The Audience 2
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- [0:00] The obligation on the community versus the individual
- [1:56] Turei Even – who brings the child?
- [4:16] Tosafot on the commandment of education and on the child
- [7:20] The individual’s responsibility in fulfilling collective commandments
- [15:36] Torah reading – an obligation of the ten, not of each individual
- [20:57] The community as a collective beyond the sum of its individuals
- [26:01] Parashat Nitzavim – a shift in language from plural to singular
- [27:02] The collective nature of the covenant for all the Jewish people
- [28:26] Converts joining the collective of Abraham’s people
Summary
General Overview
A halakhic obligation can be imposed on the community as the addressee of the commandment, and yet every individual still bears responsibility to ensure that the collective actually fulfills its obligation. The discussion of education teaches that an individual cannot “opt out” by claiming that the commandment is not personally addressed to him, because when individuals withdraw, they undermine the very meaning of the community and thereby cause a neglect of a positive commandment on the individual level. A consistent distinction is developed between the one who is commanded in the act of the commandment and the one who is responsible to make sure the commandment is carried out, and this is applied to the laws of a child and education, to Torah reading as opposed to Megillah reading, and to the conception that a community is an entity beyond the sum of its individuals yet does not release individuals from responsibility. Along the way, examples are brought from Maimonides in the laws of repentance, from Tosafot regarding a communal burnt-offering, and from the revelation at Mount Sinai and Parashat Nitzavim, which formulate a covenant and oath applying to all Israel throughout the generations.
A commandment on the community and individual responsibility according to Sefer HaChinukh
Sefer HaChinukh states that the commandment is imposed on the community, but an individual who stays home cannot say that he has nothing to do with the community’s fulfillment. Sefer HaChinukh defines an individual who disconnects from the collective as having neglected a positive commandment, even though the positive commandment, in terms of formal obligation, is directed to the community and not to the individual. It emphasizes that the commandment does not depend on absolute numerical completeness of “the entire collective” in such a way that each individual has veto power; rather, there is a personal responsibility not to undermine the community’s action by withdrawing.
Turei Even, the child, and the distinction between obligation and responsibility
Turei Even places the obligation of the commandment on the child himself as part of the collective, and examines who must bring the child—the father or the religious court—not in terms of the essential obligation itself but in terms of responsibility. The Talmudic statement, “in order to give reward to those who bring them,” fits this model: the father or the religious court bears the role of responsibility to ensure that the collective obligation is fulfilled, a responsibility that cannot be imposed on a child. Rabbi Chaim describes the novel idea that a child can have fulfillment of a commandment: he is not punishable and does not bear responsibility, but if he performs the act, there is an act of commandment and a fulfillment. From this emerges a principle distinguishing between “who is commanded” and “who can be held accountable” if it is not fulfilled, with responsibility falling on adults—parents or the religious court—even when the child is the one to whom the actual fulfillment belongs.
Tosafot in Berakhot, the Steipler, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger on two laws in education
Tosafot at the end of tractate Berakhot states that the commandment of education is imposed on the child himself, and the Steipler cites a Talmudic passage in Nazir 28 concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a father who makes his son a nazirite as a framework for understanding the obligations. A difficulty arises between Tosafot’s wording and the Talmud, which attributes the matter of education to the parents, and the question is discussed as to which parent is obligated. Rabbi Akiva Eiger formulates that there are two laws in the commandment of education: one law is that the child himself is “obligated” in the sense that when he performs the commandment there is fulfillment, and a second law is imposed on the father to educate him, in the sense of responsibility to establish that fulfillment in practice. Within this, a distinction is made between “obligated” as fulfillment of a commandment and “obligated” as responsibility that carries accountability and punishment; the child belongs to the first and not to the second.
Shema and a child’s ability to discharge others
The discussion presents the recitation of Shema as an example in which children are not obligated because of the fixed time and practical considerations such as sleep, and it examines the role of parents in bringing the child into the framework of education. According to Tosafot, if the child fulfills a commandment, there is room to say that he can discharge someone else’s obligation, because there is actual fulfillment of a commandment here. According to Rashi, the child cannot discharge others because he does not fulfill a commandment in that same sense. The explanation rests on the principle that whenever fulfillment is imposed on a child, one must also determine who is responsible to ensure it happens, because a child cannot bear responsibility.
