Audience 1

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So when do you go? Why suddenly educate them from this? When? What’s the point here? Just to hear? Yes, but what’s the point — what’s the commandment here? For children just to come and listen? Maybe they won’t understand anything. So what’s the goal? The goal is to speak in Grace after Meals within the commandment… the children already want the table, you already told him…

[Speaker B] Tell a child under six to sit quietly and keep still — he’d prefer…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To sit quietly after he walked on foot to get there… again, walked on foot… with other children… Okay, in any case, so the next line is: “in order to give reward to those who bring them,” and then he says to them, “A precious pearl was in your hands, and you wanted to lose it from me?” This wonderful interpretation was in the study hall and you didn’t want to say it? I had to squeeze it out of you? Immediately after that there’s another interpretation, which on the face of it seems unrelated. It says, this is what was expounded: “You have declared the Lord today, and the Lord has declared you today.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Israel: You have made Me one unit in the world, and I will make you one unit in the world. You made Me one unit in the world through “Hear O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One,” and I will make you one unit in the world, as it says, “And who is like Your people Israel, one nation on earth.” Also a beautiful interpretation, but it doesn’t seem that there’s any connection between these two interpretations — two interpretations that apparently were said in the study hall at the same time. On the face of it, it seems there is no commandment here on the child himself. It’s not that the child is really obligated. From the language of the Talmud it seems that “to give reward to those who bring them” means there is a commandment on those who bring them to bring the children in order to receive reward for that, but there is no commandment on the child. The child is not subject to obligation; you can’t obligate him in commandments. So it’s not a commandment on the child; it’s a commandment on those who bring them. That is the simple meaning of the Talmud. And in fact that’s exactly what the Minchat Chinukh writes as something obvious. He says it can’t be that when it says the little children are obligated, the intention is that the child himself is obligated. A minor is not obligated in commandments. So obviously this is an obligation on his father or on one of the adults to bring him to the study hall in order to receive reward, and he also cites the Talmud in Chagigah. Later he derives from this a sharp halakhic conclusion. The halakhic conclusion he derives is that the minor does not need to fulfill the conditions of obligation that an adult needs to fulfill. An adult, in order to be obligated in the commandment of Hakhel, has to own land, he must not be deaf, and so on. A minor does not need to fulfill those conditions. Even a deaf child, says the Minchat Chinukh, may also be brought in order to give reward to those who bring him. Why? Because he is not fulfilling the commandment of Hakhel. The commandment of Hakhel does not rest on him. The restrictions were stated regarding the one on whom the commandment of Hakhel rests — whether he has land, whether he is not deaf, and so on. But the children, even if they are deaf, may be brought. They have absolutely no conditions, because in truth they are not part of the obligated category. That’s what the Minchat Chinukh says, and that’s apparently what emerges from the Talmud: the obligation is not on the child, but rather on the father.

[Speaker B] What about the interpretation of “And you shall teach them diligently to your children” — surely Israel…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something like that. We still need to understand exactly what this means, this whole matter, but why…

[Speaker B] Maybe the issue here is the question of land?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the comparisons between appearing and Hakhel, there’s some kind of condition that he has to have land.

