Talmud, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 1

Table of Contents

• The structure of the lectures, recordings, and summaries
• Study partnerships around the lecture
• Opening the eighth chapter of Yoma and the five afflictions
• The language of “forbidden” in the Mishnah and the law of a partial measure
• The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish and the definition of the role of legal measures
• Measures by volume and the question of converting them into grams
• The baraita of “any fat” and the status of the source versus an asmachta
• The distinction between half a quantity and half an act: Sefat Emet and Meiri in the laws of the Sabbath
• Jerusalem Talmud Terumot: Reish Lakish agrees on Yom Kippur and the obligation of affliction
• Maimonides on leaven on Passover and the Maharalnach’s explanation regarding time-bound prohibitions
• After the break: two conceptions of the prohibition of a partial measure and the implication for choosing the lesser prohibition
• General principles and the count of the commandments: beautifying a commandment, intention, and a partial measure
• Nachmanides on sexual proximity prohibitions and a partial measure as partial enjoyment
• “Fit to be combined” as a basis for understanding the quality of the prohibition and combination
• The relationship between reasoning and exposition: the rationale of the verse and the need for a verse
• Access to the summaries and conclusion

Summary

General Overview

The lecture takes place as part of a sequence of three weekly meetings—Sunday, Monday, and Thursday—on the assumption that anyone who enrolled is following the whole sequence and making up missed classes through recordings and written summaries. The lecturer writes up a summary and sends it after the class, and while the summary model is unavailable the summaries will be uploaded to Dropbox and the recordings will appear on the Responsa and Articles website under video lectures for the eighth chapter of Yoma, Talmud, 5781. There is also an option to arrange study partnerships around the lecture. After that, they begin the first topic in Yoma chapter 8: the measures for eating and drinking on Yom Kippur and the law of a partial measure, the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, and its implications for defining legal measures, for distinguishing between half a quantity and half an act, and for the relationship between reasoning and exposition in the source of the prohibition of a partial measure.

The Structure of the Lectures, Recordings, and Summaries

The course runs as a chain of three consecutive lectures each week, on Sunday, Monday, and Thursday, and someone who registered for only one lecture does not really fit the framework, because the learning progresses in order. The lecturer records the lectures and also summarizes them in writing, and after the class he sends a recording and an organized summary for review and for making up a missed session. In the absence of the summary model, the summaries will go into Dropbox, and the recordings will be on the Responsa and Articles website under video lectures, in the eighth chapter of Yoma, Talmud, 5781, while checking whether there will also be a recording at the institute.

Study Partnerships Around the Lecture

The lecturer assumes that people are also studying around the lecture itself, and he suggests that anyone looking for a study partner should arrange one with participants in the lecture forum, subject to matching schedules so they can study on Zoom in preparation and review. The relevant pool for finding a study partner is the people attending the lecture itself, because others in the study hall are not necessarily learning the same sequence.

Opening the Eighth Chapter of Yoma and the Five Afflictions

The Mishnah opens by stating that Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations. Eating and drinking are Torah-level afflictions carrying karet, while with regard to the first four additional afflictions there is a dispute whether they are Torah-level without karet or rabbinic. The Mishnah sets the measure of liability on Yom Kippur for eating as a large date with its pit, and for drinking as a cheekful, and teaches that all foods combine for the measure of eating and all drinks combine for the measure of drinking, but eating and drinking do not combine with one another. From these measures it seems straightforward that someone who eats less than the required measure does not violate a Torah prohibition in the full punishable sense and is not liable to karet.

The Language of “Forbidden” in the Mishnah and the Law of a Partial Measure

The Talmud asks how the Mishnah can say “forbidden,” when eating and drinking on Yom Kippur incur karet, and it answers in the name of Rabbi Ila or Rabbi Yirmiyah that the Mishnah was needed for a partial measure, and therefore used the language of prohibition without punishment. It is explained that understanding “forbidden” does not require us to say this is only a rabbinic prohibition; it can indicate a Torah prohibition with no punishment attached. So that wording fits Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that a partial measure is forbidden by the Torah even though there is no punishment for it. As for Reish Lakish, who holds that a partial measure is permitted by the Torah, the Talmud explains that he agrees it is rabbinically forbidden, and so the Mishnah can still say “forbidden” even according to his view.

The Dispute Between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish and the Definition of the Role of Legal Measures

In the Talmud on 74a, Rabbi Yohanan says that a partial measure is forbidden by the Torah, “since it is fit to be combined, he is eating a prohibition,” while Reish Lakish says it is permitted by the Torah, “the Merciful One said ‘eating,’ and that is not present here.” It is suggested that the dispute depends on how one understands the legal measure: Reish Lakish sees the measure as defining the very act of eating, so less than the measure is not the act of eating that the Torah prohibited; whereas Rabbi Yohanan sees even less than the measure as an act of eating and therefore prohibited, with the measure relating to punishment and not to the essence of the prohibition itself. It is noted that Jewish law is ruled like Rabbi Yohanan, that a partial measure is forbidden by the Torah in all Torah prohibitions in principle, and that “partial measure” does not mean specifically half, but anything less than the required measure.

Measures by Volume and the Question of Converting Them into Grams

It is explained that the accepted legal measures are measured by volume, not by grams, and that converting them into grams depends on the type of food and on issues like different weights for the same volume and air gaps, just as an olive-bulk of matzah is commonly measured by the volume of crushed matzah and not a whole matzah sheet. A rough estimate is mentioned, around thirty in relation to the measures, but it is emphasized that an exact conversion is not simple and depends on different methods, including differences between Sephardim and Ashkenazim.

The Baraita of “Any Fat” and the Status of the Source Versus an Asmachta

Rabbi Yohanan challenges Reish Lakish from a baraita that derives from “any fat” that there is also a warning against a koy and against a partial measure, even though they do not incur punishment, and from this it emerges that there is a scriptural source for the prohibition of a partial measure. Reish Lakish replies that the prohibition is rabbinic and the verse is merely an asmachta, while according to Rabbi Yohanan the verse supports a Torah prohibition. The point is stressed that the Talmud does not see a contradiction between the conceptual reasoning of “fit to be combined” and the exposition from “any fat”; rather, it treats the reasoning as the rationale of the verse, directing us to what the verse comes to include.

The Distinction Between Half a Quantity and Half an Act: Sefat Emet and Meiri in the Laws of the Sabbath

Sefat Emet is cited at the beginning of tractate Shabbat, where he distinguishes between a partial measure and half a labor, and suggests that someone who performed lifting without placement has done “half a labor,” which is not necessarily forbidden by the Torah in the same way as a partial measure, unlike eating, which is a complete act done with an insufficient quantity. Sefat Emet mentions that there is an opinion—the Chacham Tzvi, responsum 86—that the Torah prohibition of a partial measure was said only with respect to eating prohibitions, but he notes that from Rashi and later authorities it appears that on the Sabbath too a partial measure is forbidden. Still, the distinction remains: lifting without placement is not a partial measure but half a labor. Meiri is cited as hesitating regarding carrying two cubits in the public domain and baking in a partial measure, and he distinguishes between a complete act performed with a partial measure, where the prohibition of a partial measure applies, and an act that is itself incomplete, which does not fall under the category of a Torah-level partial measure.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot: Reish Lakish Agrees on Yom Kippur and the Obligation of Affliction

It is stated that in Jerusalem Talmud Terumot chapter 6, it says that Reish Lakish agrees regarding Yom Kippur that a partial measure is forbidden by the Torah. The accepted explanation is that on Yom Kippur there is no explicit negative prohibition on eating; rather, there is a commandment to afflict oneself, and therefore partial eating undermines the affliction itself and is defined as half of a prohibited result, not half of an “eating” act. It is emphasized that this stands in tension with the Babylonian Talmud, which applies the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish to Yom Kippur as well, but the possibility is noted of understanding Yom Kippur as belonging to a different structure of prohibition, one that depends on the result in the person.

Maimonides on Leaven on Passover and the Maharalnach’s Explanation Regarding Time-Bound Prohibitions

Maimonides is cited in the Laws of Leaven and Matzah, chapter 1, law 7, where he rules that one who eats even the slightest amount of leaven on Passover violates a Torah prohibition, based on “leaven shall not be eaten,” which serves as an inclusion for a partial measure. But one is liable to karet or a sacrifice only for an olive-bulk, and for less than an olive-bulk intentionally one receives disciplinary lashes. The Mishneh LaMelekh asks why a special verse is needed for leaven if a partial measure is already forbidden by the Torah in all prohibitions, and he brings the Maharalnach’s answer in responsum 51: a partial measure is learned from forbidden fat, which is a prohibition not dependent on time, whereas leaven is a time-dependent prohibition, and therefore a special verse was needed to prohibit a partial measure there. That raises a difficulty as to how this can be reconciled with Yom Kippur, which is also time-dependent, and reference is made to a longer resolution in the lecturer’s article on leaven on Passover, which will be linked in the summary.

After the Break: Two Conceptions of the Prohibition of a Partial Measure and the Implication for Choosing the Lesser Prohibition

After the break, the lecturer raises two possibilities for understanding the prohibition of a partial measure: either it is an extension of the original prohibition itself—say, the prohibition of pork—without punishment, or it is a new and independent prohibition called “the prohibition of a partial measure.” It is said that if it is a new prohibition, a question arises as to why it is not counted among the commandments; and if it is merely an extension, then one can ask why there is no punishment when the original prohibition exists. Nachmanides is cited in Torat HaAdam, Sha’ar HaMichush, where he prefers feeding a sick person less than the required measure at a time in order to reduce the severity from prohibitions carrying karet or lashes to mere prohibition. This leads to a discussion of why we say “choose the lesser prohibition” between untithed produce and terumah if in both cases we are dealing with a partial measure. Nachmanides suggests either that even with less than the measure the hierarchy of severity remains in place according to the punishments attached to the full measure, or that the rule of choosing the lesser prohibition applies when one needs to reach the full measure through combination.

