Self-Reference – Lesson 9

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time we finished with the Atvon DeOraita, which is really the most direct source dealing with this issue of self-reference in Jewish law. And now I want to go into another topic; it too, at least on the face of it, deals with this point. And with this I’ll finish the human kind of self-reference and return to logical self-reference. I said at the beginning of the series that there are two kinds, two types of self-reference that we’re dealing with. So let me start for a moment with the Talmud in tractate Shabbat.

[Speaker B] I’m sharing the Talmud here for a moment. Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ila’a in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan on page 5:

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. It was also taught in a baraita, a baraita that says this explicitly: Others say, if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. What does that mean? In the labor of carrying out on the Sabbath there are several ways to violate it. There are debates whether these are derived categories or the primary category itself, doesn’t matter, I’m not getting into that now. In principle, carrying out on the Sabbath means lifting an object from a private domain and placing it in the public domain. Bringing in means lifting it in the public domain and placing it in the private domain. In order to violate carrying out or bringing in, I need to do a lifting and a placing. Another way to violate carrying out is when I move it four cubits in the public domain. Not from private domain to public domain, but within the public domain itself: I walk four cubits with the object, but I lift it at the beginning, walk four cubits, and place it down. Everything is done in the public domain. Once it was four cubits, there too one is liable. That too is some sort of derivative or quasi-primary form of carrying out. Another mode is throwing. When I take an object and throw it in the public domain, as long as I threw it four cubits, and then it came to rest, say, on the ground of the public domain or on something in the public domain, then I’m also liable. Now that’s a novelty, and you have to notice it, because here, seemingly, there was a lifting — I was the one who threw it, so the throw is the lifting — but there was no placing. It came to rest on its own, by itself. I threw it, it flew, and in the end it landed there on the ground. Why am I liable? The claim is that the placing that occurred at the end on the ground really occurred by my force. It’s considered as though I placed it there. Just as if I had taken the object and put it there myself, that would count as my placing. Now that I threw it, and by the force of that throw it came to rest there at the end, that too is called my placing. We once discussed — I don’t remember in what context anymore — what happens if I throw and the wind helps me carry the object. Then it’s no longer done by my force; the object moves with the help of the wind. I only started the process. Here there is the Minchat Bikkurim, who writes that one is liable even in such a case, but that’s just a note for those who remember it from then; I’m not getting into it. Now what happens — I’m returning to our Talmud — let’s say I take an object and throw it in the public domain at least four cubits. I said that if the object comes to rest at the end of the four cubits, then I’m liable. That’s considered that I lifted it and I placed it. What happens if I throw it to someone — I’m playing ball with him? I throw him the ball and he catches it. Here there would have been room to say that really I performed the lifting but he performed the placing. So in fact neither of us performed the whole act. The full act necessary for liability has to include both lifting and placing. So neither of us performed the full act, and therefore, at least apparently, we should be exempt. So Rabbi Ila’ai in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan says not like that. If the other person I’m throwing to was in place and remained standing there, and the object comes into his hand, then I, the thrower, am liable. It’s as if I placed it on the ground, because now I placed it in his hand instead of on the ground; what difference does it make? The placing is still my placing. But if he moved from his place — that other person standing opposite me, right? I threw to him and he wasn’t where the ball was flying to; he ran there, like in a baseball game, ran there and caught the ball — what happens in that case? The Talmud says: exempt. Meaning, why is he exempt? Because in that case apparently I performed the lifting, but he performed the placing. Since the placing wasn’t done by my force. If it had kept flying by my force, it would have settled on the ground, but he ran there and caught it himself; in effect, by his action he carried out the component of placing. And then it turns out that I performed the lifting — sorry — and he performed the placing, and therefore I am exempt. Let me say one more sentence about that.

[Speaker C] If the person didn’t move at all from his place and he catches it — if the one who caught the object didn’t move from his place but caused it to fall to him — if he hadn’t touched it, it would have continued. No, this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. As far as I’m concerned, he’s part of the ground, like if there had been a mound on the ground and I threw it there. If there hadn’t been a mound, then the ball would have landed a little farther along on the ground. Fine, but this person is now a mound on the ground, and as long as I threw and the ball reached where it was supposed to reach, that’s considered my placing.

[Speaker C] No, I wasn’t asking that. I was asking: if it reached where it was supposed to reach, I understand. But if, for example, I threw it far and he caught it earlier — not according to my plan — a meter before?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there’s room to discuss it, doesn’t matter right now. So there is room to discuss it; maybe it’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here. Maybe I’ll still comment on that later, but the topic itself matters less to me than the context we’ll get to in a moment. I just want to maybe add one more remark. There is a discussion among the later authorities (Acharonim). Let’s say I’m standing in a private domain and someone else is standing in the public domain — the Mishnah at the beginning of tractate Shabbat — say the homeowner is standing in the house and the poor man is standing in the public domain, and the homeowner gives him charity on the Sabbath, okay? So if the homeowner takes it out and puts his hand into the public domain, and now the poor man takes it from my hand, which is resting there in the airspace of the public domain, in such a case both of us are exempt. Now there is a discussion among the later authorities (Acharonim) whether in such a situation the exemption of two people who performed it was said. It begins already in the Talmud, but it gets worked out more among the later authorities. What do I mean? Let’s say I and someone else together lift an object from the private domain and together place it in the public domain — then both of us are exempt; that’s called two people who performed it. What happens if I lifted and the other one placed? That’s a longitudinal split of the act and not a lateral split of the act. In the previous case, where two people do everything together — both of us lift together and both of us place together — that’s a lateral division of the act. Meaning, each of us does half of the act, but half of the full act, okay? That’s a lateral split, and that’s the classic case of two people who performed it. What happens when I lift and my fellow places? In such a case I did a longitudinal half of the act, not a lateral half. I did only the lifting and he did only the placing. Not that I did half a lifting and half a placing and he did half a lifting and half a placing. Because the split here, or the division here, is a longitudinal division and not a lateral one. The question is whether such a case is also called two people who performed it or not — that’s a discussion among the later authorities (Acharonim); it doesn’t matter right now what the practical difference is.

[Speaker D] But the Talmud says that, doesn’t it? What? A longitudinal split is exempt. He said: if he moved from his place and received it, exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is exempt, but because — no, the question is whether that’s because of two people who performed it. Maybe he’s exempt because — no, what is two people who performed it? I’m simply exempt because I only did a lifting — what are you going to make me liable for? And the other person did only a placing — what are you going to make him liable for?

[Speaker D] Exactly! So what’s the initial assumption? What’s the other side of the understanding?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The other side is that between the two of us a full act was done. So let’s hold both of us together liable for the whole act. But there would be an exemption because it was done by two people, and we don’t hold two people liable for one act.

