: the Holy One, blessed be He, will help—even though the two hundred dollars I get from the kollel is not enough for me, the Holy One, blessed be He, will help because I am fulfilling the important commandment of Torah study—that is conduct of this type. And in that sense too it is new. This too is a result of the same new revolution of scientific Platonism, yes? Of the kind of Platonism that sees metaphysical considerations as something that takes part in our world.

Now my subject was Kabbalah and I wandered off into other things, but I hope I clarified the essence of the matter. Because in the Kabbalistic world, and I won’t even have time to get into this, there is a whole system of concepts. There are sefirot: wisdom, understanding, knowledge, kindness, strength, harmony. There are configurations, there are worlds, all kinds of divisions of the spiritual world into components. There is some sort of map, almost like a geographical map, of the spiritual worlds. And on this issue there is a dispute.

Usually it is accepted—the Leshem, for example, writes—that Hasidism sees this Kabbalistic map in an Aristotelian way. That’s my language of course, but that is basically what he says. What does it mean? There really are no spiritual worlds. It is only a language to describe the structure of our soul. Not just an effective language, but basically it describes the powers of our soul. In reality there is no world of Emanation, world of—

Now of course this can be expressed in two opposite forms. Hasidism, which says that the contraction—the Kabbalistic things do not exist; only our world exists. Nothing exists. Everything is divinity. So that is saying the same thing. They do not accept this duality between our world and some Kabbalistic worlds, where those are spiritual worlds, this is a physical world, and each one runs independently. You can say everything is spiritual, you can say everything is material, it doesn’t matter, or material-psychological. But in the end they don’t accept this duality.

By contrast, the Leshem—the grandfather of Rabbi Elyashiv, considered perhaps the greatest Ashkenazic Kabbalist of the twentieth century, nineteenth-twentieth—comes out sharply against this conception. He even has proofs; he discusses this at length. And he basically argues that the Kabbalistic description is a description of an existing spiritual reality. It is not just a language for describing the psychic structure of human beings or processes that happen in the world. These are not theoretical entities, scientific entities in the Aristotelian sense, just a conceptual system that helps me deal with phenomena and entities appearing in the world. Rather, there is some kind of spiritual reality here that we grasp with certain tools, and that reality consists of existing entities. Meaning, this reality is a real existing reality. Kabbalah deals with a reality that is not our reality. There is a correspondence or parallel between that reality and the spiritual skeleton of our reality. This is what is called “from my flesh I behold God”—that the structure of man is some tangible expression of abstract theoretical structures.

But in Hasidism they understand that what exists is only what exists in man. The abstract structures are only a conceptual system that will help me analyze how man thinks and acts, and so on. And the Leshem argues: that isn’t learning Kabbalah at all, that is learning psychology in Kabbalistic language—but you are learning psychology. In contrast, he argues that the Kabbalists, or Kabbalah, are engaged with the spiritual worlds themselves. Many times I make use of how man acts and thinks, and so on, because there is a correspondence between how man acts and thinks and what happens in the spiritual worlds. So “from my flesh I behold God”—from how I behave I can understand what is happening above.

So he was a clear Platonist. He basically understood that Kabbalah is the study of worlds. The popular saying that where philosophy ends, Kabbalah begins, is translated here into an ontological saying. Meaning, in reality itself. There are the worlds—what in the language of the ancient philosophers is called up to the sphere of the moon—Creation, Formation, Action, the three lower worlds, which are the domain of physics and metaphysics. And there are the worlds from Emanation and beyond, primordial man and line and contraction and so on, which are the worlds with which Kabbalah deals. Then there is basically a claim that there are such worlds beyond our world. It is not merely a language for describing in a more abstract way the things that happen here. It is also that. But this language works because it really describes existing structures in certain higher abstract upper worlds, which begin at the very point where the tangible worlds we encounter with our physical eyes come to an end. And in that sense there is here exactly Platonism versus Aristotelianism in relation to Kabbalah.