Neglect of a positive commandment, responsibility, and circumcision according to Maharach Or Zarua
A distinction is drawn between “you did not fulfill a positive commandment” as a state of non-fulfillment and “neglect of a positive commandment” as a matter of responsibility not having met its obligation. A child who does not perform the commandment is defined as someone who did not fulfill a commandment, but no claim of responsibility or punishment applies to him. Maharach Or Zarua and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that in circumcision there is no commandment on the father to circumcise his son personally; rather, there is a commandment on the father to ensure that his son is circumcised. A practical difference is that there is no need to appoint the mohel as an agent under the rule that a person’s agent is like himself. According to this, if the son was circumcised by someone else, it may be that the father’s responsibility was fulfilled even without direct action, and the discussion asks what “neglect of the positive commandment” means when the result occurred even though the father did not act.
The two novelties: the community as addressee and responsibility imposed on individuals
The line of argument is summarized in two innovations: there are commandments whose addressee is the collective and not the private individual, and the private individual belongs to them only as part of the collective. Alongside this is a second innovation: in those communal commandments, each individual bears responsibility to ensure that the collective fulfills them, because there is no communal fulfillment without the conduct of individuals that enables it. Neglect of the positive commandment applies to individuals from the standpoint of responsibility, whereas fulfillment of the act is not always attributed to the individual apart from the community.
Torah reading versus Megillah reading: Nachmanides in Milhamot and the practical difference regarding ten
Proofs are brought that the commandment of Torah reading is a commandment on the community, as a repetition and reenactment of the revelation at Mount Sinai, in the sense of the giving of Torah to the public through the reader. The Mishnah in Megillah 23b counts Torah reading among matters of holiness that require ten, while not listing Megillah reading, and Nachmanides in Milhamot explains that both require ten, but in different ways. Nachmanides states that Torah reading is imposed only on a group of ten, and fewer than ten are not obligated, whereas Megillah reading is imposed on each individual, except that it should be heard in the presence of ten. The practical difference is that one may gather nine people who have already heard the Megillah so that one person who has not yet heard it can fulfill his obligation, but in Torah reading, if the ten have already read, they do not rejoin anew, because the obligation is on the ten as a community.
Mishnah Berurah, Rav Sheshet, and the resolution through individual responsibility within a community
It is noted that later authorities (Acharonim) sometimes understand that if the obligation is on the community, the individual can simply leave because “what does it have to do with me?,” and it is discussed that the Mishnah Berurah seems to contradict itself. In one place, it explains that a Torah scroll is not brought to an individual in prison because the obligation of reading does not apply to the individual; elsewhere, in Bi’ur Halakhah, it explains that Rav Sheshet left during the reading because there were ten others besides him, and asks, “how did he himself fulfill the commandment?” The resolution is that when there is a community of more than ten, the very fact that the individual is part of it places responsibility on him that the community fulfill its obligation, and therefore withdrawal is not neutral from the standpoint of responsibility. Thus there is no contradiction: an individual alone is not obligated, but an individual within a community is obligated in responsibility to enable the community’s fulfillment.
Torah reading as a reflection of the commandment of Hakhel and public giving of the Torah
Torah reading is described as a reflection of the commandment of Hakhel, because receiving Torah belongs to the community and not to the individual: “And Israel encamped there opposite the mountain.” Hakhel is “the greatest Torah reading,” and therefore it is natural that Torah reading is defined as a communal obligation. The same definition of a commandment imposed on the community, along with the responsibility of the individuals, appears both in Torah reading and in Hakhel.
Maimonides in the laws of repentance: judgment of the individual, the city, and the world, and the meaning of a community beyond its individuals
Maimonides writes that the Holy One, blessed be He, judges every person on Rosh Hashanah, and also “just as the individual, so too the city, the state, and the whole world,” and the question is raised: what is there to judge in the city after each individual has already been judged? The answer is that a community is not merely an aggregation of individuals but an additional entity judged in its own right. At the same time, communal judgment does not sever the individuals, because communal failure indicates a failure of the responsibility that each individual bears as part of the whole, so that the whole can function properly.
Tosafot on a communal burnt-offering whose owners died, and the continuity of the community
Tosafot on 5b teaches that a communal burnt-offering is not treated as one whose “owners died,” even if all the people who made up the community at the time of designation died and other people later came in their place. Tosafot defines the community as still existing, even though the individuals have entirely changed, and therefore its law differs from an individual offering whose owner died. This strengthens the innovation that the collective has an existence beyond the individuals who compose it.
The oath at Mount Sinai: the Rosh, “already under oath,” and a collective oath
The Rosh writes that a father’s oath does not obligate his son, and the question is then asked: how does the oath at Mount Sinai obligate every generation, to the point of the rule that one is “already under oath from Mount Sinai”? The answer is that the one who took the oath was not a private father but the whole of Israel, and a collective oath obligates the collective even when the individuals change. This is also presented as a foundation in the laws of the state: a public oath binds the members of the public as long as they belong to it, and a connection is hinted at to local custom and communal obligations.