[Speaker E] No, you did a lifting, walked four cubits, and gave it into the second person’s hand so that he would place it. So it’s like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he took it from me. If I gave it into his hand, then I placed it in his hand. He took it from my hand to himself. Okay? So I will use that distinction later. I just want us to be aware of that distinction. It’s really not clear that the second thing is also called two people who performed it. Maybe here the exemption is simply because I didn’t do the prohibited act. The prohibited act has to be lifting and placing, and I did only lifting. The other one did only placing. And in two people who performed it, I did both lifting and placing, I just did it together with someone else who did the whole thing together with me. So there, if not for the exemption of two people who performed it, I would have done the full violation. There is an exemption of two people who performed it: two people are not held liable for one act of violation. But in the second case, then apparently there could be a situation — I mean, simply speaking, it seems to me — where the exemption is not based on two people who performed it at all, but simply on the fact that there’s nothing to hold me liable for: I didn’t do the violation. How can one nevertheless understand the view that even such a thing is called two people who performed it? It’s a bit similar — or not a bit, very similar — to what I talked about in the Atvon DeOraita. I can say that the act of lifting and placing together — yes, the act of carrying out — was done by the two of us as a pair. The two of us as a pair performed a complete act. Now, in principle, we should hold both of us liable for that act. If you remember intercourse, for example — remember?

[Speaker C] And in intercourse they’re both liable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here they’re not both liable, but one could… both of them…

[Speaker C] Yes, but there, as the Rabbi said, that’s something essential — you need both of them, without both of them…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re making a distinction, but that distinction may be right and it may be wrong. I didn’t say that’s necessarily so; I’m raising such a possibility. Such a possibility exists. Maybe your distinction is right and then that possibility doesn’t exist. But those are exactly the two sides of the doubt. I’m presenting two possibilities for explaining why, if I lift and you place, we are exempt. One possibility: there is simply nothing to hold liable, because neither of us performed a prohibited act. Second possibility: no, let’s view the two of us as a pair. The pair together, in its totality, performed a prohibited act — it did a lifting and a placing. Except that there is an exemption of two people who performed it. If two people together perform a complete act, they are exempt. And then the longitudinal split and the lateral split are the same thing. Bottom line, we look at the pair as though it performed the act together, but there is an exemption of two people who performed it. Okay? There may be a division here, perhaps similar or not similar — maybe later I’ll comment on it — from this very same Talmudic passage, that the Sefat Emet discusses at the beginning of tractate Shabbat. When I lifted, did I violate the prohibition of half a measure? You know that by Torah law all prohibitions have measures. For example, food prohibitions — most of them have a measure of an olive’s bulk. On Yom Kippur it’s a large date’s bulk. Doesn’t matter; generally, food prohibitions are measured by an olive’s bulk. Eating — and also commandments of eating like matzah, doesn’t matter — eating is an olive’s bulk. What happens if I ate a quarter-olive’s bulk of pork? A measure of a quarter-olive’s bulk of pork. There’s a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan I violated a Torah prohibition; half a measure is prohibited by Torah law. So what is the significance of the measure if I violate the prohibition even with a quarter of the measure? That I am not punished; I wouldn’t incur lashes. But there is a Torah prohibition even if I ate less than the full measure. Reish Lakish says that’s only a rabbinic prohibition if less than the measure. Jewish law follows Rabbi Yoḥanan. Many people don’t know that. The Jewish law is like Rabbi Yoḥanan, that even less than the measure is a Torah prohibition. If I ate a quarter-olive’s bulk of pork, I violated a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker C] A complete act of eating prohibited food was done, just not in the defined quantity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Now what happens when I lift and the other one places? Or you know what, I only lifted and the second one placed; doesn’t matter for the moment. Now, I also said earlier that there is a side to say that since the split is a longitudinal split, then I only did lifting and the other did only placing, so we don’t need to reach the exemption of two people who performed it, because each one did only half a half-act — there’s nothing to hold him liable for at all. But maybe there would still be a Torah prohibition here by the law of half a measure? He did half the act.

[Speaker D] That’s not half a measure. Half a measure relates to quantitative measures, not qualitative ones.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Sefat Emet there writes that in such a thing there will be no law of half a measure. Why? Because half a measure, in the language I used before, applies in a lateral division, not a longitudinal one. In a longitudinal division I didn’t do half of a prohibited act; I did half an act. Not half of a complete act that is prohibited, but half of the act. That’s not called half a measure; there is no prohibition here at all. Half a measure is when I did the entire prohibited act, just not in sufficient quantity. Say I ate a quarter-olive’s bulk — half an olive’s bulk isn’t necessarily half, it just means less than the measure, right? I ate a quarter-olive’s bulk of pork. Then I performed the act of eating pork, just not on a sufficient quantity, and I did the whole act — chewed, swallowed, everything — but on a partial quantity. That’s called half a measure. But if I only lifted, then I really — that’s not — if the two of us together lifted and placed, that would be half a measure. Why? Because there I performed a complete act, which is a prohibited act, but in partial quantity — in this case not the quantity of an object, but the quantity of the act. But a lateral division means that I performed the full act, only in a diminished intensity, as it were, a reduced quantity of act. By contrast, if I only lifted and the other one only placed — doesn’t matter, only lifted or only placed — in such a case what is lacking here is in the quality of the act, not in the quantity. Part of the act is missing, not a quantitative part. There is only a lifting here and the placing is missing; it’s not that there is a weak lifting-and-placing. There is only lifting and no placing. In such a case, says the Sefat Emet, there is no law of half a measure. There are those who also formulate it by saying that there will be no law of half a measure here because half a measure was said only regarding an object and not regarding actions — where you did half of the object and not half of the action. But the formulation I gave earlier is a different one: it could be that there is half a measure even with actions. For example, if the two of us lift and place together. Then there would be a law of half a measure. But if I lift and you place, then not. Why? Because when the complete act is there, only in diminished intensity, that’s half a measure; but when I did only half the act, that’s not half a measure. A practical difference according to what I’m saying, for example, is that if two people actually lift together and afterward place together — which people usually think is two people who performed it and therefore only a rabbinic prohibition — according to my approach there would be a Torah prohibition of half a measure. It’s lighter than a Torah prohibition of carrying out, which is a prohibited labor on the Sabbath carrying liability to stoning, but still it’s a Torah prohibition and not a rabbinic one. There is a law of half a measure even with actions, as long as the half is a lateral half and not a longitudinal half. Different possibilities, different formulations among the later authorities (Acharonim); I’m just raising the possibilities. One can argue for each of them. So this too sharpens the point I was making — that if I say that when I only lifted we don’t need to reach two people who performed it because there is nothing to hold me liable for, I did only half the act, there could still arise the question of why I shouldn’t be liable under the law of half a measure. Not liable — rather, why there wouldn’t at least be a Torah prohibition under the law of half a measure. So that’s the question whether a qualitative half has the law of half a measure or not. Okay? Okay, so I’m returning to our case. What happens in our case is that a person throws the object and on the other side there is someone else who runs to the object and receives it, and then that means I performed the lifting and he performed the placing. About that the Talmud says that I am exempt. Why am I exempt? What do you say?