[Speaker B] For example, are the Levites, who don’t have land, included in the assembly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here it’s supposedly an inheritance in the land among them, and the Levites weren’t there on that practical distinction… In the Turei Even there, on this Talmudic passage in Chagigah 3a, he asks whether this commandment is incumbent on the father or on the religious court. “In order to give reward to those who bring them” — the ones who bring them have to bring the child. Who are these bringers? Are these bringers the ones who manage things — the religious court, in halakhic language — or the father, each father with his own child? So he brings proof that it is the religious court. What is the proof? He learns as follows: “In order to give reward to those who bring them” — in the Turei Even, the question regarding bringing the children is: on whom does the obligation rest? Specifically on the father, or also on the religious court? Also on the religious court; regarding the father, that is obvious to him in any case. And if you say that if it were specifically on the father, then I would have trouble deriving those exempt from appearing from Hakhel by way of the verbal analogy “appearing-appearing,” because we derive the exemptions of appearing from the exemptions of Hakhel, and later it says that this is why “male” is written, to exclude women regarding appearing, because otherwise they would be derived from Hakhel. In other words, there is an analogy between appearing and Hakhel, and in order to exempt women from appearing, a verse from the Torah is needed, because without the verse we would obligate them due to the verbal analogy from Hakhel. He’s just bringing a somewhat long proof. He says: I would have had difficulty exempting those exempt from appearing from Hakhel through the verbal analogy “appearing-appearing.” And as Rabbi Ami said, one who has no land is exempt from appearing. There is such a rule: one who has no land does not have to make the pilgrimage festival ascent; he is not obligated to make the pilgrimage. And since he is going to bring his child — well, maybe certainly he would have to bring the child — if so, then the same law should apply to Hakhel, that one who has no land is apparently also exempt from Hakhel, just as he is exempt from appearing, because there is an analogy. Okay? The Turei Even asks: Hakhel surely applies to the father, because in fact the obligation to bring the little children to Hakhel falls on the father. Where does a child have land in the Land of Israel if the head of the household, his father, is still alive? How does the child have land in the Land of Israel if his father is still alive? The land belongs to the father. As long as he has not inherited it, it has not passed to him. So if he has land in the Land of Israel and inherited the land — maybe there’s some Torah-level issue there, I don’t know — but in the Land everything is inheritance. As long as you did not receive the land as an inheritance, it belongs to your father. You got it from your father. And we’re dealing with a case where his father died and he inherited land from him. But then, how can the little child be obligated? It must be that his father already died and he inherited the land, and that’s how he has land. In any case, let’s skip the… In short, if that is so, what does it mean? It means that the obligation is on the religious court, because if the only possibility for a minor to be obligated in Hakhel is only when his father has already died, then clearly the obligation to bring him cannot possibly be only on the father. Clearly the obligation falls on the religious court. When is a child obligated at all? Only when his father has already died. So if it is only when his father has already died, then how could it be that the obligation is on the father? It has to be that the obligation is on the religious court.

[Speaker B] That’s his proof. But if the child is obligated, then he…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s also cited in the Minchat Chinukh. Clearly this does not fit with the earlier Minchat Chinukh. What did I say before? Right? That Minchat Chinukh basically says that the minor does not need to fulfill all the conditions that an adult must fulfill in order to be obligated. Why? Because the obligation is on the father and not on the child; the father has to bring him. The Turei Even here assumes the opposite. The Turei Even here assumes that a minor, even if he has no land, is not obligated. That is a very novel assumption. The Minchat Chinukh would distinguish. A child can go up even without land — except for an obligated child who can go up — it’s not relevant; he himself isn’t obligated, the father is obligated. So the Turei Even here assumes a different Minchat Chinukh, as it were. The Minchat Chinukh himself comments on this later. He comments about the Turei Even that this is not… not correct. And there is a dispute between them here. The Turei Even assumes that the child himself has all the same limitations as an adult. He apparently learns — what’s the dispute between them? He apparently learns that the obligation in Hakhel rests on the child himself, not on the father to bring the child as the Minchat Chinukh understood. The Turei Even learns that the obligation rests on the child himself, and then automatically, like everyone else, he has to meet the conditions. One who is deaf is not obligated, one who has no land is not obligated, and the same is true for a child, because the child too is obligated like an adult — some sort of Torah commandment in which even minors are obligated.