General Principles and the Count of the Commandments: Beautifying a Commandment, Intention, and a Partial Measure

A possibility is suggested that broad principles that apply across all commandments are not counted as independent commandments within the 613, similar to beautifying a commandment and the rule that commandments require intention. It is said that beautifying a commandment is viewed as a full obligation even though it does not prevent fulfillment of the core commandment, just as tekhelet does not prevent the white strings, but failing to have it still cancels a positive commandment in its own respect. So the fact that something is not counted may stem from its being a broad principle governing the way commandments are fulfilled. In that context it is suggested that even if a partial measure were understood as an independent prohibition, it still might not be counted because it is a broad principle affecting the entire system of prohibitions.

Nachmanides on Sexual Proximity Prohibitions and a Partial Measure as Partial Enjoyment

Nachmanides is cited in his glosses to Sefer HaMitzvot, prohibition 353, where he suggests that sexual proximity prohibitions may be Torah-level by force of the principle, “whenever one derives benefit from a prohibition, it is itself prohibited, as with a partial measure.” It is suggested that if the prohibition is defined as a prohibition on enjoyment and on the result in the person, rather than on the act of eating, then one can understand that even Reish Lakish would agree with it, similar to the explanation of the Jerusalem Talmud on Yom Kippur, because here the “half” expresses half a result of enjoyment, not half of an “act” that is defined by a measure.

“Fit to Be Combined” as a Basis for Understanding the Quality of the Prohibition and Combination

It is explained that the meaning of “fit to be combined” is that when one eats less than the required measure, the quality of the prohibition is already present, and only the quantity is lacking; therefore the parts can be combined to reach the measure that creates liability, and from that we learn that each part is itself forbidden by the Torah. From this it is concluded that the prohibition is an extension of the original prohibition and not a new prohibition, because the quality of the prohibition of pork or fat already exists in each part. This distinction connects with Sefat Emet’s distinction between quantitative combination of the same quality and combination of two different qualities, like lifting and placement, where what is lacking is the quality of the labor and not just the quantity.

The Relationship Between Reasoning and Exposition: the Rationale of the Verse and the Need for a Verse

It is argued that there is no contradiction between reasoning and an exegetical source, because expositions themselves rely on reasoning in order to determine what the inclusion comes to teach, and the verse provides the binding framework for that inclusion toward which the reasoning points. It is explained that the notion of “why do I need a verse? It is pure logic” does not eliminate the need for a verse, because logic is not always enough on its own to create a new Torah prohibition; rather, it helps identify the content of the inclusion, and the verse confirms and obligates that extension. In preparation for the next lecture, the audience is asked to study the first part of the table in the summary, and also Tosafot, Tosafot Yeshanim, and other commentators on the passage, focusing on the relationship between the exposition from “any fat” and the reasoning of “fit to be combined.”

Access to the Summaries and Conclusion

The summaries are in the institute’s Dropbox through the link under the Elul program table, under the lecturer’s name and in the course for the eighth chapter of Yoma. In closing, it is said that expositions generate halakhic innovation through the power of the verse, and that the claim that all expositions are nothing more than asmachta has no basis. And with that, they conclude and say goodbye.