[Speaker F] He didn’t do a complete act?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He did half an act.

[Speaker F] He didn’t do the prohibited act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said earlier. One possibility is that there is an exemption of two people who performed it. I did the lifting, he did the placing; together there was a complete act of throwing here, but two of us did it together. There is an exemption of two people who performed it.

[Speaker D] But why, why do you need to get to that? It’s not reasonable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one possibility, what I said before. The second possibility is that there is nothing to hold me liable for, because I did only lifting and he did only placing; neither of us can be held liable. Therefore we don’t need to reach the exemption of two people who performed it. The first formulation says: it’s not true that I didn’t do anything and there’s nothing to hold me liable for, because he and I together are judged as a pair. The pair together performed a complete act — there is something to hold us liable for. Except that there is a rule of two people who performed it saying that we don’t hold two people liable when they did one act.

[Speaker D] No, that’s not an exemption of two people who performed it. It clashes essentially. You’re saying that the violation is on a pair, but then there is an exemption of two people who performed it; that exemption is in all cases, because it’s on a pair exactly. It clashes essentially — if you say the violation is on a pair, and on the other hand you say there is an exemption of two people who performed it, then there is no violation at all. In what case would there be a violation on a pair?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] You’re saying that a carrying-out violation like this is a violation on a pair. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not a violation on a pair. Obviously the carrying-out violation is not a violation on a pair. If I did it myself and threw alone in the public domain and it came to rest on the ground, I am liable. It’s not a violation defined as a violation on a pair. The violation is defined as lifting and placing. But here I can view the pair as the one that performed the act of violation. The pair, if I look at it together, performed a complete act of violation here. It’s only exempt because of two people who performed it. In a violation on a pair, in a violation defined as a violation on a pair, there will be no exemption of two people who performed it. Exactly. Like with forbidden sexual relations. Exactly. Because that’s the definition of the violation. Exactly. Here the definition of the violation is not a violation on a pair, but if not for the exemption of two people who performed it, then I would look at the two as though they were one unit, a pair, and those two together fully did this act — lifting and placing — and therefore one should hold them liable. It’s only that there is an exemption of two people who performed it, that we don’t hold two people liable for one act. Fine.

[Speaker D] Even in Shabbat there is a pair.

[Speaker C] If for example they are carrying a heavy load that one person can’t carry alone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A case where this one cannot and that one cannot…

[Speaker C] That’s something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no…

[Speaker C] It’s a kind of pair.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. There they are liable.

[Speaker C] But there…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are liable because there is no exemption of two people who performed it.

[Speaker C] Right? Right, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When this one cannot and that one cannot, that’s not called two people who performed it. No, I’m saying that this is…

[Speaker C] Two people, it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A pair-violation for which a pair is liable. נכון, but there is no exemption of two people who performed it. There certainly won’t be, because you need two. Right. Therefore they are liable. Right. I’m speaking in a situation where this one can and that one can.

[Speaker C] Yes, yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there are two possibilities for understanding why, if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. One possibility is that it’s two people who performed it. The second possibility is that we don’t look at them as a pair; we look at each one separately, and each one separately didn’t do a violation at all — one did only lifting and the other did only placing. Okay? Keep that in mind. I’m continuing in the Talmud.

[Speaker B] Rabbi Yoḥanan raised the following problem: If one threw an object, and he himself moved from his place and came back and received it, what is the law? I threw an object, ran quickly to the other side, and caught it. What’s the law?

[Speaker E] Isn’t that that the wind helped?

[Speaker B] No, no, without wind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Although it probably doesn’t matter with the wind, but without wind. What is it? What is the law? What exactly was his question? the Talmud asks. What are the two sides of the doubt? Abba bar Abba said: The question concerns two forces in one person. Are two forces in one person like one person, and he is liable, or perhaps are they like two people, and he is exempt? It remains unresolved. What does that mean? The doubt was whether when I throw and afterward run and receive it, I am essentially functioning as two people, right? I carry out the role of the thrower and also the… I perform both sides of the act — I am both the thrower and the one who runs and catches. So what? Fine, so what is the problem? It’s one person. The Talmud says no — it’s two forces in one person. What does that mean? Overall, two half-acts were done here, except that the same one person did those two half-acts. Is that considered one person, and then he would be liable — one person who lifted and placed — or perhaps is it like two people, and he is exempt? No, it’s like two people where by chance I am playing both roles, and therefore I am exempt.

[Speaker C] Because it detached from him. What? Because the object detached — because every person too is sort of two people, when he lifts and afterward places. Is it because there was a break between the person and the object, because of that it’s considered two forces of two people?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’ll get into that in a moment. But yes, in principle yes. Okay, it’s not the break in itself that is the indication, but in a moment. So that’s the Talmud’s doubt. Now let me preface this with another introduction. There is a Talmud in Bava Kamma — here, the Talmud in Bava Kamma says as follows: Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: You were not with us in the evening, within the boundary. In the evening you weren’t with us within the boundary — it was Sabbath. For we raised excellent matters. There were fascinating things in the study hall; too bad you weren’t there, you missed out. Rami bar Ḥama said to him: What were those excellent matters? What was it that you were discussing? He said to him: One who lives in another person’s courtyard without his knowledge — must he pay him rent or need he not? Right? I went into your courtyard or your apartment without asking your permission, and it’s as if I’m renting, but without a contract; I didn’t ask permission, I lived in your apartment. Do I have to pay you for that or not? The Talmud asks: What are the circumstances? If you say it is a courtyard that is not normally rented out, and a person who is not one who would rent. They divide here between a courtyard that is or isn’t normally rented out, and whether I, the resident, have an alternative place to live or not. If the courtyard isn’t normally rented out, then the other person lost nothing from the fact that I entered his courtyard. If it is normally rented out and I entered it, took over his courtyard, then he lost money. But if the courtyard is not normally rented out and I entered the courtyard or the apartment, doesn’t matter, then he didn’t lose money; that’s called: this one does not lose. Now if I have a place to live even without this, then by living with him I didn’t benefit, I gained nothing, I could have lived without it. If I don’t have an alternative place to live, then I benefited from living with him. So there are four cases: this one benefits and that one loses; this one does not benefit and that one loses; this one does not benefit and that one does not lose; this one benefits and that one does not lose. Four possibilities. Okay? It depends on whether the courtyard is or is not normally for rent, and whether the person needs housing or not. So that’s what the Talmud asks: If you say it is a courtyard that is not normally rented out, and a man who is not one who would rent — that’s a case where this one does not benefit and that one does not lose — why should he pay? I didn’t benefit, so there’s no reason to pay, and he didn’t lose anything, so what would I be paying him for? Rather, what, will you tell me that it’s a courtyard that is normally rented out and I need a place to live? That’s a case where this one benefits and that one loses — then obviously he has to pay. What’s the doubt? The Talmud says: No, it is needed only for a courtyard that is not normally rented out and a man who would rent. What is that? This one benefits and that one does not lose. I need housing, so I benefited from living there. The courtyard is not normally rented out, so he didn’t lose. This one benefits and that one does not lose. Among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the second possibility also comes up — that this one does not benefit and that one does lose. But that doesn’t enter the Talmud itself.

