Gemara, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 2

Table of Contents

• How the Wednesday–Thursday learning schedule is arranged
• The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a partial measure and the role of minimum measures
• The meaning of the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe and the focus of the dispute
• The relationship between “all fat” and khazi le’itztarufe, and the combination of verse and reasoning
• Whether a partial measure is an extension of the original prohibition or a newly created prohibition, and the implications for punishment and the count of the commandments
• Tosafot, the koy, and deriving two things from the same verse
• Reasoning versus verse: “why do I need a verse? It is logical,” and the implications of Maimonides’ approach
• Old Tosafot: the main source, lashes for a partial measure, and a newly created prohibition
• Rav Saadia Gaon, Yom Kippur, and lashes as a way of being spared karet
• Parashat Vayishlach: gift, prayer, and war
• Khazi le’itztarufe as a safeguard or as the “beginning of eating a prohibited food,” and practical differences

Summary

General Overview

The lecture opens with an administrative clarification about moving to in-person learning on Wednesday and Thursday until noon, with no Zoom classes, and therefore the next lecture will take place on Sunday. After that, the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a partial measure is presented through two basic questions: what role do the Torah’s minimum measures play in defining the act of eating, and what exactly does the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe add beyond the basic ruling that less than the required measure is still considered eating. Later, the relationship between Rabbi Yohanan’s two sources is presented—the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe and the exposition from “all fat”—and the question is examined whether a partial measure is an extension of the original prohibition or a newly created prohibition, including analysis of Tosafot and Old Tosafot and the status of reasoning versus verse according to Maimonides. Finally, a brief homily is brought on Parashat Vayishlach about “gift, prayer, and war,” and another interpretation by later authorities of khazi le’itztarufe is discussed, as the “beginning of eating prohibited food,” not as a safeguard but as a mechanism of possible combination, with practical implications such as the end of Yom Kippur and an oath concerning a partial measure.

How the Wednesday–Thursday learning schedule is arranged

The classes on Wednesday and Thursday are held in person at the institute in the study hall, from morning until noon, and the schedule ends with Minchah at one thirty-five, with no further learning afterward. On Thursday there will be no general lecture, no Talmud lecture, and no third lecture that falls during the hours of the study day, and another class that the lecturer usually gives will also not be given. The next lecture will be on Sunday.

The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a partial measure and the role of minimum measures

Reish Lakish holds that the Torah’s minimum measures define the act of eating itself. So someone who ate less than the required measure simply did not eat, and there is not even a prohibition here. Rabbi Yohanan holds that the act is defined as such even below the minimum measure, and the measure was stated only with regard to liability to punishment, so there is a prohibition but no punishment. The law of a partial measure applies where the full act is done with only a partial quantity, but when the act itself is not a “full act,” then the law of a partial measure does not apply.

The meaning of the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe and the focus of the dispute

Rabbi Yohanan does not make do with the claim that less than the required measure is called eating; he adds the reason of khazi le’itztarufe in order to say that not only is the act considered eating, but the object being eaten is also a prohibition in its quality, and only the quantity is lacking. According to this understanding, khazi le’itztarufe proves that in every small part the quality of prohibition is already present, because combining the parts creates a full prohibition. Reish Lakish could agree to khazi le’itztarufe in the sense that the quality of prohibition exists, but still claim that “we require eating, and that is absent,” so there is no Torah-level prohibition in a partial measure. The dispute is thus focused on the question whether eating less than an olive-bulk is considered an act of eating.

The relationship between “all fat” and khazi le’itztarufe, and the combination of verse and reasoning

In the Talmud, the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe appears as an explanation of Rabbi Yohanan’s position, and later Rabbi Yohanan brings a baraita that derives from “all fat” to include any amount of fat whatsoever, and the flow reads as convergence, not as contradictory sources. The verse by itself is not enough, because “all fat” is an inclusive expression that requires a decision about what should be included, and the reasoning directs that inclusion toward a partial measure rather than toward other possibilities such as a koy. Reasoning alone is not necessarily strong enough to generate a Torah-level prohibition out of nothing, so a verse is needed to anchor the prohibition. An alternative explanation was also presented through Maimonides’ view, according to which for something to have Torah-level status one needs not only conceptual reasoning but also a scriptural command. A discussion was presented of the ninth root in Maimonides, on command and content in the count of the commandments, and of the second root, on a law derived by exposition as “words of the Sages,” and a distinction was suggested: an exposition that interprets an already existing law can still yield Torah-level Jewish law.

Whether a partial measure is an extension of the original prohibition or a newly created prohibition, and the implications for punishment and the count of the commandments

The dilemma was presented that if a partial measure is merely an extension of the original prohibition, it is difficult to understand why there are no lashes, and if it is a newly created prohibition, it is difficult to understand why it is not counted among the commandments and why one would not receive lashes for every prohibition. Nachmanides’ position in Torat Ha-Adam was brought, according to which a partial measure is a lighter prohibition, and the absence of lashes serves for him as an indication of that lighter status, together with the note that there is no necessity for perfect correspondence between the severity of a transgression and the severity of its punishment. It was suggested that in the straightforward sense, “all fat” and khazi le’itztarufe tend to present this as an extension of the existing prohibition, and that creates a need to explain the view that sees it as a newly created prohibition.

Tosafot, the koy, and deriving two things from the same verse

Tosafot asks why Rabbi Yohanan did not base himself on “all fat,” even though he himself brings that baraita, and answers that without the reasoning of khazi le’itztarufe one could have said that the main inclusion is needed for the koy, while a partial measure is only rabbinic and the verse is merely an asmakhta. The point was raised that even without the koy, one still needs reasoning in order to interpret what exactly is being included by an inclusive verse, and that if necessary they would have looked for something else to include. The question was asked how one can derive two laws from the same verse, and Rashba in Berakhot was cited, where he is troubled by deriving “two things” from “Shema” and explains that there is an essential connection between the laws. Similarly, it was suggested that in “all fat,” the inclusion means “anything that has an aspect of fat,” and therefore it can include several instances that share the same underlying basis.

Reasoning versus verse: “why do I need a verse? It is logical,” and the implications of Maimonides’ approach

A common view was presented that reasoning can substitute for a verse, because the question “why do I need a verse? It is logical” assumes that the two have the same force, and it was said that according to Maimonides this is certainly not simple. An example was brought from the ninth root about the relationship between commands and contents, and it was said that according to Maimonides, both command and content are required for a commandment to be counted. Another example was brought from the second root, according to which a law derived by exposition is considered “words of the Sages” when there is no verse that explicitly points to it, and it was suggested that in the case of a partial measure, the verse “all fat” is needed in order to grant Torah-level status alongside the reasoning. A further difficulty was also presented: in Maimonides, the need for a verse is tied to the principle that “one does not punish unless one first warns,” whereas in the case of a partial measure there is no punishment. This was connected to the dispute between the Tzelach and Pnei Yehoshua in Berakhot 35 about whether reasoning alone creates a Torah-level law even without a verse.

Old Tosafot: the main source, lashes for a partial measure, and a newly created prohibition

Old Tosafot states that “the main reason of Rabbi Yohanan” is from “all fat,” and concludes, “if so, then he should also receive lashes.” From that, an understanding was developed that the verse creates an independent prohibition of a partial measure, which generates lashes but not karet, because karet was not included. It was suggested that the baraita, “I only know that whoever is subject to punishment is also subject to warning,” is to be understood as a question within the prohibition of fat itself: how can there be a warning without punishment? And the answer is that the prohibition of a partial measure is not the original prohibition of fat but a new prohibition. Later, Old Tosafot asks that this does not fit with passages such as “for all prohibitions in the Torah, permitted food does not combine with prohibited food except in the prohibitions of a nazir,” and with Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling that “a full measure is required for lashes,” and it concludes that necessarily “the verse of ‘all fat’ speaks only of a prohibition as such,” without lashes. Another difficulty was brought from Pesahim, where “anything leavened” includes mixtures and hardened leaven under a prohibition, and Old Tosafot says there, “one must distinguish between different expositions.”

Rav Saadia Gaon, Yom Kippur, and lashes as a way of being spared karet

It was said that according to Rav Saadia Gaon there is no prohibition at all against eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, only a positive commandment of affliction, and therefore the discussion of lashes on Yom Kippur does not apply in the same way. The possibility was raised that lashes in cases of people liable to karet can function as a way of escaping karet rather than as punishment for a prohibition, in the context of the ordination controversy in Safed, whose goal was to administer lashes to forced converts so as to exempt them from karet. The passage in Makkot 13 was cited, on the distinction between the Sabbath and Yom Kippur, and on Rabbi Yitzhak’s statement “to judge him with karet and not with lashes,” and it was suggested that according to the view that lashes come to exempt one from karet, lashes could exist even where there is no prohibition. But in the case of a partial measure, where there is no karet, there would be no basis for that kind of lashes.

Parashat Vayishlach: gift, prayer, and war

Parashat Vayishlach opens with “Jacob sent messengers ahead of him to Esau his brother, to the land of Seir, the field of Edom,” and it describes Jacob’s preparations for the encounter with Esau. Rashi brings that Jacob prepared himself for three things: gift, prayer, and war. These were explained as natural effort and compromise, a direct relationship with the Holy One, blessed be He, and the understanding that nothing happens without God’s will, and also readiness to stand up for what is ours when there is no choice. Jacob combines prayer with action, praying, “Please save me from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esau,” while at the same time sending many gifts to Esau, and the prayer was offered that God should grant us to walk in Jacob’s ways and overcome difficulties.