Most of this is being recorded now, yes. Most of the classes. I’ll also make another attempt with Spotlight. Binyamin, I’m putting on Spotlight, not sure what will come of it. The classes run as a series of three in a row: Sunday, Monday, and Thursday. So in principle, whoever participates in these classes is supposed to accompany us through all three classes over the course of the week. Most of the other classes in the institute are once a week, but there are three such chains that give three classes. This is one of them. So just take note: if someone registered for only one class, that’s not really worthwhile. We’re going in order, and you need to join us for all three classes. So anyone who wasn’t aware of that should check afterward whether it works for them and decide whether they’re joining or not joining, but in principle we continue consecutively. That’s Sunday, Monday, and Thursday. That’s one thing. Second, I record the classes and also summarize them in writing. I send them out after the class. You’ll have available to you both a recording and a written summary, overall written in an organized way, so that you can use it if you want to review or make up a class you couldn’t attend or something like that. During the year this goes up on Moodle, but right now we don’t have Moodle, so the summaries will go into Dropbox, and the recordings will be on my site under video lessons. I know, maybe it will also be at the institute, I still don’t know how they’re handling the Elul recordings when we don’t have Moodle, I need to check. It could be that there will also be a recording at the institute itself; I’ll check that. In any case, it will appear on my site, so you can also get it from there. Go into Video Lessons; the site is called Responsa and Articles. If you type that in, I think it’s the first result that comes up. Under Video Lessons, chapter eight of Yoma. Chapter eight of Yoma, Talmud 5781, yes—as distinct from chapter eight of Yoma from previous years. Those are different classes. Okay, so as I said, the summaries will be in Dropbox. The recording—I’ll still check whether it will also be at the institute, and if not then in any case on my site. That’s an option for making up classes you missed; because of the continuity, that’s more important. If someone missed a class, then it’s worth making up the class they missed, because afterward they’re rejoining us on the basis of the missing class. One last thing regarding study partners: if someone wants a chavruta, because my assumption is that people also study around the class. Okay? So each person, as much as works for them, but in principle people also study around the class, so if someone is looking for a chavruta, this is the opportunity. You can see here the forum of people in the class—that’s the basic pool. If there is—actually, you know what? Let’s do this for just a second, just for one second. If someone wants a chavruta, let them say so, and we’ll see if we can arrange it right here on the spot. Is there anyone? I didn’t understand—what do you mean by chavruta? You want to set up a chavruta with someone? To study this class, to study around this class, prepare, review. Simply because the potential pool of people is whoever is sitting here; others aren’t in this class. They may be in the study hall with you at the same time, but they’re not learning this class. Whoever is here and wants to learn with a chavruta—of course you need to check that there’s another overlapping time slot so you can sit on Zoom and learn—but this is the potential pool. So if someone wants that, say so; if not, we’ll move on. If everyone manages fine without it, then everything is okay. Only if someone wants it, this is the opportunity. Okay, so we’ll continue. Okay, so we’re beginning with the first topic in Yoma, chapter eight of course. The Talmud there on 73b. I’m sharing the Talmud. By the way, when I share the Talmud, I can’t see you. So every so often I’ll stop the share, just to come back and maintain eye contact with you. Otherwise I lose you, unfortunately. So let’s begin. In the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter: On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink, and to wash, and to anoint, and to wear sandals, and to have marital relations. So as is well known, on Yom Kippur there are five forbidden afflictions. Eating and drinking are one affliction, which is forbidden at the Torah level; for it there is karet, and so on. Beyond that there is washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree about the halakhic status of the four additional afflictions: whether they are rabbinic, or Torah-level without karet—but they are not like the prohibition of eating and drinking. There are of course also prohibitions of labor, as on festivals and on the Sabbath, but that is a section we are not dealing with right now. So these are the five afflictions forbidden on Yom Kippur. The king and the bride may wash their faces, and a woman after childbirth may wear sandals—these are the words of Rabbi Elazar, and the Sages forbid it. For our purposes this is less important right now. One who eats the equivalent of a large date—a date. The measure for eating on Yom Kippur is larger than the normal measures for food prohibitions. Regular food prohibitions are usually an olive-bulk. On Yom Kippur it is a large date, that is, a date; it’s larger. With its pit included. And one who drinks a cheekful. For drinking, the measure is a cheekful; he is liable. All foods combine to make up the measure of a large date. Meaning, you don’t have to eat a large date’s worth of one specific food; rather, all kinds of foods. If in total you ate a large date’s worth within the time span required to eat a half-loaf, then you are liable to karet. And all drinks combine to make up a cheekful. Eating and drinking do not combine. Meaning, eating and drinking don’t combine, but within eating all kinds of food combine, and within drinking all kinds of drink combine. Right now I’m focusing on the first part of the Mishnah and the third part of the Mishnah. What we see from there is that this prohibition, the prohibition of eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, has a certain measure: a large date for eating, a cheekful for drinking. Eating and drinking do not combine, but there are combinations within eating separately and within drinking separately. That of course means, on the simple level, that someone who ate less than that did not violate a Torah prohibition and of course also would not be liable to karet. So that is the simple meaning of a measure in prohibitions: less than the measure, no prohibition. The Talmud says here, surprisingly, that this is not true. Again, every so often I’ll lower and restore the share, because I just want to see you. The Talmud says: “Forbidden”—is he liable to karet? When the Mishnah says that eating is forbidden, it doesn’t say he is liable, it says it is forbidden. “Liable” is punishment; “forbidden” simply means there is a prohibition but no punishment. What prohibition is there? Often people think that when it says “forbidden,” it means a rabbinic prohibition. But that’s not always so. Sometimes it means a Torah prohibition without punishment. Okay? So here in any case it says there is no punishment. But apparently we know—not apparently, we know—that for eating and drinking there is the punishment of karet. The Torah itself writes that. Rabbi Ila said, and some say Rabbi Yirmiyah: this was needed only for a partial measure. Yes? Essentially the Mishnah comes to teach that there is also a rule of a partial measure on Yom Kippur, and therefore one is not always liable; sometimes he is only forbidden—or sometimes he is only forbidden. There is always the prohibition, but one is not always liable, and that is why the language “forbidden” was used. This works according to the one who says a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law, but according to the one who says a partial measure is permitted by Torah law, what can be said? For it was stated: regarding a partial measure, Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, and Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. This works for Rabbi Yohanan, but according to Reish Lakish what can be said? There is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, which we’ll deal with in this class—in a moment we’ll get to it—whether a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. What does that mean? If someone eats less than the measure—when it says “half” here, it doesn’t mean precisely half. It means less than the measure; it could be a third or four-fifths or whatever. According to Rabbi Yohanan, he has violated a Torah prohibition. According to Reish Lakish, it says it is permitted. So the Talmud says: this works for Rabbi Yohanan, but according to Reish Lakish what can be said? It works for Rabbi Yohanan, but according to Reish Lakish what can be said? For it cannot be dealing with a partial measure, because for a partial measure there is no prohibition. Not only is there no karet; there is no prohibition at all. According to Rabbi Yohanan, one can explain that the Mishnah comes to introduce the law of a partial measure. But according to Reish Lakish, what can be said? Notice: there is also a novelty here in Rabbi Yohanan’s view. Because when the Mishnah says “forbidden,” as I mentioned earlier, people usually interpret “forbidden” as rabbinic but not Torah-level. Here we see an example of what I said earlier, that that is not always true. The word “forbidden” does not necessarily signal a rabbinic prohibition, but rather a prohibition without punishment. Even if the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, but for some reason there is no punishment for it, they still use the word “forbidden.” Okay? And that’s what the Talmud says here, because otherwise the Talmud would also have had to ask according to Rabbi Yohanan why it says “forbidden.” True, there is a Torah prohibition, but there is no punishment. In a moment we’ll see: according to Rabbi Yohanan, in any case there is no punishment for less than the required measure; only the prohibition exists. So according to Rabbi Yohanan as well, it doesn’t fit, because it says “forbidden,” and “forbidden” should mean a rabbinic prohibition. We see that the Talmud doesn’t think that. The Talmud is comfortable with Rabbi Yohanan’s view, because “forbidden” means forbidden as a prohibition without punishment. True, usually Torah prohibitions carry punishment, so “forbidden” means a rabbinic prohibition—but not necessarily. There are Torah prohibitions with no punishment, and that also works. But according to Reish Lakish it doesn’t fit. The Talmud says: Reish Lakish concedes that it is forbidden rabbinically. Reish Lakish also agrees that a partial measure is forbidden; he simply claims that it is not forbidden by Torah law but rather rabbinically. Then the Mishnah also works according to Reish Lakish: what it says “forbidden” means there is a prohibition without punishment. According to Rabbi Yohanan it is Torah-level, and according to Reish Lakish it is rabbinic. Now on the face of it—I already mentioned this, but let me sharpen it—on the face of it. Can I ask a question? One second. What? What does “a prohibition without punishment” mean? A prohibition that, if you violate it, carries no punishment. How is the Yom Kippur prohibition written in the Torah? “You shall afflict yourselves, and any soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” There is karet. It says “shall be cut off”—it says that explicitly. How can you say there is no punishment when the Torah says “shall be cut off”? For the full measure, but not for less than the measure. “The soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” What is “being afflicted”? Not eating a large date’s worth. But if I ate half a date or a third of a date, then I violated the prohibition, but I don’t receive punishment; there is no karet for that. Okay. Here indeed this is the point I wanted to sharpen, exactly this point. On the face of it, when the Torah says there is a prohibition and one is liable to punishment for it, it isn’t clear how a situation can arise in which the prohibition exists but there is no punishment. Either way: if you really weren’t afflicted, whoever was not afflicted is liable to karet. If you were afflicted, then you also didn’t violate any prohibition. How do we disconnect the prohibition from the punishment? Whoever violated the prohibition, the Torah imposes karet on him. How can there be a situation where the prohibition applies but the punishment does not? And there’s no option to say that according to Rabbi Yohanan the punishment also applies, and that this is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, because otherwise what is the meaning of the measures? After all, the Mishnah gives measures: a large date or a cheekful, and Rabbi Yohanan does not dispute the Mishnah. Therefore it is clear that the measures have some implication even according to Rabbi Yohanan. So in what sense does Rabbi Yohanan understand the measure? Rabbi Yohanan apparently understands the measure in relation to punishment: someone who did not eat the full measure did indeed violate the prohibition, but he is not liable to punishment. According to Reish Lakish, he did not violate the Torah prohibition at all; there is a rabbinic prohibition, and the Torah prohibition he did not violate, and so clearly he is also exempt from punishment. Meaning that according to Rabbi Yohanan, we are really dealing here with a prohibition—you violate the prohibition, but you are not liable to punishment. The whole significance of the measures in the Torah is only measures for punishment, not measures for prohibition. That is how it appears according to Rabbi Yohanan. This really is the prevalent view among the medieval