[Speaker C] Why isn’t there a rule of compelling… I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] This one benefits and that one does not lose — we compel against the trait of Sodom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said that? The Talmud there is uncertain about that very point. Fine. There’s a Pnei Yehoshua here, and there’s Tosafot in Bava Batra on page 12, who connect this to coercing someone not to act with the “trait of Sodom.” At the moment, the Talmud is unsure whether yes or no. Simply speaking, the discussion here is about whether I am obligated to pay. Coercing someone over the trait of Sodom is, on the contrary, evidence that I am exempt. Otherwise it wouldn’t be called the trait of Sodom. Here the discussion is whether by law I have to pay, not whether they force me because it’s the trait of Sodom. Fine. In any case, the Talmud says we’re dealing with a case where one benefits and the other does not lose. In our terms, what exactly is the Talmud discussing here? Let’s abstract it a bit. What is the conceptual analysis in the Talmud, not the case itself? The Talmud generally tends to speak about cases. But behind it there is a principled discussion. What is the principled discussion? Basically, I would formulate it like an inquiry of the later authorities (Acharonim). Yes, the later authorities would formulate it as follows: when I have to pay, say I lived there, this is a case where one benefits and the other loses. I benefited and you lost. I have to pay. Is the payment because of my benefit or because of your loss? What is the basis of the payment? Is it because you lost, or because I benefited? Where is the practical difference? What happens if I benefited and you did not lose? One benefits and the other does not lose. If the basis of payment is the benefit, then even in such a case I have to pay, because in the end I did benefit. Why should I care that you didn’t lose? Or perhaps the basis of payment is the loss, in which case what does it matter that I benefited? Bottom line, you didn’t lose anything, so I don’t have to pay you. Right? So basically, in the formulation of the later authorities, they wouldn’t phrase it as: what happens in the case of someone who lives in another person’s courtyard without his knowledge—does he need to pay rent or not? That’s phrased as a halakhic question about a concrete case. The later authorities would phrase it as a principled conceptual question: is the obligating factor in payment the benefit or the loss? Right? But now, usually the style in the Talmud itself is generally that the questions are phrased as questions about cases. We have a halakhic question about cases. It’s relatively rare for the Talmud to enter into abstract principles, to do what’s called abduction, yes, in science—where you move to abstract principles that explain the cases you’re dealing with. So the Talmud usually leaves that to the commentators. Usually that’s even more the later authorities than the medieval authorities (Rishonim). A bit with the medieval authorities, more with the later ones. In the Talmud itself, the discussion is about cases. It’s rare in the Talmud for it to do the kind of inquiry later authorities do, where it raises the conceptual discussion and puts it on the table. Usually that lies behind the discussion. The Talmud deals with the case. Behind it, of course, sits a conceptual uncertainty. The ones who conceptualize and formulate that conceptual uncertainty are usually the commentators, generally the later authorities. In the Talmud itself it’s presented as a discussion of a case. What is unique here is that the Talmud starts with a discussion of a case, but immediately afterward it also formulates what the conceptual uncertainty is, which is really like a text of the later authorities. Is what obligates me to pay the benefit or the loss? The practical difference is a case where one benefits and the other does not lose. That’s really the style of the later authorities. You begin like the Talmud—what is the law regarding one who lives in another’s courtyard without his knowledge? Does he have to pay rent or does he not have to pay rent? That’s Talmud, characteristic Talmud, a question about a case. But the discussion in the Talmud really looks like a conceptual discussion of the later authorities. The question is whether benefit obligates or loss obligates, and the practical difference is a case where one benefits and the other does not lose. Now I’m returning to the Talmud. All this is a bit of a parenthesis, but it’s interesting, so I’m lingering on it a little. Yes, so the Talmud asked: what is the issue? Can he say to him, “What loss did I cause you?” Or perhaps he can say, “But you benefited.” Yes, I can say to him: I didn’t deprive you of anything, why should I pay? And you can answer me: fine, but you benefited, so pay. They say: what kind of discussion is this? Is the discussion whether the benefit obligates or the loss obligates? He said to him—so Rami bar Hama, who had not been there, was not present in the study hall—Rav Chisda excitedly tells him what a fascinating discussion there had been in the study hall. The question is why this was such a fascinating discussion. What is special about this discussion beyond any other discussion in the whole Talmud, that takes place everywhere in the Talmud? What is special about this discussion that made it seem so fascinating to him? I’ll come back to that in a moment. He said, so he tells him: it’s a Mishnah. Rami bar Hama says to him: why are you so excited about this discussion? All your pilpul is explicitly written in the Mishnah. He asks him: which Mishnah? He said to him: come serve me. I’m not answering you until you serve me. Meaning, serve me like a student serves a rabbi. He took his scarf and wrapped it around him, yes, so he dressed him with his garment. He said to him—after he had served him—Rami bar Hama said to him: if it benefited, it pays according to the benefit it received. What does that mean? This

[Speaker C] is the animal, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the animal that fell into the garden—if it benefited, then it pays according to the benefit it received. What does that mean? For example, the animal fell onto a garden and crushed the vegetables in the garden, but that cushioned its fall, so it actually gained from it, or it ate the vegetables in the garden. So it benefited. Fine? Then it pays according to the benefit it received. What do you see from here? That what obligates payment is the benefit and not the loss—it pays according to the benefit it received.