Khazi le’itztarufe as a safeguard or as the “beginning of eating prohibited food,” and practical differences

An interpretation of later authorities was presented according to which khazi le’itztarufe is not an indication of the quality of prohibition in the part itself, but rather a kind of safeguard based on concern that one may reach a full measure, and it was said that it is difficult to ground a Torah-level prohibition on that, because safeguards are usually rabbinic, while noting the work Atvan De-Oraita, which discusses exceptions such as seclusion and the prohibition against keeping leaven visible. One practical implication mentioned was eating a partial measure in the last moments of Yom Kippur, when there is no possibility of completing a full measure, and it was said that some distinguish between a “safeguard,” as a fence that stops continuation, and a “decree,” which is concerned about other scenarios. It was then argued that in the language of the foundational sources this is not really a safeguard, and Meiri, Shaagat Aryeh, and Avnei Miluim were cited, explaining that a partial measure is the “beginning of eating prohibited food,” in the sense that when combination is possible within the time it takes to eat a loaf, the first act of eating is considered prohibited eating by virtue of that potential combination. But when combination is no longer possible—“it is no longer fit to combine”—there is no Torah-level prohibition in the same way. Meiri also connects this to the law of an oath regarding a partial measure, and says that when the person taking the oath reveals that he does not intend combination, it may be that there is no Torah prohibition here but only “words of the Sages,” and therefore the oath takes effect. In conclusion, it was said that this ruling is not a formal proof but a reading of the language, and it was emphasized that the wording of “retroactively” and “the beginning of eating prohibited food” is not the style of a safeguard but of an act-structure dependent on the possibility of completion.