authorities (Rishonim): for a partial measure, although there is a Torah prohibition according to Rabbi Yohanan, he also agrees that one is not punished for it. It is prohibited, but one is not punished. And as I said earlier, one still has to understand the meaning of this matter: if the prohibition exists, then the punishment the Torah imposes on that prohibition ought also to apply. How do we break up this package, or this connection, between the prohibition and the punishment? Before I return to Rabbi Yohanan, who is in fact the halakhic ruling—we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law—it’s worth knowing, and not everyone is aware of this, that in practice we rule that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. And we are talking here about all Torah prohibitions, not specifically Yom Kippur—we’ll see qualifications later—but in principle this is a general law, not only on Yom Kippur. And the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. According to Rabbi Yohanan—we rule like Rabbi Yohanan. According to Reish Lakish there is also a prohibition, but it is rabbinic; according to Rabbi Yohanan it is a Torah prohibition. And one more thing: “partial measure” does not mean precisely half, but any amount you eat out of that measure, no matter how much. “Half a measure” means less than the measure; that’s the rabbinic expression. So that is the law. Let’s touch for a moment on Reish Lakish, and through him start to analyze the dispute a little. We see here that according to Reish Lakish there is a rabbinic prohibition on a partial measure. Why indeed is there no Torah prohibition on a partial measure? What is the idea? Why is less than the measure not a Torah prohibition? So let’s look for a moment at the Talmud on the next page. The Talmud on the next page, 74a. We’ll skip a few things that we’ll still see later. What is the measure in grams? I can’t hear. What is the measure in grams? It’s not in grams; in the accepted approach it’s by volume. Sephardim and Ashkenazim have some differences, but in the accepted approach it’s by volume, and it depends—depends on what. More or less thirty. The measure of a date—I don’t remember its translation into volumes. For drinking, yes, it’s a quarter-log or a cheekful; there too there are differences. I can’t translate it right now. What do you mean it depends? Does that mean there’s also a difference according to the type of food? The volume determines it, and therefore if I want to translate it into grams, it will depend on what food, because the same volume of different foods will weigh differently. And there is also the question whether one takes into account the air found, for example, in matzah. When we want to eat an olive-bulk of matzah, the accepted way to measure what an olive-bulk of matzah is is to check the volume of crumbled matzah, matzah meal, not regular matzah, because regular matzah has air spaces. So here too there are various different methods, and the translations are not simple. In any case, for our purposes, the Talmud on 74a says: Returning to the matter itself. We see here: regarding a partial measure, Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law; Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, since it is fit to combine, he is eating prohibition. Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law: the Merciful One said “eating,” and here there is no eating. Here, beyond the citation that was brought in the earlier passage we saw, here they already discuss the dispute itself—that is the meaning of this introductory expression, “returning to the matter itself”—and the Talmud also explains the two views. It explains Rabbi Yohanan’s view, why in his opinion a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law: because it is fit to combine; we’ll talk about that in a minute. Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law: the Merciful One said “eating,” and here there is no eating. The Torah said it is forbidden to eat, and a partial measure is not eating. Then the Talmud asks—let’s just read one more sentence—Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: I know only that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning; as for a koy and a partial measure, since they are not subject to punishment, one might think they are not subject to warning. Therefore the verse says: “any fat.” What do we see? This is some kind of baraita that Rabbi Yohanan brings against Reish Lakish, and the baraita says that we would have thought that only what is subject to punishment is subject to warning, and what carries no punishment has no warning. The baraita says, but there are two things for which there is no punishment but there is a warning: a koy—which is an animal of doubtful status, possibly domesticated and possibly wild—and a partial measure. Since it is not subject to punishment, one might think it is not subject to warning; therefore the verse says “any fat.” We see that there is a verse from which they derive that there is a prohibition on a partial measure and on a koy. Okay, so this is difficult for Reish Lakish. Reish Lakish claims there is a prohibition on a partial measure, but he says the prohibition is rabbinic and not from the Torah. Yet he also agrees that a partial measure is forbidden. The verse “any fat” is just a scriptural support. So this is the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, and I want to start specifically with Reish Lakish. When Reish Lakish says that a partial measure is permitted by Torah law and prohibited only rabbinically, he explains it by saying that if I eat less than the measure, there is no eating here. The prohibition is a prohibition on eating. If you ate less than the measure, that is not eating. Meaning, he understands that the measure—say, an olive-bulk in forbidden foods or a large date on Yom Kippur—the measure defines the act of eating. Therefore, if you ate less than the measure, you simply did not do the thing the Torah prohibited. Let’s try, based on this, to understand how Rabbi Yohanan defines the issue of measures in the Torah. How does Rabbi Yohanan understand the issue of measures in the Torah? What do you say? In what does he disagree with Reish Lakish? Only for lashes is that the measure. Good, but that’s the implication, and I already said that earlier: according to Rabbi Yohanan, the measures were said only with regard to punishment, not with regard to the prohibition itself. But I’m asking about the underlying idea: how does he grasp the concept of measure in Jewish law, as opposed to Reish Lakish? Reish Lakish understands that the measure defines the act of eating. How does Rabbi Yohanan understand it? The threshold of prohibition, the threshold of prohibition, not of eating. Again? The parameter that determines whether you violated or didn’t violate. No—the opposite. According to Rabbi Yohanan, you violate even without the measure. Rabbi Yohanan apparently understands that even when you eat a third of an olive-bulk, that is an act of eating. Therefore you have violated the prohibition. So what does the measure say? The measure says: look, even if you violated the prohibition, there is a certain quantity of prohibition from which onward you become liable to punishment. Meaning, the difference between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan begins with how they understand the concept of measure in the Torah. Reish Lakish understands that the measure defines the prohibited act, and if you did not eat the required measure then you simply did not perform the prohibited act. Therefore not only is there no punishment, there is no prohibition at all. Rabbi Yohanan says no: the act of eating exists even with a third of an olive-bulk or a third of a date. You performed an act of eating, therefore the prohibition exists. So what is the measure? The measure tells you: true, you violated the prohibition, but there is a certain amount of prohibited conduct from which onward you become liable to punishment. Therefore Reish Lakish defines it such that when I eat half an olive-bulk, what is the difference? According to Reish Lakish, I did not perform an act of eating. According to Rabbi Yohanan, I performed an act of eating, but I didn’t eat enough to be punished. But I did perform an act of eating, therefore the prohibition exists. Meaning, according to Reish Lakish, half an olive-bulk is half an act; according to Rabbi Yohanan, it is a complete act performed on half the quantity. Can you hear me now? Yes, yes. Okay. I think if that were the explanation, then on Yom Kippur the measure according to Rabbi Yohanan wouldn’t need to be a large date. Because if it’s just the accumulation of a certain quantity of prohibition that I need to do, then what does the whole issue of satiety have to do with it? My feeling of being satisfied? It seems that it doesn’t… So therefore I want to suggest that really Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan both agree that the prohibition applies only from a large date and above. So what then? They both also agree that there is a rabbinic prohibition on less than that because it ought to exist as a safeguard. And Rabbi Yohanan simply holds that this safeguard is already from the Torah. That’s all. They both agree that the core prohibition begins from a large date. Rabbi Yohanan holds that the safeguard is from the Torah? Yes, yes, sorry, that this safeguard is already from the Torah. Everyone agrees that the core prohibition begins at a large date, and less than that is only so that you won’t come to it. The only question is whether that safeguard is a rabbinic safeguard or whether the Torah itself said it. I’ll get to those definitions later, because here, specifically with Yom Kippur, the story is more complicated. Because on Yom Kippur it doesn’t say there is a prohibition of eating. It says there is an obligation of affliction on Yom Kippur, not a prohibition of eating. So what is the meaning of Reish Lakish’s reasoning when he says, “we require eating, and there is none”? Where does it say that we require eating? We require affliction. No, but affliction means not eating—it depends on how much you eat. Who said? No, eating means the act of eating. And if that’s not an act of eating… Here we’re talking about satiety, here we’re talking about the benefit I get from it or the pleasure… This is eating, this is eating… It was an olive-bulk; it’s not talking about eating, it’s talking about… No, the measure of eating on Yom Kippur is a large date. No, it doesn’t make sense that specifically on Yom Kippur “we require eating and there is none.” So what does a partial measure in all prohibitions have to do with this? No, with eating—he meant affliction. That’s what I asked, why after you eat… But he is speaking about half an olive-bulk throughout the Torah, not about Yom Kippur. Throughout the Torah it’s half an olive-bulk, but on Yom… But after all, the dispute of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan is throughout the Torah, not only on Yom Kippur. True. According to my approach… The Talmud applies it to Yom Kippur. According to my view that works perfectly, because throughout the Torah the dispute—each place according to its own measure—the dispute is whether one makes a safeguard below the measure. But on Yom Kippur indeed the measure is not an olive-bulk but a large date. But then “we require eating and there is none.” On Yom Kippur don’t we require eating? On Yom Kippur, right, there is a precision issue in the wording here: “eating” of Yom Kippur here means something different. That’s what I said, that’s what I asked, that’s what I’m pointing out—that on Yom Kippur in any case we’re in a bit of trouble because there is some exception here that doesn’t fit the general pattern of the dispute. I’ll come back to that later. In any case, on the face of it—I’ll still get to Binyamin’s formulations; that’s definitely possible, and it also appears here in the commentators—on the face of it, when I read the Talmud, it seems to me that I would formulate the dispute like this: the dispute is whether the Torah’s measures define the act—leave Yom Kippur aside for a moment, let’s talk about pork—whether the Torah’s measures define the act of eating, and that is what Reish Lakish holds, and therefore if you ate less than the measure, you simply did not perform an act of eating, so you did not violate any prohibition. And according to Rabbi Yohanan, you performed an act of eating even when you ate half an olive-bulk or a third of an olive-bulk; you just need to eat enough to become liable to punishment. And that’s not enough—the measure defines how large the act must be in order to incur punishment, but the very definition of the act does not depend on quantity. Meaning, the question is whether when you eat a third of an olive-bulk you did not perform an act of eating—you performed a third of an act of eating, let’s call it that—or whether you performed a complete act of eating with a third of the quantity. Okay? That’s… And what about Grace after Meals? Regarding Grace after Meals… yes, there with satiety, what happens? What happens if the measure for Grace after Meals requires satiety—that’s not connected to the question of what act of eating… Yes, I understand. Let’s try for a moment to see an implication of this. Look, at the beginning of tractate Shabbat there is a very well-known Sefat Emet. I’ll share it in a moment. This is the Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat. The Mishnah there at the beginning of tractate Shabbat discusses the laws of carrying out, and it says that a poor person is standing in the public domain and the homeowner is inside the house. The question is: if the homeowner takes something, lifts it from a place inside his house and places it into the poor person’s hand, then the homeowner is liable. If the poor person