Parashat Nitzavim: the shift from plural to singular and the covenant with “those here” and “those not here”
In Parashat Nitzavim there is a shift from the plural, “You are standing today, all of you,” to the singular, “that you may enter into the covenant of the Lord your God,” and this is interpreted as a covenant made with the community and not with a collection of individuals. The verse, “And not with you alone… but with those who are here… and those who are not here,” is explained as a covenant cut with the collective, and therefore it also applies to those not present. The rabbinic midrash that all souls were at Mount Sinai is interpreted here as a “metaphor” for the fact that all the Jewish people were there as a collective, not necessarily as a description of visibly standing souls. At the end, it is hinted that even converts say “our God and God of our fathers” because they join the collective of Abraham’s people.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it ruled in Jewish law that this obligation is on the community? Sefer HaChinukh says that this obligation is on the community, here at the end of Parashat Bo, as it should be. And then of course the question arises: what is the relationship between a commandment on the community and the individuals? What do the individuals owe the community? So here, in fact, we see the first hint in Sefer HaChinukh. The first hint Sefer HaChinukh gives us is that it’s true that the commandment is imposed on the community, but if one person stays home, then who is the community? What remains of it? I’m not connected to this matter of the community, so why should I care who the community is? I’m not part of the issue. Sefer HaChinukh says no—you as an individual cannot exempt yourself from it, because if every individual exempted himself from it, then there wouldn’t be any community there either. So if there is an individual, male or female, who did not fulfill his obligation, then he has neglected the positive commandment even though he is not personally obligated in that positive commandment; the one obligated in the positive commandment is the community. But he can still nullify that positive commandment. He can fulfill that positive commandment as part of the collective; he can nullify that positive commandment as an individual. Because every individual who disconnects from the collective is considered to have neglected a positive commandment. Not that the collective didn’t fulfill the positive commandment. Those who were there fulfilled the positive commandment. Notice, it’s not that the result wasn’t achieved—that the commandment wasn’t fulfilled because not the whole collective was there. If two people stayed home, then that’s it, there was no collective and the act wasn’t fulfilled. That’s a subtle point. In other words, Sefer HaChinukh says that the addressee of this commandment is the collective, the people. But that doesn’t mean that now everyone has veto power—if one or two stay home, that’s it, the collective didn’t fulfill the commandment because not the entire collective was there. No. There’s a very delicate relationship here between the whole and the individual. The obligation is on the community. The responsibility of each individual with respect to the community is that if he alone stays home, he is considered to have neglected a positive commandment even though that positive commandment commands not him but his community. And we see another example of this in Turei Even; I think that was the question you asked. What happens in Turei Even? In Turei Even, the commandment is imposed on the child himself. But Turei Even begins with what? With the question of who has to bring the child—the father or the religious court? So what if the commandment is imposed on the child? Then what are the father or the religious court doing here? The commandment is on the child, period. What do the father and the religious court have to do with it? But it’s obvious, and the Talmud says, “in order to give reward to those who bring them.” So how does Turei Even deal with that Talmudic statement? He reads that passage too. That’s exactly what he’s talking about. So how does he reconcile it? What does he say? He says that the obligation imposed on the father or on the religious court to bring the child is from the standpoint of responsibility. And that is not the commandment obligation itself. The commandment obligation is imposed on the child himself as part of the collective. But each person also has an additional obligation as an individual—an individual obligation to make sure that the collective obligation is fulfilled. And that I cannot impose on a child. Since you don’t impose responsibility on a child. I can say: look, you too are obligated. Meaning, if you go up to Jerusalem, you have fulfilled a commandment. What Rabbi Chaim calls this—it’s the famous Rabbi Chaim who spoke about a child who became an adult between the two Passover offerings—that there is a novelty here, an interesting novelty, namely that there is such a thing as a child having fulfillment of a commandment. He is not obligated in the sense of being punishable; he doesn’t receive punishment if he didn’t do it. But if he performs a commandment, that is called an act of commandment. There is fulfillment of a commandment here. That is what it means that the child is obligated. In other words, the child is obligated not in the sense that responsibility is imposed on him. Responsibility cannot be imposed on a child. He lacks legal understanding. But clearly, as part of the collective, he too must be there. The commandment in its fullness is fulfilled only if the children are there too. How do we ensure that? So who is responsible? For every commandment, it is not enough to know who fulfills it; you also need to know who is responsible for making sure it is fulfilled. To whom do we come with complaints if it wasn’t fulfilled? Not to the child. It’s either the father or the religious court. And that is exactly the same relationship we saw in Sefer HaChinukh. The commandment is imposed on the collective, and seeing to it that the collective carries out its role—the father or the religious court, in Turei Even, their role is to be responsible for making sure that the child’s commandment too is fulfilled. So there is a difference