Self-Reference – Lesson 10
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The Sabbath topic: stood in place and received it, versus moved from his place and received it
- Rabbi Yohanan’s question: he threw it, moved from his place, and came back and caught it
- Maimonides: ruling to exempt, and the reasoning of the place of setting down
- The difficulty in the language of the doubt versus Maimonides’ reasoning, and understanding the object’s trajectory
- Rashi: “two people who did it” in one person, and the apparent oxymoron
- Resolution through Atvan De’oraita: two half-actions that do not combine
- The doubt in the Talmud as related to the person: does one person combine the halves, or split into roles?
- Example from damages: he threw a vessel from the roof and ran and smashed it with a sword
- Example from impurity: two paths and cumulative doubt in one person
- Inciting one’s own dog: rejecting the explanation of two forces in one person and framing it in damages
- An ownerless ox and a desert ox: indication of liability resting on the ox itself
- Moving to loops: “do not place a stumbling block” and “before the one before” as an infinite chain
- Conclusion and continuation: halakhic applications of the self-reference of claims
Summary
General Overview
The text analyzes the Sabbath topic of someone who throws an object and then runs himself to catch it, and frames it around the tension between a “meta-halakhic” reading of two forces in one person and a reading focused on the parameters of the labor of throwing and the definition of setting down. It presents Maimonides as ruling exempt, explaining this by saying that “there is no complete setting down until the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of the lifting,” and sets against him Rashi, who uses the language of “two people who did it” even though it is one person. It then suggests, with the help of the conclusions from “Atvan De’oraita,” a way to understand how an exemption similar to “two people who did it” could apply even in one person by breaking the act into two halves that do not combine. It expands this to examples in damages and to the case of “do not place a stumbling block,” which generates a loop of causing stumbling, and ends with a promise to move next time to self-reference of claims themselves.
The Sabbath topic: stood in place and received it, versus moved from his place and received it
The Talmud states that when a person throws an object four cubits in the public domain and the receiver stood in place and received it, the thrower is liable because the setting down is considered to have happened through his force, so there is both lifting and setting down. The Talmud also states that if the receiver moved from his place and received it, the thrower is exempt because the setting down is considered to have been done by the receiver and not by the thrower. The baraita brings the same rule in the name of “Others say,” and confirms the distinction between standing in place and moving from one’s place.
Rabbi Yohanan’s question: he threw it, moved from his place, and came back and caught it
The Talmud asks about a person who throws an object, himself moves from his place, and comes back and catches it, and Rav Adda bar Ahava formulates this as a doubt about “two forces in one person.” The Talmud presents the two sides: if two forces in one person are considered like one person, he is liable; if they are considered like two people, he is exempt. The doubt remains unresolved, and the wording sounds like a general framing of the question whether, when one person fills two roles, Jewish law sees that as one person or as two people.
Maimonides: ruling to exempt, and the reasoning of the place of setting down
Maimonides rules that in the case where the receiver stood in place and received it, the thrower is liable, and where the receiver moved from his place and received it, the thrower is exempt. Maimonides adds that when the thrower himself runs after the object and catches it in his hand in another domain or beyond four cubits, he is exempt, “as though another person had moved and received it.” Maimonides explains that “there is no complete setting down until the object comes to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest at the time of lifting,” and therefore if the object did not come to rest where it was designated to rest from the time it was thrown, there is no setting down that makes the thrower liable.
The difficulty in the language of the doubt versus Maimonides’ reasoning, and understanding the object’s trajectory
The text raises a difficulty: Maimonides’ reasoning seems to shift the discussion from the category of “two forces in one person” to the laws of throwing and setting down, to the point that it seems independent of the meta-halakhic doubt. It sharpens the point that Maimonides does not make the rule depend on the thrower’s plans, but on an objective description of the trajectory: where the object “was supposed to come to rest at the first moment” as opposed to where it in fact came to rest. It notes that if Jewish law follows the trajectory and not the intention, then even prior planning to make a delivery that requires the receiver to move from his place does not change the exemption.