Rabbi? Yes. Doesn’t this last approach really undermine the whole matter itself? Because if in the end there are such entities, there are sefirot—whether they’re there or here, but they’re somewhere—then what is the difference really? There is no categorical difference between that and what we see here. It’s just that this we see and that we don’t manage to see. I haven’t seen Mars, I haven’t visited it, but it exists. So if there are sefirot, then there’s no metaphysics here at all. Right, that is what I said earlier. What I said earlier was that a Platonist in the mathematical sense can behave just like an Aristotelian. Because he basically makes his judgments just as the Aristotelian does; he only uses Kabbalistic language, but he describes things and makes judgments in light of what he knows here in the world, only he calls it by a Kabbalistic language. No, that’s not what I’m aiming at. That I actually support. I mean: the approach that says there are such entities, there is a sefirah located somewhere, the sefirah of kindness—so how is that really different from what exists here? Here you see a tree and there there is a sefirah. What is the categorical difference really? I don’t know, it turns it—basically it undermines this whole distinction. It’s just a new science.

Again you’re dragging me into a semantic discussion, but in the end call it whatever you want. What we call physics—that is, Platonism with regard to these concepts, the view that they really exist in some sense, not in our world but in some other abstract worlds—that is what is called mysticism or Platonism. But Rabbi, that’s idolatry. If it’s Platonism, then call it something other than Platonism. No, Rabbi, but what is idolatry? When you say there is God, yes, but He is just another force—that’s idolatry, and that is exactly simplistic Kabbalah. The simplistic version that says there are such entities is simply obvious idolatry. Not true. Why is that obvious idolatry? Because it worships something we do not grasp. No, it does not worship—that is exactly the point, it does not worship. It doesn’t matter if it doesn’t worship, it merely admires and is impressed by it, but it uses it—no problem—but it says it exists and acknowledges it. What is the problem? Because it has turned it from a God we don’t grasp into a god we do grasp. It hasn’t turned anything into anything. I think it exists, so what? If I think an angel exists, am I an idolater? No. I think angels exist. I become an idolater when I begin to worship angels. But the closer this comes to divinity, the more I lower Him. You already lowered Him to the sefirot and lowered Him to the angels, and little by little we’ll lower the Infinite as well.

That is another discussion, one I really won’t be able to get into here: the question whether there is indeed some kind of concretization or multiplicity here, polytheism in some sense, and then whether there is a religious problem in the Kabbalistic conception. But that question really arises only if you are a Platonist. Meaning, if you are a Platonist and you understand that these are existing entities and not merely a language for describing our reality, then now the question starts arising how legitimate these beliefs are.

So first: if you worship them, that may indeed raise more of a problem. If you do not worship them, I do not think that raises a problem. But the conception itself—well, I don’t have time to get into it, I’ll just say it in one sentence. The conception is basically this question: the Kabbalists were always challenged from Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry, where he says that if we worship intermediaries like the stars, the sun, the moon, and so on, that too is called idolatry, even though we see them as agents of the Holy One, blessed be He. That too is called idolatry. So in that sense Kabbalah is a kind of idolatry, even though you see everything as garments or as agents of the Holy One, blessed be He.

And the claim—Shomer Emunim HaKadmon speaks about this, and many others too—is first of all that the Kabbalists owe nothing to Maimonides. The fact that Maimonides decided that this is idolatry doesn’t mean they agree with him; they are not required to agree with him. That is one thing. Second, they do not really worship these things. They worship the Holy One, blessed be He, who appears to us through various faces—kindness and judgment and strength and harmony and victory and so on—and they address Him in different ways each time they want to address a different aspect of Him. But it is all Him; there is no multiplicity here and nothing of the sort, only different forms of relating to Him. But really this needs more expansion, and I won’t have time to get there. I think we’ll suffice with this just to clarify the implications of Platonism for Kabbalah.

That’s it. Well, Rabbi, I have a question. How dominant is the Platonic conception today after Immanuel Kant and Wittgenstein? Is this really still strong in philosophy today, or— I don’t know. First of all, I haven’t taken a survey, but it also depends on among whom. I don’t know how many of these there are and how many of those. Today there is a huge amount of New Age, for example, which is completely in—I don’t know—Platonic worlds; I’d even say imaginary ones. So it depends whom you’re measuring. Are you talking about people? Philosophers? Scientists? The whole world? I don’t know how to answer such a question. Obviously there are such views and there are views that aren’t such. How much of each and where—I don’t know, I haven’t checked.