between who is obligated in the commandment and who is responsible for its fulfillment. Those are two different things. And from the very source where I brought the proof for Turei Even, you can see this directly. Where did I bring the proof for Turei Even from? It’s there at the end of tractate Berakhot. Tosafot in Berakhot says that the commandment of education is imposed on the child himself. The Steipler, in Sukkah siman 2, brings a passage from Nazir 28, where the Talmud there records a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish regarding a nazirite case—whether a father can make his son a nazirite. And this fits well, because Tosafot said that the commandment of education is on the child in general; it is not on the father, not on the mother, and not on the religious court at all. It is a commandment on the child. But the Talmud explicitly says it is on the parents. Now which parent? The father, the mother, both? That is another dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But it’s an internal contradiction. The answer to that—the answer to that, he says—Rabbi Akiva Eiger writes something technical. He says: listen, there are two laws in the commandment of education. One law is that the child himself is obligated in the commandment, and a second law is imposed on the father to educate him. But what does that mean? It is exactly what I just said. In other words, there is a commandment on the child to perform a commandment, to perform a particular commandment. That is one definition of the commandment of education. Now, who is going to make sure he does it? After all, responsibility cannot rest on the child. Responsibility—meaning, you must make sure it gets carried out—that applies here in a different sense. When someone is obligated in a commandment in the sense that if he does this commandment, then a commandment has been fulfilled—that is part of the fulfillment of the commandment. That is one concept of “obligated.” He is commanded, so to speak. Not “obligated” but “commanded.” What does “obligated” mean? “Obligated” means that you have to make sure it is carried out, and if not, responsibility rests on you. Now, in the case of a child, even when the commandments are imposed on him, I do not impose responsibility on him. A child is not responsible for what happens. You can’t come to him with complaints that he failed to do something. Therefore, in the commandment of education, even Tosafot, who says the commandment is imposed on the child, obviously agrees that the responsibility is imposed on the parents. The parents have to make sure that the child fulfills the commandment imposed on him. So there are two meanings here.
[Speaker B] And if he didn’t fulfill it, then it wasn’t done—the commandment didn’t happen. And the commandment is rabbinic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The commandment is rabbinic. What? Shema, by the way—it’s interesting, there’s a point here—
[Speaker B] Children—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —are not obligated in Shema because it has a fixed time, and after an hour they’ll already have gone to sleep by then. For example, in cases where he comes home—what do you do?
[Speaker C] Since it’s Shema, it’s more the father’s role.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is responsibility on the parents. For example, if there’s a child from age nine—here it starts, the hours, and after that this—here, education. According to Rashi, he is not obligated. This is the responsibility of—
[Speaker C] The parents—to bring him to that point.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The parents’ task is to educate the child. According to Tosafot, there is an obligation on the child himself. If he fulfills it, he can discharge someone else’s obligation, because he is fulfilling a commandment. He is someone who is obligated. And according to Tosafot—according to Rashi he cannot discharge anyone, because he is not fulfilling a commandment. You’re not imposing commandments on him. He fulfills no commandment at all. But according to Tosafot, where he himself fulfills a commandment, then how can the Talmud say there is also a commandment on the parents? What—two separate laws? Where did two separate laws suddenly come from in this rabbinic enactment? So it’s simple. Whenever you impose an obligation on a child, you also have to determine who is responsible for making sure he fulfills it. Because the child cannot be responsible. He is commanded, but he is not responsible. He is not “obligated”; he is commanded. And that is exactly the same thing as every individual being responsible for the fulfillment of the collective’s commandment. He is not personally obligated in it. The one commanded in it is the collective. The ones obligated to make sure it is carried out are the individuals. Exactly the same with a commandment on a child. The commandment is on the child insofar as he is commanded. But who has to make sure he carries out what he is commanded to do? The adults. The religious court, the parents, and everyone around him.
[Speaker B] And that always creates a distinction in the phrase “reward to those who bring them.” The point of it isn’t just the reward to those who bring them. The point is that the father is obligated to make sure—even in a fast day, say—the father is obligated, meaning the father is obligated to make sure of it. Is there reward for the father? Not certain. No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that it applies to the father could be that the responsibility imposed on the father to bring the child is in order to give reward to the father. For example, if Turei Even, in his final conclusion, like Sefer HaChinukh, says it really is on the father and not on the religious court, then basically why is it really on the father and not on the religious court? In order to give reward to those who bring them. Meaning, they placed the responsibility on him and not on the religious court. Why shouldn’t the religious court be responsible for it? Why is the one responsible for the fulfillment of the commandments of the Jewish people the religious court and not the father? Why was the responsibility imposed on the father? To give reward to those who bring them. Meaning, it is on the father and not on the religious court.