Rashi: “two people who did it” in one person, and the apparent oxymoron
Rashi explains the exempt side as “that it is like two people who did it,” and explains that “since he did not let the object go until the place of its travel and come to rest, but rather ran after it and stopped it, the first lifting is without a setting down.” The text presents this as extremely difficult, because it is the same person, and the exemption of “two people who did it” is usually an exemption that results from multiple actors, not from one individual. It emphasizes that unlike “one who rounds and one who is rounded,” where the very definition of the act has two sides, in throwing the act is usually attributed to one person, and so turning one person into “two people who did it” sounds impossible.
Resolution through Atvan De’oraita: two half-actions that do not combine
The text suggests reading “two people who did it” here as a kind of “longitudinal two people who did it,” where the problem lies in the nature of the act and not in the identity of the actors. It presents an understanding according to which, when the object does not come to rest in the place planned in advance, the act of lifting and the act of setting down do not combine into one complete act of throwing, but remain two separate acts, an “act of lifting” and an “act of setting down,” and therefore there is no liability for a complete act of throwing. It suggests that in such a case, even if one person performed both halves, each half can be seen as a separate act that does not connect, and Rashi uses the phrase “two people who did it” as an expansion of the concept to describe the non-combination of the halves.
The doubt in the Talmud as related to the person: does one person combine the halves, or split into roles?
The text returns and raises the possibility that the doubt is not only about the act, but about the person: whether the same person who performed the lifting and then the setting down can combine the two halves through himself and become liable, or whether Jewish law sees him as someone “playing two roles,” and therefore he remains exempt as if they were two different people. It presents this as parallel to the topic of “estrangement” discussed in the context of Atvan De’oraita, where the possibility arises of seeing one subject as alien to himself. It emphasizes that here there is no “act performed between two parties” that obligates both sides, but rather an act which, when it emerges between two parties, exempts both sides; therefore the liable side depends on the possibility of seeing the person as one who combines the halves.
Example from damages: he threw a vessel from the roof and ran and smashed it with a sword
The text brings an example in which a person throws a vessel from the roof and, just before it hits the ground, runs and smashes it with a sword, and presents a side according to which one might want to exempt him because the throwing was not the “damaging act” and the smashing is “breaking a vessel that was already, in essence, broken.” It formulates the difficulty as a dilemma either way: if the first is exempt because the second broke it, and the second is exempt because the first broke it, then when the same person does both roles, it would seem that either way he broke it. It suggests that the tension is between looking at the acts in themselves, which do not generate liability, and looking at the person as the unifying factor that allows liability, because in the end he performed both components.
Example from impurity: two paths and cumulative doubt in one person
The text compares this to the law of two paths, one of which contains impurity, where if two people each walk one of the paths, each is judged as a doubtful impurity case leniently even though one of them is certainly impure. It notes that when the same person walked both paths, he is “one hundred percent impure,” and mentions that there are opinions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that this is only rabbinic. It uses this to sharpen the distinction between looking at each act as a separate doubt and the accumulation in one person that generates certainty.
Inciting one’s own dog: rejecting the explanation of two forces in one person and framing it in damages
The text brings a claim from later authorities (Acharonim) about one who incites another person’s dog, and the dog bites a third person’s chicken, where there is a side in the Talmud that both the one who incited and the owner of the dog are exempt. It notes that some wanted to claim that even one who incites his own dog would be exempt, and emphasizes that here there is no room to explain this through “two forces in one person,” because there is no combination of half-actions here but rather two conditions in damages law. It proposes an analysis according to which, in property damages, liability is “first and foremost generated upon the dog,” and only if the owner did not guard it do we “transfer” the liability to the owner; and if there is no liability on the dog, there is nothing to transfer, even if the owner was negligent. Therefore, one who incites his own dog is exempt in human court, though he may be liable in the heavenly court as indirect causation.
An ownerless ox and a desert ox: indication of liability resting on the ox itself
The text notes that the law of “a desert ox, an ownerless ox that gored” teaches that there is liability on the ox itself even before ownership, so that if someone comes and acquires it after the goring, “it won’t help him; the injured party takes the ox.” It explains that the prevention of taking the ox exists only when there are owners who guarded it properly, because then there is no justification to harm their property. It uses this to strengthen the understanding that in property damages there is a primary focus of liability on the damager itself, and only afterwards a mechanism of collection from the owner.