[Speaker B] And what is he looking for? Who is obligated to bring them?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The religious court. That’s one question, but I’ll get to it in a second. First of all, let this be clear, okay? So the dispute between the Turei Even and the Minchat Chinukh is basically over the question of how to define the commandment of Hakhel as it applies to minors. The Minchat Chinukh holds that minors cannot be obligated in anything — they are minors, after all… minors are not obligated in commandments. The obligation is on the parents to bring them, or on the religious court, or on the parents — it doesn’t matter. The Turei Even, beyond proving that it is on the religious court — and afterward he rejects that — still, within his discussion it is implied that he assumes the opposite, that the minor must meet all the criteria of an adult: he himself is obligated. Not that the father has to bring him. If the child has no land, he does not need to go up. If he is deaf, he does not need to go up, contrary to the Minchat Chinukh. In other words, there is a dispute here over how to understand the obligation of minors. Is the obligation of minors an obligation on the father to bring the child, as the Minchat Chinukh understood, or is it an obligation on the child himself, like an adult — some sort of Torah commandment in which Hakhel is exceptional, and even a child is obligated in it? Okay? That is what emerges from the Turei Even.

[Speaker B] Besides, a child can’t acquire land.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s why he says that in the Land of Israel it works through inheritance.

[Speaker B] But why through inheritance? He can buy it later. He has land until the Jubilee.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Buying land… This gets a bit more into the issue of what happens in the time of the Jubilee or outside the Jubilee. If someone buys during the Jubilee era, then there’s some issue here of… he has land, so… Anyway, first of all, this raises yet another question that joins the previous one. Earlier we saw that there is some exceptional obligation of women in the commandment of Hakhel, even though it is a time-bound positive commandment. Now we see that even minors are obligated — even minors, who are never obligated in commandments at all. A time-bound positive commandment, and here even minors are obligated. The whole thing keeps expanding; somehow everyone is obligated in this commandment. But before I get to that point — how can you obligate minors at all? Can one address minors with any kind of command? Can the Torah — or anyone at all — obligate a minor who has not reached the age of commandments in something? So in fact, I wrote this on the source sheet too: there is a famous dispute between Rashi and Tosafot in Berakhot and in Megillah regarding the law of education. Granted, that’s rabbinic — the law of education — but with respect to the law of education there is this dispute. The Talmud on Berakhot 48 says that one who ate an olive’s bulk is obligated in Grace after Meals on the rabbinic level; only one who ate to satisfaction is obligated on the Torah level. He is obligated on the rabbinic level, and the question is whether he can fulfill the obligation for someone who ate to satisfaction, who is obligated in Grace after Meals on the Torah level. The Talmud says that he can: one who ate an olive’s bulk can fulfill the obligation for someone who ate to satisfaction. Rashi there asks from the Talmud on page 20. The Talmud on page 20 says that a minor who is obligated on the rabbinic level cannot fulfill the obligation for his father, or for some adult. Why? Because an adult who ate is obligated on the Torah level, while a minor is not really obligated in commandments, only because of education and rabbinic law. And since the minor is only obligated rabbinically, he cannot fulfill the obligation for someone who is obligated on the Torah level. Rashi asks: that’s a contradiction between the passages. Rashi says we have to say that the minor is not considered obligated even rabbinically. A minor is not obligated at all. The obligation is on his father to educate him; there is no obligation on him to recite the blessing. So how can he fulfill the obligation for someone else? He is not obligated even on the rabbinic level, not only not on the Torah level. On the rabbinic level too, he is not obligated at all, because minors cannot be obligated in anything. Only the father is obligated to educate him in commandments on the rabbinic level. That’s what Rashi says. And Tosafot there on page 48 says that Rashi — peace unto him, as it were, and with all due respect — that cannot be right; the minor himself is also obligated on the rabbinic level. And then Tosafot offers other explanations for why the minor cannot fulfill the obligation for his father — not important right now. But there is a dispute here, and this appears again in Megillah: is the minor obligated in the commandments of education, as a commandment resting on the child himself — again, this is all rabbinic, but still it says something — or is it imposed on the father, meaning we say to the father: educate your son so that when he grows up he will know what to do? So there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Which means that maybe obligations can be imposed on minors, as Tosafot holds. But the question still remains: why? Why here is there this broadening of the boundaries of obligation to include women, minors, and so on? Before I move to the answer to that question, I want to move to one more category that always has to be checked — the slave. What is the law regarding a slave in Hakhel? We talked about women, we talked about minors. So women, according to everyone, are obligated — that’s exceptional. Minors — there is a dispute whether they are obligated to begin with; perhaps according to Tosafot minors too can be obligated, maybe like Tosafot in the commandments of education. What about slaves? So Maimonides writes in halakhah 2 that anyone who is exempt from appearing is exempt from Hakhel. And in effect he excludes three: the uncircumcised, the impure, and women. Now regarding appearing, it is explicit in Maimonides in the laws of Festival Offering and in the Talmud that slaves are exempt from appearing. And when Maimonides compares appearing and Hakhel, he says except for women, the impure, and the uncircumcised. He does not mention slaves. That implies that all the other categories exempt from appearing are exempt from Hakhel as well. In other words, slaves are exempt from Hakhel. That is what Maimonides writes, that is what seems from Maimonides’ words, and that is how the Lechem Mishneh understands it — that