[Speaker D] And according to Maimonides it’s on the religious court. Yes, according to Maimonides it’s on the religious court. The conclusion of Turei Even…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. This whole concept that in fact there are two concepts in a commandment—the concept of the commandment itself and the concept of responsibility—and…
[Speaker C] I mean, I have no problem accepting that there is responsibility here, but how can you say that the person who has that responsibility is violating a positive commandment? You can say there is a commandment that the collective has to do, and clearly it will happen even if I don’t come. What’s demanded of me is really responsibility to participate with the collective—but how can you say I violate a positive commandment? Is the responsibility part of the commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not “violating a positive commandment” in the sense that this is a transgression, but rather that you did not fulfill it. There are two concepts of violating a positive commandment. There are obligations—say, this needs sharpening—but even for a positive commandment there are two concepts of not fulfilling it. You didn’t fulfill the positive commandment: you didn’t take a lulav, you didn’t cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, you didn’t serve God. Fine. But was a transgression committed? A transgression is where responsibility was imposed on you and you failed to meet it.
[Speaker B] The force of responsibility was placed on you. This transgression is a transgression of neglecting a positive commandment because of the responsibility attached to that commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And as for the child—if he didn’t perform the commandment, then he did not fulfill a commandment.
[Speaker C] From his perspective, let’s call it an existential commandment. If he fulfilled it, good; if he didn’t fulfill it, then he didn’t fulfill a commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Responsibility—if you come to him with claims, “you’re an offender, you deserve punishment because you didn’t meet the responsibility imposed on you”—that category doesn’t exist with a child. Neglect of a positive commandment. Correct. There are examples. You know there is the view of Maharach Or Zarua on this situation, and a few other isolated medieval authorities (Rishonim). Why is this practically relevant?
[Speaker B] The Jewish people as a collective—if I didn’t circumcise the child, but the child went and circumcised himself, or went with his uncle, then did I neglect a positive commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There may be room to explain such a situation there, that if you didn’t do anything—you didn’t make sure that the child would be circumcised—then you neglected it. But if he was circumcised, then he’s fine. What, then you didn’t neglect it? There was an obligation to make sure.
[Speaker C] Absolutely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is room to say you didn’t fulfill your obligation. If you didn’t circumcise your son—
[Speaker B] —and instead others did it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not “I neglected a positive commandment.” There is certainly room to say such a thing: that neglect of the positive commandment means you didn’t fulfill your obligation. Here’s an example. Precisely with circumcision—the father’s commandment regarding the son—Maharach Or Zarua and a few other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that there is no commandment on the father to circumcise his son; there is a commandment on the father to make sure his son is circumcised. What is the practical difference? Whether I need to appoint the mohel as my agent. If I take a mohel—not I myself circumcise my son, I take a mohel—then if the commandment is on me and I take a mohel who does it in my place, then he is my agent so that it will count as though I fulfilled the commandment under the rule that a person’s agent is like himself. Maharach Or Zarua says you do not need to appoint him as an agent. Why? Because the commandment is not on me; I only have to make sure that he is circumcised. If I brought a mohel and arranged it, everything is fine. In other words, the commandment of circumcision is pure responsibility. It is not responsibility plus personal fulfillment of the commandment. In other words, I do not need to fulfill—
[Speaker B] —the commandment. If I circumcise him, I’m not fulfilling a commandment at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s only responsibility.
[Speaker B] If the son was not circumcised, then I neglected a positive commandment. But if the grandfather circumcised him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I didn’t even know, and I thought he hadn’t been circumcised, and still I did nothing about it—I don’t know, there is room to discuss that. At least it’s not so simple. It’s not clear. It’s not obvious that you neglected anything; not obvious that your obligation wasn’t fulfilled. You may have been fine. Okay. And maybe we see something even sharper with bringing an offering. There is Rav from Brisk, in Nazir, who says that one needs atonement. What does he need atonement for? Because the simple reading of the Talmud is that needing atonement doesn’t mean he actually committed a transgression—it’s just not ideal. But the Rav from Brisk explained that it’s a real transgression; he violated a prohibition.