Moving to loops: “do not place a stumbling block” and “before the one before” as an infinite chain
The text distinguishes between two types of self-reference: a person relating to himself, and a claim relating to itself, and marks that it is still in the first category. It brings in the name of the Rabbi of Ponevezh a claim about a case of “two sides of the river,” where a nazir hands over a cup of wine so that someone else will return it to him, and if one accepts that “before the one before” is forbidden, a chain is created in which each person causes the other to stumble in causing stumbling, all the way to an infinite number of prohibitions. It notes that this also leads to the question whether a person can cause himself to stumble under the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block,” and shows that unless one defines here an “essential freedom” that limits the concept to another person, then every sin a person commits would generate an infinite number of violations of “do not place a stumbling block.”
Conclusion and continuation: halakhic applications of the self-reference of claims
The text concludes that up to this point it has presented halakhic applications of a person relating to himself, including Atvan De’oraita, two forces in one person, and “do not place a stumbling block.” It states that next time it will present halakhic applications of the second type of self-reference, “claims relating to themselves,” with logical loops and paradoxes. It closes with “Shabbat shalom” and “yasher koach.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we finished with the topic of two forces in one person, and I just want to show something about it, or analyze it in light of what we saw about the self-reference of the… of Atvan De’oraita. So let’s look for a moment again at the… wait, at the Talmudic text. Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Ilai, who said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. Right, if I throw an object four cubits in the public domain, if the receiver of the object is standing in place and I threw it into his hand, then I’m liable, even though the setting down happened far from me. It’s considered a setting down that happened through my force, and therefore I did both the lifting and the setting down, and I’m liable. But if the receiver left his place in order to receive the object that I threw, then the setting down is a setting down done by him and not by me, and therefore I’m exempt, because I only did the lifting and not the setting down. A baraita also teaches this: Others say, if he stood in his place and received it, he is liable; if he moved from his place and received it, he is exempt. Right, so it also says this in the baraita. Rabbi Yohanan raised a question: If he threw an object, and he himself moved from his place and went back and received it, what is the law? The person throws the object and he himself runs to the other side in order to receive the object himself. What exactly was his doubt? Rav Adda bar Ahava said: His doubt was about two forces in one person. Are two forces in one person considered like one person, and then he is liable, or are they considered like two people, and then he is exempt? Unresolved.
[Speaker B] So again, then there’s no question about the rules of ruling? I understand. Again, according to this reasoning, there’s no question. Right. Again, according to this reasoning, there’s no longer any question about the rules of ruling, because the Talmudic text remains unresolved only regarding the rationale of whether two people in one person are considered like one person or not. But on a different rationale, the Talmudic text itself could also say that he’s exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that reasoning were correct, then there would be no doubt at all from the first rationale. Maimonides understands that this is what the Talmud’s doubt means.
[Speaker B] Maybe not? Maybe the Talmud’s doubt remains unresolved—that’s the Talmud’s doubt—but for a different reason, from a different angle, this person should be exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s the reason?
[Speaker B] The reason is that there is no complete setting down until the object comes to rest in the place where it did not come to rest at the time of the lifting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So even if two forces in one person are like one person, he would still be exempt? So what is the Talmud unsure about?
[Speaker B] It’s unsure only from the perspective of that rationale—whether this is two people or one person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Think for a second what comes out of that—it can’t be. Practically speaking, according to your approach, it comes out that even if two forces in one person are like one person, even then he is exempt. Why? Because the setting down isn’t considered a setting down, since it’s not the place where it was originally intended to come to rest. But what does it say? That on the side that two forces in one person are like one person, he would be liable.
[Speaker B] Because the Talmud is talking about a case where the object came to rest in the place where it was supposed to come to rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if he himself ran and received it there, then it didn’t come to rest in that place. It was supposed to come to rest on the ground, and in the end it came to rest in the hand of the person who ran and caught it.
[Speaker B] So how can there be a case where the other person moved from his place and received it? So when the other person moved from his place and received it, the object came to rest in a place where it was not originally going to come to rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore exempt!
[Speaker B] But if he stood, then there isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A problem, because then the object really did come to rest in the place where it had been meant to come to rest.