there is a list of three, and slaves are exempt. The Lechem Mishneh asks: why are they exempt? After all, there is an analogy between slaves and women — the “her-her” analogy from woman. Just as a woman is obligated, a slave is obligated; just as a woman is exempt, a slave is exempt. So if a woman is obligated in Hakhel, then a slave should also have been obligated in Hakhel. Why is a slave exempt? That is the Lechem Mishneh’s question. The Lechem Mishneh says, in the section before you: “And one may say that here it is different, because the verse says, ‘when all Israel comes to appear,’ implying the exemption of slaves, as our teacher wrote.” Our teacher, in the laws of Festival Offering, when Maimonides discusses appearing, gives two reasons why slaves are exempt: one is because of the analogy to women, since women are exempt from appearing; and the second is because it says “when all Israel comes,” and slaves are not included in all Israel. The Lechem Mishneh says: the reason of the analogy between women and slaves is indeed relevant regarding appearing. Here, women are obligated, so if the analogy applied, slaves should also have been obligated; but they are exempt. Yes — because there is the second reason: it says “when all Israel comes,” and that exemption exists in Hakhel as well. With regard to women, something new was introduced so that they are not exempt. That’s what the Lechem Mishneh says. And in truth the question arises: why were slaves not analogized to women? If women are obligated, why are slaves not analogized to women? Why is this, once again, something exceptional here? I think the explanation for this whole mess is that the real question is how to understand this commandment of Hakhel. Now the simple understanding of the verse, even before all the Talmudic discussions and the medieval authorities and later authorities, is that this commandment is imposed on the public; it is not imposed on individuals. Hakhel is a commandment incumbent on the whole of Israel. We know an entire collection of commandments whose addressee is the public, not the individual. The commandment to build the Temple, the commandment to appoint a king, to destroy Amalek, to conquer the land according to Nachmanides in positive commandment 4 among his additions there, and the wiping out of Amalek too — that’s also disputed, but it is quite likely that that too is a commandment imposed on the public. It is not a commandment imposed on each individual; not every individual is obligated to build a Temple. The public, the whole of Israel, is commanded to do these things. There are commandments whose basic addressee is the public, not each individual. Now of course, what is a public? A public is the collection of individuals who make it up. So in order for this public commandment to be fulfilled, the individuals have to do the work — but the one obligated in this commandment is the public. Now if that is so, then for example in the Halakhot Gedolot — I looked at the source sheet — in the Halakhot Gedolot, in his book of commandments, in his enumeration of the commandments, there are positive commandments, prohibitions, and sections. And Maimonides attacks this method and does not quite understand it. We don’t really know — the enumerators of the commandments before Maimonides generally divided the commandments into three categories: positive commandments, prohibitions, and sections. What are “sections”? The Halakhot Gedolot says — look at the last passage in the photograph on the page — that “sections” are commandments imposed on the public, and he counts all the commandments imposed on the public. The last of them — there are seventy-five — the last of them is Hakhel. There it is, right here in the chapter. So in the Halakhot Gedolot it says explicitly that the addressee is the public. It’s not that each member of the public is obligated and then of course the whole public must be present at Hakhel; rather, the one obligated is the public. It’s not that each individual is obligated and then, when everyone arrives, the public happens to be in Jerusalem. No — the obligated entity in this commandment is the public as a whole, not the individuals. And therefore this follows: regarding a time-bound positive commandment and the obligation of women, there is no question. If the whole public is obligated, then everyone who is included in the public is obligated. Why would you exempt the public from a time-bound positive commandment? Women are not personally obligated in this commandment; the one obligated is the public. And everyone who belongs to the public must therefore take part in fulfilling this commandment. So it makes no sense to say here that women are exempt because it is a time-bound positive commandment. According to this, it is also clear why one cannot draw an analogy to slaves. There would be room to analogize to slaves if women themselves were truly obligated with a personal, head-count kind of obligation, some duty imposed on them as individuals; then there could be an analogy to slaves. But there isn’t. Women are not obligated as individuals; they are obligated as part of the collective. So who else is obligated in this? Whoever belongs to the collective. The Lechem Mishneh says that slaves are not obligated. Why not? Because it says “when all Israel comes.” Whoever belongs to the whole of Israel is obligated in this, and slaves were excluded because they do not belong to “all Israel.” This has nothing at all to do with analogizing to women. Women are not playing a role here; they are neither obligated nor exempt, because this commandment is not speaking to private individuals at all. This commandment speaks to the public. So the question of why slaves here were not analogized to women simply does not arise. Women are obligated as part of the public, and slaves are not analogized to women because there is nothing to analogize; women are not even personally obligated or exempt. Slaves are judged on their own terms, and on their own terms, when we ask whether they are obligated or not, the verse says “all Israel” — slaves are not included in that. How do we know this from the verses themselves? Look at the top of the page. What do the verses say? “Assemble the people,” and afterward, “the men, the women, and the little children” — there is then a detailed listing. First of all there is a definition. Why doesn’t it say “assemble the men, the women, and the little children”? Why does it say “assemble the people” and then “the men, the women, and the little children”? Why? To tell us that the one obligated here is the people. Of course this is translated into each of the individuals who make up that public, but the addressee of the commandment is the people.