stretches his hand inward, lifts the object and takes it out and places it down, then the poor person is liable. What happens if the homeowner lifts and the poor person takes and places it down, or the reverse? In that case both are exempt. That is what the Mishnah says. The Sefat Emet says as follows: “Both are exempt”—apparently it would seem that nevertheless it is forbidden by Torah law like every partial measure, especially the one who lifted it, since it is fit for him also to perform the placing down. And we’ll discuss this later. There is apparently a difference between one who only lifts and one who only places down, because one who only lifts can still complete it by placing it down, while one who only places down has not done the lifting. So he says that at least the one who only lifted ought to be forbidden by Torah law like every case of a partial measure. And so one could explain what the Talmud says there, that the exempt cases listed are those that could lead to liability for a sin-offering, because they are forbidden by Torah law but do not lead to a sin-offering, whereas placing down, according to Rashi’s explanation, is permitted by Torah law and therefore is not counted. In the Talmud it appears that we mention only the one who lifted alone and not the one who placed down alone, so according to my words, says the Sefat Emet, this is very well resolved: one who lifted alone is a Torah prohibition, though one is not liable to karet because it is a partial measure, not liable to stoning or karet, but one who placed down—that is only rabbinic if anything, and therefore that case was not taught there. However, from Rashi it appears, and the Rosh explicitly wrote, that it is forbidden only rabbinically. It is not a Torah prohibition of a partial measure; it is only rabbinic to lift alone or place down alone. And also among all the measures of Sabbath law I have not found anywhere explicitly in the Talmud that there is a Torah prohibition below the measure because it is fit to combine. I have not found, says the Sefat Emet, anywhere—after all, in Sabbath laws, in the prohibited labors of the Sabbath, various measures were stated for when one violates a labor on the Sabbath. I haven’t found anywhere any discussion of this. And one can say, says the Sefat Emet, that specifically in food prohibitions a partial measure is forbidden from the verse “any fat,” as was written in the responsa of Chacham Tzvi, section 86. Yes, this is the well-known position of the Chacham Tzvi that the law of a partial measure was said only regarding food prohibitions. And here you are talking about carrying out on the Sabbath; that is not a food prohibition, so there is no prohibition of a partial measure here. However, in Rashi later on 74a it is explained that also in Sabbath prohibitions a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. And in Lechem Mishneh chapter 21 of the laws of Shabbat, that a partial measure is forbidden. Fine, and there it says “on the Sabbath day you shall cease,” and see Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 18 and Pri Megadim and so on. So if so, then there are those who disagree with the Chacham Tzvi and say that there is a partial measure also in Sabbath laws. According to the Chacham Tzvi, it is resolved why someone who only lifts does not violate Torah law because of a partial measure—because this is not a food prohibition. But according to Rashi and all the other medieval and later authorities who disagree with the Chacham Tzvi and say that there is a prohibition of a partial measure even in the labors of the Sabbath, the question returns: why should there not be a Torah prohibition here in the case of someone who lifted but did not place down? The Sefat Emet says: “Nevertheless, it appears that here this is not called a partial measure but half a labor, and this is not forbidden at all. As opposed to half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, where the prohibition exists in the deficiency of the measure.” What does that mean? He says there is a difference between a situation in which you perform half a labor—you only lifted without placing down—and a situation in which you performed a complete labor on half the measure. Say, you ate an olive-bulk of forbidden fat—you performed a complete act on half the quantity of fat. That is the law of a partial measure. But in a place where you performed half an act, there is no law of a partial measure. That is what the Sefat Emet says. What does this really—perhaps before I speak about the significance of the matter—the Meiri also says, and hesitates, for example, regarding a person who carries two cubits in the public domain. Yes, I didn’t bring the citation here. If a person carries something two cubits in the public domain on the Sabbath, is there a prohibition of a partial measure here? The Meiri says that such an act is not forbidden. Why? Even according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law, this is not forbidden by Torah law. Why? He distinguishes exactly like the Sefat Emet between a complete act done on half the measure and someone who did half the act on a full measure, or half an act. When we eat half an olive-bulk—Rabbi, the issue of “purposeful labor,” the issue of “purposeful labor” is all over the Torah, and carrying two cubits is not—it is not labor. Why is it not labor? It also doesn’t rise to the level of purposeful labor, just like lifting and placing. You are assuming that quantity is part of the definition of purposeful labor, but how do you know that? On the simple level, quantity is just quantity. The definition of purposeful labor is a definition of the complexity of the labor or the significance of the labor, but quantity is not connected to the quality of the labor. You are already making some assumption; in a moment we can discuss it. Right. In any case, here he says—the Meiri says, like the Sefat Emet—that if you carry two cubits on the Sabbath, it is not that you did a complete act on half the quantity. Rather, you did half the act, and on half the act there is no Torah prohibition of a partial measure. Rabbinically perhaps there is, but by Torah law there is not. Four cubits—isn’t that a person’s domain? And therefore what? Therefore he doesn’t begin doing a transgression because the person is in his own domain, so it’s not half a transfer. In the public domain a person has no domain. There are those who want to claim, as in acquisitions in the public domain, the acquisition of four cubits, that rabbinically they did grant him four cubits as his domain, and therefore the measure for carrying in the public domain is four cubits in order to leave the person’s domain—which of course assumes that there is some Torah-level significance to a person’s four cubits in the public domain. But a person truly has no domain in the public domain. Rather, it’s a measure of significance. And then on the simple level, two cubits is half the measure of four cubits, though perhaps in the case of four cubits one could answer as you suggest. For the case of the Sefat Emet, certainly not, because there it is lifting without placing down, so there it is not relevant. In any case, what is written here in the Meiri is exactly like the Sefat Emet: Rabbi Yohanan’s Torah prohibition of a partial measure exists when you do a complete act on half the measure, but if you do half the act, there is no law of a partial measure. He brings another example: what happens if someone bakes on the Sabbath half a dried fig’s worth? He argues that this would indeed be forbidden under the law of a partial measure—by the way, there you have it in the laws of Shabbat—he would be forbidden under the law of a partial measure. But if he baked a full dried fig’s worth at half the necessary baking heat, something that cannot bake fully, that would not be a partial measure. Because heating at low heat is half an act, or perhaps not an act of baking at all, and therefore it is not the same as doing a full act of baking on half the measure. Now really, if I take these two sources, it seems to me that this is exactly the necessary implication of the analysis I gave earlier of the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan. After all, what are they saying? They are discussing the view of Rabbi Yohanan, which is ruled as law, that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. And what are the Meiri and the Sefat Emet saying? That even according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law, that is only where you did a complete act on half the measure. But if you do half an act, then even according to Rabbi Yohanan there is no prohibition. So what do we see? They understand that the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is the question of what happens when you eat a third of an olive-bulk. According to Reish Lakish, you did not perform an act of eating—and here, “eating” is absent. I explained that I think the meaning of Rabbi Yohanan is that he disputes that very point. He says: you performed a complete act of eating on a third of the quantity. And that is exactly the definition of the Sefat Emet. The Sefat Emet and the Meiri say that when you eat a third of an olive-bulk of pork, that is a complete act of eating on a third of the quantity, and therefore the law of a partial measure applies to it, the prohibition of a partial measure. And they certainly understood the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as I explained earlier: Rabbi Yohanan disputes Reish Lakish because he claims that when you eat less than the measure, that is a complete act of eating performed on a smaller quantity. Therefore they say that in a place where the act itself is not complete, there even Rabbi Yohanan agrees that there is no Torah prohibition. So every place where Rabbi Yohanan forbids by Torah law is a place where he understands that a complete act was done, just on half the quantity. Especially when he eats a third of an olive-bulk of pork, or forbidden fat. Okay? So we see that he understands that eating a third of an olive-bulk is indeed eating, and that itself is the point of his dispute with Reish Lakish, who says it is not eating. That is the necessary implication if one understands the dispute as I explained earlier. Okay? Maybe in that same context: in the Jerusalem Talmud, Tractate Terumot chapter 6, it says that Reish Lakish agrees on Yom Kippur that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. One who is afflicting himself in order to benefit—he is not afflicting himself properly, right? So I mentioned earlier we’d get to that in a moment, yes. The claim is that this is of course against the Babylonian Talmud. The Babylonian Talmud brings the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish also regarding Yom Kippur. But in the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot it says that on Yom Kippur there is no dispute; even Reish Lakish agrees that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. Now the accepted explanation of this is that in regular forbidden foods, such as forbidden fat or pork or something like that, the prohibition is a prohibition on eating. And in Reish Lakish’s opinion, less than an olive-bulk is not an act of eating. But on Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of eating; there is a commandment to afflict oneself. According to Saadia Gaon, there is no explicit negative commandment at all on eating on Yom Kippur—I’ll comment on that later. But in the Torah in any case it does not write a negative commandment; it writes that there is an obligation to afflict oneself. And if so, then Reish Lakish will presumably understand that from the standpoint of the obligation of affliction, if you ate half an olive-bulk then you have only half-fastened, and so there there is indeed half of the prohibited result, and therefore there Reish Lakish concedes that there is a Torah prohibition of a partial measure. Okay? As we saw earlier, when you do half an act, Rabbi Yohanan agrees with Reish Lakish, because all that Rabbi Yohanan disputes with Reish Lakish about is that he claims eating a partial measure is a complete act on half the quantity. But in places where a person does only half the act, there even Rabbi Yohanan agrees with Reish Lakish that there is no Torah prohibition. Here we see the other side of the coin. Where it is clear that the “half” is really a complete act on half the quantity, there even Reish Lakish agrees that there is a Torah prohibition. And the Jerusalem Talmud says that about Yom Kippur. What happened—everyone disappeared on me with the cameras? I didn’t disappear. Try to stay with cameras on as much as possible, because I want to see that you’re with me. There we go, there we go, there we go. What, I can’t hear? Did he say something? No, suddenly you disappeared, I don’t know. Okay. So this is really the reverse implication, but of the same distinction. There is just one more comment, maybe, since I already brought this Jerusalem Talmud: the Mishneh LaMelekh in chapter 1 of the laws of leaven and matzah, law 7. Let’s take a quick look. One second. This is Maimonides: “One who eats any amount whatsoever of leaven itself on Passover, this is forbidden by Torah law, as it is said: ‘No leavened food shall be eaten.’ It does not say ‘you shall not eat leavened food,’ but ‘leavened food shall not be eaten’—this comes to include a partial measure. Nevertheless, he is not liable to karet or to an offering except for the full measure, which is an olive-bulk. And one who intentionally eats less than an olive-bulk is flogged with disciplinary lashes.” By the way, disciplinary lashes do not tell you whether it is Torah-level or rabbinic; it only means that where there is no Torah punishment, they administer disciplinary lashes. Even for the neglect of a positive commandment there can be disciplinary lashes. That is Maimonides. The Mishneh LaMelekh asks what all the later authorities ask here: why does Maimonides need a source to forbid less than the measure? After all, there is a general law that we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that a partial measure is forbidden. So yes, the Mishneh LaMelekh writes: tractate Yoma, chapter “Yom Kippur”: returning to the matter itself—regarding a partial measure, Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law; Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. Then he says: and we rule—I’m skipping a bit—and we rule like Rabbi Yohanan, and so all the legal authorities ruled, that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. According to this, one should wonder about our master Maimonides: why does he need a verse regarding leaven on Passover? After all, for all Torah prohibitions we hold that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. Why does Passover need a special source? And this too was asked by our master in Kesef Mishneh, and he left it unresolved. And I saw that Rabbi Maharalnach, in responsum section 51, was troubled by our master’s question on this matter and answered: the prohibition of leaven is unlike forbidden fat, from which they learned that a partial measure is forbidden. For forbidden fat is prohibited forever and never had a time of permissibility, whereas leaven is permitted before Passover. Therefore a separate verse was needed with regard to leaven to prohibit a partial measure. And the rabbi derived from this that on the fourteenth day from the sixth hour and onward there is no Torah prohibition at all. So Maharalnach explains why Maimonides needs a special source to forbid a partial measure of leaven on Passover: because the prohibition of leaven on Passover depends on time. The source for the prohibition of a partial measure is from forbidden fat. “Any fat”—the prohibition of forbidden fat is a status-based prohibition that always exists; it doesn’t change with time, and there the law of a partial measure was stated. We want to learn from that to the law of a partial measure in food prohibitions on Passover. But leaven on Passover is a prohibition that depends on time—before Passover it is permitted, after Passover it is permitted, only on Passover is it forbidden. Usually the idea is that if these are time-dependent prohibitions, then they are person-based prohibitions and not object-based prohibitions. And in such a place there would be no law of a partial measure. A partial measure was said only in object-based prohibitions. Therefore a special source is needed to teach that even in the prohibition of leaven there is a prohibition of a partial measure. That is what Maharalnach claims. The interesting question is how he resolves our Talmud, which regarding Yom Kippur brings the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. Yom Kippur also is time-dependent. Yom Kippur is a prohibition that depends on time, and if for that there is no special source, apparently we should have said that there would be no prohibition of a partial measure. But here on Yom Kippur the prohibition is on the person? The prohibition is to afflict oneself, not not to eat. Therefore… Right. So precisely there should not have to be a partial measure. Yes. Because it depends on time, it’s on the person, not on the object. That’s what Maharalnach says. Fine. So in an article—you’ll see in the summary, I referred to it—there I explained this one way. It may be that one can see it in light of what the Jerusalem Talmud says. The Jerusalem Talmud says Yom Kippur is not part of the game. Because on Yom Kippur… On Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of eating; there is an obligation to afflict oneself. And in the obligation to afflict oneself, the moment you did not fully afflict yourself but only partially, there is a partial measure here, and in that even Rabbi Yohanan agrees that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. That is outside the game. And in all the regular food prohibitions, there there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, and there, if the prohibition depends on time, then even Rabbi Yohanan agrees there is no Torah prohibition unless there is a source, as with leaven. But Yom Kippur is not in the game at all, as the Jerusalem Talmud says. It isn’t connected to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. There it is simply half-affliction, and half-affliction is the logic of “fit to combine”; it is not because of the verse “any fat.” And we’ll still see later the relationship between the logic and the verse—this is something the medieval authorities already discuss here. Okay, I can’t hear? Actually this is the wording of the Mishnah here. It says “Yom Kippur is forbidden”; it doesn’t say “a person shall not eat” or something like that. Yom Kippur is forbidden. Meaning, this is something unique to Yom Kippur. Obviously the rest of the year it is certainly permitted to eat, so what does that mean? I didn’t understand. The prohibition of Yom Kippur is a prohibition that depends on time. So if Maharalnach says that time-dependent prohibitions do not have the law of a partial measure, how will he explain our Talmud? Our Talmud applies the law of a partial measure to Yom Kippur, which is time-dependent. So I resolve it in light of the Jerusalem Talmud we saw: Yom Kippur is an obligation to afflict oneself. And there even Reish Lakish agrees. Of course this is problematic, because the Babylonian Talmud disagrees with this Jerusalem Talmud. The Babylonian Talmud applies the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish also to the prohibition of Yom Kippur. So this is problematic. That is why, in order to explain this resolution, I say it can work with the Jerusalem Talmud. How does it fit in the Babylonian Talmud? After all, the medieval authorities generally rule like the Babylonian Talmud, though here again it isn’t really so consequential, because in any case we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that there is a partial measure on Yom Kippur. In any case, you’d need to see my article on leaven on Passover if you want. There is a link from my summary. When I send my summary into Dropbox, you’ll be able to see a link to my article there where I resolve it—it’s a long analysis, I won’t get into it here. Okay, let’s take a few minutes’ break, because Zoom tends to tire everyone out. We’ll take a few minutes’ break—say, in another five minutes we’ll meet again and continue. Okay? Freshen up a bit, drink something, wash your face. We’ll come back in five minutes. We’re continuing. Is everyone back? And turn on cameras. So until now I’ve really been speaking based on Reish Lakish’s reason, that someone who eats less than the measure is not really performing an act of eating, and from there I tried to infer exactly where Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with him. But Rabbi Yohanan also has his own positive reason. Rabbi Yohanan says it is because it is fit to combine. So let’s look a bit at how exactly to understand this “fit to combine.” Maybe before that I’ll introduce another question that is often asked in connection with a partial measure. There are two ways to understand the prohibition of a partial measure. One possibility is to understand that we are dealing with an extension of the original prohibition. Say there is a prohibition of pork in an olive-bulk; according to Rabbi Yohanan the prohibition was extended, even at the Torah level, also to half an olive-bulk, but the prohibition you violate is the prohibition of pork, only you do not receive punishment. We said yes—but still, the prohibition you violate is the prohibition of pork. That is one possibility. A second possibility—and of course the first possibility raises the question that if there is a prohibition of pork, why are there no lashes? Where does the split between pork and lashes come from? One could say that really this is not the prohibition of pork. There is a special renewed prohibition called the prohibition of a partial measure. A partial measure of any Torah prohibition is a prohibition unto itself. And it is not the prohibition of pork; it is a prohibition called the prohibition of a partial measure, and for that prohibition no punishment was introduced. What would be the implication of these two understandings? Or even before the implication: of course on the first view the question that arises is why, if there is a Torah prohibition and it is the original prohibition, there is no punishment. On the second view the question that arises is: if this is a new prohibition, why is it not counted among those who count the commandments as a separate prohibition? It should have been, besides the regular 613 commandments, another separate prohibition within the 613, called the prohibition of a partial measure. Why don’t they count it if it is separate? If it is an extension of the existing prohibitions, then there is nothing to count, because it is just a detail within the prohibition of pork or within the prohibition of Yom Kippur, so there is no need to dedicate a separate commandment to it. But if it is a new and independent prohibition, I would have expected it to be counted separately in the enumeration of the commandments. Where would the practical implication be? The implication is: the question I am really asking is what prohibition did I violate when I ate a partial measure. If this is a new prohibition, then I violated the prohibition of a partial measure. If it is the existing prohibition, then I violated the prohibition of pork. Let’s take, for example, terumah. If I ate a partial measure of terumah, yes? Then am I liable to death at the hand of Heaven because it is the prohibition of terumah? Or not? It is a regular prohibition, an independent prohibition. One could say that I am not liable to death at the hand of Heaven according to all views, because one is not punished for a partial measure; it’s only the prohibition, and death at the hand of Heaven is a punishment. But what about where the category relates to the very nature of the transgression, not to punishment? For example, with meat and milk, when you eat a partial measure… if… also if… if you eat meat and milk not in the normal manner of benefit, you are exempt. That is the rule, as distinct from other prohibitions. There are a few others too, but meat and milk is relatively exceptional. Most food prohibitions—if you consumed them not in the normal way of benefit, you are exempt. What if you ate a partial measure of meat and milk not in the normal way of benefit? If a partial measure is the prohibition of meat and milk, then even if you ate it not in the normal way of benefit, you violated the prohibition. You won’t be punished, because one is not punished for a partial measure, but you violated the prohibition. But if the prohibition is an independent prohibition, then it is like all the other food prohibitions: unless something special was introduced, if you consumed it not in the normal way of benefit, you are exempt. So here this is not connected to punishment. With death at the hand of Heaven one can say it isn’t really a practical difference, because even if there is a Torah prohibition of a partial measure, one is not punished for it, and so death at the hand of Heaven is a punishment and that won’t be a practical difference. But with regard to the manner in which the prohibition is violated, there it would apparently be a practical difference. There is a Nachmanides in Torat HaAdam, in the section on illness. Let me share that for a moment. What I’m sharing with you is the file that I’ll upload afterward to Dropbox; it’s the summary of the class, which I update a bit after the class. “And it appears that even for a sick person one does this”—it is speaking of feeding a sick person on Yom Kippur in increments of less than the required measure. Or not on Yom Kippur—feeding a sick person forbidden food in increments of less than the measure. Because if I have a lighter prohibition, I prefer it over a more severe one. Now he says: “And it appears that even for a sick person one does this, in order to lighten his burden from prohibitions of karet and lashes to a mere prohibition.” Here already there is a novelty—that there is no punishment because the prohibition is lighter. Instead of saying that the prohibition is full-fledged and there is merely a novelty that there is no punishment, Nachmanides understands that the fact that there is no punishment is an indication that when you eat a partial measure, it is a lighter prohibition. Fine. But the question is whether it is a lighter prohibition that is still the prohibition of pork, just lighter—which again is a bit strange: if it’s pork, it’s pork, what does lighter and heavier mean? Or whether it is an independent prohibition, and that is the lighter prohibition. So Nachmanides says: “And if you ask, if so, why did they say that we feed him the lighter one first—untithed produce and terumah, we feed him terumah,” because eating terumah is a lighter prohibition than eating untithed produce. “So why do we feed him terumah and not untithed produce? After all, in both cases there is only a mere prohibition.” In both cases this is the prohibition of a partial measure, which is a lighter prohibition. So what difference does it make whether it is a partial measure of terumah or a partial measure of untithed produce? He says: “Even so, since in their full measures they differ in severity of punishments, even when below the measure the severity of one is greater than the severity of the other.” What is he saying? Since when you eat the full measure the prohibition of terumah is lighter than the prohibition of untithed produce, then even in a partial measure the prohibition of terumah is lighter than that of untithed produce. “Alternatively, there”—that