[Speaker C] So the thrower threw the—
[Speaker B] The object, and it was supposed to come to rest at point X, and he stood at that point X and received it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if he stood at that point, then it was meant to come to rest in his hand.
[Speaker B] Exactly! That’s what he planned from the start.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore he is liable. Yes, liable.
[Speaker D] I can’t hear in the lecture, what are you saying?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Somebody here needs to mute the microphone.
[Speaker B] Yes, I see what you’re trying to say, but I wanted to say that on the rationale of whether two people in one person are like one person and so on, then the Talmud and Maimonides both remain unresolved. But from another angle—why really can’t that be?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because according to Maimonides, it comes out that even if two forces in one person are like one person, he would still be exempt. And the Talmud says that if it is like one person, then he is liable.
[Speaker B] Right, okay, so I understand. The only thing I didn’t understand is that if a person throws and runs after the object, they say that in any case he stopped the object, right? I didn’t understand—when he caught the object, is it considered as if he stopped the object in a place where it wasn’t supposed to come to rest?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he hadn’t run there and the object had kept traveling, then it would have reached the ground.
[Speaker B] So also in the case where his fellow stood in his place and received it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if his fellow stood there, then at the moment I threw the object there was already a person standing there, so from the outset the object was meant to come to rest in the hand of the receiving person.
[Speaker B] And if when he threw it, he planned to run after the object?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter—at least in the straightforward reading of Maimonides, that’s not what it says. The question isn’t what his plan was. The question is: look at the object’s trajectory—where was it supposed to come to rest at the first moment?
[Speaker B] If—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If when you photograph the first moment, the object is supposed to come to rest at a certain point, regardless of the person’s plans, and in the end it comes to rest elsewhere, then you’re not liable. Understood? Okay. So in Maimonides, in any case, it seems that the discussion here is a discussion about the parameters of the labor of throwing on the Sabbath, and not a general meta-halakhic discussion about two forces in one person. And it may be that Maimonides really interprets the Talmudic discussion itself that way because he doesn’t understand how it could be interpreted otherwise. He thinks: how can we possibly have a doubt whether two forces in one person are like one person or like two people? After all, whichever way you look at it, if these are two violations, what is this whole discussion? How could there be a situation where I’m unsure about self-reference? Therefore Maimonides says: it can’t be that the Talmud’s doubt is about self-reference. And so he shifts it, or interprets it, as a doubt about the labor of throwing. But in Rashi: “or perhaps they are like two people, and he is exempt.” According to Maimonides, do you remember why he is exempt? He is exempt because the object did not come to rest in the place where it was originally meant to come to rest. According to Rashi? “For it is like two people who did it.” “And since he did not let the object go to the place of its travel and come to rest, but rather ran after it and overtook it, the first lifting is without a setting down.” Rashi brings into the discussion the concept of two people who did it. Of course, this is two people who did it longitudinally and not laterally; I explained that last time. But still, Rashi sees this as a model of two people who did it, even though we’re talking about one person. Now, now you can understand very well why Maimonides doesn’t accept this, because Rashi’s words seem absurd on their face. What do you mean, this is a model of two people who did it? The same person did it. So which two people did it? How can you say here that two forces in one person are like two people? What does that mean, like two people? After all, the whole exemption here is because two people did it, but here two people didn’t do it, so what is the discussion? And in the case of one who rounds and one who is rounded, the definition of the act is a definition that is done by two people. In throwing, it is not the definition of the act that it is done by two people; the act is done by one person. If another person does it too, then it is two people who did it and you’re exempt because there are two of us. But if the second one who did it was me myself, then how can I be exempt because of two people who did it? What does that have to do with anything? How can one exempt one person on the grounds of two people who did it? It sounds like an oxymoron.
[Speaker D] So how can he be exempt according to Maimonides? According to Maimonides, when he says—even according to Maimonides this doesn’t—if a person throws something in order to catch it somewhere else, what is missing in…? It was supposed to come to rest there in my hand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it was supposed to come to rest on the ground.