[Speaker D] It really is… you see there is room to explain such a thing, maybe from the standpoint of ex post facto—
[Speaker B] —that in fact you performed the act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s exactly the issue. Responsibility is threshold-based—if the state of affairs didn’t fail to materialize, then he did not neglect a positive commandment; there is no neglect of a positive commandment. Even though he is one of those included, there is no neglect of a positive commandment. Fine. That’s exactly the issue. So what does this really mean? It means that every commandment, beyond the commandment itself, gives us two novelties. The first novelty is that there are commandments whose addressee is not the private individual but the collective. And the private individual is obligated in them only as part of the collective. The second novelty is that in those commandments whose addressee is the collective, the individual still has responsibility to fulfill them. Because we might have said: okay, if it’s the collective, let the collective fulfill it—what does that have to do with me? No. There is no such thing as the collective fulfilling a commandment apart from the individuals who must see to it that it is fulfilled. So there is a second novelty: when the collective is obligated in something, that imposes obligation or responsibility on the individuals so that it will be fulfilled. And as we said, this has halakhic definitions: neglect of a positive commandment belongs to the individuals; fulfillment of the act does not always belong to the individuals, as we saw in the previous examples. Where do we find such a thing? We find such a thing with Torah reading. In the previous lecture and in the other sources, regarding Torah reading, there are several proofs from midrashim and so on that the commandment of Torah reading is a commandment on the community. A commandment on the community as a repetition and reenactment of the revelation at Mount Sinai in some sense—the Torah reader, as it were, gives the Torah to the public sitting around him. There are various midrashim that show this idea. But there are two types of communal commandments. There is a Mishnah in Megillah 23b that brings Torah reading as one of the commandments that require ten—matters of holiness require ten. But it does not bring Megillah reading. And Nachmanides there, in Milhamot, asks why not. Nachmanides says: indeed, both require ten, but they involve different concepts of the need for ten. Torah reading is imposed exclusively on a group of ten people. If you are fewer than ten people, you are not obligated in it. Megillah reading is imposed on each individual. Each person has to make sure he hears the Megillah, but he has to hear the Megillah when there are ten people around him, or nine others besides him. That is how Megillah is read. But as for who is obligated—the individual. That is what Nachmanides says. Where is the practical difference? What if I took nine others who already heard the Megillah? With Megillah reading, if there are nine others who already heard the Megillah and I have not yet heard it, there is no problem at all. Why? Because the commandment is imposed on me. There just have to be ten there, because there is a certain public framework in which I have to hear it. That’s how Megillah is read. There are ten there—what’s the problem? But in Torah reading, the ones who are obligated are the ten, not each individual separately. The ten are the obligated unit. So if they already read, they cannot rejoin; they are no longer obligated. That is what Nachmanides says.
[Speaker B] And maybe that can explain the words of the Magen Avraham. Here you wouldn’t need to explain it as a matter of a majority of the ten from the community.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, the issue of a majority might indeed help; not דווקא nine—it could be that a majority also helps. But you still need a majority. Usually, the practical implication people bring from this whole discussion, in the well-known conceptual analysis of the later authorities regarding Torah reading, is this: usually the assumption is that, fine, if the obligation rests on the community, then I can, say, after the Amidah, fold up my tefillin and drive home. What’s the problem? The community wants to read from the Torah—what does that have to do with me? As an individual, I’m not obligated in Torah reading; only the community is obligated. So I leave, and the community that is obligated stays here. Seemingly that shouldn’t be a problem. That’s the usual way it’s is understood. The Mishnah Berurah contradicts itself on this point. In one place, regarding the question of bringing a Torah scroll to someone who doesn’t have one—for example, in prison—he explains that the obligation of the reading does not apply to the individual at all, so why bring a Torah scroll? Elsewhere, in Biur Halakhah, he writes that the Talmud says that Rav Sheshet, when they would read the Torah, would go outside; he went outside to study Torah. So the Talmud says that Rav Sheshet—when they needed ten—left them and did not join the Torah reading. Biur Halakhah explains that there were ten others besides him, and therefore he could leave them; had there been fewer, he couldn’t. So Biur Halakhah asks: what do you mean? But how did he himself fulfill the commandment? The ten fulfilled it, but how did he fulfill it? Biur Halakhah is difficult here. And that seemingly contradicts what he said in the previous case. Which way is it? If the obligation is on each individual, then you also need to bring a Torah scroll to someone in prison. There is an obligation of Torah reading—bring him nine more people and let them read the Torah, like with the Megillah. Bring him nine more people to read the Torah. But he needs to read; the obligation is on the individual. That’s how the Mishnah Berurah understood it there, that the obligation is on the individual. But if he holds that you don’t need to bring a Torah scroll to someone in prison because he’s alone, and a lone individual isn’t obligated in Torah reading, only the community is—then what bothers him about Rav Sheshet withdrawing? There are ten here, the community read, and everything is fine. So what’s the answer? It’s exactly what we just said. If in fact you’re one person alone, you’re