Self-Reference – Lesson 8

Table of Contents

• One transgression for which two sides receive lashes
• A commandment or prohibition imposed on the “pair” and on the “household”
• We divide monetary liability, but we do not divide lashes
• Maimonides on clothing someone in kilayim and the distinction between an act and responsibility
• Sexual intercourse versus kilayim: punishment for the act itself versus punishment for responsibility
• Essential otherness versus an act defined as being done by two people
• Two understandings of why both sides are liable: “a prohibition on the pair” versus “contributing to the result”
• Atvan DeOraita: cutting one’s own sidelocks, penetrating oneself, and making an idol for oneself
• The order of the examples and the claim of “lack of conceptual analysis”
• Kilayim and a priest’s impurity: a critique of Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh
• A nazirite who shaved: one liability for one shaving, plus additional liabilities
• The apostate city: Atvan DeOraita’s question and his answers
• Methodology: Beit HaLevi, Rav Chaim, and Rabbi Lichtenstein
• Concluding questions: the apostate city, responsibility, and the urge toward idolatry

Summary

General overview

The text presents an inquiry into transgressions in which there is an acting side and an acted-upon side, and what it means that two sides can both be punished for a single transgression, including the possibility that a person could become liable twice when he “does to himself” an act that is usually defined as occurring between two people. It distinguishes between punishment for the very act of transgression in offenses defined as a “pair-act,” and punishment that stems from responsibility and blame for a prohibited result, and applies this to the cutter and the one whose hair is cut, male homosexual intercourse, making an idol, the shaving of a nazirite, kilayim, and a priest’s impurity. Throughout, it argues that the lack of conceptual analysis leads to unnecessary questions and forced answers in Atvan DeOraita, Kesef Mishneh, and Lechem Mishneh, and it presents a methodology of “conceptual analysis” in the style of Rav Chaim and Rabbi Lichtenstein that prevents the questions from arising in the first place.

One transgression for which two sides receive lashes

The text argues that Atvan DeOraita is apparently speaking about one transgression, not two, and nevertheless two people can receive lashes for it because it is done “through the two of them.” It compares this to sexual prohibitions, where both sides are punished even though, in the enumeration of commandments, there is no separate “prohibition on the one penetrated and prohibition on the one penetrating,” but rather a prohibition on forbidden intercourse as a joint act. It explains that within this framework there is no problem with one transgression bringing punishment on two people, because both are participants in the act itself, not because there are two separate transgressions.

A commandment or prohibition imposed on the “pair” and on the “household”

The text cites Rabbi Lichtenstein as saying that the commandment of Hanukkah candles is a commandment imposed on the household or family, not a commandment on each individual in the ordinary sense. It suggests that similarly, in prohibitions such as the cutter and the one whose hair is cut, the enticer and the led astray, and others, the definition may be a prohibition on a pair, with the obligated entity being the pair itself. From this it raises a fundamental question: why are the lashes not “divided” between the two sides, and from there it moves to the distinction between monetary liability and lashes.

We divide monetary liability, but we do not divide lashes

The text brings the rule regarding conspiring witnesses that we divide monetary liability, but we do not divide lashes, and explains that with money we can divide the amount in order to produce the desired financial result, whereas lashes are bodily punishment imposed on the person, whose basic unit is 39. It uses this to sharpen the point that lashes are not a “half-punishment” divided among partners, but a full punishment that each liable party receives in full when he is considered an offender.

Maimonides on clothing someone in kilayim and the distinction between an act and responsibility

The text cites Maimonides’ discussion of one who clothes his fellow in kilayim, and the question of Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh as to why the accidental or intentional status of the wearer changes the law, and presents this as proof that the transgression is not two separate transgressions but one framework created between two people. It explains that Maimonides is operating with a different principle: in kilayim, the prohibition is result-oriented—that a Jew “wear kilayim”—and the lashes are given to the one responsible for making that happen and the one blameworthy for it, so at times only one party receives lashes. It emphasizes that here the lashes are for failure in responsibility, not because the person himself “performed the transgression” in the sense of a joint act.

Sexual intercourse versus kilayim: punishment for the act itself versus punishment for responsibility

The text argues that in sexual prohibitions, the prohibition is the interaction between the two people, and therefore both performed the prohibition and are automatically both responsible, unlike result-oriented cases where one distinguishes between the doer of the act and the one responsible for the result. It sharpens the point that in intercourse there is no need to invoke a mechanism of “responsibility,” because the act itself is defined as one done between two people. It cites the notion of “mere ground” as an example of a case in which one side truly did not act and therefore is not punished, but argues that when both sides are active, both are punished because they both performed the act.

Essential otherness versus an act defined as being done by two people

The text grapples with the formulation “essential otherness” and distinguishes between a situation in which an action is not defined at all without another person—like lending to oneself with interest, which is not a loan—and a case like male homosexual intercourse, where the question is whether one person can “serve in two roles.” It argues that in male homosexual intercourse there is no “conceptual essential otherness” that nullifies the definition, and therefore there is room for Atvan DeOraita’s question whether one is liable once or twice when doing it to oneself. It says that cases in which essential otherness is absolute do not enter the discussion at all, because there is no halakhic act there on which one could ask about double liability.

Two understandings of why both sides are liable: “a prohibition on the pair” versus “contributing to the result”

The text offers two frameworks for explaining why two people receive lashes for one transgression: either the prohibition is defined on the pair, and therefore each side in the pair is considered an offender with respect to the transgression itself; or anyone who contributed to a prohibited result is liable because of that contribution to the result. It presents a practical difference for the case in which a person does it to himself: according to the “pair” definition, there is room to say that he would be liable twice when filling both roles, whereas according to the “contributing to the result” model there is no reason to give a person two sets of lashes for the same contribution, even if his contribution is 100 percent. It suggests that this may be the very doubt of Atvan DeOraita, while qualifying that even the pair model might perhaps still lead to only one liability—though the side of two sets of lashes is more plausible under that model.

Atvan DeOraita: cutting one’s own sidelocks, penetrating oneself, and making an idol for oneself

The text reads the formulation of Atvan DeOraita, who states a rule: “Every place where the Torah prohibited doing an act to another and also prohibited receiving the act… if a person does that act to himself, he violates two prohibitions, one as the actor and one as the recipient.” It quotes Makkot 20, that one who cuts his own sidelocks receives 80 lashes, one set for cutting and one set for having his hair cut; and Sanhedrin 54, that one who penetrates himself in male homosexual intercourse incurs two liabilities, one as the penetrator and one as the penetrated. It cites Maimonides in Laws of Idolatry chapter 3: one who makes an idol for himself receives lashes, one who makes one for others receives lashes, and therefore one who makes one by his own hand for himself receives two sets of lashes.

The order of the examples and the claim of “lack of conceptual analysis”

The text argues that the simplest case is male homosexual intercourse, because in its normal form it is between two people, and therefore it is clearer that one act can obligate two sides; accordingly, if one person plays both roles, it makes sense that he would incur two liabilities. It argues that the cutter and the one whose hair is cut, and making an idol for oneself, are a greater novelty, because there are normal situations in which a person does these things to himself, and only after the Torah newly teaches that the “other” side also receives lashes does it become clear that the action is defined as being done between two people. It criticizes Atvan DeOraita for beginning with the novelty before establishing the conceptual basis, and argues that if the conceptual tree had been built from the start, it would have been clear which cases are comparable, which case is the simple one, and which is the novel one.

Kilayim and a priest’s impurity: a critique of Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh

The text argues that with kilayim there is no verse that makes “the one who clothes another” liable as a structure of a joint transgression, and therefore Maimonides there is discussing a law of responsibility, not a law of a “pair.” It says this is why there is no room for Atvan DeOraita’s question or for all his pilpul about why, if both are intentional, they do not both receive lashes, because “the question does not exist to begin with” when we are dealing with lashes for responsibility rather than for performing the transgression itself. It applies the same principle in the laws of mourning regarding a priest’s impurity, and argues that Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh are mistaken when they compare it to the cutter and the one whose hair is cut, because there there is no “verse that adds another person” as an offender, but rather a mechanism of punishment for blame when the primary violator acted accidentally.

A nazirite who shaved: one liability for one shaving, plus additional liabilities

The text cites the Mishnah in Nazir 42 that a nazirite who shaved all day is liable only once, and presents Atvan DeOraita’s question: why should he not receive two sets of lashes, one as the shaver and one as the one being shaved, in light of the Talmud in Nazir 44 that one who shaves a nazirite violates “a razor shall not pass,” which is read as “he shall not cause it to pass”? It proposes as the main answer that “liable only once” means once for one shaving, not one liability for each separate shaving; but for that one shaving there could still be double liability. It adds the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word” and explains that when Maimonides writes “for the shaving, only one,” he means to exclude the possibility that there are also additional lashes under “he shall not profane his word,” which is a general prohibition covering all nazirite restrictions.