You are right that Kant and Wittgenstein are in a certain sense an antithesis to this conception. Meaning, one who adheres to their philosophies probably won’t be such a person. Though notice that Wittgenstein, at least the early one, ends his Tractatus by saying: whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. He does not say it does not exist; he says only that we have nothing to say about it, which actually could be a Platonic conception.

But okay, that already—and late Wittgenstein even speaks about it, and that really throws out the baby with the bathwater, because in talking about following a rule and things like that, he basically shows you that when you relate to those things about which one cannot speak, in the terms of early Wittgenstein, they are actually what leads you and takes part in the way you actually think—which is really even scientific Platonism, not only mathematical. So Wittgenstein is an interesting case, the development he underwent, even the early one, and certainly the later. But that is another discussion.

Rabbi, may I ask? Yes. First of all, thank you very much. Well, but that is another discussion. Rabbi, may I ask? Yes. First of all, thank you very much for the lecture. I wanted to ask about halakhic rulings based on Kabbalah. That is, sometimes Kabbalah really does have consequences. Meaning, one who accepts that it has practical consequences according to Jewish law, sometimes even contrary to what you might call traditional Jewish law—would that be considered scientific or mathematical Platonism?

So here I think this is exactly where one can apply what we saw in the lecture now. Meaning, if you believe there is a parallel Kabbalistic plane, a spiritual plane, the question is what you do with it. That is, if you use it to issue a halakhic ruling—now I’m not speaking about reality but about Jewish law, but the logical structures are the same structures—if you use it to issue a halakhic ruling even where the regular rules of Jewish law are contradicted in this way, meaning against the regular rules of Jewish law, then you are a scientific Platonist. You are basically using Kabbalistic considerations also on the practical plane. Practical here means not what you do in the world but what you do in Jewish law, that is, how you conduct yourself halakhically.

And in my opinion that is forbidden to do, like the Magen Avraham in the laws of phylacteries in section 32, who says that we do not follow Kabbalah where it contradicts Jewish law. And again, that is not because Kabbalah is untrue, but because we are not supposed to take Kabbalistic considerations into account when we make practical decisions, or when we make halakhic decisions, just like dreams, as I mentioned in the earlier examples. One who takes those considerations into account is basically the scientific Platonist; he is messianic in the sense I described before.

By contrast, a person might describe that same process of halakhic ruling in Kabbalistic language, but he reaches the same conclusions as the master of the revealed law. That is a person who is a Platonist in the mathematical sense, not the scientific sense. And that is legitimate; that can be fine. There is even a story that the Ari would relate to Maimonides as the halakhic authority to whom he adhered, even though Maimonides did not know Kabbalah at all and certainly did not use Kabbalistic considerations. So how can one understand that? Because the Ari understood that Maimonides, since he was a great halakhic figure, then presumably what he says will also fit the Kabbalistic considerations. And that shows you exactly that you can be deeply rooted in the Kabbalistic world, but your rulings will look exactly like the rulings of someone focused on the revealed law. That is mathematical Platonism. If you reach conclusions opposite to the revealed halakhah, against Maimonides—Maimonides as an example, yes—against the revealed halakhah, then you are a scientific Platonist. And someone who does not recognize Kabbalah at all and only makes revealed-law considerations is Aristotelian.

Rabbi, the use you made in this lecture of scientific and mathematical Platonism—is that what you used in earlier lectures in parallel to soft Platonism and radical Platonism? There is a connection. I need to think about it more, but there is a connection. I see the connection; I still need to think for a moment whether it is exactly the same thing or not. Because hard Platonism is what Popper warned against: the view that you cling to some Platonic utopia and crush the world in order to realize it, and from that come all the extreme and violent movements and so on. So what is soft Platonism? Soft Platonism is someone who basically says: I see the vision before my eyes, but I do not use it to crush reality. Rather, I want to realize the vision, but when I examine the ways of doing it I do so according to considerations that will not crush reality; I also look at what is happening here in reality. So in that sense it is very similar. Whether it is exactly the same thing or not, my inclination is to think not, but I need to think why exactly. I need to think about it more.