Alright, let’s begin. Before I continue with the previous topic, on Thursday—well, Wednesday and Thursday—you got a notice that on Wednesday and Thursday there are supposed to be in-person classes at the institute, with lessons given there in the study hall. So the plan is—an outline was sent out—it’s basically classes from morning until noon, and at noon the schedule ends. Meaning, studies don’t continue afterward, because with Zoom and all that, people need to get back home, it’s complicated. So people come to the institute on Wednesday and Thursday until noon, and at noon it ends; at Minchah, 1:35, it ends, and there’s nothing afterward. Which means that as far as we’re concerned, on Thursday that means there won’t be a general lecture, there won’t be the Talmud lecture, the third class that was supposed to be, because it falls during the hours of the study day. And there’s another class I give—those of you who are registered, I don’t know—also won’t take place; it’s at two, or actually at twelve, either at twelve or at two, I don’t remember, and in any case it won’t be given. So just take that into account: we’re really supposed to meet for the next class after today on Sunday. Okay, back to our topic. In the previous class we began the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish regarding a partial measure. We saw that from the plain sense of the Talmud, at least when analyzing Reish Lakish, it seems there’s a different conception there of the Torah’s measures—what exactly their role is. Reish Lakish says that the Torah’s measures define the act of eating—I’m talking now about eating for simplicity’s sake—they define the act of eating. Someone who ate less than the required measure simply did not eat, and therefore there can’t even be a prohibition here, not just no punishment. According to Rabbi Yohanan there is a prohibition and no punishment. The simple conception is that the act is defined even with less than the measure; the measure is the minimum quantity on which the act is supposed to be performed. Therefore, since the act was performed, the prohibition exists. The measure was stated regarding liability to punishment; as long as the act wasn’t done in the full measure, there’s no punishment. And I connected this to a number of comments by medieval authorities (Rishonim), later authorities (Acharonim), and the Jerusalem Talmud, where we see that in a half-act there is in fact no law of a partial measure. When the act itself was not fully carried out, there is no law of a partial measure. The law of a partial measure applies when the full act was done, but it was done on a partial quantity. Okay, so that’s the basic claim. We saw that beyond the conception of the measures, Reish Lakish does not accept—after all, whenever there is a dispute in the Talmud and the Talmud explains Reish Lakish’s view and explains Rabbi Yohanan’s view, we need to ask first: what does Rabbi Yohanan say about Reish Lakish’s reasoning, and what does Reish Lakish say about Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning? What I’ve said until now is what Rabbi Yohanan says about Reish Lakish’s reasoning. Reish Lakish says that we require eating, and it isn’t there, so Rabbi Yohanan would say: that’s not true, it is there. Meaning, someone who eats less than the required measure is still called eating, only the quantity is lacking. Now the question is how this connects to what Rabbi Yohanan says—the reasoning that it is fit to combine. After all, Rabbi Yohanan’s reason—Rabbi Yohanan doesn’t make do with saying: no, that’s wrong, it is eating even when you eat half an olive’s bulk. Beyond that, he adds the reason that it is fit to combine. The question is what the reason that it is fit to combine adds beyond the claim that there is eating here. I assume this is where the reasoning of the later authorities comes in, who say that “fit to combine” means that the quality of the prohibition exists even if the quantity is lacking, because the proof is that if you take this third of an olive’s bulk and add another third and another third, you get the full prohibition. That means that already in the third there is the quality of the prohibition. Why do you need that in addition to the previous reasoning, that even less than the measure counts as eating? Because you need to say that true, it is an act of eating—but what did you eat? You ate the… So Rabbi Yohanan says: what do you mean? What I ate is indeed pork, just in a small amount. And the proof is that it is fit to combine. If you add this same quantity once more and then another time, you’ll get the full prohibition of pork. That means that in each part of the quantity there is the quality of the prohibition; this is called pork. All that’s missing is the quantity. And in that way, the combination of these two points together explains why, according to Rabbi Yohanan, there is a Torah-level prohibition in a partial measure. On the one hand, less than an olive’s bulk is also eating; in that he disagrees with Reish Lakish. On the other hand, less than an olive’s bulk is also pork, what I’m eating. The act is an act of eating, and what I’m eating is also pork. If I now return to Reish Lakish, then Reish Lakish tells me: less than an olive’s bulk is not eating. What does that really mean? It basically means that Reish Lakish may accept the reasoning of “fit to combine.” Reish Lakish may also agree that if I eat a third of an olive’s bulk of pork, the quality of the prohibition is there; I ate pork. I just didn’t eat. Meaning, I did not perform an act of eating. So if I now return the ball to Reish Lakish after explaining Rabbi Yohanan, I go back: what does Reish Lakish not accept? It could be that Reish Lakish accepts the reasoning of “fit to combine”; he only claims: fine, but we require eating, and it isn’t there. And in the flow of the Talmud that really seems to be the case. In the flow of the Talmud, it starts with Rabbi Yohanan and says “fit to combine.” That’s the basic explanation. Then it returns to Reish Lakish and asks him, okay, and what is your reason? So he says, we require eating, and it isn’t there. What do you say about “fit to combine”? He doesn’t answer that. So he doesn’t need to answer it, because he accepts “fit to combine.” He only claims that “fit to combine” cannot stand on its own. Because it’s true that what you ate here is pork, but what you did was not an act of eating. Because if you don’t eat an olive’s bulk, then it may indeed be pork, but the act is not an act of eating. Therefore Reish Lakish says that despite the reasoning of “fit to combine,” there is no Torah-level prohibition of a partial measure. What Rabbi Yohanan disputes with Reish Lakish is only this point: in his opinion, even eating part of an olive’s bulk is an act of eating. About “fit to combine,” there need not be any dispute; both can agree. So true, at first when Rabbi Yohanan explained his position he brought only the reasoning of “fit to combine,” because he assumed it was obvious that this counts as eating. And only when Reish Lakish is asked to respond does Reish Lakish say: what are you talking about, such a thing is not eating. Then from that I understand that according to Rabbi Yohanan it is eating. And once I understand that this is the dispute, there is no reason to assume they also disagree about “fit to combine.” They may agree about “fit to combine,” at least if that is the understanding of it. That’s the first point. The second point: we dealt with the relationship between the sources. In the Talmud the reasoning of “fit to combine” appears at first as an explanation of Rabbi Yohanan’s position. But later, when Rabbi Yohanan brings a baraita against Reish Lakish, in the baraita there appears a source from a verse: “any fat,” to include even the slightest amount of fat. Right? That’s a source from a verse. And the question is what the relationship is between these two sources. The conclusion that emerges from the Talmud—I spoke about this last time too—the conclusion that emerges from the Talmud is that these are not two competing sources. The proof is that after the Talmud explains Rabbi Yohanan through “fit to combine,” it naturally continues with the question from the power of the baraita against Reish Lakish. Meaning, Rabbi Yohanan has no problem at all with the baraita, even though the baraita doesn’t bring the reasoning of “fit to combine” but rather the derivation from “any fat.” So it seems that in the eyes of the Talmud, it does not see these as two contradictory things, “fit to combine” and “any fat.” Also, okay, we’ll see that later. Therefore, in the simple reading it seems that these two sources are supposed to come together. And I explained at the end of the class that why exactly they come together—I said the verse alone would not have been enough, and the reasoning alone would not have been enough. The verse alone would not have been enough because the verse “any fat” comes to include—but what does it include? Here you need to activate the reasoning that tells me what it makes sense to include, because I could have included a koy, I could have included, I don’t know, all kinds of other things. The reasoning says: yes, but there is logic in including a partial measure too. That’s why the verse alone is not enough. And I said that usually we do not derive the reason of a verse—that applies only to things explicitly written in the verse—but things learned through an interpretive derivation, there is always a reasoning at the base, because otherwise we could not derive that derivation. Where would we get that derivation from? Because we have a reasoning that this is how the derivation should be made. On the other side of the coin: why is the reasoning alone not enough? Why do we need the verse? Here I said that maybe the reasoning alone is not strong enough to create a prohibition out of nothing. Because even if you say that the quality of the prohibition exists—that’s the “fit to combine” we saw—and if you say that it is a fence, we’ll see later, Binyamin raised this in yesterday’s class too, but we’ll also see it later—maybe it is also a fence-prohibition lest you eat a full measure—these things are not strong enough to derive from them that there should be a prohibition even in a partial measure. And if I had only that reasoning, it is not at all clear that I could conclude from it that there is a Torah-level prohibition even in a partial measure. And the proof is that, for example, I do not impose punishment on a partial measure. That reasoning is not an absolute reasoning. Therefore you need the verse to tell me that this reasoning is strong enough to create a Torah-level prohibition. In short, you need the combination of the reasoning and the verse. We also dealt with the question whether the prohibition of a partial measure is a novel prohibition or an extension of the original prohibition—say, in fat. Is it an extension of the prohibition of fat, only without punishment, or is it a novel prohibition, a prohibition of a partial measure? There was a difficulty with each of the two possibilities. If it is an extension of the existing prohibition, then if you violated the prohibition, why are you not punished? A person eats pork; he violated the prohibition against pork. The Torah imposes the punishment of lashes on someone who eats, someone who violates the prohibition against pork. Here you tell me he violates the prohibition against pork but does not get lashes. Why shouldn’t he get lashes? On the other hand, if you say this is a novel prohibition—if it’s a novel prohibition—then first, there is still room to discuss why he should not get lashes. One gets lashes for every prohibition. Second, it is not clear why it is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. No one counts a partial measure in the enumeration of the commandments. So I said that maybe, like beautifying a commandment, some broad rules, meta-halakhic rules, will not enter as a commandment in the enumeration of commandments. I spoke about that. We saw in Nachmanides, in Torat HaAdam, that a partial measure, although he wavers between these two possibilities, still says that it is obvious that a partial measure is a lighter prohibition. Whether it is an extension of the original prohibition or a novel prohibition. Meaning, he takes the fact that there are no lashes for this prohibition as an indication that this prohibition is lighter. That is not always true, by the way. The absence of punishment or a lower punishment, a lighter punishment, does not always mean that the prohibition is also lighter. It’s not completely simple. One of the conceptions, by the way, in “we do not derive punishments from logical inference,” is that there is not necessarily a connection between the severity of the transgression and the severity of the punishment. Therefore, even if the second transgression is more severe, that doesn’t mean you deserve the punishment given for the first, because punishments differ from one another in kind as well—in kind, and not only in intensity or severity. In any case, I ended by saying that from both sources, both “any fat” and the reasoning of “fit to combine,” it seems—at least in the straightforward sense—that we are not talking about a novel prohibition but an extension of the existing prohibition. “Any fat”—so that means any amount of fat; in other words, it comes to include, to expand the prohibition of fat. That is the simple conception. One can argue with that a bit; one can say “any amount of fat” comes to innovate that there is a novel prohibition on something that is less than the measure. But simply speaking, it is an extension of the existing prohibition. And “fit to combine,” the way I explained it earlier, certainly leans in that direction. Because you are basically telling me that the quality of the original prohibition is here, the quality of pork, even when you eat less than an olive’s bulk, and therefore there is a prohibition here. What prohibition? The prohibition of pork. Because you told me that the quality of the original prohibition is here, therefore the original prohibition is here. So according to the conception of “fit to combine” too, it seems that this is not a novel prohibition but an extension of the original prohibition. And that of course raises the question: then how do we understand the conception that says this is a novel prohibition? I’ll come back to that later. Let’s begin now; up to here I more or less summarized, with some additions, what I said. I’m sharing with you Tosafot in our passage. “Since it is fit to combine, he is eating prohibition.” Tosafot says: it seems difficult to me—why doesn’t it say because of what is brought