[Speaker D] No, but there too the owner also suffered a loss.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. Rava said: how healthy and unaware a man is when his Master helps him—that even though it is not similar to the Mishnah, he accepted it from him. This case is one where one benefits and the other loses, while that case is one where one benefits and the other does not lose. Fine? What does that mean? He says: what a foolish thing he told him—it’s not similar to the Mishnah at all—and the man kept quiet. He didn’t say to him that it is completely different. After all, in the Mishnah we are talking about where the animal ate the fruit, meaning the owner of the fruit also suffered a loss, not only that the animal benefited. There, payment is made. But here we’re talking about someone who entered another person’s courtyard that is not intended for rent, so that person didn’t lose anything. I benefited and he didn’t lose. How do you want to resolve our question from the Mishnah? Fine? So basically,

[Speaker C] he served him for nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so Rav Chisda basically is silent before Rami bar Hama and doesn’t answer him. The Talmud asks: fine, but why does Rami bar Hama himself say this? Never mind—the owner regards fruit left in the public domain as ownerless. He has some explanation why it is similar. But some explanation is needed—it’s very subtle. Now, why indeed does Rami bar Hama say to Rav Chisda, I won’t tell you what Mishnah it is until you serve me? What is special here? In every other place, if someone asks me a question I answer him. Why here does he demand that he serve him first? The answer is that Rami bar Hama himself understood that the similarity between our case and the Mishnah is very subtle. On the face of it, it seems really not similar at all. So what? If I had just said this to Rav Chisda, he would have laughed at me and thrown me down the stairs. Because it’s nonsense; it’s not similar at all. So I tell him: serve me first. Give me a respectful attitude as toward a rabbi. If I see that you relate to me as a student to a rabbi, then I can tell you this. Why? Because then when you hear the point, you won’t dismiss it outright and say it’s nonsense. If I’m your rabbi, you’ll at least make the effort to think again before rejecting it, and then maybe you’ll understand on your own why what I said is correct. Now this is interesting—I… the one who brings this Talmudic passage is Rabbi Shimon Shkop in the introduction to Shaarei Yosher. And there he says—the reader, in the introduction he speaks with the reader. So he says to the reader: look, when you approach my book, if you give me credit, if you value me, I invite you to read the book. If you don’t give me credit, I ask you not to open the book. And he explains why. He says: in this book there are many fine distinctions which, on the face of it, if you don’t think about them, will seem to you like nonsense. If you don’t value me, every time I make some distinction you’ll say it’s nonsense and move on. If you value me, then even if it doesn’t seem right to you at first glance, you’ll make the effort to think about it again. Therefore only someone who values me, I ask him to open the book. What happens if someone doesn’t value Rabbi Shimon Shkop? What will happen? The distinctions that seem logical to him he will accept; the distinctions that don’t seem logical to him he won’t accept. But if so, then he gained nothing from the book. What already seemed logical to him remains true for him, what didn’t seem logical remains untrue for him. So it turns out you gained nothing from the book. I once told the guys at the yeshiva in Yerucham—I’ve mentioned this before—that the argument you gain from is an argument in which you lost. Why? Because in an argument you won, you come out with the same position you came in with; it turned out you were right and not the other person, so you gained nothing from the argument. But if you lost, then you came to the argument with position A, after the argument it turns out you were mistaken and position B is correct, so you gained something, you learned something new. You gain something from arguments only in arguments that you lost; from arguments you won, you gain nothing. That’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says to the reader. Open the book if there is a chance you’ll learn from it something you wouldn’t have thought of on your own. If you will accept from the book only things you think of on your own, then why are you opening the book? You’ll remain with what you knew beforehand. How will it happen that you learn things you didn’t think of in advance? If you value me. Because if you value me and you see something that initially seems foolish to you, you’ll think about it again, and there’s a chance you’ll be persuaded. So only if you value me should you open the book. Now, this reminds me of the well-known Magen Avraham. You know, I’m drifting a bit here. The Magen Avraham says—and this is really based on Talmudic passages in two places—that you are allowed to say things in the name of a great person so that people will accept them from you. So say I have an argument with someone, and I say, “This was said by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein.” Fine, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it, so of course he accepts it. So I’m allowed to lie and say that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it so that he will accept the point from me. And the Magen Avraham brings this as Jewish law in section 156. A subsection there, and afterward he goes out to his business. There’s such a section in the Shulchan Arukh at the end of the laws of morning prayer: “and afterward he goes out to his business.” So there the Magen Avraham brings all the laws for which he had no other place to put them. He brings many, many laws there; one of them is this law. Now on the face of it, this is an absurd thing. I tell you a halakhic ruling that you don’t agree with, and I tell you it in the name of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and now you’ll accept it. And it could be that you’ll desecrate the Sabbath because of this. How is it permitted for me to make you stumble through a lie, by telling you that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein permitted it? So the answer I suggest for this matter—and it seems to me there can’t be another answer—is that this permission was stated only in a place where you would not accept the point even if Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it. Because if you would accept it if Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it, then I am making you stumble through a lie; it would be forbidden to do that. The only case where I am allowed to do it is on the assumption that you won’t accept it even if Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it. Only then does the question arise: so why am I doing it at all, if in any case you won’t accept it? After all, I’m doing it so that you will accept it. The answer is that it’s like Rabbi Shimon Shkop. When I argue with you and raise arguments, and I have the feeling that you look down on me so much that you aren’t seriously considering the arguments I bring, then I lie and say to you: do you know who said this opinion and these arguments? Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. Him you certainly don’t look down on. So what will you do now? You won’t automatically accept it just because Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it. But you will consider it again. You will think through the arguments once more—maybe after all there is something to them—and then there is a chance you’ll be persuaded. Only in such situations am I allowed to lie and attribute things to a great person. In order to persuade you to think again—but the assumption always is that in the end you will reach conclusions according to your own understanding; you won’t accept it because Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said it, because otherwise it would be forbidden to do this. The only place where it is permitted is where I feel you are looking down on me, that you’re not seriously considering my arguments, and so I’m trying to get you to consider them more seriously. In the end, you will consider and you’ll make the decision according to what seems right to you; I only want to bring it about that you seriously take all the considerations into account. Okay?