The apostate city: Atvan DeOraita’s question and his answers

The text quotes from Sanhedrin 112 the question whether, in the case of the apostate city, “they were led astray on their own,” and brings Atvan DeOraita’s question: why not resolve this from the cases of one who cuts his own sidelocks and one who penetrates himself, where when the Torah spoke of acting on another person, the law still applies when the action is done to oneself? It presents Atvan DeOraita’s answer, which distinguishes between a practical act like cutting and being cut and intellectual persuasion and seduction, and also his additional answer that perhaps being led astray on one’s own is more severe, and therefore the law is different. It rejects these answers and bases its own explanation on essential otherness in enticement, arguing that when a person decides to worship an idol, that is not “he entices himself,” but simply that he worships an idol.

Methodology: Beit HaLevi, Rav Chaim, and Rabbi Lichtenstein

The text describes the difference between Beit HaLevi, who begins with questions and ends with a resolution, and Rav Chaim, who begins with a conceptual distinction, so that the questions never arise. It says this is a substantive difference, because conceptual analysis is not a “band-aid” for a contradiction, but an understanding of the logic that explains in advance why each source says something different. It describes Rabbi Lichtenstein’s method of study as building an a priori tree of conceptual possibilities before opening the Talmudic passages, so that afterward one can place the sugyot and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) into that framework without needing questions and answers.

Concluding questions: the apostate city, responsibility, and the urge toward idolatry

The text concludes with a discussion with students about the nature of the guilt of the people of the apostate city when they were led astray by others, and about the meaning of “the words of the master and the words of the student.” It argues that the idolatry punished in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) takes place when people know that God exists and nevertheless worship idols out of impulse, and it mentions the Talmud’s statement in Yoma about the nullification of the urge toward idolatry in the days of the Men of the Great Assembly. It adds a description of trance parties where the names of Indian deities are tossed around, as an illustration that something like the urge toward idolatry still exists even in our time, even without conscious belief in those idols.