not obligated. But if there is a community here of more than ten, then that community is obligated in Torah reading. The moment you’re part of that community, then as an individual you have a responsibility to ensure that the community fulfills its obligation. You may be number eleven, but you know that one more person like you could also turn his back and leave. The moment you’re one of those eleven, all of you are obligated in Torah reading, and each of you has responsibility that this commandment actually be carried out. And if you turn your back, the Mishnah Berurah asks: how can that be—how did you fulfill your obligation? This is not a contradiction. It isn’t a contradiction precisely because of the second innovation, not the first. Someone who takes only the first innovation we mentioned earlier—that there are commandments imposed on the community and others imposed on individuals—then in that framework there really is a contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah. Which way is it: either the community is obligated or the individual is obligated, and the two rulings he brings contradict one another. But if we understand that it’s not merely that the obligation is on the community, but that whenever there is an obligation on the community there is a responsibility on the individuals included in that community to carry it out, then there is no contradiction here—if we also adopt the second innovation. And in truth, Torah reading is a kind of reflection of a reflection of the commandment of Hakhel. What is Torah reading? It’s not just an example; it’s the same thing. The commandment of Hakhel is also a kind of giving of the Torah. Why is the commandment of Hakhel really—why is Torah reading really—a law stated about the community? Because receiving the Torah is done as a community. As a community. There is no receiving of the Torah by an individual; receiving the Torah is communal: “And Israel encamped there opposite the mountain.” So this is a commandment imposed on the community. Hakhel is the greatest Torah reading there is, by the entire community, not just ten people sitting and reading from the Torah. And therefore it is exactly the same category. What appears in Torah reading also appears in Hakhel. It is a commandment imposed on the community, and every individual has responsibility that this commandment be carried out. Fine, now let’s look at the possibilities that remain. First of all, Maimonides writes in the Laws of Repentance that the Holy One, blessed be He, judges each and every person—intermediate, righteous, and wicked—and on Rosh Hashanah the righteous and the wicked are judged immediately, while the intermediates are left hanging in the balance, and so on. So Maimonides says: just like the individual, so too the city and the state and even the whole world—intermediate, righteous, or wicked. And the same judgment applies to all of them. What does that mean? The question people ask is: after every individual in the state has already been judged, what is there left to judge about the state? Or the city? Fine, we’re done—everything is already settled, each person has already had written for him exactly what he deserves and what he doesn’t deserve. So what is there now to judge about the city? Or the state? Or the world? After all, all of that is just the collection of the individuals. And the answer is that apparently that isn’t true. Meaning, a community is not merely some gathering of the individuals included in it. There is something in the community beyond the collection of the individuals included in it. Even though this is very subtle. On the one hand, there is something in it beyond that; it isn’t just a communal obligation in the sense of being the same thing as an individual obligation on each and every person, as Maimonides says in distinguishing between reading the Megillah and Torah reading. It is a communal obligation; there is no individual obligation here on each and every person. It is an obligation on something else. On the other hand, even though it is something else, that doesn’t mean it stands above all the individuals. If the Holy One, blessed be He, were to decide that all the individuals are righteous in the judgment of Rosh Hashanah, but the city is found guilty—then what happens? Clearly, what happened is that we as individuals did not meet the responsibility imposed on us to carry out what is imposed on the community. As part of the community, we did not function properly. As individuals we are completely righteous. Internally, privately, we are righteous; everything is fine; we were inscribed on Rosh Hashanah. But there is still room to judge us as a collective—each one in terms of that responsibility he takes on himself, or does not take on himself, so that the collective will do what it needs to do. Because if we go with the simple approach, without the second innovation, only the first one—okay, let the collective do it. That’s like what is very common today: why doesn’t the government solve this problem and that problem; this isn’t okay here and that isn’t okay there. And what are you doing? There is no such thing; a community does not run by itself. If each one of us were okay, then the community would also look okay. If the community doesn’t look okay, that means something—at least in our aspect as part of the collective—is not functioning properly. It could be that as individuals we are perfectly fine, but there is another aspect in which each one of us must be evaluated, and that is the question of what he is doing so that the collective should look as it ought to. And on that issue we are judged separately—with respect to the city, with respect to the state, with respect to anything—and in every such circle there is an additional judgment. Another example: Tosafot on page 5b. Tosafot there discusses a communal burnt offering, which in principle is a burnt offering whose owners died. But Tosafot first says there that a communal burnt offering belongs to the community. Meaning, even if the community dies, that is a different law from a burnt offering of a private individual who died. Tosafot asks there why, really—even if all the individual people who made up the community at the time that this burnt offering was designated, afterward there was an earthquake and they all died. And now there