[Speaker G] They don’t do that in a conversation between just two people; it’s only between two Torah scholars who know how to weigh things. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, indeed, in a place where it is clear that the other person will accept it, it’s forbidden to do this, according to my explanation. Now look at a nice thing, just again, parentheses inside parentheses inside parentheses. At the beginning of the twentieth century, or the end of the nineteenth century beginning of the twentieth, there was some young fellow from Berlin who forged a Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim. He said he had found a manuscript—after all, there is no Jerusalem Talmud on the order of Kodashim. He said he had found a manuscript of the Jerusalem Talmud on the order of Kodashim, which was really his own novelties. He wrote these novelties as though—he phrased them in Aramaic, he was a Torah scholar and knew how to do it. He phrased them in Aramaic as if there were give-and-take of the Talmud there, and said that he had found it as a manuscript of the Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim. A great controversy arose in the rabbinic world: was this genuine or forged? Books and articles were written about it. By the way, the myth says that the Rogatchover ruled that this thing was a forgery. Why? There is a rule in the Jerusalem Talmud that in every chapter a sage appears who had not appeared until then. So says the Rogatchover, and this was not maintained in that forged Jerusalem Talmud, therefore it was clearly a forgery. If that’s true, it’s amazing. I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s what the legend says; you can check it. That’s what the legend says. In any case, books were written about it. But it was clear to everyone that in the end it turned out to be forged. It was clear to everyone that assuming it was forged, the man did something that should never be done. But the question is: why? After all, the Magen Avraham brought as Jewish law that I’m allowed to say things in the name of a great person so that people will accept them from me. That’s what he did. He said things in the name of the sages of the Jerusalem Talmud so that people would accept his ideas.

[Speaker C] But then you can’t argue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. According to the explanation I gave earlier, it’s very clear. Because the Talmud has authority; you don’t argue with the Talmud. When you tell me things in such a way that if you tell me them in the name of a great person I will definitely accept them—not that I’ll reconsider, but that I’ll accept them—then it is forbidden to do this. The only thing they permitted was only in a place where if you tell me it in the name of a great person, I’ll reconsider it, and then maybe I’ll change my mind, maybe yes maybe no, but at least I’ll seriously think about your arguments. In a place where I will automatically accept it, it is forbidden to do this. That’s what the Talmud says; that’s what I claim the Magen Avraham says. The Magen Avraham brings it as Jewish law. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says the same thing. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: look, if you think I’m a great person, then open my book. Why? Not because I expect you to accept everything I wrote. No, don’t accept it. What I expect from you is that even if there are things that seem strange to you at first glance, think about them again. If in the end you conclude that you disagree, then don’t accept them. But at least don’t dismiss me contemptuously. Give me credit, because I worked hard on this. There’s no nonsense written here. And if you don’t give me that credit, then don’t open the book. Meaning, this walks between two poles. On one side there is authority that I accept automatically; Rabbi Shimon Shkop does not demand that you accept what he wrote—not at all, on the contrary, argue. He only asks: don’t dismiss it outright even if it looks silly to you. Consider it again and then decide. Once you consider it again, there is a chance you’ll understand that there is logic here after all, and then you learned. Because you considered it and suddenly discovered that your first thought was not correct. You learned something new. It’s worth opening a book only if you can learn from it new things. Don’t open a book from which you won’t learn anything. Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings for this principle of his the Talmudic passage we read earlier in Bava Kamma. The Talmudic passage we read earlier in Bava Kamma—when he says to him, “come serve me,” what is he saying to him? He is basically saying: I want to see that you give me respectful treatment, like a student to a rabbi. If so, I’m willing to tell you the very subtle argument, one that on the face of it seems very foolish. Because I know that if you respect me, you won’t reject it outright but will consider it again. But if you don’t serve me—if you don’t give me the credit that I can also be your rabbi, you don’t really value me—I won’t tell you the proof from the Talmud. Because on the face of it, that proof from the Mishnah—sorry, from the Mishnah—because on the face of it, that proof from the Mishnah seems foolish. And if you don’t give me credit, there’s no point in telling it to you; you’ll throw it out immediately. Now look how beautiful this is, how beautifully the Talmud unfolds. So this is how it goes: Rabbah bar bar Hana says to Rav Chisda, yes, after he served him, he says to him: if it benefited, it pays according to the benefit it received. Rav Chisda is silent. Right? Rava bar Rava says—this is already a new figure here—how healthy and unaware a man is when his Master helps him. Rava says: what nonsense this Rabbah bar bar Hana is saying, and Rav Chisda, the fool, didn’t even notice. He must have had enormous help from Heaven that such nonsense was accepted by Rav Chisda, who was a great Torah scholar. Now look how this fits everything we said earlier. Why did Rav Chisda accept it? Because Rav Chisda had served Rabbah bar bar Hana and gave him credit, and therefore although at first glance he also understood that it seemed foolish, he thought about it again and understood that there was logic in it after all, and so he accepted it. Rava is looking at this from the side. He did not serve Rabbah bar bar Hana—Rava didn’t. So Rava gives no credit to Rabbah bar bar Hana. As far as Rava is concerned, Rabbah bar bar Hana is talking nonsense, and then he doesn’t understand why Rav Chisda is silent. Why? Because Rav Chisda had served Rabbah bar bar Hana, so he thought about it again and understood that there was substance to it, although on the face of it it looked foolish. Rava didn’t serve Rabbah bar bar Hana; he looks at this from the side, from the Secretary-General of the UN’s chair. So he says: what is this foolishness? What nonsense is he babbling? Because from his perspective he sees it at first glance and doesn’t bother to think about it again. So this is the proof—or not a proof, the indication—of why Rabbah bar bar Hana was right when he demanded that Rav Chisda serve him before he told him the explanation. Because look what happened with Rava, who didn’t serve him. And then indeed in the end the Talmud asks: and what did Rabbah bar bar Hana himself really think? After all, once Rav Chisda accepted it, it can’t have been nonsense, and Rabbah bar bar Hana was no lightweight, and neither was Rav Chisda. So there is logic behind it, even though on the face of it it seems foolish. And then the Talmud brings the logic; that doesn’t matter right now, but that logic underlay the reasoning of Rabbah bar bar Hana. He understood that it was very subtle reasoning, so he asked Rav Chisda to serve him before telling it to him. Rav Chisda served him, and therefore after Rabbah bar bar Hana told it to him, Rav Chisda indeed accepted it. Because he thought about it again—even though it also seemed foolish to him—and he understood that it was nevertheless correct. Rava, who looks at all this from the side, says: what do you want? These two things have nothing to do with each other at all.

[Speaker H] But there’s a bit of an injury to Rava’s image here, a bit of damage to his image. What can you do? He doesn’t enter into the depth of the matter just because he looks down on him,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He thought that Rabbah bar bar Hana was saying nonsense, didn’t value him, and didn’t think about it a second time. The Talmud doesn’t make life easy for the sages of the Talmud. It also sometimes presents them with their less attractive sides.