Okay, we’re in the middle of self-reference. And after the analysis we did last time, we reached the conclusion—I don’t know, I reached the conclusion, and I hope you did too—that the Atvan DeOraita, when it discusses this question of how many lashes someone gets when he performs this kind of act on himself, like shaving and being shaved, is apparently talking about a case where there is one transgression and not two. Because if it were two, there would be no discussion. But for that one transgression, two people can receive lashes. Why? How can two people be flogged for the same transgression? Because this is a transgression done by both of them together, like a sexual prohibition where both sides are punished, even though in the count of commandments there isn’t one prohibition on the one penetrated and another on the one penetrating. The prohibition is on forbidden intercourse; the prohibition is on the pair. And therefore the fact that both of them, each one, is punished, is not because there are two transgressions here. It’s one transgression that is carried out by these two people. We spoke about various other qualifications, kinds of substantial otherness of different sorts—that was already in earlier classes. Still, I want to sharpen a bit more what it means that both of them are flogged for one transgression. If one transgression is committed, why are both of them flogged? So first of all, I think intercourse is an excellent example, because somehow intercourse goes over very simply; everybody understands that if they committed this transgression they ought to be punished. So you see that once I define the transgression as a transgression carried out by the two of them together—one transgression—then there is no obstacle to both being punished even though it is only one transgression. Maybe an example of this: I once saw, I think in the name of Rabbi Lichtenstein, that he says or writes that the commandment of Hanukkah candles is the only commandment that is imposed on the home or on the family. It’s not a commandment on an individual, not a commandment on each person where one discharges the obligation for the other; rather it is a commandment imposed on the family. That is the entity obligated in this commandment and the one that fulfills this commandment. It could be that this depends on different opinions; I’m not getting into that right now. Here too the claim is, as with sexual prohibitions, so perhaps also with these prohibitions of shaving and being shaved, cutting and being cut, and all the prohibitions he discusses, it could be that the definition is actually that the prohibition is defined as a prohibition on a pair. That is how the prohibition is defined. The one commanded regarding this prohibition is the pair. So in such a situation one could ask, okay, if so, then let each get twenty lashes—nineteen and a half. Really it should be nineteen and nineteen, yes, if we reduce one so there won’t be an error, then apparently we should take away one blow from each of them. But why don’t we divide it between them? So in truth, for example, the rule with conspiring witnesses is that we do to them as they intended to do to the defendant, the one they testified against. But the rule is that money is divided, while lashes are not divided. Mishnah in tractate Makkot. What does that mean? If under “as they intended” they are obligated to pay him one hundred shekels and there are two witnesses, each one pays fifty. But if they wanted to obligate him to lashes, and therefore they too became liable to lashes, then each one receives thirty-nine, not twenty. Why? What’s the difference? The difference is apparently that each one has in fact committed a transgression and is liable for lashes. Now there are no lashes less than thirty-nine. Lashes for a transgression are thirty-nine. There is no less. Maybe an example of this—I gave it one of the previous times when I spoke about the possibility, when I mentioned Maimonides, that Maimonides writes that someone who renders his fellow impure or dresses his fellow in shaatnez, if the one wearing it was unwitting—unwitting, and the one dressing him was intentional—then the one dressing him receives lashes. But if the one wearing it was intentional, then the one dressing him, whether he is intentional or unwitting, does not receive lashes. He violates “do not place a stumbling block,” but he does not receive lashes. And they ask there—the Kesef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh ask him—why? If both of them should receive lashes, then there are two transgressions here, so what difference does it make whether the wearer was unwitting? If the dresser is intentional, then the dresser should receive lashes. I don’t care what the wearer’s status was. This sharpens very much the point I made earlier: it is not two transgressions; it is one transgression that emerges from two people. But still notice that in our case the Atvan DeOraita proves regarding shaving the head that both sides receive lashes. If both are intentional, both receive lashes. In the case of dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez, Maimonides says there is no situation in which both receive lashes; it’s either the wearer or the dresser, whichever of them is intentional. If both are intentional, then only the wearer. What’s the difference? So I explained that Maimonides is talking about a different principle. Maimonides is talking about a case where the prohibition is actually a result-oriented prohibition: that so-and-so, or that a Jew, wear shaatnez. The lashes are given to the one responsible for that happening—not the one who did it, but the one responsible for it happening, the one at fault for its happening. And therefore the lashes are given to the one who acted intentionally. But they are given only to one person. Why only one person? Because if I am responsible, then I get lashes; if he is responsible, then he gets lashes. But there isn’t a double flogging here. The transgression is a transgression committed by one person. The responsibility sometimes rests not on the one who committed the transgression—that is, the one who wore the shaatnez—but if he was unwitting then responsibility rests on the one who dressed him. And the lashes in this case are given to the one at fault for what happened, not to the one who committed the act. And I brought examples for this from the education of minors and from communal commandments, where we see a similar distinction: there is a difference between the one commanded in the commandment, who does or does not do it, and the one punished because of his responsibility for the fact that it was not done. And the punishment is punishment for not standing up to your responsibility, not for your having committed the transgression. Even if you didn’t commit the transgression, if you are to blame for its having been committed, then you are considered the offender. Okay, so that’s what we basically see here in Maimonides, that we are really identifying the one responsible for the matter. Now here we need to pay close attention: what happens if there is an act for which both sides are responsible? Say in shaving the head when both are intentional. Or leave shaving aside—intercourse. Intercourse, when both are intentional, both are put to death in that case—not flogged, but both are punished. Why are both punished? We should see who is responsible and punish him. In this case both are responsible. Why? Because the act is carried out by two. The act is an act of two people. So here you can’t say that in shaving and being shaved the prohibition is simply that there be someone shaved—that that’s the prohibition. Okay, now we need to discuss who is responsible for that. But in the one who lies and the one who is lain with, in intercourse, the prohibition is the interaction between them; that is the prohibition. Not that one committed the transgression and the other is responsible; both committed the transgression, and therefore both are responsible. So there you don’t even really get flogged for responsibility; rather, you get flogged for the very fact that you committed a transgression—or put to death, yes, not flogged—for the very fact that you committed a transgression, because it is a transgression done by two people together. So that is a completely different story. Here you are flogged for the commission of the transgression, not for your responsibility for the fact that it was done. So Rabbi, are we back to the distinction between substantial responsibility and incidental responsibility? In all commandments where the responsibility is substantial? No, why? Why in this case, for example the one who lies and the one lain with, would I claim that maybe he really would be punished twice if he does it to himself? Why? Because the normal act is an act done by two. An act of intercourse is an act between two. Therefore the Torah says there are essentially two sides to this act, and both are considered offenders from my point of view. They are not offenders because they are responsible for what happened; they are offenders because both of them committed the transgression as a pair. Both sides of the pair are offenders. Here there is room to discuss what happens if both sides of the pair are the same person. But if both sides of the pair are the same person, then again, the transgression is not defined here as a transgression—it’s like with a married woman: if one person has intercourse with a married woman, then if he has intercourse with himself, then again it’s not a married woman. The Gemara says yes, the Gemara says yes. Right, but not because of a married woman. One who inserts into himself is not liable because of a married woman, because he is not a married woman—what does that have to do with a married woman? Exactly. So here we have the matter of male intercourse. All sexual prohibitions—I’m saying sexual prohibitions in general—are prohibitions where the act itself is done by two people. The otherness is substantial, in other words. No, no, no, that identification I don’t accept. The otherness is not substantial. It’s an act done by two people. That does not mean there cannot be a case where one person performs both sides of the act. But then he really is serving in two roles, and there is room to say that he gets flogged twice or commits two transgressions. Because here, unlike what Maimonides writes about dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez, in dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez usually I wear shaatnez and that’s it—it’s an act done by one person. There aren’t two; the normal way of doing it is by one person, okay? Therefore it’s clear that the transgression is that I be wearing shaatnez. The only question then is why the dresser, if he is intentional and I am unwitting, why does the dresser get lashes? Apparently we have to say that he is flogged not because he committed the transgression, but because he is at fault for a transgression having been committed. No, I wasn’t talking about that case. I was talking, for example, about forbidden sexual relations. Forbidden sexual relations—both of them do the act; this isn’t responsibility. Fine, but the otherness is substantial. No, absolutely not. What is the difference between substantial otherness and a case where a transgression is defined on two people? There is a distinction between them; obviously there is a distinction. What is it? Substantial otherness means the act is not defined at all if it is not done to someone else. When I lend to myself with interest, when I lend to myself with interest, that isn’t even a loan—it’s not a problem of halakhic definition. Fine, and when I have intercourse with myself it isn’t a married woman at all. No, what does that have to do with a married woman now? When I have intercourse with myself, I am not a married woman, that’s obvious—what does that have to do with anything? It does have to do with it, because with a married woman the otherness is substantial. No question arose about a married woman, so what does that have to do with substantial otherness? How is it possible for a person to be penetrated by himself and for that to be called intercourse with a married woman? The question doesn’t arise there; I’m not talking about that. When I speak about a situation of forbidden relations, I’m talking only about male intercourse. Because with male intercourse there can be a situation where a person does it with himself, but still the definition, even in male intercourse, is a definition carried out between two people. The fact that I do it with myself is exactly what raises the Atvan DeOraita’s question: can I be counted here as the two people? Therefore I say this is not a situation of substantial otherness; it is not the same definition. If the act is done by two people and the otherness is substantial, then there would be no room for the question at all. All I want to claim is that the otherness is always not substantial on the one hand, but