is—“when they amount to the full measure and one needs that combined amount.” Really, one does not feed the lighter one first if you are feeding a partial measure. But if there is in fact a sick person whom it is impossible to feed less than the measure, and in order to recover he needs a full measure, then it was said that one should feed him the lighter one first. And only there. But if in fact there is a sick person who can eat a partial measure, then it makes no difference whether you feed him untithed produce or terumah, because in a partial measure it is the same thing. The difference between these two views in Nachmanides is exactly the two approaches we discussed, right? That is, if this is an independent prohibition—the prohibition of a partial measure—then why should I care whether it’s a partial measure of untithed produce or a partial measure of terumah? The prohibition is neither untithed produce nor terumah; it is the prohibition of a partial measure. So what difference does it make what kind of partial measure it is? Therefore there is no rule here of feeding the lighter one first. It doesn’t matter whether you feed him untithed produce or terumah. But if the prohibition is an extension of the original prohibition, then just as with untithed produce the original prohibition is more severe than the prohibition of terumah, so too the extension of a partial measure of untithed produce is more severe than the partial measure of terumah, because it is the original prohibition, and the original prohibition in untithed produce is more severe. Okay? So apparently these two approaches in Nachmanides are really exactly the two possibilities we discussed here. As I said, the question asked here is why it is not counted in the enumeration of commandments. If it is an independent prohibition, why don’t they count it in the enumeration of commandments? I once thought there is a general principle in the enumeration of commandments—not specifically connected to this, but it can be applied here—that general principles that apply to the whole system of commandments do not themselves enter as one commandment among the 613. Let me give you an example. For example, beautifying a commandment. They derive from “This is my God and I will beautify Him”—beautify yourself before Him in commandments. So one has to beautify the commandment, decorate the sukkah, take a beautiful etrog, yes, beautify the commandments. Those who count commandments do not count the obligation to beautify commandments as one of the 613 commandments. Some might perhaps connect this to the fact that beautifying a commandment is not indispensable. One could say it is voluntary. If you want to beautify, wonderful. If you didn’t beautify, nothing happened. But that isn’t true. In principle we also count non-obligatory but fulfillment-based commandments. Beautifying a commandment is a fulfillment-based commandment. If you beautified, you fulfilled a commandment. True, if you didn’t beautify, you did not violate a transgression. But fulfillment-based commandments also have a place in the enumeration of commandments. According to Maimonides there are commandments at an even higher level, even definitional commandments—they are not in the enumeration of commandments, commandments that merely define something; they are neither fulfillment-based nor obligatory nor anything. So fulfillment-based commandments certainly ought to be counted. It seems to me that with beautifying a commandment—I’ll go further than that—in my opinion even beautifying a commandment is a full obligation. It is not voluntary as people usually understand. That is what I think. What is said about beautifying a commandment is that it does not invalidate the commandment, but that does not mean it is voluntary. I’ll give you an example. The Mishnah says in Menachot: the blue thread does not invalidate the white, and the white does not invalidate the blue. Does that mean that putting blue dye in the fringes is voluntary? Optional? If you want, put it in; if you don’t want, don’t put it in. Or that it is a fulfillment-based commandment: if you put in blue, you fulfilled a commandment; if you didn’t put in blue, nothing happened? Absolutely not. Someone who did not put in blue cancelled a positive commandment. What it says is that it does not invalidate the white. Meaning, if you put white fringes and did not add the blue thread, you did not lose the commandment of the white, but the commandment of the blue you did not fulfill; you cancelled the positive commandment of blue, but you did not cancel the positive commandment of the white, because the blue does not invalidate the white. When I say that something does not invalidate something else, it does not mean that that thing is not obligatory. It is fully obligatory in its own right; it’s just that if you did not do it, then you did not do that, but you did not lose something else that you did do. That is what “it does not invalidate” means. Yes, this is a very common mistake regarding blue dye. By the way, several later authorities wanted to argue this, but in my opinion there is no basis for it; it’s not correct. It is a full obligation. So I want to say the same regarding beautifying a commandment. Beautifying a commandment is a full obligation. If you did not beautify, you cancelled the positive commandment of beautifying a commandment. The only thing is that it does not invalidate the commandment itself. Thus if you took a non-beautiful etrog or sat in an undecorated sukkah, you fulfilled the commandment. The fact that you did not fulfill the commandment of beautification means you cancelled the commandment of beautification, but you did not lose the commandment that you did fulfill—the one you did not beautify—you did not lose that. It does not invalidate the commandment itself. But the beautification itself is a full obligation. So why is it not counted among the commandments, especially if I say it is a full obligation? Doesn’t Maimonides say that he does not count commandments that are underneath another commandment? That there are sub-commandments, so to speak? I didn’t understand. Maimonides says in the Book of Commandments that he does not count commandments that are underneath a commandment he already counted. There is a larger commandment, and under it he won’t count further commandments. The idea is that he does not count details within a commandment. Details within a commandment. Okay. Or further commandments. Okay. So here too the same: details. A partial measure is a detail within the… So here it can be discussed. One can say that beautifying a commandment is not counted because it is a detail within the commandment itself. There is a detail in the laws of sukkah that one must beautify the sukkah, a detail in the laws of the etrog, a detail in the laws of every other commandment that one must beautify that commandment. So there is no need to count that commandment separately because it is already included in the regular commandments; it is just another detail within the regular commandments. But if I understand that beautifying a commandment, exactly like a partial measure, is an independent commandment and not a detail in the existing commandments, one can still perhaps understand why it is not counted. It is not counted because beautifying a commandment is not really a commandment in the ordinary sense, but rather a meta-halakhic principle that deals with all commandments. How does one fulfill commandments? Commandments are fulfilled in a beautiful way. “How one fulfills commandments” cannot itself be considered one commandment. It is a general principle that teaches me how commandments are fulfilled. And therefore it may be that even if beautifying a commandment is defined as an independent fulfillment, Maimonides still would not count it—or those who count commandments would not count it—because it is a meta-halakhic principle. It is not one commandment among the commandments; it is a mode of how to fulfill… Like the rule that commandments require intention. Commandments require intention, so there is no point counting intention as an independent commandment. Intention is the way one properly fulfills a commandment. So there is no point counting that as an independent commandment; it is a rule that tells me how to fulfill commandments. It may be that a partial measure, even if it is an independent obligation or prohibition, since it applies across the whole legal system, merely tells me: know that with regard to all transgressions, how does one avoid transgressing them? Even with a partial measure one must not transgress them. So although if one violated it, perhaps it is a separate prohibition—as is somewhat implied by the fact that there is no punishment, as I said earlier—it is still not counted among the commandments because it is a broad principle. It relates to the whole system of commandments, and such a thing is not included in the enumeration of commandments. Perhaps—that is one possibility. Now, earlier we discussed… Hello? Rabbi, can you hear me? Yes. Yes, so what you’re basically saying is that the principle of a measure applies to all commandments—transgressions, sorry—that involve eating, so the principle of measure is understood. Meaning, leaven, eating pork, eating on Yom Kippur… Not only eating, not only eating. According to the Chacham Tzvi it is only in eating, but according to most authorities it applies to all prohibitions, not only eating. What do you mean? How is “measure” understood, say, not in eating? If you carry out half a dried fig’s worth on the Sabbath from a private domain to a public domain. I understand. Or if someone cooks half a dried fig’s worth on the Sabbath, yes? Okay. There are those who, again… or whether it is object-based prohibitions and not action-prohibitions; we saw that in the Sefat Emet above. But this is a general principle throughout Jewish law. Maybe one more sentence before I continue—I forgot earlier to add one more thing. There is a Nachmanides in the glosses to the Book of Commandments, negative commandment 353. He speaks about physical closeness to forbidden sexual relations. Maimonides says that physical closeness to forbidden sexual relations is a Torah prohibition, and he derives it from the verse “Do not come near to uncover nakedness,” meaning that even closeness to forbidden relations is prohibited. Nachmanides, in his glosses there, claims that there is a prohibition, but it is not derived from that verse. Rather, he writes: “And since they did not do so, we shall understand from them that according to them this is a rabbinic prohibition, or perhaps it is from the Torah, for in every case where one benefits from a prohibition, it is prohibited, as in the case of a partial measure.” Anyone who benefits from a prohibition, even if he has not violated the full prohibition and this is not the full benefit, it is prohibited like a partial measure. What is the meaning of this? Hugging and kissing—that is physical closeness to forbidden relations—are forbidden by Torah law like a partial measure. What does that mean? What does that have to do with a partial measure? He says that hugging and kissing are acts that produce a minor sexual pleasure. Since there is half of the pleasure here, it is a partial measure. Now notice that according to this, it comes out that even Reish Lakish should agree with this, because after all Reish Lakish does not dispute the prohibition—we do not find anywhere that Reish Lakish disputes the prohibition of physical closeness to forbidden relations. So that means he too agrees with it. How can it be a Torah prohibition if according to Reish Lakish a partial measure is only rabbinically prohibited? So perhaps one can explain this as we saw earlier in the Jerusalem Talmud—again, of course, at least according to the Jerusalem Talmud—as we saw earlier, that when there is a prohibition of a result on the person and not of an act, then even Reish Lakish agrees to the prohibition of a partial measure. After all, what happens when you say that the prohibition of physical closeness to forbidden relations exists? You are really saying there is a prohibition to derive sexual enjoyment from forbidden relations. It is not a prohibition on the act; it is a prohibition on the result—that you derive sexual benefit from physical closeness to forbidden relations. In that sense, this is very similar to affliction on Yom Kippur, where the prohibition is not a prohibition on the act of eating but on the result—that you are supposed to afflict yourself. There is a prohibition on enjoying, or an obligation to afflict oneself. The result that happens in the person is what is prohibited. In such a situation, says the Jerusalem Talmud, even Reish Lakish agrees that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. Then it may be that also with physical closeness to forbidden relations, the prohibition of a partial measure is agreed upon by Reish Lakish as well, even at the Torah level. Now I want to—this is just a supplement to what I said earlier, because really another implication comes out from here regarding the Jerusalem Talmud we saw and action-based prohibitions. Now I return for a moment to the prohibition according to Rabbi Yohanan. Rabbi Yohanan basically says there is a Torah prohibition. We discussed whether it is an independent prohibition or an extension of the existing prohibitions, and now I want to speak about the source of this prohibition. Regarding the source of this prohibition, we saw in the Talmud later on 74a that Rabbi Yohanan explains it by logic—that it is fit to combine. What does “fit to combine” mean? The simple understanding is—thus several later authorities say—that when you eat, say, an olive-bulk of pork, if you eat an olive-bulk of pork, you violated the prohibition of pork. Now, clearly, if you ate a third of an olive-bulk of