[Speaker E] And what really is that subtle logic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind, you can go into the Talmudic passage there; I’m not going into it now. The Talmud itself brings the explanation. What matters to me is specifically the framework, not the topic itself. I’m using it to show the framework. Now I remind you that the topic begins with Rav Chisda’s excitement about what happened in the study hall. What was the excitement? How is this topic different from any other topic? Again, you see that there is something here, some subtle conceptual analysis. And therefore Rav Chisda is impressed by this topic, because this is a special topic, not a regular one. The indication of that is what we also see later with the fine distinction that Rabbah bar bar Hana brings. But what is Rav Chisda’s indication of that? I claim the indication is that the Talmud is phrased in the language of the later authorities, as I said earlier. The Talmud performs a conceptual inquiry of the later authorities: is what obligates payment the benefit or is what obligates payment the loss? You hardly find that in the Talmud. The Talmud asks halakhic questions about a case. Of course behind that there is conceptual analysis and understanding and analysis and everything else, but the analysis is not in the Talmud’s own explicit discussion. It’s in the subtext, it stands behind the words. Maybe even the sages themselves are not aware of it, I don’t know, but it is there somewhere in the background. Here in this topic it is written like a text of the later authorities. And Rav Chisda is so excited by that conceptual analysis because in the Talmud there isn’t the conceptual analysis of the later authorities. It’s like that story about Moses in Rabbi Akiva’s study hall, where he understood nothing of what was going on there and felt distressed. Because Rabbi Akiva was already a conceptual analyst. Moses brought the raw material. Rabbi Akiva analyzes it like a conceptual scholar, so Moses doesn’t understand what he wants, doesn’t understand that kind of analysis. Similarly, Rabbi Akiva would not have understood Rabbi Akiva Eiger, because Rabbi Akiva Eiger is a conceptual analyst and Rabbi Akiva is one of the sages of the Talmud or the Mishnah. This conceptual analysis intensifies over the years, the analytical ability, the conceptual analysis increases over time, this analytical ability. And therefore, when in the Talmud you suddenly see such a beautiful analytical discussion—something that for us has become routine, we do this in every topic—but in the Talmud it is so rare that Rav Chisda is so impressed: you missed it, Rabbah bar bar Hana, what a wonderful topic there was in the study hall last night. Meaning, they did conceptual analysis there and danced with joy. We do this in every topic, but for them it was something new. It always reminds me of the wonderful point of Maimonides. In the commentary to the Mishnah in tractate Keritot, in tractate Keritot Maimonides says: and I have here a wonderful point; no one before me paid attention to it. No one noticed this until today, and Maimonides there is so excited with himself. And what is that wonderful point? He says there is a rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition. Today I’m drifting a bit into matters of framework, never mind. There is a rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. What happens if I took forbidden fat, chelev, which is a type of meat fat forbidden to eat, it resembles ordinary fat. It’s hard to distinguish between the forbidden fat of an animal and ordinary fat, but forbidden fat carries karet, while ordinary fat is permitted for someone who isn’t on a diet. Now meat cooked in milk is forbidden to eat. What happens if I ate forbidden fat with milk? The forbidden fat is part of meat. Now the forbidden fat is forbidden in itself, regardless of being mixed with milk; it is forbidden as forbidden fat. Besides that, now it is also mixed with milk. So one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, seemingly. But the Talmud says that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, and therefore there will be a prohibition of forbidden fat here, but there will not be a prohibition of meat in milk. Maimonides asks: why? After all, the prohibition of meat in milk is broader than the prohibition of forbidden fat. The prohibition of meat in milk forbids both eating and benefit; the prohibition of forbidden fat forbids only eating. And the rule is that in a case of an adding prohibition, one prohibition can take effect on another. When the second prohibition adds things not present in the first prohibition, then it takes effect on the first prohibition. Here, when I took the forbidden fat, it was forbidden only for eating. I mixed it with milk, and now the prohibition of meat in milk forbids it both for eating and for benefit. That is a broader prohibition. The broader prohibition takes effect on the narrower prohibition.

[Speaker C] But does the narrower prohibition remain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker C] Does the narrower prohibition remain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The narrower one remains; both do. Since it came first, it certainly exists on the forbidden fat even before it was mixed with milk; after it was mixed with milk, the prohibition of meat in milk is also added. Maimonides says: then why does the Talmud say that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, and therefore there is no prohibition of meat in milk? Even if

[Speaker C] if he eats it, Rabbi? Even if he eats it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he eats it, he has violated the prohibition of forbidden fat, but not the prohibition of meat in milk.

[Speaker C] Ah, that’s it? So now that’s the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine? Maimonides says: what is the wonderful point there? He says prohibitions of benefit branch off from prohibitions of eating. Basically it is a prohibition of eating; on every prohibition of eating there is an extension that it is also forbidden for benefit, and this is a dispute among Amoraim. Maimonides says this. Basically, a prohibition that is forbidden both for eating and for benefit is a regular eating prohibition. Once it is forbidden for eating, I extend it also to prohibitions of benefit. But I judge it as a regular eating prohibition. Now I ask: forbidden fat was mixed with milk. So the prohibition of meat in milk is a prohibition of eating. Once it is established that it is forbidden for eating, I will also extend it to benefit. But here, as a prohibition of eating, one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. A prohibition of eating that comes upon another prohibition of eating—the second prohibition does not take effect. Once the eating prohibition of meat in milk did not take effect, the benefit prohibition of meat in milk also never arose, and therefore there is nothing. There is only the prohibition of forbidden fat. That is Maimonides’ wonderful point. Fine, a nice conceptual move. A student in a junior yeshiva says something like this once every two weeks. Maimonides was so excited that no one had ever preceded him with this wonderful point. Why? Because the conceptual analysis keeps developing. What today we do very simply, among the medieval authorities it was something worthy of amazement, and among the Amoraim even more so, and there are all kinds of indications like this. Now what, what exactly do I want to conclude from all these nice things I just finished, for our purposes—and I’m still only in the introduction. The lesson is that when the Talmud formulates a sweeping rule, that is not typical Talmudic formulation, because it is essentially talking about the theoretical conceptual principle and not about the case. Usually it talks about the case and we as commentators do the theoretical conceptualization. The Talmud talks about the case. There are situations in which the Talmud itself conducts a theoretical discussion. For example, one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, what I said earlier. You see, this is not phrased as a case; there is a rule: one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. Okay? Or the rule: one benefits and the other does not lose—is he liable or exempt? This is not one case; it is a whole group of cases in all of which the situation is that one benefits and the other does not lose. These are relatively rare formulations in the Talmud. These are discussions of theoretical principles, of broad principles, conceptual principles. That usually happens among the later authorities, not in the Talmud. But there are