the act is still done by two. Only in such situations can the Atvan DeOraita’s discussion exist. So we’ve come back to substantial otherness on the normative plane? What does that mean? In male intercourse the otherness is not conceptually substantial; meaning, it is still considered male intercourse, but the question is whether, when you do it to yourself, there is a transgression here of male intercourse. That’s already the outcome. I don’t call that substantial otherness because that is the result of the inquiry. The inquiry begins from the fact that I think that in principle a person can insert into himself. There’s no principled problem with that; it is defined as insertion. Now I ask whether he gets one set of lashes or two. You’re saying that according to the side that he gets one, it could be that this itself is what is being said here: that there is substantial otherness on the normative level. Fine, that can already be one of the answers. But I’m asking how I understand the case when I ask the question about it. When I ask the question about it, for me it is an act defined as an act done between two people, and still I can ask myself whether, when I do it to myself, I will incur two or incur one. So in other words, is this substantial otherness on the normative plane? You can formulate it that way too. You can formulate it that way, okay, fine, fine, okay? But that is the question; it is not an assumption. There are many places where the question does not arise because it is obvious to you that this is substantial otherness. Right, fine. So what I want to say is that an act done by two people is not the same thing as Maimonides talking about your responsibility for what happened. Here you are punished for the very commission of the transgression, not for being to blame that a transgression took place. It is not similar to what Maimonides is talking about, because here I want to claim that both of them acted—each one of them committed a transgression, even though it is only one transgression. So how can two people be flogged not for responsibility, but for the very commission of the transgression? Answer: because this is an act defined as an act done by two. And still it is possible that a person does it to himself and functions in both roles. And then the Atvan DeOraita’s question arises. So basically what I want to say is that in sexual prohibitions—in this case only male intercourse when I want to discuss a person doing it to himself, but when I speak about sexual prohibitions in general—the prohibitions are defined as prohibitions imposed on the pair of people. Not that you have a prohibition against penetrating and she has a prohibition against being penetrated. No. There is a prohibition on the act of intercourse, and the addressee of that prohibition is the pair. Two people. Therefore if that thing happened, then the pair committed a transgressive act, and for that it is punished. And therefore there is no question here of who is responsible and who is not responsible. It is not like dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez, where the one who committed the transgression is the wearer. No one disputes that. The transgression is to wear shaatnez, that I have a garment of mixed wool and linen on me. The innovation of Maimonides—that the dresser gets lashes—is because he claims that the lashes are not given to the one who committed the transgression, but to the one at fault that a transgression was committed. And in certain cases the blame can fall on the dresser, even though it is obvious that the one who committed the transgression was the wearer. In that way it differs from sexual prohibitions. In sexual prohibitions the act is carried out by two. It’s not just a question of responsibility; the act is carried out by two. Okay? Two people. Rabbi, but why not say sweepingly that in every case punishment is imposed on the one responsible? Why say there are cases where punishment is for the transgression itself? Usually in the Torah punishment is on the one upon whom the transgression itself falls—what do you mean? One who commits a transgression deserves punishment. Usually there is a simple identity between the one responsible for the transgression and the one who actually committed it. Why do you need a source in the case of dressing and wearing shaatnez that the dresser also receives lashes? Because there is a law in the case of dressing someone in shaatnez where the lashes are for responsibility and not for the transgression. No, I’m claiming that it’s not a special source; it’s simply a case where there is a clear distinction between the responsible party and the one who commits the transgression. But in all the other cases it may be that this is a general rule in all of Jewish law. I’m willing to accept that. In Maimonides it really does seem that way, because he writes this law in three places. But that still doesn’t change what I said earlier. Because when I speak about an act of intercourse, there is no need to reach responsibility, pardon me, because here both of them committed the transgression. If there were a situation in that intercourse where the one who committed the transgression was not the responsible one, but someone else was, then there would be the practical difference that you are speaking about—that the responsible one would get lashes there too. But I’m not talking about that situation. I’m talking about a situation in which both committed the transgression and they are also responsible. So I claim that what they are flogged for is because both of them committed the transgression. The act was done by two. All right? So the lashes are for a transgressive act and not for responsibility for a transgression—which is itself a novelty: that where the performer of the transgression is not responsible for its occurring, then we flog the responsible party. And I’m talking about when he is responsible. And when he is responsible, then I flog the one who committed the transgression. Who here committed the transgression? Both sides in sexual prohibitions. Okay? Both committed the transgression. And what if she was merely passive? I didn’t hear? No, if she was merely passive, then indeed she didn’t act, and that’s a good example of a case where she didn’t act. But I’m talking about where she was not merely passive, and then both are punished. Okay? So can we? Yes, yes. Why do you say that in the case of dressing, the prohibition according to everyone is to wear a garment of shaatnez, and you say that in shaving the head and “do not shave,” there is doubt—maybe it’s the shaver, maybe it’s the one shaved, and so on? Why do you say there is doubt in “do not shave”? You simply see it in the Gemara; I’m not saying it from logic. I’m trying to suggest an explanation for the distinctions I see in the Gemara. Okay, so okay. How did the Gemara understand it? I don’t know. You have to look at the verses, you have to look at the logic, why the Gemara decided that here the definition is like this and there the definition is like that. I’m only trying to suggest an explanation that can resolve why the Gemara says two different things. Where does it derive it from? Good question. I don’t know. Okay. Another possibility for understanding why both receive lashes is basically to say that there is a result, there is a certain result—this is already very similar to Maimonides, but I don’t think it’s exactly the same—there is a forbidden result, namely that the one shaved… is shaved. That too—the result here is also a forbidden result. But everyone who contributed to that result deserves punishment. Not responsible, guilty. Whoever contributed, whoever brought about that result, okay? Not whoever is to blame that it happened, but whoever brought about that result deserves punishment. So in that situation I say that both are guilty not because both committed the transgression, but because both brought about the transgression with their own hands. And therefore anyone who has contributory guilt—or not contributory guilt, who has a contribution to that result—he basically receives lashes. In such a case, where would the difference be? I’ll tell you where the difference would be. If the person did it to himself, then according to the first formulation, where the transgression is defined on the one who lies and the one lain with, or on the shaver and the one shaved, then there is certainly room to say that a person who does it to himself gets flogged twice. Because of the warning, he functions in both sides of the equation. He plays both roles in this game. But if I define it as: everyone who contributes to the result that occurred deserves lashes, then a person who performed both roles obviously will not be flogged more than once. Because in the end, lashes are for the fact that you contributed to the result occurring. Did you contribute? You deserve lashes. Did he contribute? He also deserves lashes. Anyone who contributed—even if his contribution is only partial—it doesn’t matter. If your contribution is partial, but without it this would not have happened, then you deserve lashes. All right? But there is no reason at all to flog one person twice. All you can say is that he contributed the entire contribution to what happened. Fine, you contributed half the contribution, you contributed the whole contribution—you deserve lashes, but one set of lashes, not two. And it could be that this itself is the Atvan DeOraita’s uncertainty. In an act done by two—why is it, really, that when two are involved, both receive lashes? The question is why both receive lashes. Is it because it is a prohibition on the pair? It is a prohibition on the pair, and the pair is flogged. According to that, I’m not sure it’s necessary, but at least there is room to say that if one person performs both roles he gets flogged twice. Another possibility is to say that if an act is done by two and both receive lashes, the definition is not that both committed the transgressive act, that both are offenders. Rather, anyone who contributed to the result, without whom the result would not have occurred—like “do not place a stumbling block” when the sinner is on the other side of the river, where you have a contribution without which the result would not have occurred—then you deserve lashes for that. If each of you contributed his contribution, then both of you deserve lashes for that. But if one person did the act to himself, he cannot be flogged more than once. At most you can say that he contributed to what happened. Right. His contribution in this case is not fifty percent but one hundred percent. Fine. From fifty percent and up, someone who has a contribution without which it would not have happened receives lashes. But it’s not that for every fifty percent you get another set of lashes. Rather, from fifty percent and up, if without you it would not have happened, then you deserve lashes. Fine. But even for one hundred percent you deserve one set of lashes and not two. And it could be that this itself is the Atvan DeOraita’s uncertainty. Are transgressions done by two people acts for which you are flogged because it is a transgression defined on the pair? Or not? You are flogged because you contributed to the result. Without you the result would not have happened, but the transgressive act is on one person alone—the one shaved alone. Then the question is whether you are flogged because you contributed. And if that is so, then when you do it to yourself you will get flogged once and not twice. Meaning, it may be that this itself is the Atvan DeOraita’s uncertainty. It’s not certain, because as I hinted earlier, even if I say that the transgression is a transgression on the pair and therefore each member of that pair is liable to lashes, there is room to say that if I play both roles I get one and not two. The transgression is a transgression on the pair, and therefore each member of that pair is liable to lashes. If I am both sides of the pair, then I too am liable to lashes—but once, not twice. You can say that. Therefore the side that says he gets one could hold like either of the two possibilities I mentioned. The side that says he gets two, it seems to me, very likely speaks according to the first possibility and not the second. I also thought that maybe there are differences here between situations in which the normal mode is to do the action as a… pair, but there are situations where I can do it with myself, as in intercourse for example. In such situations one can definitely define the prohibition as a prohibition defined on the pair, okay? But in situations where the normal way is to do it with one person—someone shaving himself, rendering himself impure, or things like that—in such situations the definition cannot be that the prohibition is on the pair; the prohibition is mine. At most you can say that someone who contributed to the creation of the prohibition will also receive lashes, and then it simply depends on the nature of the transgression. The