[Speaker D] Is there maybe a general-and-particular structure here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not general-and-particular in the sense of the interpretive rules.

[Speaker D] That was my question — whether it is in that sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not in the sense of the interpretive rules. The verse appears in plural language and not in singular language. That’s all general, in the way it’s translated…

[Speaker D] This…

[Speaker C] Meaning, it’s worthwhile also in the counting of the commandments, that they don’t count this as a positive commandment — the Halakhot Gedolot, for that reason, doesn’t count it as a positive commandment but only counts who violates it. Right, right. Yes, but what’s the point here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Halakhot Gedolot… here…

[Speaker B] How do you distinguish between what counts as an assembly and what doesn’t, basically? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the book, in the counting of Hakhel, if it’s counted in the numbering of Hakhel… I don’t know, but… It could be that there really is a dispute here whether from now on you classify it under Hakhel. Maybe that’s why he changed it.

[Speaker B] Why in Sefer…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Sefer HaChinukh — why, why didn’t he write that those obligated are both males and females? Not everything, not everything. Not HaChinukh, not HaChinukh — why did he write it that way? HaChinukh — why does it matter? The Turei Even, who says that children… we spoke about women, we spoke about slaves. I asked: according to the Turei Even, maybe now I also understand HaChinukh regarding children, like we found in Tosafot regarding the commandments of education. But why really? Why are children obligated here? So again, it is not that the children are obligated; the public is obligated. After all, look at the Talmud — this is what Sefer HaChinukh was puzzled by. The Talmud says, “to give reward to those who bring them.” That means, who is obligated in this? Those who bring them. So how does the Turei Even learn that the obligation is on the child himself? The Turei Even says: no, the obligation is on the public as a whole — and that includes the children too. And of course slaves are not included in the public, so they are not.