right nearby, that “any fat” includes a partial measure? For Rabbi Yohanan knew that baraita that appears right nearby, since he raises an objection from it. After all, Rabbi Yohanan himself brought this baraita as an attack against Reish Lakish. Meaning, Rabbi Yohanan knows the baraita. It didn’t escape him. And not only that—I noted even more in the Talmud—not only does he know this baraita, he accepts it; he assumes it and attacks Reish Lakish on its basis. Meaning, it is clear to him that he himself fits very well with this baraita. But how? The baraita learns it from “any fat,” and he learns it from the reasoning that it is fit to combine. Tosafot says: and one can say that this is why Rabbi Yohanan needed to explain this reason, that it is fit to combine, because if from the verse “any fat” alone, I would have said that the main verse is needed for a koy, and a partial measure is rabbinic and they merely attached it to the verse. But now that he states the reason that it is fit to combine, it is logical reasoning, and for this reason the derivation is a full derivation regarding a partial measure. Tosafot says that from “any fat” we include two things: a partial measure and a koy. Now if not for the reasoning, I would have included only the koy, not the partial measure. Therefore the reasoning is needed. Yes, what I said before—what I said before—because of the reasoning that it is fit to combine, which is a reasoning, I learn that the inclusion from “any fat” of a partial measure is indeed a full inclusion; it is not merely a textual support, and this is a Torah-level prohibition. But there is a point here worth noticing. Tosafot uses the fact that the baraita learns two things from “any fat,” both a partial measure and a koy, okay? And then Tosafot says like this: if we did not have the reasoning that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, then I would include only the koy. After all, I have something to include from “any fat.” “Any fat” needs to include something, and I have something to include from “any fat”: a koy. So if I didn’t have the reasoning, I would make do with just the koy and would not include the partial measure. What would happen if they included only the partial measure? If they did not include—from “any fat” they would learn only the partial measure. Yes, if the koy is not a creature of its own, as the Talmud says later—after all, it’s a tannaitic dispute—there are opinions that do not include the koy from this verse. So what then? What would we say? I think you don’t need to reach the example of the koy. Even if nothing is included except a partial measure, one can still say what Tosafot said, exactly what I said before in the summary of the previous class: namely, suppose that from “any fat” we include only a partial measure. There would still be room—you can’t say it’s mere textual support, because then what are you including from “any fat”? After all, the basic assumption is obviously that the expression “any fat” requires inclusion for some reason. Now if you’re not including the partial measure but saying it’s just textual support and really a rabbinic law, then what are you including from “any fat”? Therefore the formulation, it seems to me, should be: if I didn’t have a reasoning that a partial measure should be prohibited by Torah law, then maybe I would find something else to include, something for which there is a reasoning in its own right, even if in the Talmud itself there wasn’t another example like the koy. Something else, I don’t know, I would invent a koy on my own, or I would include, I don’t know, the fat of a wild animal and not just a domesticated one, and not just a wild animal—not of a doubtful case like a koy, but of a real animal, okay? Maybe I would include that too. So the claim is that the claim that you need the reasoning in order to include the partial measure does not depend on the fact that the Talmud actually includes something else from there, and therefore the partial measure could have been left un-included. Even if the Talmud had not included anything, still, if there were no reasoning in the case of a partial measure I would look for something else to include, and if I didn’t find something then maybe I wouldn’t include anything. In any case, you need a reasoning to explain an inclusion. Therefore you don’t need the fact that there is another example here. I’ll ask even more than that: why indeed—another question—why indeed do we include from the same verse two different things? How can that be? Usually from each verse one thing is learned. How do we include both a koy and a partial measure? There is a reasoning in the case of a partial measure, and apparently there is also a reasoning in the case of a koy. Okay, fine, now I have two reasonings, but I have only one inclusion. How can I include two things from the same verse? In the simple conception, usually when we see that two different things are included from one source, what we are supposed to do is look for a common principle between the two things. I’ll give, for example, a favorite example of mine, not related to us, but just to show the principle. The Talmud in Berakhot 15 brings Rabbi Yosei’s opinion there, in a tannaitic dispute; it brings Rabbi Yosei’s opinion: “let your ears hear what your mouth says,” and that it can be said in any language. So Rashba asks—Rashi interpreted, may his memory be a blessing: two laws are learned from it, because if one derives from it also “hear” meaning in any language, then one also learns from hearing that one must make it audible to his own ear. And Rashba says: this does not connect in my eyes. How do we know that two things are learned from it? What do you mean? How can you include two things? Who said two things are learned from it? If you included one thing, then you have no source to include the other. How do you know another thing is included? Moreover, even aside from that, it is not the same principle—he is already hinting that if you see two things being included then apparently they have a common principle. But here he says they do not have a common principle. “Hear in any language” and “make it audible to one’s own ear” are two different laws; what is the connection between them? Rashba says as follows: it seems right to explain that this is what it means: since you derive from it “any language that you hear,” automatically you also hear from it that one must make it audible to one’s own ear. For if not—why do I need the Merciful One to permit any language that one hears? Obviously! Since if one did not need to make it audible to one’s ear, then even mere thought in the heart would be permitted. And as is implied later concerning a man who had a seminal emission, and thought in the heart has no language. And automatically we hear that there is no distinction between the holy tongue and all other languages. Rather, it is certainly because the Merciful One had to permit any language, we automatically hear that one must make it audible to one’s own ear. Meaning, what bothers Rashba is how we learn two different things from the words “Hear, O Israel,” from the same word in the verse. And he has to say that there is a connection between the two derivations, either a common principle or one depends on the other and follows automatically, something like that. But without that, you don’t learn two things from the same source in a verse. So how in our case do we learn both a koy and a partial measure from “any fat”? Here I think one can say—one can say it in two ways. No, actually, I’ll put it like this. There are two types of inclusion, or two types of things I can derive from the Torah. The derivation from “Hear, O Israel” is not from a superfluous word. It’s not because there is some extra word or something that comes to include, and therefore I include things. Rather, I ask myself: what does “hear” mean? What is hearing? “Hear in any language” or “make it audible to your ear” is an interpretation of the word “hear,” okay? Now here, if “hear” comes to include that I can hear in any language, who says it also comes to include making it audible to one’s own ear, or vice versa? So Rashba asks, and he answers what he answers. Here there really is room to be bothered by the fact that I am learning two different things from the same element. But in our case, when it says “any fat” and it comes to include—what does it come to include? “Any fat”—think about the meaning. What is “any fat”? “Any fat” means everything that has an element of fat in it. Right? That is called “any fat.” Now what does that mean? Many things. Anything that has a certain aspect of fat. Therefore with this kind of expression there is no problem that we include several different things. The fat of a koy has a dimension of fat in it, and the fat of a partial measure of fat also has a dimension of fat because of the reasoning of “fit to combine,” where I understand that the quality of fat is present also in a partial measure. So since that is so, when I include “any fat”—meaning anything at all that has fat—anything at all that has fat, by the way, includes not only a partial measure; “anything at all that has fat” also includes a koy. That too is “anything at all.” “Anything at all that has fat” does not mean any amount in the quantitative sense, but anything that has some dimension of fat is included in this prohibition. And that can of course include very many things. Anything that has some connection to fat is prohibited—either less than the required measure, or the fat of something that is doubtfully a wild animal or a domesticated animal, or things of that sort. All these things somehow touch on the concept of fat; they have some trace of fatness, of the… of the concept of fat. And therefore this type of inclusion can include many things. But of course, again, I return to the point: this is conditioned on the reasoning really telling me that there is indeed this dimension here of the prohibition of fat. And that is what the reasoning of “fit to combine” does. Okay? Fine. So back to us. One could also have explained this verse in another way—the need for the verse, yes, “any fat,” in another way. Earlier I said: why do we need the verse? After all, the reasoning—why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning. I have a reasoning, and the reasoning seemingly should suffice. Why do I need a verse? So I said: maybe the reasoning is not strong enough to create a prohibition, and therefore I need the verse. But there is another possibility. We are used to understanding that when the Talmud asks “why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning,” what that means—not everyone is used to this, but it appears in the later authorities and people often say this—is that reasoning is an alternative to a verse. Whatever a verse can do, reasoning also does. And seemingly there is indeed clear proof of this from the Talmud. When the Talmud asks “why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning,” the Talmud is basically assuming that if there is reasoning, no verse is needed. Meaning, whatever I would get from the verse I would also get from the reasoning. If there were a difference between reasoning and a verse, there would be no room for the question “why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning.” We need the verse to provide what the verse gives and the reasoning does not give. Rather, from this objection we see that reasoning and verse give the same thing. It is with the same force. Both are Torah-level, both are a full prohibition, everything is the same. That is the common conception. But that is apparently not correct, certainly not according to Maimonides. More or less in all views, but certainly according to Maimonides it is not correct. Why? I’ll bring perhaps just one example. You can see this in Maimonides in dozens of places. In the ninth root, Maimonides—yes, he has roots before the enumeration of the commandments—in the ninth root Maimonides speaks about why we do not count commandments that appear several times in the Torah. Negative commandments or positive commandments that repeat several times in the Torah—why do we count each one once and not according to the number of times it appears? Maimonides says: because we are essentially counting—after all, there is repetition here, the Torah is simply repeating itself again and again. There is only one prohibition here, say keeping the Sabbath. The Torah repeats it some twelve times. We count one prohibition here, or one commandment. Even though the Torah repeats it twelve times, it repeats the same thing. It commands me the same thing. What matters, in other words, I’ll formulate it this way: what matters is the content and not the command itself. If there is one content, even if there are twelve commands, the commandment is one commandment. That is Maimonides in the ninth root. In the second half of the ninth root, Maimonides seems to say the opposite. There he speaks about a general prohibition. A general prohibition is a case where I have one verse, for example “you shall not eat upon the blood,” and from it several prohibitions are learned: that a court may not eat on the day they issue a death sentence, not to eat before prayer, it is a warning for the stubborn and rebellious son. There are some five or six things learned from “you shall not eat upon the blood.” Maimonides says there too one counts one commandment, or one prohibition. In that case he classifies it as the warning for the stubborn and rebellious son. He does not make five or six prohibitions out of it. Rabbi Yeruham Fishel Perla asks about this, in his commentary to Rav Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments. At the beginning there is an essay there on each of Maimonides’ roots. He checks whether Rav Saadia agrees, disagrees, and discusses the matter. In his essay on the ninth root, he argues that there is a contradiction between the two parts of Maimonides’ root. In the first part of the root, Maimonides says what matters is the content, and therefore if there are many commands with one content, that will be one commandment, and I don’t care that there are many commands. In the second part it works the opposite way: what matters is the command and not the content. Because when there are five different contents, if I have one command, it is counted as one commandment. And if we go by content, it should be five commandments, not one, because content is what matters. And he leaves it unresolved, saying there is a contradiction between the two parts of Maimonides’ root. But of course there is no contradiction here, because what Maimonides really wants—Maimonides’ view is apparently that in order for