definition—is it lashes for having committed the transgressive act, because the transgression is on the pair, or is it lashes for contributing to the other’s commission of the transgression? Okay? Which is a different definition. So perhaps that is the difference between the situations. Why do I think that is not correct? Because what happens in shaving and being shaved? In shaving and being shaved, the normal way certainly can also be that a person does it to himself—he shaves himself. It doesn’t have to be done by someone else. And I also don’t think that’s the abnormal way. So therefore in this context, if the Atvan DeOraita discusses this and even brings a Gemara that for this one gets lashes twice, then it seems that even in situations where there is a normal way for a person to do it to himself, there is still room to say that if two people do it, it is a transgression that comes about through two people. Otherwise there would be no basis for saying that both are flogged. And perhaps this itself is what we learn from the source that says that one who dresses another in shaatnez receives lashes. The Gemara brings a source for that. We learn that even though in principle I would define such a transgression as a transgression of the wearer, the Torah says no: here it is also a transgression of the one who dresses him. This is a transgression that comes about through two people. And then, if I do it to myself, I really would get flogged twice. Okay. Now we can discuss each of the cases according to all the distinctions we’ve accumulated until now. We can discuss each case: which category it falls into, and whether he gets one set of lashes, two sets, and so on. So now let’s finally see the Atvan DeOraita, after all these long introductions. Let’s see the Atvan DeOraita. Let’s see. “Wherever the Torah prohibited a person from doing something to another and also prohibited receiving that act from another, then if a person performs that act on himself he violates two prohibitions: as the actor and as the one acted upon.” We already saw this. “And in the Talmud in tractate Makkot 20 it is explained that one who shaves himself receives eighty lashes, for being the shaver and for being the one shaved; see there carefully. And from this emerges the above rule, that when the Torah made both the actor and the recipient liable, then even when the act is directed to the person himself, he is still called both actor and recipient and becomes liable for both. And this reasoning is further clarified from what we say in Sanhedrin 54 regarding male intercourse, that the Torah made liable both the one who lies and the one who is lain with, and it is explained there that one who inserts into himself becomes liable for both—as the one who lies and as the one lain with; see there carefully. And you will find this reasoning also in Maimonides, Laws of Idolatry, chapter 3, and this is his language: ‘One who makes an idol for himself, even though he did not make it with his own hands, but others made it for him, receives lashes, as it says: “You shall not make for yourself a graven image.” And likewise, one who makes an idol with his own hands for others receives lashes. Therefore one who makes an idol with his own hands for himself receives two sets of lashes.’” Three cases, in all of which we see that a person who commits the transgression to himself receives lashes twice. Okay. As I said, in the case of the one who lies and the one lain with, that’s the simplest. Even though it’s absurd there and looks the strangest, still that is actually the simplest case. Why? Because in sexual prohibitions the reasonable way for it to happen is between two people. Therefore there it is clear that the act is a transgression carried out by two people. And with a transgression carried out by two people, if I play both roles, then it is very likely that I get eighty lashes—specifically there I get eighty lashes. In contrast, in shaving and being shaved, and in making an idol for oneself, there the situation is that there is a normal case where a person does it to himself. This is not some pathology that requires warning, but rather there is a normal case where a person does it to himself. On the contrary, there are certain situations in which one person does it to someone else. Okay. The novelty is that in those situations he gets two sets of lashes, which is a major novelty, because in principle I would expect this to be like Maimonides—that basically the one who gets lashes is the one who committed the transgression, the one shaved or the one who… made the idol. Unless he is unwitting and the other is intentional and is to blame. Then there is the issue of responsibility. But in terms of who committed the transgression, straightforwardly it is only one person in these two cases. That is unlike the one who lies and the one lain with. But since the Torah—according to what I said earlier—since the Torah innovated that one who makes idolatry for others receives lashes, and one who shaves his fellow also receives lashes, then once the Torah innovated that, we understand that these prohibitions are like sexual prohibitions. This is essentially an act done by two people. And now the statement returns: if a person does it to himself, then he really gets flogged twice. But this is only after the Torah innovated that both the shaver and the one shaved are flogged. As for forbidden intercourse—yes, like male intercourse—there I do not need to reach some special innovation of the Torah. From the very fact that there is a forbidden act here, and it is clear that both sides are punished for it, here the normal way to define the act is as an act done by two. No special innovation of the Torah is needed for that. So there, if you do it to yourself, you automatically incur two. In shaving and being shaved, and in constructing an idol for oneself, were it not for the Torah’s innovation that the second party—who supposedly is not committing the transgression at all—also gets lashes, were it not for that I would never have imagined flogging twice someone who does it to himself. But after the Torah innovated that even the other person gets lashes, who seemingly did not commit the transgression at all, it may be that the Torah was really innovating that this is like sexual prohibitions. It is an act done by two people. And the proof is that in the count of commandments, in all these cases we do not count two prohibitions. We count one prohibition, even though two people are flogged for it. But we count one prohibition. So apparently the fact that both people are flogged is a novelty that says that this one prohibition is done by two people. Once the Torah innovated that, now if I do it to myself I receive lashes twice. So if you had been writing this siman, you would have brought the case in Sanhedrin before the case in Makkot? Obviously. That’s the simplest case. That’s where I would have started. And obviously I would have had to do a conceptual analysis here, and then I would explain that in both shaving and being shaved, and in constructing an idol for oneself, there too first of all I would start from the fact that there is a novelty in the Torah that also the dresser and the builder get lashes. Then I would say: if so, then why do they get lashes? After all, it is one transgression. Apparently the Torah wanted to tell us that this is like the transgression of lying with someone. So if this is like the transgression of lying with someone, then just as in the transgression of lying with someone, when a person does it to himself he receives two sets of lashes, so too in these transgressions it is a novelty, but in these transgressions too, if you do it to yourself you receive two sets of lashes. And the Atvan DeOraita, as he proceeds, starts with shaving and being shaved, where it is more of a novelty, and then moves upward. And again I attribute that to the fact that he did not begin with a conceptual analysis. Once you do the conceptual analysis, it is obvious to you where this starts and which things are greater novelties. Whom do you compare to whom. Which is simple and which is innovative. Okay. Next. Rabbi, but does that mean there is no essential distinction between shaatnez and the other transgressions? Once again? So apparently there is also no essential distinction between shaatnez and all the other transgressions? No, there is a big distinction. That is exactly the distinction. In shaatnez there is no verse saying that the dresser receives lashes. The Gemara, after all, brings a verse regarding shaving and being shaved. And also regarding the one who constructs an idol. That verse transforms a transgression done by one person into a transgression done by two people. And now the discussion begins: then if both are involved, should he receive two sets of lashes if he does it to himself? Now in dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez there is no such verse. On the contrary, the medieval authorities (Rishonim), even after Maimonides writes this, as I mentioned, are astonished at Maimonides: where did he get this from? There is no such verse. So as you said correctly earlier, Ido—yes, as you correctly said earlier—that Maimonides probably understands that lashes are also given for responsibility. Fine. But if lashes are for responsibility, then obviously there is only one set of lashes here, on the one responsible, not two. Whichever of the two acted intentionally gets lashes. So if so, then it is also obvious that if I do it to myself I get one set of lashes, not two. That is, for example, a practical difference. Because the Atvan DeOraita follows the Lechem Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh—he really does not understand why according to Maimonides, if both are intentional, both do not get flogged. Because he did not do the conceptual analysis. If you had done the conceptual analysis, then you would understand: this is not similar at all. There it is lashes for responsibility; it is not lashes for committing the transgression itself, and therefore it is not similar. It is irrelevant. If I did it to myself, at most you can say I am the sole responsible party. Okay. And therefore what? Therefore I get lashes, because I am the sole responsible party. But I get one set of lashes, not two. It’s not that I performed two sides of a transgression, each of which entails lashes. We are looking for who is responsible here. They found me, because I am the sole responsible party. Very good—then I will be the one who gets lashes, but one set of lashes. Why on earth two? Therefore this is exactly the difference between Maimonides—that is why I gave the whole introduction—that is the whole difference between what Maimonides says and shaving and being shaved. Even though it looks very similar, and it really is similar, were it not for the fact that there is a verse in the Torah saying that the shaver gets lashes. But doesn’t the Atvan DeOraita bring Maimonides about shaatnez and the wearer? I didn’t hear. Doesn’t the Atvan DeOraita bring Maimonides about shaatnez? Yes, he does. No, where is it? He brings the Lechem Mishneh, who asks in astonishment why, if both are intentional, both do not receive lashes, and then he develops all kinds of pilpul there. But no pilpul is needed; the question itself never gets off the ground. The lashes there are lashes for responsibility; they are not lashes for a transgressive act. That is what should also have been the case in shaving and being shaved—the same thing, not like the act itself. Rather with shaving and being shaved—except that in shaving and being shaved there is a verse that obligates the shaver to lashes. That verse tells me that shaving and being shaved is like the transgression of intercourse: it is a transgression done by two people. Ah, if so, then when I do it to myself I am liable for two. So with interest too it would be like that? Once again. Like the Rabbi mentioned, with interest too, because interest also requires two. Interest—what? With interest, if I lend to myself, that’s substantial otherness; it’s not a loan. Ah, yes, but basically it’s a kind of thing done by two people. Of course. Interest is like the one who lies and the one lain with. Obviously. Except that unlike the one who lies and the one lain with, with interest there is no practical extension when I do it to myself. If I do it to myself it is not a loan; that is substantial otherness. In the one who lies and the one lain with there is no substantial otherness. If I do it to myself it is still male intercourse. But you’re right that at the principled level it is the same thing: it is a transgression done by two people. Therefore I said in advance that besides the fact that the transgression has to be done by two people, it also must be the case that there is no substantial otherness. Because if there is substantial otherness, then again the Atvan DeOraita’s question does not arise. And that is exactly the case with a loan at interest. Where does the