Rabbi, this duality still isn’t clear to me. It’s really as if a person is living a certain lie. If a person believes that all these Platonic concepts exist, then to say “I will make some artificial internal disconnect, some compartmentalization, and I will act only according to what I see with my eyes”— I agree. That is exactly the claim. I agree with what you’re saying; that is exactly the claim of the messianists or the scientific Platonists. They basically say: if the reality is that redemption is now taking place, my diagnosis is correct, then why not take that into account? After all, I know what will come out. And I claim that there is a kind of scriptural decree here; this is a bit of an upside-down argument. I am not coming against them in the name of saying they are wrong and I am right. On the contrary, I am saying to them: even if you are right, you are forbidden to behave this way. Because it is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, to realize metaphysical visions. That is not our role, even if it may be true, and maybe the Holy One, blessed be He, will now take these things where He wants to take them. You are not supposed to make those calculations, just like Joseph with fulfilling the dream. After all, the dream is correct—but the dream is correct.

What can the son do and not sin? He’s knocking on our door, the Messiah is knocking, I see him knocking. And now they tell me: ignore that, act according to rational considerations. I’m in the middle of answering you. This is exactly what happens with Joseph. Joseph saw in his dream the dreams, right? That his brothers bow to him and his parents bow before him. What can the son do and not sin? So he understands that this is what is happening. So why not act to realize that thing? The answer: because it is not your role. It is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He. You should do what you are commanded. What the Talmud says: “What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?” Hezekiah knows what will happen with his son, with Manasseh. Therefore he says: I won’t engage in procreation, because I know what will come from there. They tell him: “What have you to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?” And in the end Manasseh came out. He was right—it’s not that his vision was wrong. But still Isaiah says to him: you do your role and the Holy One, blessed be He, will take care of the metaphysics. You are not supposed to take care of metaphysics. It is some kind of decree. You have to understand: I am not coming in the name of reason. On the contrary, reason works with the messianists—if they are right. Meaning, assuming they are right. One can argue about whether they are right, but assuming they are right, the claim is not that you are not working with reason, but that there is a decree of scripture not to do so. “Decree of scripture” here in a metaphorical sense—that is, a division of roles. That is the claim.

Besides that, of course personally I also have criticism of them because I am not at all sure they are right. They somehow feel they are deciphering metaphysics and spiritual processes with too much confidence. As if it is clear to them what is going to happen and how it will happen and that it will succeed, and so on. I do not agree with the determination itself. But I’m saying my criticism of them is double. First, I’m not at all sure you are right. Second, even if you are right, that is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He. You do what you can but from realpolitik considerations.

Rabbi, could one argue that the criticism or description given now in the lecture regarding those messianic people, messianic positions that derive practical things in reality from their theory and crush reality—maybe that is somewhat similar to what secular people claim against religious people when they take Jewish law into account? Meaning, a person who adheres to Jewish law and acts in a way that somewhat contradicts the norms? There is something like that here. Exactly. Where it contradicts the norms, yes. Where it is merely additional norms that the secular person does not accept, then probably not. In the place where it contradicts, for example, moral norms, then yes—a very similar claim. Meaning, what is a very similar claim? The secular person does not accept at all the existence of the metaphysical-theological layer. But he can also make an additional claim: even if it is true, it should not override moral norms. Then again, it really is the same double claim, like what I said earlier about messianism. Yes.

But in that way there is some sort of demand to be, let’s call it, a scientific humanist? Tradition—the religious tradition—does not accept that claim. The religious tradition says: if there are religious values, it is incumbent upon us to realize them. Yes. Even at a moral cost sometimes. Not humanistic values. Yes. And truly in a certain sense not humanistic also in the sense that it is not human—not human being, that is, not humanistic in the sense that it does not begin and end with man. Okay.

Good Sabbath. The series is over. Yes. Thank you for the whole big, important series. Maybe the Rabbi will devote some lecture, series, mini-series, to really expand on the topic of Kabbalah and Hasidism and the dangers or advantages and the contexts, because the Rabbi touched on it here and there. Maybe. I’ll think about it. Okay. Goodbye, good Sabbath.