[Speaker D] thousands—there are thousands of rules in the Talmud.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not thousands; there are some, and still they are a minority of the topics in the Talmud, a very small minority. Most Talmudic topics do not deal with, do not discuss, a halakhic principle; they discuss a case. The number of principles is small compared to the number of topics. I see here every so often comments in the chats, correct comments. As I said, I don’t respond to the chats because it interrupts my train of thought, but it’s true—whoever is commenting in the chats here, I agree with everything I saw. In any case, why am I saying all this? Because in the Talmud in tractate Shabbat you see the formulation: two forces in one person is what he was asking about. Are two forces in one person considered like one person and he is liable, or perhaps they are like two people and he is exempt? What kind of formulation is that? It starts with a case: Rabbi Yohanan asked, if someone threw an object, and it was uprooted from its place, and he returned and caught it, what is the law? This is a discussion about a case, a normal discussion like they always do in Talmudic topics. But now the Talmud says: let’s conceptualize it—what exactly was he asking? Here begins the discussion of the later authorities, as it were later authorities. Let’s conceptualize: what are the two sides here really? He discusses a broad halakhic principle, not one specific case; the case is only an example. The principle is whether two forces in one person are like one person or like two people. You understand that there is basically here a conceptual discussion of the later authorities; this is not a typical discussion of the Talmud itself, right? Why am I saying this? Because this formulation of the Talmud shows that there is really a broad discussion here, one which in principle could have appeared in many other topics as well. In many other topics, if one person performs the role of two people, do I see that as one person or as two? For example. For example, the shaver and the one being shaved, right? We return to all the examples we saw in the issue of nullifying her vow at the Torah level. All these examples are the same question. When one person fills the role of two people, is he considered one person or is he considered two? Right? That is basically the question. Except that there the discussion is whether he gets flogged once or twice, and here the discussion is whether he is liable or exempt, not whether he is liable for two or liable for one. But that doesn’t matter; that depends on the context. Still, the discussion is the question: when one person performs two roles, do I treat it as two people and draw distinctions, or is it one person? And in that sense it is the same discussion as nullifying her vow at the Torah level. Only, unlike the shaver and the one being shaved and all the other places, here the Talmud puts it explicitly on the table. But this is very strange, because on the one hand, the formulation in the Talmud looks as though there really is a broad discussion here, a conceptual, analytical discussion.

[Speaker C] So why didn’t it learn it from there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the other hand, the Talmud doesn’t bring any other case except this one. It remains unresolved. Bring the shaver and the one being shaved, bring one who has relations with himself, bring the condemned city, one who incites himself—there are many examples throughout the Talmud where one could discuss and see whether two forces in one person are like one force or like two people. Why don’t you bring other cases? Seemingly it appears that this is a discussion specific to this case of throwing. It is not a general discussion of what happens when one person performs the role of two people. So on the one hand, there is the wording of the topic, which makes it seem as though there is a general theoretical discussion here. The content of the topic, the structure of the topic, makes it look like a specific discussion. Now, what?

[Speaker C] The Talmud didn’t resolve it. It said it remains unresolved.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And there are other cases from which it could have resolved it.

[Speaker C] Right. So I’m saying, why didn’t the Talmud resolve it like with the shaver and the one being shaved?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m asking. From the fact that it didn’t resolve it, it seems that the discussion is a specific one, not a general one. I want—I have three more minutes—so I want to show you language from Rashi and from Maimonides. Rashi explains the discussion in the Talmud like this: like two people, and therefore exempt, because it is like two people who performed it. And since he did not let the object continue on to its resting place and come to rest, but rather ran after it and stopped it, the first act was an uprooting and there was no placement. What is he saying?

[Speaker C] It’s not two people who performed it; it’s like one action without placement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he says it is two people who performed it.

[Speaker C] Yes, he begins with two people who performed it and ends with one action, namely no placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Half an action, not one action.

[Speaker C] Yes, only uprooting without placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now just for comparison, look at Maimonides’ wording. One who throws, and it comes to rest in the hand of another person—if the other person stood in his place and received it, the thrower is liable, because he uprooted and placed. If the other person uprooted himself from his place and received it, he is exempt. Up to here, that’s an introduction. Now our question. If he threw it and the thrower himself ran after the object and received it in his hand in another domain or beyond four cubits, he is exempt, as though another person had uprooted himself and received it, because there is no complete placement until the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of the uprooting. Do you notice that he does not mention two people who performed it? Yes. He exempts him, but not because of two people who performed it. Rather, why?

[Speaker C] As if it were two people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the definition in the laws of throwing. In the laws of throwing, among the parameters of throwing, there is a definition that placement is considered complete placement only if the object came to rest in the place where I had planned from the outset that it would come to rest. Only then is the placement considered a placement that creates liability in the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. It follows from Maimonides: first, this has nothing to do with two people who performed it. Second, this is a specific discussion regarding the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. He does not say that this is because when one person performs two roles, it is like two people. He does not mention this at all. He says there are specific parameters of throwing here; there is no liability here because the placement is not considered placement.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, what if I planned it? I planned that I would throw it and catch it there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That was my plan. Maybe then you would be liable; you asked that earlier too. I said maybe you would be liable. It doesn’t matter right now; from my point of view it’s a side discussion. Okay. But Maimonides explains it in a way that makes it seem that the whole discussion is about the parameters of the act of throwing on the Sabbath. Is there a rule in throwing that placement is not considered complete placement unless the object comes to rest in the place where I had planned from the outset for it to come to rest? So you understand that this is only a question in the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. This is not at all that broad question of whether an action made up of two actions performed by one person is considered like two people or like one person. It is not at all the sweeping general conceptual question. That is, Maimonides understood it as a particular formulation for this topic, not as a general principle. Rashi explains that the debate, the discussion, is the question whether this is two people who performed it.

[Speaker D] So is Maimonides ignoring the doubt in the Talmud? What? Is Maimonides ignoring the doubt in the Talmud?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said that in the Talmud itself there is a dissonance. On the one hand, the formulation looks like a general formulation, which fits Rashi. On the other hand, the Talmud brings it regarding this case and doesn’t bring any other case to resolve it. So somehow it seems that although it uses a general formulation, its question is really a question only about the act of throwing. So Rashi learned it this way and Maimonides learned it that way.

[Speaker D] But in the Talmud itself does it actually say two people who performed it, or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud it does not say that this is two people who performed it. Rashi says that it is two people who performed it. Ah, right. Fine. So that’s it for today; we’ll continue next time.

[Speaker C] More power to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Questions or comments? If so, go ahead.

[Speaker E] What’s the conclusion regarding

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] one benefits and the other does not lose? One benefits and the other does not lose—he is liable. But the Pnei Yehoshua and Tosafot argue that this liability is not by strict law; it’s only because of the trait of Sodom. Thank you. Anyone else? Okay, so goodbye, have a peaceful Sabbath.

[Speaker B] Have a peaceful Sabbath.