[Speaker B] But the language, the language of the Torah is not that the people have to assemble themselves. Maybe it’s the king — “assemble the people” — someone has to gather them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not the king to gather them — but gather whom?

[Speaker B] So maybe the commandment is on the king.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? “Assemble” — maybe the king is being addressed, I don’t know whether the king is being addressed, but clearly he is responsible; he will bring them; there is a commandment involving the king in this matter. But there is a commandment here on the public. Of course, whenever there is a commandment on the public, which institution is responsible for carrying it out? Probably the king, or the religious court if there is no king, whoever governs the public. Why is it said this way? Why isn’t it said in some communal institutional language? But this is not a commandment only on the king; perhaps the commandment here is not imposed on the king alone but on the public.

[Speaker D] Like “Remember what Amalek did to you” — that isn’t imposed on the king even though it’s said in the singular; it’s imposed on the people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it is imposed on the people, and it could be that the king, as the one who manages things, is the one who has to carry it out in practice. And that is because he was appointed — he is the overseer of the people, as the king is called “one of the people,” and he is the one who represents the people as a whole. So things that are imposed on the people — the king is supposed to make sure they are carried out.

[Speaker B] But it’s imposed on the people, not on the king. Not like the commandment on the king to write himself a Torah scroll — that is a commandment on the king as an individual, as a person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here it is a commandment on the public. Of course, with public commandments the king is supposed to make sure they are carried out. So bringing them as part of the collective — not in order to give reward to those who bring them, but rather what? So if HaChinukh says to bring them — no, wait, wait, there are two sides here. This connects to the previous question you asked. Fine. So if that’s the case, there are commandments that are imposed on the public, and as part of the public this includes women, children, and so on. Regarding HaChinukh itself, we asked: why doesn’t HaChinukh really say that women and men are both obligated in this together? And in fact it’s not correct that women and men are both obligated in this. It’s not a commandment on individuals at all; it’s a commandment on the public. What you can say in HaChinukh, though — and here I’m beginning to answer the questions that were asked here — what does HaChinukh say? What HaChinukh says is that if someone transgressed this, whether a man or a woman, then he has nullified a positive commandment. Why? Because if the commandment is imposed on the public, someone might come and say: okay, let the public carry it out — what does that have to do with me? A woman at home? If each person says that, then I’m not sure what public exactly is going to arrive in Jerusalem. The abstract public, without any of the individuals, is a little hard to detect. Meaning, the individuals have to take part, and that ties into these questions — what is the relation, what exactly do the individuals need to do so that the collective can carry out its role? But that is what HaChinukh wants to tell us. He is telling us: look, I’m not telling you that women and men are obligated. That’s not the point. Why? Because the one obligated is the public. What I am telling you is that there is responsibility — that if there is a man or a woman who did not come and thereby caused the public not to fulfill its obligation, then they have nullified a positive commandment. And it’s a kind of way of violating, as it were, a prohibition. Why? Because in relation to the individuals it is really a kind of prohibition. The individuals are not the ones commanded; the one commanded is the public. The individuals, of course, can ruin things; they can cause the public not to carry out its obligation. That is why HaChinukh writes it in the opposite language. That is also why Maimonides and HaChinukh both saw fit to cite this Talmud in Kiddushin that speaks about the obligation of women. I asked why exactly this is what Maimonides chose as the example that represents what the commandment of Hakhel is. It seems to me that this is the answer. He also gives the reason, because you don’t say “apart from the regular general rules,” even what is written as an exception. What does that mean? There is something here that has nothing to do with the rule that women are exempt. Why? Because the one obligated here is the public. And Maimonides, in his list, also said this in a very simple way — he simply placed it in the list of public sections. What is the list of the children? Basically it’s a very simple way to say this. How does Maimonides say it? Maimonides simply brings the Talmud that points to this. The Talmud points to the fact that women here are obligated even though it is a time-bound positive commandment. Why? Understand — this is a commandment on the public. Maimonides is right here.