some commandment to be counted, there must be a command and it must have independent content. Both are required. If there are twelve commands with the same content, then how many different things do I have that have both command and content? Only one. I only have one content. If there are indeed twelve commands but one content, then I count one commandment. If I have five different contents but all of them have one verse, one command that commands them, then again, how many things do I have that have both content and command? One. I am lacking commands. In order to have five commandments I need five commands, each with a different content. So according to Maimonides, in order to define a commandment as a Torah commandment, as a commandment counted in the enumeration of commandments, he requires two things: that there be a command in the Torah, and that this command have independent content, not content overlapping with other commands. You need both command and content. Another indication of this, for example, is Maimonides in the second root. Maimonides writes there that if a law is learned from a derivation, it has the status of the words of the Sages. It is not Torah-level; it is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, it is not Torah-level. It is rabbinic. Why? Maimonides says: because there is no verse that explicitly points to it. A law that is learned from a derivation—we don’t have a verse. We have some hint from which through reasoning or derivation we extract the law, but the verse does not say it. If the verse does not say it, it cannot be Torah-level. Again, Maimonides according to his view: in order for something to be Torah-level it needs independent content and it needs a command in a verse. Now if I translate these things to our case, one could elaborate on this but I won’t get into it too much—if I translate these things to our case, then assuming I had only the reasoning of “fit to combine” for a partial measure, would that suffice to create a Torah-level prohibition? According to Maimonides at least, maybe not, because for a prohibition to be a Torah-level prohibition you need a command in a verse as well; reasoning alone is not enough. And therefore you need the inclusion of “any fat,” so that it has a source and not only reasoning. One can of course ask: but “any fat” is only a derivation, and according to Maimonides a derivation is rabbinic, not Torah-level. Here I think one can get out of that. You can see in Maimonides in several places that if the derivation explains an existing law, then the result is a Torah-level law. For example, Maimonides says that betrothal by money is rabbinic at the beginning of the laws of marriage. In the very next law he writes that one who has relations with the woman is liable to death in all these modes, including betrothal by money. If betrothal by money is rabbinic, then the woman is only rabbinically betrothed, so how can someone who has relations with her be liable to death? I think the meaning is—and so one sees in Maimonides’ Book of Commandments on monetary betrothal, betrothal in general—that the derivation teaching monetary betrothal illuminates the concept of betrothal, which appears in the Torah, “when a man takes a woman.” Since that is so, here the result of the derivation is Torah-level. When the derivation innovates a novel law, it does not explain a Torah law that already exists and merely add another detail to it, but rather innovates a novel law—that is rabbinic. But if the derivation only shapes an existing Torah law, then the result of the derivation is also Torah-level. Now in “any fat,” at least if I understand that “any fat” is an extension of the prohibition of fat and not a source for a new prohibition, then indeed we will have here—then one can say that this is a Torah-level prohibition according to Maimonides, and that is the reason the reasoning alone is not enough; the verse is needed. Because without the verse it could not be Torah-level. However—however—there is room to comment a bit on this explanation of the need for the verse, because in Maimonides usually he explains the need for a verse on the grounds that we do not punish unless there was a warning. Therefore you need a warning in a verse, because without that you cannot punish. Which means that the need for a command that appears in a verse is a condition for my being able to impose punishment, but not necessarily a condition for the prohibition to be a Torah prohibition. After all, there is no punishment for a partial measure, only a Torah prohibition. Therefore it could be that here you do not really need a verse in order for the prohibition to be Torah-level, because one does not punish for it. Only where one punishes do you need a warning, because we do not punish unless there was a warning, and a warning means a verse. Reasoning is not a warning; you need a verse to warn. But where there is no punishment—in the case of a partial measure there is no punishment—in such a place it may be that there is a Torah-level prohibition even without a warning for it. This may depend—there is a famous dispute between the Tzelach and the Pnei Yehoshua in Berakhot 35 regarding the blessing before Grace after Meals, what we call the blessing over enjoyment. Right? The Talmud there concludes that the blessing over enjoyment is learned from reasoning. Yes—that it is forbidden for a person to enjoy this world without a blessing, and anyone who enjoys this world without a blessing is as if he committed sacrilege. So that is reasoning. Pnei Yehoshua asks about this: if it is reasoning, then why in cases of doubt about blessings do we rule leniently? The obligation to bless should be Torah-level, because reasoning is Torah-level. And Tzelach says about this: what are you talking about? Since when is reasoning Torah-level? There is no verse about this. In order for something to be Torah-level, you need a verse. Now someone who eats without a blessing is not punished. Right? In any case he is not punished. Maybe it would still be Torah-level and he would not be punished. Yes, the question is whether eating without a blessing is a prohibition involving an action or not. Is the prohibition that I did not bless, or that I ate without a blessing? After all, I do this through eating. Fine, there is room to discuss that issue. In any case, we are not dealing here with punishment. Now if we are not dealing with punishment and nevertheless Tzelach argues that a verse is needed for it to be Torah-level, then we see that the requirement for a verse is not a requirement for the possibility of imposing punishment, but without the verse it would not be a Torah-level law at all. By contrast, Pnei Yehoshua could answer him: what are you talking about? Reasoning is Torah-level. True, you need a verse in order to punish, but there is no punishment for eating without a blessing. And as for this being Torah-level, the reasoning alone suffices. Perhaps what I am saying here will depend on the dispute between Tzelach and Pnei Yehoshua: the question whether here a verse is needed to make it Torah-level according to Maimonides, because without a verse it cannot be Torah-level. So this may depend on that question. According to Pnei Yehoshua, the reasoning alone suffices, so long as there is no punishment—and here there is indeed no punishment. According to Tzelach, even when there is no punishment, reasoning alone is not enough; you need a verse. So this may depend on their dispute. Okay. I’ll say perhaps—I’ll say perhaps even more than that, just as a remark. If I understand the prohibition as a novel prohibition—the phrase “fit to combine,” I said, seems to imply that this is an extension of the existing prohibition, because the quality of the original prohibition is present. But “any fat”—there may perhaps be room to understand it as innovating a novel prohibition, not the prohibition of fat but the prohibition of a partial measure. If so, then perhaps it is even clearer why a verse is needed. If I had only the reasoning, then I would think this is an extension of the original prohibition. The verse comes to say that there is a novel prohibition here. And that is of course subject to the questions I asked: then why is it not counted? Why are there no lashes for it? And so on. Fine, so up to here we saw that the simple conception both in the Talmud and in Tosafot is that the verse and the reasoning work together. These are not two competing conceptions. Look at the Old Tosafot, which I’m also sharing with you. Old Tosafot here on the page in Yoma: Rabbi Yohanan said it is prohibited by Torah law because it is fit to combine. However, Tosafot says, Rabbi Yohanan’s main reason is what he derives later from the verse “any fat.” The main reason is the verse “any fat,” not the reasoning that it is fit to combine. And if so, one also gets lashes for it, since this is what the verse “any fat” seems to imply, from the fact that it says: I only know that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning, etc. What do we see in this Old Tosafot? This is a big novelty. First of all, this Old Tosafot says one thing: that Rabbi Yohanan’s main reason is the verse and not the reasoning. He adds: and if so, one also gets lashes. From this it follows that one gets lashes for a partial measure. And that is something we haven’t encountered until now. One gets lashes for a partial measure. Then he says: for this is what the verse “any fat” seems to imply, since it says: I only know that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning. He infers this from the wording of the baraita that Rabbi Yohanan brings against Reish Lakish. We’ll get to that in a moment. For our purposes, what matters is what is primary and what is not primary—that is not so critical; it’s also what I said earlier, that the reasoning tells me what to include from the verse. But Tosafot here innovates two points. First, that according to Rabbi Yohanan one gets lashes for a partial measure. Second, that the reason one gets lashes is because the source is the verse “any fat” and not the reasoning of “fit to combine.” That is what he says: and if so, one also gets lashes. Meaning, “one also gets lashes” is a conclusion from the fact that the prohibition of a partial measure comes from the verse “any fat.” If it came from reasoning, there would be no lashes. But if it comes from the verse, then there are lashes. The question is why. So I think one could understand it as I said earlier: Tosafot comes to say that “any fat” innovates a novel prohibition. “Fit to combine,” as we explained in the later authorities, is basically an extension of the existing prohibition. Therefore Tosafot says: Rabbi Yohanan’s main reason is from “any fat.” And “any fat” is a novel prohibition. And then what follows? Then it turns out that the prohibition of a partial measure is not a diminution of the existing prohibition. It is an inclusion of a new prohibition. If so, there is no reason that he should not get lashes. Like any prohibition in the Torah: if there is a prohibition and you violated it, you get lashes. If you tell me this is the normal prohibition of fat, then when the law of a partial measure comes to limit it, what does it limit? It limits the punishment. Right? “Any fat” comes to say that although there is a prohibition here, there is no punishment. Therefore it is clear he does not get lashes. But if you understand “any fat” not as a limitation but as an inclusion, it comes to include the prohibition, not to limit the punishment. So basically there is a new prohibition here, of a partial measure of fat. And if so, then certainly, as Tosafot says, he also gets lashes for it. Like any negative prohibition, once there is a negative prohibition one gets lashes for it. You know that for all punishments you need a source in the Torah in order to punish—death penalty, burning, stoning, whatever you want, all death penalties and spiritual excision and all the other punishments, monetary punishment—all these punishments have to be written in the Torah or in some derivation, but they need to be written. The punishment of lashes is the one punishment that does not need to be written. Any prohibition that appears in the Torah as a prohibition—if you violated it, you get lashes. There is such a sweeping rule. Therefore here, once a prohibition was innovated, there is no reason at all not to administer lashes. Why shouldn’t he get lashes? So understand that if he understands that from the verse “any fat” it follows that there are lashes—which from “fit to combine” we would not have learned—it makes very good sense that Tosafot is saying that the prohibition learned from “any fat” is a novel prohibition. It is not an extension of the existing prohibition. Since if it were an extension of the existing prohibition, then as I said earlier, it would come to limit punishment and not to include the prohibition. Once it is a novel prohibition, it comes to include the prohibition; automatically there will also be punishment. So from this it follows first, that Tosafot learns that the prohibition is learned from “any fat.” Second, that if the prohibition is learned from “any fat,” it is a novel prohibition. Third—and this is the biggest novelty here—that if the prohibition is a novel prohibition learned from “any fat,” then one also gets lashes for it. Not like the view of all the medieval authorities, that there are no lashes for a partial measure. Tosafot says there are lashes for a partial measure. So in what way does it differ from the full measure? In spiritual excision. For a full measure there is also spiritual excision. For fat, on Yom Kippur, there is also spiritual excision. For a partial measure there is a Torah-level prohibition, there are lashes, but there is no spiritual excision. You’ll ask why there is no spiritual excision. Not because spiritual excision was excluded, but because it was not included. After all, this is a novel prohibition. For this prohibition, like any negative prohibition, of course there are lashes. But spiritual excision—where would that come from? This is not the prohibition of fat or the prohibition of Yom Kippur. It is another prohibition. It is the prohibition of a partial measure. For there to be spiritual excision for it, you need a verse that innovates spiritual excision. There is no verse that innovates spiritual excision, so there will be no spiritual excision. There will be lashes because lashes do not need a verse to innovate them. Once there is a prohibition, there are lashes. That seems to me to be Tosafot’s intention. And if that is so, then here in our Tosafot another source emerges—and we also had it in Nachmanides’ Torat HaAdam—but