are new people here—their children, their grandchildren, I don’t know who—new people. Fine, somebody else. This still is not considered a burnt offering whose owners died. Why not? Because the community still exists. The collection of individuals could have changed completely; not one of the previous individuals still exists, and it is still the same community itself. And this is not a burnt offering whose owners died. Meaning, the collective has an existence beyond the individuals who compose it. That was the first innovation: that there is such a thing as the collective, and it can be judged—not only the collection of individuals who compose it. And the second innovation is the opposite one: that although the collective is judged, the individuals are not exempt. They have responsibility that the collective fulfill its role. Maybe one final example is the giving of the Torah. We spoke about the giving of the Torah in the context of Hakhel, in Torah reading—how did the giving of the Torah itself work? The Rosh writes—it is brought in Biur Halakhah in siman 141 in the Shulchan Arukh—that an oath taken by a father does not obligate the son. But the Talmud says, after all, that we swore at Mount Sinai to keep the Torah. Fine—let the one who swore keep it. What does that have to do with me? Why am I obligated? Not only am I obligated; I am obligated by virtue of an oath. The Talmud says that if I swear not to fulfill a commandment, the oath cannot take effect upon an existing oath, because one is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. Meaning, this is really by virtue of an oath—not as a metaphor, not as aggadic literature. It is by virtue of an oath; that is the halakhic definition of our obligation to the commandments. How? Did I swear there? My father swore there, my father’s father’s father. How can that obligate me? A father’s oath does not obligate his son. And the answer is that the one who swore there was not my father’s father’s father, but the collective of Israel, because the revelation at Sinai is the giving of the Torah, and in receiving the Torah it is an event in which the Torah was given to the community. And the community—as Tzofnat said earlier—even if all the individuals who were present at that event have died and today these are different people, that does not matter. The community remains standing. A private oath of a father does not obligate his son, but an oath of a collective obligates the collective, whoever the particular individuals included in that collective may be. And therefore it was established that this oath obligates everyone. And this is a foundation in the laws of the state: despite what the Shulchan Arukh says, that a father’s oath does not help with respect to the son, if a community swears to do something, that will obligate even its children when they are part of the community—as long as they are part of the community. Maybe you can’t move away—if this is an oath of Israel, you can’t move away. But if it’s a local community or something like that, then you would have to move away or something like that in order to be exempt from that oath. And this is connected to what we know about local customs, and so on. And that was such a communal oath. And actually, at the end of the matter, in Parashat Nitzavim, there is a certain punchline here. Right. In Parashat Nitzavim there is a fascinating shift from plural language to singular language. The Torah portion simply says this very thing. “You are standing today, all of you, before the Lord your God”—plural language. “Your heads, your tribes, your elders, and your officers, every man of Israel.” It really recalls the assembly of Hakhel. All the people, the men, the women, and the children, and the stranger here—“all of you,” “your heads,” “your tribes,” and so on. And all of this is plural language: “your children, your women,” and so on. “That you may enter into the covenant of the Lord your God and into His oath”—suddenly singular language. Right? Earlier: “You are standing”; then: “that you may enter into the covenant of the Lord your God.” Why is it suddenly singular? Because it is speaking about the community. The one that enters—you are standing first of all before the covenant as a collection of individuals, and when you come to the covenant, I make the covenant with the community; I do not make the covenant with the individuals. The individuals are included in the community—that is what we said about the giving of the Torah, the individuals are included in the community. And afterward it says, “And not with you alone do I make this covenant”—plural language. I am not making this covenant with a collection of individuals, “with you alone” in the plural, each one separately. Rather, “with whoever is here with us today before the Lord our God, and with whoever is not here with us today”—with them I make the covenant. What does that mean? How can I make a covenant with one who is not here? An oath, after all, does not obligate descendants. Because I am making the covenant with the collective, “not with you alone.” I am making the covenant with you as a collective, and therefore it is not only with you; whether one is present or not present makes no difference—whoever belongs to the collective is obligated in this covenant. That is what these verses say. And that is the meaning of the famous midrash of the Sages who say that all the souls of all Israel were at Mount Sinai. And one can understand this in some mystical way, that all the souls descended there and stood in rows before the mountain, even though no one saw the souls—usually you don’t see souls. But it could be that the intention is something completely different: that this is a metaphor for the statement that all Israel was there as a collective, so I do not have to be there in order to be obligated. The whole community was there—“those who are here and those who are not here.” Why? Because it is not “with you alone,” but with the entire community.
[Speaker B] And maybe this also explains, regarding converts, that when they join the collective of the community, it explains how they say, “our God and the God of our fathers,” and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They join the collective of the people of Abraham.
[Speaker B] After all, he enters the collective of the people of Abraham.