Atvan DeOraita bring Maimonides on shaatnez? I didn’t hear. Where, where does the Atvan DeOraita bring Maimonides on shaatnez? In a moment we’ll get there, in a moment we’ll get there; let’s finish him and then we’ll get there in just a bit. Okay. I just want you to notice that after doing the logical analysis, all the cases fall into place, each one in its place. You don’t need difficulties and answers, and everything is completely clear what’s being discussed. That’s why I told you I wanted to bring this in as the last topic in the series on conceptual analysis, because this is an excellent example of what happens where conceptual analysis is missing—why it is missing. Okay. Let’s continue. I’m sharing again for a moment. From time to time I stop the sharing, as I already told you, because when I’m sharing I don’t see you. “And one should note here from what we say in Sanhedrin 112: They asked: if they were led astray by themselves—such as the people of an idolatrous city who led themselves astray—what is the law? The verse says, ‘and they shall lead astray’—and not that they were led astray by themselves; or perhaps even if they were led astray by themselves…” End of the Gemara’s language. “And it is evident from this that where the Torah speaks of an act that a person does to another—namely the one who leads others astray—the Gemara asked whether the law applies also when the activation was from the person himself to himself. And it remains there in Sanhedrin as an unresolved question, see there carefully. And if so it is difficult: why was the Gemara’s question not resolved from Makkot and Sanhedrin, where we say that when the Torah made one liable for an act done to another, then the liability also applies when the activation was from the person himself to himself, as above?” Yes, so he asks a question. What would you answer? Like the Rabbi said, it’s not substantial, there has to be something substantial, because incitement to oneself—incitement is substantial otherness, I can’t incite myself. Right. And therefore this question is not relevant. Now what he answers sounds fairly similar, but if you do a conceptual analysis the question never arises at all. There’s no need to ask questions and give answers—you know, this is… I once mentioned the story about the Beit HaLevi and his son Rabbi Chaim, yes, when Rabbi Chaim entered as rosh yeshiva in Volozhin together with his father; for a short period they overlapped. So his father heard one of his classes, or heard his classes, and afterward came to speak to him, to Rabbi Chaim, and said to him: listen, your classes are difficult. On the mind. I give a class, I ask ten questions, and with one foundation I stitch up all the questions and everyone dances with joy. It’s sharp, it leaves you with the questions, you’re stirred up, and then I show you how I resolve all the questions. With Rabbi Chaim, he begins with a distinction, and once he states the distinctions no question ever arises. Because it’s all just clear that this belongs here and that belongs there, so there’s no question and no answers, and the class is terribly dry. So he says to him: listen, methodologically you’re not doing it right. Because methodologically you need to interest the students. Let them ask a question, let them struggle with it, let them ask, and then give them an answer. Rabbi Chaim chose the opposite methodology. If you do a proper conceptual analysis, the questions won’t arise. Because you can do it as conceptual analysis, and it’s a difference not only methodological but substantial. Because here I say these distinctions by force of logic, not because I have a contradiction in the Gemara. The logic dictates these distinctions. After that, the contradiction in the Gemara doesn’t arise. With the Beit HaLevi, the resolution is given because there was a contradiction between sugyot. Meaning that logically the resolution itself is not necessary; I just have a contradiction, so I propose a resolution. That’s a miss. It’s not only a methodological difference, in the sense that I want to show the students how the Sages derived it. After all, the Sages did not begin with a question and then offer answers. They simply said straight out that this Gemara is like this and that Gemara is the opposite. How did they get there? Why in this Gemara is it this way and in that Gemara the opposite? Because they understood the concepts, and immediately it was clear to them that here it is like this and there it is the opposite. They did not arrive at it as a resolution to a problem. Therefore there is—true, maybe it’s less interesting to students, though by the way I’m not even sure of that. But even if it is true, there is obviously tremendous added value. Getting used to doing conceptual analysis is very important. The whole sugya falls into place completely differently. You’re not looking for band-aids to patch up sugyot. Yes, because if not, you’re always getting tangled up with whether maybe you won’t have an answer. Right. Whereas if you start with conceptual analysis and open it up properly, then you don’t need to get tangled up in maybe not having an answer. Right. Except that not getting tangled up makes the class more boring, supposedly. Yes. Fine. But the sugya is more open. I think I told you, in that same context—I don’t remember when I told this—but in that same context I once spoke with a very famous Haredi rosh yeshiva. And he said on the phone that he had heard great and wondrous things about Rabbi Lichtenstein in Gush. And he saw things that Rabbi Lichtenstein writes, and he told me, not a big deal—any average kollel fellow in the Chazon Ish kollel or the Ponevezh kollel says more brilliant things than that. So I told him, in more refined language, but basically I said to him: you’re talking like a child. Why? Because that is exactly the difference between the Beit HaLevi and Rabbi Chaim. Because Rabbi Lichtenstein does conceptual analysis; he starts—all his classes were built that way. He started with a conceptual analysis: what possibilities arise to explain the law in question. Then let’s see where such a possibility could exist and where another could, before we even opened the Gemaras. And after you sketch out this a priori conceptual tree, now you enter the sugyot and immediately you can place the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the cases—everything fits onto the tree. There are no questions and no answers. So it looks much less brilliant. But that’s for children. What do you mean less brilliant? It’s much more correct. More fundamental. It holds the sugya much more completely, correctly, clearly. You can draw conclusions about other cases, not only the cases you happened to encounter, because you understand the concepts being discussed, their logic. This is not a resolution to this question or that question. The sugya is spread out before you. Whereas if all you did was resolve a contradiction between two sugyot or between two cases—you grasp the sugya, you hold the sugya. When you study seriously and you want to hold the sugya, not merely fascinate the students, but to study responsibly—to hold the sugya and understand it—then you need to learn like Rabbi Lichtenstein. Which supposedly is less brilliant. I don’t think it’s less brilliant, by the way. But to listeners it sounds less brilliant. But that’s incorrect—it’s much better, much more correct, much smarter, and it holds the sugya much better. So what did he say? I don’t even remember anymore. He wasn’t convinced, but I didn’t give him a whole lecture there on the importance of conceptual analysis and all that. I’m also not sure all the pieces had clicked into place for me yet. But I did tell him the basic principle there with the Beit HaLevi and Rabbi Chaim. That I did bring him. Because that is Rabbi Lichtenstein’s own intellectual home. Rabbi Chaim is the grandfather of his father-in-law. His wife is a great-granddaughter of Rabbi Chaim. He’s Brisker; he comes from there. It didn’t just grow out of nowhere. That’s where it came from. Did you study with him? I was in the yeshiva—I didn’t study directly, but I spent some time in the yeshiva. Fine. Rabbi, may I ask a question? Yes. For the Atvan DeOraita, doesn’t the question fail to arise even בלי the conceptual analysis and all that? The Atvan DeOraita’s discussion is where the Torah made both the actor and the recipient liable, but with one who leads others astray there is only a transgression for the actor. So even if he acts on himself, and even if we say there isn’t the problem of substantial otherness and so on—who is the actor? The inciter or the one incited? The inciter. What do you mean? The law of the idolatrous city applies to the one incited. After all, they ended up worshipping idols and judgment is carried out on them. Now what happens if they incited themselves? Others incited them and they worshipped idols—what happens if they incited themselves? There is a transgression on the inciter and a transgression on the one incited; what happens if they incite themselves? No, exactly. So let’s see what he answers. Okay. So he says something similar, but it’s not the same. “And one must distinguish between a practical action, like the one who lies and the one lain with”—and I mentioned this earlier—“and the one who shaves and the one shaved, and between incitement and leading astray, which are intellectual and contemplative acts. And it makes more sense to say in the case of a practical act that a person himself is both the actor and the one acted upon, than to say of a person that he incites and leads himself astray, and this is obvious.” What does he answer? The difference between something practical and something intellectual, yes, or spiritual, or cognitive. Why is there a difference between them? I don’t agree at all with his answer. It’s not the same thing as what I’m saying. What difference does it make? Maybe you could understand it like the Rabbi says, that it’s not substantial within yourself, so to speak. I said in one of the previous classes that I brought this example as an example of substantial otherness. Because what I would answer here is that where the inciter incites someone else, that means that the incitement is defined as incitement of someone else. Now first of all this belongs to the topic of the Atvan DeOraita because this is a transgression done between two people. The person you incite—you incite somebody else—that’s like intercourse, right? In that sense this is a classic case where the question really ought to arise. Except that it’s like a loan at interest. Why? Because there is no such thing as inciting yourself. What does it mean to incite yourself? It’s like what we discussed about repentance in one of the first classes. I said that I can’t incite myself. If I want to worship idols, then I already want to. There’s no need for someone to motivate me to worship idols if I am both the motivator and the one motivated. If I am the motivator, then I already want to, so what is there for me to be motivated toward? It’s like repenting, yes? How can a person decide to repent? If he already decided, then he already repented. So I say that what I would say here is that the otherness here is substantial otherness, and it has nothing to do with a practical act or an intellectual act. Here is where the practical difference lies: is a loan at interest practical or intellectual? It’s not practical, it’s intellectual. Completely practical! And still I say there the same thing. You understand—the distinction is not at all between a practical act and an intellectual act. The distinction is between a case of substantial otherness and a case where the otherness is not substantial. True, in intellectual acts, in most cases, the otherness will be substantial, because intellectually working on myself—it can’t be. I can do a physical act on myself; I can shave myself, I can clip myself, I can dress myself in shaatnez. Here one can define an act done to oneself. An intellectual act on oneself generally cannot be done. But the converse is not true. When the act is practical, there can still be substantial otherness, as with a loan at interest. Therefore I claim that because he did not do the conceptual analysis but instead is looking for answers to contradictions between questions, I’m also using this class to complete that earlier series. Yes, so because he did not do the conceptual analysis, he looks for an answer to a contradiction between two sugyot. If he had done the conceptual analysis, then he would have seen that it is not intellectual and contemplative versus practical, but rather whether there is substantial otherness or not—that’s all. Next. I liked here the point about repentance; it’s just like the Rabbi explained about repentance. That really cuts through it. It’s true. Another answer: “And one could also say that when a person is led astray and enticed by another, his sin is not as great as when he worships idols of his own deliberate intention. If he incites