here another source emerges that understands the prohibition of a partial measure as an independent prohibition, and the greatest novelty is that one even gets lashes for it. That is a very major practical implication. Okay, let’s take a few minutes’ break; in another five minutes we’ll come back, refresh yourselves a bit, wash your faces. Today we’re studying the weekly Torah portion, the portion of Vayera, about the hospitality of Abraham our forefather. It says: “And the Lord appeared to him in the plains of Mamre, and he sat at the entrance of the tent in the heat of the day.” Rashi explains that the Holy One, blessed be He, brought the sun out of its sheath so that guests would not trouble him, but Abraham was distressed that guests were not coming. From here we learn that hospitality to guests is greater than receiving the Divine Presence. And this needs to be understood: how can something physical like feeding and giving drink to human beings be greater than encountering the Divine Presence itself? The explanation is that Abraham our forefather understood that God’s will is that it be good for His creatures. When a person does kindness to another, he is essentially carrying out the deepest will of the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore this is even above the revelation of the Divine Presence. Abraham our forefather did not only receive guests; he also ran toward them. “And he ran toward them from the entrance of the tent.” He did not wait for them to come to him; he went outside to look for them. This teaches us that kindness is not only when someone asks, but to look for where one can help. Abraham our forefather said: “Let a little water, I pray you, be brought, and wash your feet.” He gave them a good feeling—not just food and drink, but also a personal and warm attitude. And this is the secret of true hospitality: to give the other person the feeling that he is wanted and important. May it be His will that we merit to learn from the ways of Abraham our forefather and increase kindness and mercy in the world. In the Old Tosafot that I read, I explained that he apparently understands that we are dealing with a novel prohibition, and therefore one also gets lashes for it. There is no spiritual excision for it because spiritual excision was not innovated for this prohibition. And at the end of the passage I brought, he infers something from the wording of the baraita. It’s not entirely clear. “For this is what the verse ‘any fat’ seems to imply, from the fact that it says: I only know that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning.” What is the inference from the wording of the baraita? Why is the wording of the baraita support for the claim Tosafot makes? The truth is that this baraita by itself is not entirely clear. What does it mean: “I only know that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning”? And do we need “any fat” to include, to include that there are situations in which there is warning but no punishment? A prohibition lacking an action has warning but no punishment. A prohibition repaired by a positive command has warning but no punishment. There are many things that have warning and no punishment. So why do we need the inclusion of “any fat” to teach me that there can be something with warning and no punishment? On the face of it, I would say we are speaking specifically about the prohibition of fat. Not the general question of how it can be that there is something with warning and no punishment. Obviously there are such things in Jewish law. By the way, that is unlike ordinary legal systems. In ordinary legal systems there is no criminal offense without punishment. Meaning, if there is no punishment, it is not a criminal offense. In Jewish law that is not so. In other words, the accounting will apparently be settled above; it doesn’t matter, but at least in court there is no punishment. But the baraita says: with respect to the prohibition of fat itself, there the Torah defines that one who violates this prohibition is subject to punishment—spiritual excision in that case. Okay? Now here, do we find a prohibition of fat for which there is warning and no punishment? That is the Talmud’s question—not whether in Jewish law in general we find a prohibition with warning and no punishment. Of course we do; there are many such cases. Rather, regarding the prohibition of fat it is not logical, because once you already have the prohibition, then you violated the negative commandment, so why shouldn’t you also get the punishment? After all, the Torah defines that whoever violates this negative commandment deserves such-and-such punishment. So how can there be a situation of warning without punishment? The Talmud says: “any fat.” What is it saying? One can understand it in two ways, but perhaps Tosafot—if I continue what I inferred—perhaps Tosafot says: this itself is what they answer. True, “any fat” is a novel prohibition; this is not the regular prohibition of fat. The regular prohibition of fat—if you violated that prohibition, there is spiritual excision for it. The Torah says that whoever violates the prohibition of fat incurs spiritual excision. So decide: if you violated the prohibition of fat with a partial measure, does the Torah impose spiritual excision for that? So if “any fat” comes to include that even for a partial measure you violated the prohibition of fat, then where does it come from that there is no spiritual excision? If you violated the negative commandment, then there should also be spiritual excision. Therefore, that is what the Talmud is asking. And therefore the baraita itself raises the same question that I asked earlier about the conception that sees a partial measure as an extension of the original prohibition. If it is an extension of the original prohibition, it is not clear why one does not receive the punishment, that same punishment of the original prohibition. We are forced to say, Tosafot says, that this is a novel prohibition learned from “any fat” and not from the reasoning of “fit to combine,” because from the reasoning of “fit to combine” we would have learned that it has the quality of the prohibition of pork and it is the prohibition of pork. But from “any fat,” as we saw at the beginning of Tosafot’s words, it turns out that this is an independent prohibition. If it is an independent prohibition, then there is no question why you are not liable to spiritual excision. You are not liable to spiritual excision because spiritual excision was not innovated for this prohibition. And ordinary prohibitions that have warning and no punishment certainly exist in Jewish law. The whole question was only about the prohibition of fat: can it be that you violate the negative commandment and do not receive punishment? That cannot be. The Talmud answers: right, that indeed cannot be—but here there is a novel prohibition from “any fat.” If I read it that way, then it also resolves the baraita’s question: how did we find warning without punishment, after all we find it everywhere. Clearly it is asking this specifically about fat, not generally in Jewish law. Then if so, I ask myself, okay, and what is the answer to that question? The answer is: you are right, indeed where you violate the prohibition of fat there will also be spiritual excision. But the prohibition of a partial measure is not the prohibition of fat; it is the prohibition of a partial measure, an independent prohibition learned from the verse “any fat,” and for that there are also lashes. Lashes—why? Because it is a negative commandment. But not spiritual excision. Why? Not because it was excluded from spiritual excision, but because spiritual excision was not innovated for this new prohibition. So it seems to me that this is the correct reading of that passage in the Old Tosafot. What happens with prohibitions for which there are only lashes and no spiritual excision? Seemingly there the law of a partial measure has no significance, because according to Old Tosafot, who says there are lashes even for a partial measure, the whole difference between a partial measure and a full measure is only regarding spiritual excision—but there are lashes even for a partial measure because it is a novel prohibition. If so, then what about prohibitions for which there is no spiritual excision? Then for a partial measure one gets lashes, and for a full measure one gets lashes, and only lashes—there is nothing more. So there is no difference between a full measure and a partial measure. Say, Nachmanides who says this is a lighter prohibition—that may not be true, because after all it is the same prohibition: for this one gets lashes and for that one gets lashes. I think that is not correct, because that is exactly what Old Tosafot tells us here: even if one gets lashes for the partial measure and for the full measure, the partial measure is a lighter prohibition. Why? Because it is another prohibition, a novel prohibition; it is not the prohibition of fat or the prohibition of pork. When you eat half an olive’s bulk of pork, you violated the prohibition of a partial measure, not the prohibition of pork. The prohibition of a partial measure is perhaps lighter. And even if one gets lashes for it, there is room to see it as the prohibition of a partial measure and not the prohibition of a full measure, because the prohibition of a partial measure is not the prohibition of pork; it is another prohibition. And the practical implication we saw in the previous class—for example, someone who eats a partial measure of meat and milk in an unusual manner. So if it is an extension of the prohibition of meat and milk, then you violate the prohibition even if you ate in an unusual manner. But if it is a novel prohibition, and in this novel prohibition it was not innovated that one also violates it when eating is in an unusual manner—that was innovated in the prohibition of meat and milk, not in the prohibition of a partial measure—therefore it is not that the law of a partial measure is redundant for things where there is no spiritual excision; it is not redundant. It innovates that you violate another prohibition, for which there are also lashes, but it is not the original prohibition. And this has all sorts of ramifications—say, in Sabbath prohibitions, if one carries out half a dried fig on the Sabbath, according to the one who says there is a law of a partial measure in Sabbath prohibitions too—we saw there is such a Rashi and other medieval authorities—then what would be his status? He would not be an apostate for the whole Torah, because he violated the prohibition of a partial measure, not the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath. It is another prohibition. Only the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath turns you into an apostate for the whole Torah, and similarly eating in an unusual way in… Okay, now later Old Tosafot rejects this, or raises a difficulty against it, rejects it, disputes it—depending on whether it is the same Tosafist. “And it is difficult, for Rabbi Yohanan should have said: the law follows Rabbi Shimon, and for Reish Lakish it follows the Rabbis. And furthermore, Rabbi Yohanan himself says in the Talmud in the chapter Three Kinds and the chapter These are Transgressed: in all prohibitions in the Torah, permitted food does not combine with prohibited food except in the prohibitions of a Nazirite.” If you eat half an olive’s bulk of pork and half an olive’s bulk of kosher meat, that is exactly a practical implication for our issue, by the way. If you ate half an olive’s bulk of pork and half an olive’s bulk of kosher meat, then as regards whether there was eating here—there was eating, because you ate an olive’s bulk, within the time of eating half a loaf, you ate it all. Did you eat pork? You ate pork, because after all half an olive’s bulk is also pork. So basically you should need to get lashes. But the Talmud there says no: in all prohibitions in the Torah, permitted food does not combine with prohibited food except in the prohibitions of a Nazirite. The permitted food does not combine with the prohibited food; you need to eat an olive’s bulk of pork. The act of eating is defined on the pork; an act of eating in which pork was also eaten is not enough. There has to be an act of eating of pork. Okay? Tosafot asks: and if one gets lashes for a partial measure, what need is there for combination? After all, if according to Rabbi Yohanan one gets lashes even for a partial measure, then what is there to discuss about whether permitted food combines with prohibited food? Let it not combine—he should get lashes for the partial measure of the prohibition. Even if the partial measure of the permitted food does not combine. Clearly, Tosafot says, one does not get lashes for a partial measure. And Rabbi says that this is not difficult, for all of them hold like the Rabbis—never mind, that enters the passage there—but necessarily this, regarding the prohibition from the verse “any fat,” is speaking only of prohibition in general. He rejects the first opinion in Tosafot and says no: there is only a prohibition and there is no punishment. And at the end of the chapter of the sciatic nerve in Hullin, Rabbi Yohanan requires a full measure for lashes, for it says there: a limb torn from a living animal that he divided outside is exempt; inside, within his mouth, Rabbi Yohanan said he is liable, for his throat derived pleasure from an olive’s bulk. What do we see? That according to Rabbi Yohanan, in order to get lashes you need an olive’s bulk; for a partial measure one does not get lashes. So these are two difficulties against the first opinion brought in Tosafot, that one gets lashes even for the prohibition of a partial measure. So Old Tosafot basically rejects the first conception he presented. Again, I don’t know whether this is a view that remained or a first thought he then rejected, or whether there is such a view and he just disagrees with it—I don’t know. In any case, I think this is not necessarily rejected. One could have said that all these cases, all these Talmudic discussions, are asking whether one would get lashes for the prohibition of pork. The first view in Tosafot would say: correct, one also gets lashes for a partial measure, but he gets lashes not for the prohibition of pork or of fat; rather, he gets lashes for the prohibition of a partial measure. The discussion here is whether it combines regarding prohibitions that have a measure. Regarding prohibitions that don’t have a measure, then obviously I don’t need combinations, so that’s not what’s being discussed. Therefore I think this too can be reconciled in that way. More than that: at the end Old