pork—I always say a third and not a half so we don’t get stuck—if you ate a third of an olive-bulk of pork, then the quality of the prohibition is still there; what is missing is only the quantity. And therefore the fact that it is “fit to combine” is an indication. It is an indication that if you take that third of an olive-bulk and add another third and another third, you get a complete prohibition including punishment and everything. So that means that in each third the quality of the prohibition is present. The quantity is lacking, but the quality of the prohibition is there. And therefore the fact that it is “fit to combine” testifies that in each and every part the quality of the prohibition already exists, and that is why it is forbidden by Torah law. This is how several later authorities explain this principle of “fit to combine.” If you ate a third of pork, there is a quality of Torah-level prohibition here; in that sense there is still eating of pork here. Therefore, although there is no punishment because some quantity is missing, still the prohibition exists. This ties in with what I said earlier—what I said earlier was that Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with Reish Lakish because he claims that eating half an olive-bulk is a complete act of eating. What is missing is only the measure. And you say: a complete act of eating of what? It is a complete act of eating of the prohibition of pork. Only the quantity of the pork prohibition is missing. How do you know that a third of an olive-bulk contains the prohibition of pork? That is the logic of “fit to combine.” “Fit to combine” says that if you take two more thirds like this, you’ll get a full prohibition of pork. So that means that in each third the quality of the prohibition already exists, and all that is lacking is the quantity. Because zero plus zero still remains zero. If the quality of the prohibition were not there in the third, then adding another third and another third would not change the quality, only the quantity. So how does a prohibition of pork emerge? If the prohibition of pork exists in the whole, that means that in each of the components it is already essentially present. Of course, as long as the components are identical. If we go back to the Sefat Emet with lifting and placing down, when someone only lifted and did not place down, here you cannot say that in each half the quality of the prohibition exists, right? Because the combination of lifting plus placing down is a combination of two different qualities that together create a whole quality. It is not a quantitative combination. It is two things that differ essentially from each other. So here there is a lack in the quality of the prohibition, not only in quantity. Therefore this fits very well with the direction of the Sefat Emet that we discussed earlier. According to this explanation of “fit to combine,” what do you think is the nature of the prohibition of a partial measure, out of the two options I raised earlier? Is it a new prohibition or an extension of the original prohibition? An extension. An extension. Right, it is quite clear that this is an extension of the original prohibition. Because what are they telling me? They are telling me that there is a prohibition of pork. If you ate a third of an olive-bulk of pork, the quality of the pork prohibition is still there. Meaning, the prohibition Rabbi Yohanan is speaking about—the prohibition I violate—is the prohibition of pork; it is not another prohibition. Otherwise, why would the quality of the prohibition of pork be relevant? Unless one strains and says there is some general prohibition on consuming qualities of prohibition where quantity is missing. But that would already be a somewhat convoluted formulation. So that is one side—the “fit to combine.” Later in the passage, the Talmud challenges Reish Lakish—we brought this earlier—Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish: I know only that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning; as for a partial measure, since it is not subject to punishment, one might think it is not subject to warning. Therefore the verse says “any fat.” So Rabbi Yohanan says: we see that the prohibition of a partial measure is Torah-level; it is included by “any fat”—any amount of fat. Reish Lakish answers: rabbinically; and the verse is merely a support. What do we see in Rabbi Yohanan? That he holds it is a Torah prohibition because it is included from “any fat.” But earlier he said it is prohibited because of the reasoning that it is fit to combine. How are these two statements reconciled? Now one has to understand that the simple approach is that these are not competing sources within Rabbi Yohanan’s view. Because after the Talmud brought Rabbi Yohanan saying that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law because it is fit to combine, immediately afterward Rabbi Yohanan objects to Reish Lakish from this baraita. It says: this is clear according to Rabbi Yohanan; what will Reish Lakish do with it? How is it clear according to Rabbi Yohanan? Rabbi Yohanan says the prohibition of a partial measure is because of the logic that it is fit to combine, and here they derive it from the verse “any fat.” So then that should be difficult for Rabbi Yohanan as well, not only for Reish Lakish. But from the flow of the Talmud it is clear that the Talmud does not see this as difficult. From the Talmud’s perspective, to say “fit to combine” or to cite the verse “any fat” is saying the same thing. The reason of the verse, the reason of the verse. What did he say? The reason of the verse—as if the Talmud is explaining the reason. Okay, so this brings us into a discussion of the relationship between logic and source. From the fact that the Talmud says there is no difficulty according to Rabbi Yohanan, that apparently means that from its point of view, when you bring a logical argument and bring a source, there is no contradiction between the two. I just want to emphasize to you why this is not so trivial. Let me give you an example. In the Talmudic Encyclopedia, when it discusses the rule that one does not administer punishments based on logical derivation, it brings—really the source is Rabbi Yosef Engel in Atvan DeOraita, but the Talmudic Encyclopedia quotes it. It says there are three approaches to why one does not administer punishments based on logical derivation. One approach is logic: if you derive a severe law from a lighter law—“one does not punish based on logical derivation” means that if I learned law B from law A because law B is more severe than law A, and law A has a punishment written for it, that does not mean I can punish for law B. I learned the prohibition regarding law B, but I will not learn the punishment. Why not? For example, there is a logic that says perhaps there is a refutation to the a fortiori argument. You cannot punish on the basis of an a fortiori argument. There is another logic that says perhaps prohibition B is so much more severe that the punishment of prohibition A is not enough in order to punish for it. Therefore one cannot apply the punishment found in prohibition A also to prohibition B. And there is a third approach that learns this from a verse. It says “or his father’s sister, or his mother’s sister, or the daughter of his father and his mother.” The Talmud asks: if you already say “the daughter of his father” by itself, why do you need to say “the daughter of his father and his mother” together? What would prevent us from knowing that? Someone who is both his father’s daughter and his mother’s daughter is certainly also his father’s daughter. Why do you need to say it? To teach you that one does not punish based on logical derivation. You would have learned it by an a fortiori argument, but you still would not punish. You need a verse in order to punish. So that is three approaches. And I have never understood this. Those are two approaches: two logical explanations and one source. It is not three logical explanations. There are two logical explanations and a source. And logic does not contradict a source. When you bring me a source, the source tells me that it is prohibited. The logical explanations explain why the source says it is prohibited. There is no competition between logic and source. Okay? Now, where does the notion come from that if there is a source, that means it disagrees with the logical explanations? That notion says that if there is a source, apparently one cannot derive it from logic. Because if one could derive it from logic, then why do I need a verse? It is logical. Therefore every source is by definition a scriptural decree without reason. If it had a reason, there would be logic, and there would be no need for a verse. That is nonsense. It is not true. What we say—that we do not derive the reason of Scripture—applies to things written explicitly in the Torah. That is something else. Regarding things we learn from interpretation, there is always logic there. Because without the logic, I would not make that interpretation. How do I know to include from “any fat” any amount of fat? How do I know to include “any amount”? Perhaps “any fat” comes to include also the fat of a deer, as the Talmud says. Or also not—I don’t know what—also the fat of domestic animals and not only wild ones. Or maybe also… Why specifically a partial measure? Because I have logic to prohibit a partial measure. Once I have logic to prohibit a partial measure… Because otherwise I wouldn’t interpret it that way. Yes, “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars. Why not include chairs? Because the logic says that what is closest to the Holy One, blessed be He, is Torah scholars and not chairs. So therefore I include from “et.” I include what? I include what logic tells me to include. When there is an interpretation, it does not render logic unnecessary. The logic tells me what the interpretation comes to include or teach. It does not contradict it. Therefore, when I say “any fat” is the source, that does not contradict the fact that I derive from it a partial measure—any amount of fat. Yes, there is no contradiction between the source and the logic, especially since the source is an interpretive derivation, an inclusion; it is not the plain meaning of the verse. Therefore the rule that we do not derive the reason of Scripture does not apply here at all. The rule that we do not derive the reason of Scripture applies to things written explicitly in the verse. Things learned by interpretation—that rule was not said about them. On the contrary: interpretations are always based on the reason of Scripture. Without the reason of Scripture, you cannot interpret. How do you know what to interpret? Something comes to include—how do you know what to include? You choose what logic says makes sense to include. So you’ll ask me: fine—but if there is logic, then why do we need a verse? Why do I need a verse if it is logical? One can say this in two ways. I’ll return to it next time, but I’ll just finish now. One possibility is to say that true, if I have logic, that’s nice, but without a verse one could not punish. Because one does not punish unless one first warns. Of course, for a partial measure this won’t help, because for a partial measure there is no punishment. But one could say that logic itself is not sufficient. Logic alone is not strong enough for me to introduce a Torah prohibition on its basis. Fine, reason suggests it, but it isn’t certain. Then the verse comes and says: yes, yes, from “any fat” you must include. I ask myself: what should I include? Ah, this logic says—good, then apparently that is what the verse comes to include. The logic alone may not be enough to introduce here a Torah prohibition, but the logic can help me focus what to include from the verse “any fat,” while by itself it is not enough. Logic that is enough on its own is logic so strong that I would say it is enough to understand there is a prohibition even without a verse. There are logical considerations where, true, there is good sense in it, but by itself I would not—since we do not act merely because things seem analogous—not be sure that this is enough to introduce a Torah prohibition. For that, there is the verse that says: yes, yes, I am introducing this inclusion of that logic. You need both the verse and the logic. Okay, I’ll stop here. Just for next time, look also in Dropbox at the summary, because I’ll write there some instructions too—but I’ll tell you verbally: look at the passage here, the passage of a partial measure. We read the second half of the page; go over the first half of it, and look there also at Tosafot, Tosafot Yeshanim, commentators on the Talmud. In the first stage I’ll deal with the relation between the two sources, so focus on the relation between the two sources: the inclusion from “any fat” and the logic of “fit to combine.” Okay? Does anyone want to comment or ask now? Where can we find the summary? What, I can’t hear? Where can we find the summary? In the institute’s Dropbox. Look underneath the Elul program chart; there is a link into the Dropbox, and according to the names of the teachers you can find, under my name, in this course of chapter eight of Yoma, the summaries. According to your explanation, interpretation is not something that comes from the sources but rather a product of thought. What? Of course not. Meaning, interpretation is actually from the force of the verse; it’s just that we understand that there is… Most interpretations are creative interpretations. That is what Maimonides writes explicitly. I don’t understand all these hairsplitters who want to say that all interpretations are only mnemonic supports; there’s no basis for that. You’re saying that interpretation is from the force of the verse, and we simply formulate a new Jewish law. I understand. Okay, all the best, goodbye.