himself, then his transgression is more severe than if someone else incited him, because there is contributory guilt by the other. Therefore the Gemara properly asked whether, when they led themselves astray, perhaps their transgression is more severe and they are not atoned for by the sword, as an idolatrous city led astray by others is atoned for—and this is obvious.” It’s not obvious, but it’s maybe possible. His claim is really the known claim regarding “we do not punish by logical derivation.” Yes, you know there are several explanations for that principle: if I derive transgression B from transgression A by an a fortiori argument, and transgression A has a punishment, I cannot conclude that the same punishment is also given for transgression B, because “we do not punish by logical derivation”; “logical derivation” means an a fortiori argument. One explanation is that we do not impose that punishment on B because B is more severe than A—after all, that’s why we derived it a fortiori—so it could be that the punishment given for A is insufficient, because transgression B is more severe. And therefore we do not punish him for transgression B with that punishment. That same principle is what he wants to say here. It may be that when others incite me, that is a lighter offense, a lighter transgression—after all, they incited me; I’m not entirely at fault. So here the punishment of an idolatrous city is sufficient. But if I incite myself to idol worship, here perhaps the punishment is not severe enough, because this is a much graver transgression, and therefore here indeed they do not undergo that law. That is his suggestion. Just note, though—what? An idolatrous city gets a much harsher punishment than an ordinary idol worshipper; they burn the whole city and all that. So talk about an idolatrous city that incited itself, not an individual person. Yes, fine, that’s not important. The point is that if I am right that with incitement there is substantial otherness, then his second answer has no place at all. It isn’t needed, and it also isn’t correct. It isn’t needed because there is no question. But it also isn’t correct, because one who incites himself is not called an inciter. He is simply an idol worshipper; he is not someone who incites himself. Because a person cannot incite himself; it is an act not defined on itself—there is substantial otherness here. So you cannot say what he says. He assumes that if a person causes himself to worship idols, that is called “he incited himself.” I call such a person an idol worshipper, not someone who incited himself. Someone who worshipped idols. He is not called someone who incited himself. And the Torah does not call him an inciter. It calls him someone who worships idols; it does not call him an inciter. No, I’m saying, but what if the whole idolatrous city did it? No, and I’m saying that if the whole city worshipped idols on its own, I do not call that a case where it was incited by itself. Rather, simply, it was not incited. That is the side in the Gemara according to which they are liable. Okay? Sorry—according to which they are not liable. So the second answer is, first, unnecessary because it is not difficult; there is substantial otherness here, so there is no difficulty why it is not obvious they become doubly liable. And second, even if there were a difficulty here, this answer is not correct. Because this answer assumes that it still is an act of incitement, but because the act was done by oneself it is much more severe. Okay, fine, okay, so we’ve finished that passage. Next. “And see further in Nazir 42a in the Mishnah: ‘A nazirite who shaved all day is liable only once. If they said to him: Do not shave, do not shave, and he shaved, he receives lashes for each and every one.’” End of the Mishnah. Yes, if he has a warning for each time, every time he shaves he receives lashes. But if he shaved continuously all day and there was not a warning each time, then he is liable only once. “And it is difficult, also in the first clause: why is he liable only once? For we say in Nazir 44a that one who shaves the nazirite also violates a prohibition, as it is written, ‘A razor shall not pass over his head’—we read it as ‘he shall not cause a razor to pass.’ Meaning that another person is forbidden to remove the hair of the nazirite. See there carefully. And if so, a nazirite who shaved himself ought to receive two sets of lashes: as the shaver and as the one shaved.” So why does the Mishnah say he is liable only once? Well, that’s not much of a difficulty. “And one can say that the Mishnah is indeed speaking of a nazirite shaved by another, and then the nazirite has only one prohibition in allowing the razor to be on him. And one can also say”—which is of course the correct answer—“that it is indeed speaking of one who shaves himself, and when it teaches ‘he is liable only once,’ the meaning is that he is liable only for one shaving, and not for each separate shaving; but for that one shaving he really receives eighty lashes.” What does that mean? It means he is liable once—that this is considered one shaving; he gets lashes for one transgression. But as for that one transgression that he does to himself, he gets flogged twice, just like one who shaves himself. Why do I compare the two things? Precisely because of what the Gemara says there—that one who shaves the nazirite also gets lashes. Meaning there is a verse, as with shaving the corners of the head, saying that the shaver gets lashes. Also with shaving a nazirite there is a verse that the shaver receives lashes, not only the one being shaved, but also the shaver. So this is not like Maimonides’ case of dressing one’s fellow in shaatnez, as we said in the introduction. When there is a verse, that verse teaches that this is a transgression carried out by both of them. And if it is carried out by both of them, then the Even HaEzer is right that here he ought to be flogged twice. And the fact that it says he gets lashes only once is no difficulty at all—it means he gets lashes for one act of shaving. How many lashes are given for that one transgression? Eighty lashes. It means not that he is not flogged for every separate shaving, not that he is not flogged twice for the one shaving—that is not what is being discussed here. He is flogged as much as he needs to be flogged. Now he brings proof, and notice that this is exactly the same as with shaving and being shaved, because here there is a verse in which the Torah says that the shaver too is liable. And again, this is not Maimonides’ principle. There is a verse that the shaver is liable; that means the shaver is liable because he is an offender, not because he is responsible for the transgression. This is a transgression carried out by both of them, and therefore if he shaves himself, then apparently he should indeed be flogged twice; the Even HaEzer is right. He says: “In any case, one must say so, for there is another prohibition in a nazirite who shaves himself, namely ‘he shall not profane his word,’ as explained in Nazir 38a, that a nazirite who drinks wine violates ‘he shall not profane his word’; see there. And it is obvious that the same applies to a nazirite who shaved, that he also violates this prohibition. See Maimonides, Laws of Naziriteship, who wrote: ‘A nazirite who shaved his whole head receives only one set of lashes for the shaving.’ And it seems that what Maimonides wrote, ‘for the shaving,’ comes to exclude that there is another set of lashes for ‘he shall not profane his word.’ And it is a general prohibition covering all prohibitions of the nazirite—shaving, drinking, and impurity—and his profaning his word by acting against his acceptance of naziriteship. And it is not because of the shaving itself; and for the shaving itself he gets only one set of lashes.” All right? What he’s saying basically is that for a nazirite, in any case, you cannot explain that he gets only forty lashes; it’s obvious that “one” means for one shaving, but he gets eighty. Why? Because in any case he has to be flogged more than once because of “he shall not profane his word,” so if so he gets three sets of lashes. One as one who profanes his word, one as the one shaved, and one as the shaver. But is “he shall not profane” an action? Is “he shall not profane his word” a prohibition involving an act? Of course—because he violates his word through an act; when he profaned his word he did so through an act. Yes, but all “he shall not profane”—its prohibition is not the speech; the speech was fine. The prohibition is that the act he did profanes the speech, so this is a prohibition done through an act. And why, when he drinks, does he not get flogged twice? He also gets flogged twice. When he drinks wine? Why not? Yes. If that is Maimonides’ meaning, then the difficulty returns to its place, because for the shaving itself as well there are two sets of lashes—one as shaver and one as the one shaved. And it is forced to say that Maimonides is speaking specifically of one shaved by another, and it requires a little further thought. So now it’s not difficult. No, it’s a case where he shaves himself, only he is liable for three sets of lashes. Rather, when Maimonides writes that he receives only one set of lashes for the shaving, he means he gets lashes for one shaving, but true, he gets flogged twice or even three times. The same answer we said above. So therefore I don’t see this as a difficulty in Maimonides. And where do we learn that he gets flogged twice when he drinks? Again? When he drinks wine, where do we learn that he gets flogged twice? Why do we need to learn it? He violated the prohibition of a nazirite, so he gets lashes. So he gets one set of lashes, not two. Which prohibition of drinking wine? Two. For “he shall not profane,” not because he made himself drink. Yes, “he shall not profane.” Maybe I didn’t understand your question. By two, I mean for “he shall not profane his word” and for the fact that he drank wine as a nazirite, not because he gave himself to drink. Why indeed does he not get lashes for the fact that he gave himself to drink? So that’s the question. Answer? Because there is no verse. Exactly! The whole discussion starts only because, as with shaving and being shaved, there is a verse that whoever does this to me also gets lashes. With forbidden relations, no verse is needed, because the act itself is an act carried out by two. But in all the other acts, which in the simple sense are acts done by one person, only if there is a verse joining another person does the discussion begin that a person who does it to himself should get flogged twice. With drinking there is no such verse; only with shaving is there such a verse. All right? “And one should further note from the words of Maimonides, chapter 3 of the Laws of Mourning, halakhah 5, where he wrote that one who renders a priest impure receives lashes.” One who renders a priest impure receives lashes. “For what he wrote there, that where the priest who became impure was intentional, the one who renders him impure does not receive lashes, and only when the one made impure is unwitting does the one rendering him impure receive lashes. The Lechem Mishneh has already asked there in astonishment: from where did he derive this distinction between unwitting and intentional? If the Torah prohibited rendering a priest impure, it should follow that even when the priest who becomes impure is intentional, the one rendering him impure should also violate the prohibition; see there carefully.” This is exactly like the wearer and the dresser. What? This is exactly like the wearer and the dresser. Right. I said that he brings this difficulty, right? Here in Laws of Mourning, the one who raises this difficulty is the Lechem Mishneh. In shaatnez he brings it later, and the same difficulty itself is raised by the Kesef Mishneh. Here you can see in this passage. “One who dresses his fellow in shaatnez receives lashes. And the Kesef Mishneh in Laws of Shaatnez, chapter 10, halakhah 31, wrote there because it is written: ‘You shall not wear shaatnez.’ And Maimonides there wrote that the dresser receives lashes only when the wearer is unwitting, just as he wrote in the matter of defiling a priest, that the one rendering him impure receives lashes only when the one becoming impure is unwitting, and so on. And the Kesef Mishneh there in Laws of Shaatnez asked him in astonishment: from where did he derive this? And from the plain sense of the Tosefta it is proven that there is no distinction, but rather that even when the wearer is intentional there is a separate transgression for the dresser. And according to this it would also follow that one who wears shaatnez on himself receives eighty lashes.” The same difficulty that the Lechem Mishneh raised above. What do you answer? So this is responsibility and not… He gets eighty lashes—why not? Right. Because in both of these cases there is no verse obligating the dresser or the one who renders impure. And what the Tosefta writes regarding dressing in shaatnez—that he receives lashes—Maimonides explains: the Tosefta here is saying the law of responsibility. It has no verse obligating the dresser to lashes because he committed a transgression; rather it is by the law of responsibility. So that exists only if the dresser is intentional and the wearer is unwitting. This is a completely different law from our law. Therefore the whole discussion the Atvan DeOraita makes about these two cases in Maimonides is irrelevant. Irrelevant. Not our issue. Because there he is talking about a different law. He is talking about the law of lashes for responsibility, not lashes for transgression. And therefore afterward he goes on calculating—well, if he gets flogged twice, then if he does it to himself he should get flogged twice. And all the calculations he does there are based on the identification he makes between the Tosefta on shaatnez and Maimonides and our law of shaving and being shaved. There is no such identity. And in this the Kesef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh are also mistaken with the same mistake, because when they challenge Maimonides, they too understand it as similar to shaving and being shaved. But that is incorrect. In Maimonides this is talking about a completely different law, the law of responsibility. It is not a transgression carried out by two people. Two completely different things. What? Can I ask the Rabbi to define what “the law of responsibility” is? What does it mean? Responsibility means that when I dress my fellow in shaatnez, this is not a transgression carried out by two people. The transgression is the wearer’s. Except that there is a general novelty, as Ido said earlier, and I accept it—that this is a general novelty—that sometimes, when the wearer himself, the one who committed the transgression, is not to blame for having committed it because he was unwitting, and there is someone else who is to blame, then that other person gets lashes even though he did not commit the transgression. He gets lashes because of his responsibility for the fact that the transgression was committed. This does not come from a verse; it is a general principle throughout Jewish law. What? That in places where there is a verse obligating the one who performs the act, like in shaving for example, there it is an entirely different principle. There it would exist even when both are intentional. Because there the lashes are not for your responsibility for the transgression that I committed. There the lashes are because you yourself are part of the transgression. A transgression that comes about through two people. In intercourse, in sexual prohibitions, I know that from the very definition of the prohibition. In shaving and being shaved, I know it from the fact that there is a verse saying the shaver gets lashes. That is not Maimonides’ principle. So according to this, when you are intentional and he is unwitting, maybe you get it because of “do not place a stumbling block”? “Do not place a stumbling block” has no lashes; I said that in the previous class. “Do not place a stumbling block”—you are causing someone else to sin. But I mean, still, if there is no lashes for “do not place a stumbling block,” then why do I get lashes? Because either there is a verse, or I’m intentional. I’m intentional and he’s unwitting. It’s not enough that I’m intentional. Because if both of us are intentional, I still do not get lashes. That’s exactly the difference. If both of us are intentional, then the wearer receives lashes, because the wearer committed the transgression and is also responsible for it. Only if he is not responsible for it do we look for someone else to be responsible, and he gets lashes in his place, even though he did not commit the transgression. But in the end they all made the same mistake—the Kesef Mishneh, the Lechem Mishneh, the Maggid Mishneh, the Atvan DeOraita, and so on. I didn’t hear. The Kesef Mishneh, the Lechem Mishneh, the Maggid Mishneh, the Atvan DeOraita—the conclusion is that they all made the same mistake. Yes, in my opinion, yes. Now all the calculations he makes—look, now he keeps reading, keeps reading, and says: yes, after all the Gemara there discusses this and asks from Nazir 47a, where there is a dispute between Tannaim about a high priest and a nazirite who encountered an unattended corpse. Which of them should become impure for it—the high priest or the nazirite? So the Atvan DeOraita says: what is the doubt? Obviously the nazirite should become impure. Why? Because if the high priest becomes impure, then he renders himself impure and gets eighty lashes. Whereas the nazirite is only forty. How do I know? Because concerning the nazirite there is a Gemara—and Maimonides, by the way, brings it as law—that there, if the nazirite renders himself impure, he does not get lashes. There is a verse excluding the nazirite from this principle. What do you answer? So that’s difficult from the Gemara, right? Why does the Gemara hesitate? Obviously it should be the nazirite and not the priest. And the answer is: no, the high priest also gets only forty and not eighty. Because with one who renders a priest impure, the reason the one rendering impure gets lashes is only if the priest who became impure was unwitting. These are not lashes like shaving and being shaved. So in such a situation, if the priest renders himself impure, that is forty lashes, not eighty. So if that’s the case, priest and nazirite are indeed the same, and the Gemara properly asks who should become impure. His whole discussion never starts. Neither the questions nor the answers. And by the way, I don’t have time now, but if we read the answers I would show you that the answers also are not correct according to our conceptual analysis—except that we don’t need to, because there is no question. So why does the Gemara in the end conclude that the nazirite should become impure and not the priest? If they are the same. I didn’t hear. The Rabbi says that in the end the halakhah rules that the nazirite should become impure and not the priest. I didn’t say that. It remains in doubt. I don’t know what was ruled there in practice, if it was ruled. It seems to me it remains in doubt. It would be interesting, if someone ruled it in practice, to see what… But not because of eighty and forty. In any case, the Gemara itself doesn’t bring that, because otherwise the Gemara itself should have resolved it from the fact that the priest gets eighty and the nazirite forty. Yes, that’s obvious. So even if they rule for some reason like one side, it won’t be related to our issue in any case. A different reason. This is yet another example of the mistakes you reach when you don’t do conceptual analysis. The whole discussion is basically unnecessary. The questions are incorrect, they don’t exist, and the answers he gives are incorrect—but also unnecessary because there is no question. And maybe, maybe even with a priest—a high priest—it’s something imposed on him from above, that he is forbidden to become impure. Whereas for a nazirite, he imposed it on himself, so maybe there it’s lighter than a high priest. So you’re suggesting another distinction why the nazirite would be preferable to the priest. Fine. Could be. There in the question there are other reasons too; the Gemara itself says that prohibitions that can be undone by asking a sage are lighter—you can seek release from naziriteship. Yes, yes. Okay. Comments or questions? I think we’ll stop here. The principle is clear. Almost all the rest of the discussion in the Atvan DeOraita is discussion of these things that I told you there’s no point discussing because they rest on a false question. So what’s next? We’ll continue to another sugya: two forces in one person. There too we’ll see a similar principle. Is that a new topic or a continuation? No, no, a continuation. Self-reference. Can we go back for a moment, Rabbi, to the idolatrous city? There? What is the prohibition there in the Torah? The prohibition is to lead others astray. The prohibition is to incite, and the prohibition is to be incited. Who said there is a prohibition to be incited? After all, what is the law of the idolatrous city? The law is that if others led them astray, then they are punished, not the others. Aren’t the others punished too? They are punished too. It doesn’t matter. Both and both. We don’t say “the words of the student versus the words of the master—whose words should one obey?” Here there is a special law. Right. No, but what is the guilt of that city when other people convinced them to worship idols? What do you mean convinced them? What are you, a little child? They convince you to worship idols? Is anyone who is incited not punished? If I incite you to murder and you murder, am I the offender? Yes, of course. What are you talking about? “The words of the teacher and the words of the student—whose words should one obey?” The Holy One, blessed be He, told you not to murder, and I tell you to murder. Whom are you supposed to obey? No, but if you convince me, for example, that there is no Holy One, blessed be He, and murder is allowed. Then you’d be under compulsion; that’s unrelated. But here we’re talking about where you are intentional, not under compulsion. So what if I incited you? Only with the idolatrous city and idol worship—as Shlomo noted earlier—the Gemara itself says: we do not plead on behalf of an inciter, that “the words of the teacher and the words of the student” is a reasoning that would in principle exempt the inciters. In idol worship and the idolatrous city we do not have that reasoning. That’s what I don’t understand—why isn’t the idolatrous city guilty? It was other people who persuaded them to worship idols. What do you mean? I don’t understand—if someone persuades me to murder, then I’m not guilty? What am I, a child? What kind of thing is that? On the contrary, I don’t understand at all what claims one could even have against the inciter. The inciter did nothing. I’m the offender. So what if he incited me? He could say: what do you want from me? He’s an adult; let him decide for himself what to do. What do you want from me? I only spoke. But if other people convinced them that there is no Holy One, blessed be He, and there is no God and Judaism is false and so on. So I say: then they are coerced. But the inciter still has nothing to do with it. Maybe from the angle of Maimonides’ responsibility, but the inciter did not worship idols. So what kind of transgression is that of an idolatrous city? They worship idols while being aware that there is God, but despite that they still worship idols? Of course. That’s what happened with everyone punished for idol worship. He decided that idol worship was better. Not only in an idolatrous city—even with idol worship generally, not only that he decided; sometimes it’s impulse. On the contrary, if he really believes in the idol worship, in my opinion he would not be punished; he is coerced. Okay, that’s what I wanted to know. Okay, so idol worship is only when you say that Judaism is true, but despite that I worship idols. Yes—isn’t the whole Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) full of that? That the prophet comes and rebukes them and they understand that he is speaking the truth. He isn’t suddenly informing them that there is God. They know there is God, but they have an evil impulse to worship idols. And the Men of the Great Assembly abolished the evil impulse for idol worship, as the Gemara in Yoma says, and therefore today we do not understand this. But in their reality they worshipped because of impulse. But what kind of impulse is there to worship idols? I don’t understand. I’m saying that today we don’t understand it because the Men of the Great Assembly abolished it. Again, that’s aggadic literature, but the meaning is that we lost that impulse. Not entirely, by the way; there are also similar impulses. Go to any trance party and you can see it. I once saw a video about a trance party—I may have mentioned this once here or there. A video about a trance party with Yoav Ben-Dov, who was a researcher of all sorts of such phenomena—he was, he died young—a researcher of all sorts of these things. He gave a lecture to some group of rabbis; I think it was in the Tzohar framework, I don’t remember where. He showed a video of how it works. They keep throwing into the air the names of Hindu gods—Shiva and Vishnu and things like that. I think very clearly they are operating there out of an impulse of idol worship. It’s not that I’m saying they are idol worshippers; I don’t think such a party is a prohibition of idol worship. I don’t think they believe in any Hindu deity. We’re talking about intelligent people, like you and me. Some of them don’t even know that it’s the name of idolatry. Yes, right. I think so too. I’m not at all sure they understand those names, that they know what they are. Fine, excellent. Anyone else? See you tomorrow. Okay. See you, yes.