Tosafot brings another support for the first view. He says: however, it is difficult for Rabbi Elhanan, for what is the difference that here we do not derive from “any fat” anything but prohibition, warning alone, and not lashes, whereas in Pesahim in the chapter These are Transgressed he derives from “you shall not eat any leavened thing” complete grain by means of mixture and hardened leaven, with a full negative prohibition, apparently including lashes. For what is the difference between “you shall not eat any leavened thing” and “you shall not eat any fat”? And one can distinguish between the derivations. Tosafot says: after all, “any fat,” how is that different from that? If there it is included as a full negative prohibition with lashes, then here too it should be included as a full negative prohibition with lashes. I think, though, that perhaps what he means by “one can distinguish between the derivations”—he doesn’t explain what the difference is. I think that according to the first view in Tosafot, indeed one gets lashes for a partial measure. Then there is no need to distinguish between derivations at all: in both “any fat” and leaven, one indeed gets lashes for a partial measure, though apparently because it is an independent prohibition and not because one is getting lashes for the original prohibition. But notice that I explained that there are lashes, but lashes for another prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, not for the original prohibition. Okay? And perhaps that is the distinction in derivations even in Old Tosafot’s own view. When we say “any fat,” if we learn that this is an independent prohibition, then for an independent prohibition there are also lashes. If we learn that it is only an extension of the existing prohibition, then in fact “any fat” comes to limit, not to include. It comes to exempt the case of a partial measure from lashes. Here, obviously, there are no lashes. So in short, the question is whether the derivation comes to limit or comes to include. And that is the distinction that perhaps Tosafot means by “one can distinguish between the derivations.” But according to the first view in Tosafot, of course, there is no need to distinguish anything; both in “any fat” and in leaven one really gets lashes for a partial measure, though apparently because it is an independent prohibition and not because one gets lashes for the original prohibition. In Maimonides—we saw, I mentioned Maimonides in the second root—that Maimonides says a prohibition learned from inclusion or derivation is not a Torah-level prohibition. So here in “any fat” it is learned from inclusion. I explained that true, it is learned from inclusion, but if it includes the original prohibition then I can say it is also Torah-level. If it comes to innovate a new prohibition, then it is harder to say it is Torah-level. So in Maimonides it seems not like what we saw at the beginning of Old Tosafot, but rather that “any fat” really includes the original prohibition and does not innovate a novel prohibition. Another remark: according to Rav Saadia Gaon there is no negative commandment at all for eating and drinking on Yom Kippur. There is an obligation to afflict oneself; there is no negative commandment for eating and drinking. So what is the spiritual excision for? On the face of it, it seems that according to Rav Saadia the spiritual excision is for the positive commandment. For the positive commandment of self-affliction, as we find spiritual excision for circumcision—there is spiritual excision for the positive commandment of self-affliction on Yom Kippur. That is spiritual excision for a positive commandment, not spiritual excision for a negative commandment. Now according to that, there is no room at all to discuss lashes, because there is no negative commandment here, only spiritual excision. So there is no question here at all; on Yom Kippur there is no question of lashes, only a question of spiritual excision. Therefore what Tosafot says at the beginning, that one gets lashes for a partial measure, is, at least regarding Yom Kippur according to Rav Saadia, not relevant, because there are no lashes. But that is not entirely certain. Why? I’ll say this briefly because it doesn’t really relate directly to our issue. I have long suspected—and I have not yet checked this through completely—I’m raising a possibility here. It could be, after all it is written that those liable to spiritual excision who received lashes are exempted from their spiritual excision. Meaning, if you get lashes, you are exempt from spiritual excision. When do you get spiritual excision from Heaven? If you were not lashed here in court. Okay? What happens with spiritual excision that is given for a positive commandment—circumcision, and according to Rav Saadia perhaps also Yom Kippur? Do I give lashes there too? There are no lashes; there is no negative commandment. So there there is no escape—I would have to get spiritual excision. I have no way to be exempted from spiritual excision by means of lashes. You know that in the sixteenth century there was a controversy in Safed, the controversy over ordination. The sages there—Mahari Beirav and his students—wanted to renew ordination. Their main purpose was in order to exempt the forced converts in Spain after the expulsion from Spain, to exempt them from spiritual excision for idolatry. Therefore they wanted to have them lashed in court, but for that you need ordained judges, because without that there are no lashes. Meaning, lashes basically exempt you from spiritual excision. What will happen with spiritual excision for a positive commandment? Is there a way to be exempt from it? I suspect yes. I suspect there will be lashes for a positive commandment. These are not lashes as punishment for the prohibition; they are lashes as a substitute for spiritual excision. Lashes whose purpose is to exempt you from spiritual excision, not lashes that are punishment for the prohibition. Then it may be that there are lashes also on Yom Kippur even though there is no negative commandment—but these are not lashes for the negative commandment; they are lashes meant to exempt from spiritual excision. Now of course for a partial measure, where there is no spiritual excision, there would also be no lashes, because if there is no negative commandment and no spiritual excision to be exempted from, then there is no basis at all to lash you, no basis at all to lash you. But in principle, for a full measure there may indeed be lashes even in that case. And indeed the Talmud in Keritot—in Makkot, sorry—the Talmud in Makkot 23 says: Rabbi Yohanan said, his colleagues disagree with Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamliel. Rav Adda bar Ahava said in the study hall: we learned this—there is no difference between the Sabbath and Yom Kippur except that for this one its intentional violation is by human hands, and for the other its intentional violation is by spiritual excision. But if that is so, both are by human hands, since there are lashes for them. Both on the Sabbath and on Yom Kippur there are lashes, but on Yom Kippur there is no death penalty. So the punishment is spiritual excision, a punishment from Heaven. So that is the difference between the Sabbath and Yom Kippur: on the Sabbath, deliberate violation is punished by human hands through stoning, while on Yom Kippur, deliberate violation is punished only from Heaven. Now if there are lashes for Yom Kippur too, then both are by human hands. That is how the Talmud asks on Rabbi Hananiah ben Gamliel, who says those liable to spiritual excision receive lashes. Rav Nahman says: this follows Rabbi Yitzhak, who says there are no lashes for those liable to spiritual excision. For it was taught: Rabbi Yitzhak says, those liable to spiritual excision were included in the general category, and why was spiritual excision singled out in the case of his sister? To judge him by spiritual excision and not by lashes. That applies to all negative commandments. Where there is a negative commandment for which spiritual excision was innovated, then lashes were not innovated for it. Spiritual excision replaces lashes. Lashes are given for negative commandments without spiritual excision. Negative commandments with spiritual excision—the spiritual excision removes them from lashes. Rav Ashi said: you can even say it follows the Rabbis; this one, its primary intentional violation is by human hands, and this one, its primary intentional violation is by Heaven. Meaning, there is still a difference between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath even if there are lashes. Why? Because this one, its primary intentional violation is by human hands, and this one, its primary intentional violation is by Heaven. What does that mean? First of all, we see that on Yom Kippur there are lashes, which seemingly contradicts what Rav Saadia says—after all, there is no negative commandment at all. If I combine Rav Saadia with the Talmud here, this is proof for the novelty I wanted to suggest earlier: that when there is a liability of spiritual excision, there may be lashes even without a negative commandment in order to exempt you from spiritual excision, and therefore on Yom Kippur there are lashes because you are coming to be exempted from spiritual excision. And perhaps that itself is the dispute between the Amoraim here, for Rav Ashi says that its primary intentional violation is by human hands and its primary intentional violation is by Heaven. What did he say? There really are lashes on Yom Kippur too, but even so it is still considered different. Why is there a difference? What difference does it make whether it is lashes or death? What is “its primary intentional violation”? According to my way, “its primary intentional violation” means because even the lashes on Yom Kippur are not a punishment by human hands. They are a means to be exempted from spiritual excision. Meaning, the essential punishment on Yom Kippur is a punishment from Heaven, namely spiritual excision. The lashes are only in order to be exempted from spiritual excision. So indeed the primary intentional violation on Yom Kippur is by Heaven and not by human hands. Practically speaking for our purposes, this basically brings us back to the question whether for a partial measure on Yom Kippur one is liable to lashes or not. I claim that on Yom Kippur he would not be liable to lashes according to Rav Saadia. He would not be liable to lashes because there is no negative commandment on Yom Kippur even for a full measure. And for a partial measure he would not be liable to lashes because there is no spiritual excision. For a full measure you would be liable to lashes in order to be exempted from spiritual excision, but for a partial measure, where there is no spiritual excision, there would likewise be no lashes. Okay. That is an implication of this conception that the lashes come to exempt from spiritual excision and not to punish him for the negative commandment. Okay. So we saw a bit in the medieval authorities the relationship between the sources of “any fat” and “fit to combine,” and the question whether this is an independent prohibition or an extension of the existing prohibition. Whether “any fat” is an explanation or an inclusion. The possibility of seeing it as an independent prohibition also arises in another way. We assumed until now that the basis of the reasoning of “fit to combine” is that in every part of the prohibition there exists the quality of the full prohibition. The quantity is lacking, but the quality of the full prohibition is there. But there are later authorities who explained that the basis of a partial measure is because it is fit to combine into a full measure. It is not a sign. It is not that because it is fit to combine, that is an indication that in each half there is the quality of the prohibition. No. It is because you can come to eat a full prohibition, and therefore they prohibited even a partial measure. Seemingly there are later authorities who formulate it this way; ostensibly we are speaking here about a fence-prohibition. Yes, they prohibit a partial measure because of concern that you may eat a full measure. But notice that a partial measure, according to Rabbi Yohanan—and that is how Jewish law is ruled—is a Torah-level prohibition. Usually fences are rabbinic prohibitions. Quite a few later authorities discuss this as an essential matter; it is not accidental. Every fence is by its nature rabbinic. The Torah does not deal in fences. There is no Torah-level fence. In his book Atvan DeOraita, Rabbi Yosef Engel devotes a section to this and discusses the issue. He brings two exceptions—he brings several exceptions, mainly seclusion and “it shall not be seen.” Seclusion is a fence to sexual prohibitions, and “it shall not be seen” is a fence to the eating of leaven too, and that only according to one view among the medieval authorities. But his simple conception there, as he shows, is that there is no fence at the Torah level. Torah prohibitions are not fences. The role of placing fences is the role of the Sages. The Torah says what is truly forbidden; the Torah says the truth, and what in truth is prohibited. The role of the Sages is to place fences, because what is a fence? A fence is really a not-truly-forbidden thing, it’s like a slippery slope. I forbid you poultry with milk lest you come to violate meat and milk. So poultry with milk in itself is not a problematic act; I only fear that you’ll come to do another act that is problematic, so I forbid you a permitted act out of concern that you’ll perform a forbidden act. The Torah does not deal with that. The Torah says what is really forbidden. The role of the Sages is to erect a fence and forbid permitted things to you. So if I understand that a partial measure is prohibited because of a fence, it is a bit hard to say, in Rabbi Yohanan’s opinion, that a partial measure is a Torah-level prohibition. Fine, but there are those who want to say this, and then it turns out that a partial measure is one of the exceptions to this rule that there are no fences at the Torah level. Here, a partial measure is a Torah-level fence. What is the practical implication of the conception that a partial measure is because of a fence? For example, in a place where there is no possibility of reaching completion of the prohibition to the full measure. For example, later authorities discuss someone who ate a partial measure in the last moments of Yom Kippur. He finished eating the partial measure just as the fast ended, so he has no way to complete it to a full measure, because if he eats from then onward he does not violate the prohibition; there is no way to complete it to a full prohibition. The fence is not only that perhaps he will complete it to a full measure, but that perhaps he will eat it in other opportunities as well. Okay, so I’ll get to that remark in a moment. But several later authorities claim that this is the practical implication of the fence-prohibition. They are basically saying that a fence-prohibition applies where there is concern that you’ll come to eat the full measure, but at the end of Yom Kippur, for example, not. The truth is that, of course, one can reject this, as Binyamin rightly said. The fence could be that if you permit yourself to eat a partial measure now, then next Yom Kippur you’ll eat a full measure, or alternatively other people will eat a full measure because they see people eating on Yom Kippur. So the fence does not have to be specifically that you yourself will complete the forbidden act to a full measure. Though it may be that perhaps this is the difference between a fence and a decree. A decree is lest something else happen; a fence may be—perhaps this is the difference—that a fence is something that comes to stop you. A fence is a barrier, right? A barrier that comes to stop you from going further; that is the literal meaning of a fence. It comes to stop you from going further. So perhaps they really mean the concept of a fence and not the concept of a decree, and then perhaps this really is a possible practical implication regarding someone who ate at the end of Yom Kippur. But there are several commentators who really do bring this very practical implication, and when you read them carefully, in fact all of them, all the ones I saw—if you read their wording carefully, you see they do not mean a fence. That is not right; that is a mistake of these later authorities. The earliest sources are Meiri, Shaar Yosef, Avnei Miluim—even the earlier later authorities, the more foundational later authorities, not the contemporary later authorities who bring this practical implication. If you read their wording carefully you will see they are not talking about a fence. Let’s see a few examples. There is Meiri in our passage, only part of it. Meiri is speaking about what is discussed in the passage at the beginning of the chapter. The question is about taking an oath regarding the prohibition of a partial measure—whether the oath takes effect or not. If I swear not to eat pork, an olive’s bulk of pork, the oath does not take effect because a prohibition does not take effect on a prohibition, right? Or an oath does not take effect on an oath—that is already imposed and standing from Mount Sinai. What happens if I swear not to eat a partial measure? So this is a dispute among the medieval and later authorities, and the Talmud itself discusses it here; perhaps we’ll get to it later. But right now the Talmud brings this as a practical difference between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish: according to Rabbi Yohanan the oath would not take effect because there is a Torah-level prohibition, and according to Reish Lakish the oath would take effect because there is no prohibition. And afterward Reish Lakish answers that it is a rabbinic prohibition, and the question is whether an oath takes effect on a rabbinic prohibition—another discussion among later authorities. In any case Meiri here says as follows: a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, though there are no lashes for it, and since it is prohibited by Torah law, if one swore not to eat half an olive’s bulk of forbidden fat, it seems from this passage that the oath does not take effect on him. For he is already under oath and standing, even though there are no lashes for it. Nevertheless, we ruled in Shevuot 21 that the oath does take effect on him. He argues that the oath does take effect on a partial measure. And he explained the reason: for even Rabbi Yohanan only said it is by Torah law because it is fit to combine, and this is the beginning of an act of forbidden eating. But when one swears regarding a partial measure, he is thereby revealing his intention that he is not aiming at combination, and even Rabbi Yohanan agrees that it is only rabbinic. Do you think he is talking about a fence? He says that basically a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law where it can combine with another half. But if someone swears not to eat a partial measure, then this is not because we fear he will eat a full measure—the prohibition is not to eat a partial measure—so he does not intend combination at all. So there, Rabbi Yohanan too would say there is no Torah-level prohibition of a partial measure. Why? Because there it cannot combine into a full measure. Or in other words, the prohibition of a partial measure there is rabbinic; therefore the oath takes effect on it. Why? Because here, when he swears not to eat a partial measure and he eats the partial measure, we have no concern that he will eat a full measure, because he violates the prohibition the moment he eats the partial measure. Therefore there is no prohibition of a partial measure here. But this is not a fence. I think from his wording you can see—he says “and this is the beginning of an act of forbidden eating,” that is his wording. What does he mean? He means that when you eat an olive’s bulk of a prohibited item, then at the beginning you ate the first third of the olive’s bulk. Right? After you finished the olive’s bulk, it became clear retroactively that already with the first third you had eaten a prohibited thing. Therefore there is a prohibition of a partial measure. But where you cannot complete the eating to a full measure, then it does not become clear retroactively that there was a prohibition in the first part. Therefore there is no prohibition there. This is not a problem of a fence. On the contrary, if anything, in Meiri I understand something very similar to the reasoning of “fit to combine.” He basically says that since you are in fact doing a complete act of eating, then obviously the beginning of the act of eating is already a prohibition, because the proof is that if you continue it this will become a fully prohibited act. But unlike what I said earlier in the name of the later authorities—the view I called the indication view, that combination is an indication that in every half there is the quality of the prohibition—here he speaks about the act and not the object. They spoke about the object: if a third of an olive’s bulk plus another third plus another third is a complete prohibition, then in each third there is the quality of the prohibition. He speaks about the act of eating: the beginning of the act is an act of prohibition, because the proof is that if you continue it this will be a fully prohibited act. Not about the object but about the act. But his reasoning is the same reasoning: the complete act is an indication that the part also has the prohibition in it. It is not the fence view. Therefore he says that all this applies only where eating the half can indeed be completed into eating a full measure. But if we are speaking about eating a partial measure that is not supposed to be completed, or cannot even be completed, to a full measure, or where there is no concern that you will complete it to a full measure—in that case there is no indication that eating the half is an act of forbidden eating, and therefore there really will be no Torah-level prohibition of a partial measure there. Look at a very, very similar style in Shaagat Aryeh, end of section 81. Again, I marked here in bold the relevant passage. “Unlike in all prohibitions, for there we say that even a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law”—I’m reading the lines underlined—“this is because it is fit to combine; he is eating prohibition. And this reason applies only to prohibitions of eating, because we hold there that one who eats an olive’s bulk within the time of eating half a loaf combines and is liable for it. Thus, if he now ate any small amount, when he returns and eats within the time of eating half a loaf until he completes it to the measure of an olive’s bulk, then this small amount that he already ate turns out retroactively to have been eaten in prohibition, for it combined and completed the measure of eating,” exactly like Meiri’s language. And note, this too is not a fence. What will be interesting here is that the practical implication Shaagat Aryeh brings is what happens if one eats at the end of Yom Kippur—the practical implication I brought earlier that everyone brings as the implication of the fence conception. So Shaagat Aryeh and Meiri agree that this would indeed be a practical implication, but they argue that there would be no prohibition of a partial measure there not because the conception is one of a fence, but because you cannot complete the act and show us retroactively that eating the initial part was already an act of prohibited eating. Maybe allow me another two minutes. What happens if you eat the partial measure a little before the end of Yom Kippur? You still have time to complete the partial measure, but you did not complete it. Would that be a Torah-level prohibition of a partial measure? I don’t think Shaagat Aryeh means to say that you also have to complete it and only then will it reveal retroactively that the first half was also a prohibition. Because then it is meaningless, because the moment you completed it you already violated the full prohibition. It is hard to say that in the same act you would violate two prohibitions. He means to say that if you have the possibility of completing the second half, then the first half is in fact a prohibition. If you eat right next to the end of Yom Kippur, you have no possibility of completing it. Not because in practice you did not complete it. What matters is the possibility of completing it. Also in the responsa of Avnei Miluim he says: “Since a partial measure is prohibited only because it is fit to combine with another partial measure into a complete olive’s bulk, therefore if one swore that he would not eat this loaf and he ate it, and there remained from it only half an olive’s bulk, then that partial measure no longer has combination with another partial measure, because from that loaf nothing remains anymore.” Only half an olive’s bulk remains, so you cannot complete the measure with another half from this loaf, because he swore only about this loaf. And then he says that in that case there is basically no reasoning of “fit to combine.” Does he mean a fence? It doesn’t seem so. He says because it is fit to combine; he is not talking about the concern that he may eat, but about the fact that there is no reality in which he can eat. He says: “But if his heart hesitates in this, then on Yom Kippur at the end of the day, where there is no time except for less than the measure, it would be permitted by Torah law, since it is no longer fit to combine.” Here the language is more concise, and one could perhaps impose on him the fence reasoning, but in light of what we saw earlier, I am not at all sure he means that. I think he too is not speaking about the fence reasoning. Okay, we’ll stop here. Again, the summary will be uploaded to the site—and there at the end I also write instructions for you—it will be uploaded to Dropbox, yes, and afterward I’ll write for you instructions for what comes next. In the meantime we are still in the passage of a partial measure. I suggest reviewing the beginning of the passage, about an oath on a partial measure, and the Avnei Miluim that I brought here—but I’ll write this for you at the end of the file. Okay, we’ll stop here. Does anyone want to comment or ask? If so, you can. I—okay, but I don’t want to delay the others, so maybe. Whoever wants can leave. It’s not delaying anything. The class is over. Regarding this reasoning of Avnei Miluim, in the end I didn’t understand why—how do you prove that this is not a fence? Is it a proof from the wording or…? No, the wording. The wording. I’m not proving anything. The wording. Because the wording is not unambiguous, since all the arguments of “fit to combine” can in fact explain a fence. Because after all, a fence only makes sense in a case where it is fit to combine. Of course. So look at their wording and you’ll see they’re not speaking that way. Here, take Shaagat Aryeh. He says: “Thus, if he now ate any small amount, when he returns and eats within the time of eating half a loaf until he completes it to the measure of an olive’s bulk, then this small amount that he already ate turns out retroactively to have been eaten in prohibition, for it combined and completed the measure of eating.” That is not the style of a fence. In a fence, it does not become clear retroactively. In a fence, the first half that you ate is a prohibition. You do not need any retroactive revelation. The concern is that you will eat another half. Here he says that when you eat another half, it will reveal retroactively that the first half was already a prohibition. In any case, that does not mean you need also to eat the second half. I said, he doesn’t mean that. He’s only using the language. In any case, it’s still not clear to me why he writes that. This whole sentence seems problematic to me anyway. Why? Because why does he need to add that it turns out retroactively that this was prohibited? Surely “fit to combine” applies even if we don’t say it was prohibited retroactively. Suppose it wasn’t prohibited retroactively. No, he also doesn’t mean it was prohibited retroactively. Again. He doesn’t mean that you have to complete the second half in practice in order to violate the prohibition of a partial measure with the first half. Otherwise there is no such thing as a partial measure. You would always need to complete it. To violate a full-measure prohibition. He means to say that the fact that you can violate the second half—let’s do a thought experiment. Suppose you would eat another half. That would reveal retroactively that the first half was already an act of eating. So now I already know that; I don’t need to eat the second half in practice. But why do I need that revelation? It seems superfluous. It’s a thought experiment. You don’t need the revelation, you don’t need to eat in practice. It’s only hypothetical. No, but what does that thought experiment come to prove? You see that a prohibition that is half—this is like “fit to combine.” If you add another half, there will be a full prohibition here. That means the quality of the prohibition already exists in the first half. This is exactly the reasoning of “fit to combine,” just not about the object but about the act. Okay. Fine, I hear. Thank you very much. Okay. Goodbye.