[Speaker D] No, I threw it so that it would come to rest there in my hand. I—sorry—I throw an egg and I don’t want it to fall on the ground and break.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s repeating the question that was asked earlier. They asked before what happens if he plans from the outset to run and catch it. Right, and I answered that. I said that I think Maimonides does not mean the question of the person’s plans; rather, I photograph the trajectory. If at the moment the object left his hand it was supposed to fall to the ground, regardless of his plans, in terms of the trajectory, and he ran and got ahead of it, then you are exempt for that throw regardless of your plans. You could force Maimonides and say that it depends on his plans, but Maimonides doesn’t say that, and it doesn’t seem right to me. Because for example, according to that, what would happen if the one who moved—let’s say I do it with two people—and the second moved from his place and received it. If I had planned from the outset to pass it to him in such a way that he would move from his place and receive it, then according to that Maimonides would have to say that he is liable. Even with two people.
[Speaker D] Exempt. No, jointly exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right—why? Because it doesn’t depend on the plans; it depends on what the trajectory looks like. He’s not talking about the thrower’s plans. Okay?
[Speaker D] Fine.
[Speaker B] But how does Maimonides’ explanation fit the language of the Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the language of the Talmud it is very difficult, very difficult.
[Speaker D] By the way, Rashi is also difficult. Rashi also comes out difficult.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He means to say that two forces in one person are like one person with respect to throwing. Not really a broad formulation, but specifically with respect to throwing: whether I see two forces in one person as if it were one person or not. Or in other words, whether there is a requirement in throwing that it come to rest in the place planned in advance or not. That’s a question in the laws of throwing.
[Speaker D] And that—
[Speaker B] seems—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] forced.
[Speaker D] Rashi is also forced. Why? What does two people who did it even mean here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So that’s what I said. What leads Maimonides to choose such a forced interpretation of the Talmud is that the alternative proposed by Rashi seems impossible. Not merely forced, but impossible. You know, it’s Sherlock Holmes in The Sign of Four. He says that once you eliminate the impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, is probably the truth. When there are two alternatives, and one is impossible while the other is very improbable, you choose the improbable one. Even though it’s improbable, because the alternative is impossible. Right, when you have an impossible interpretation, then true, the alternative is a strained interpretation, but that’s what there is. I don’t have anything better than that. So if Maimonides says Rashi’s interpretation simply cannot be, because it’s an oxymoron to exempt one person who performed a complete act on the basis of two people who did it—what does that mean? The whole exemption when the other person moved is not related to the laws of throwing; it is only the exemption of two people who did it. So if that “other” is me myself, how can I possibly exempt myself on the basis of two people who did it? It simply cannot be said. So Maimonides says: no choice, I choose the strained interpretation, because the other interpretation is impossible. But Rashi, who does interpret it that way—how can we nevertheless understand Rashi?
[Speaker B] But Rashi too brings Maimonides’ reasoning at the end of the passage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He brings the description of the situation that resembles Maimonides, because indeed the objective description of the situation is that situation.
[Speaker B] It’s not just a description of the situation. It says “since,” which is a logical term.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—“since he did not let the object go to the place of its travel and come to rest, but rather ran after it and overtook it”—because of that, the first lifting is without a setting down, because it is like two people who did it.
[Speaker E] Ah, okay.
[Speaker D] And that fits with what the Rabbi has been talking about all along now, that one person can be—looked at from the side as if he’s now someone else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Ezra—I spoke, I said, seemingly. But still, we have to understand how this works here. That’s why all the introductions I gave were exactly in order to explain this Rashi. But first of all, try for a moment to forget those introductions. Understand that there is an interpretation in Rashi here that is, at first glance, impossible.
[Speaker B] Maybe one could say that a person at T1 is not the same person at T2. At one moment—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then according to that, also the person—
[Speaker D] who eats half a measure and then another half a measure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I lifted in the private domain, passed into the public domain, and set it down there. The one who lifted is not the one who set it down, because when I set it down it was a minute later. In short, I think there’s no escape here except to try to apply the conclusion we reached in Atvan De’oraita. And the claim is basically probably the following. In the labor of throwing, when I throw and the object falls to the ground, that is a case where I’m liable because I did the act. In the case where I throw and someone else moves and receives it, there is an exemption of two people who did it. But what is the exemption of two people who did it here? It means—wait, one second—the exemption of two people who did it means that the act of throwing and the act of setting down do not combine into one complete act.
[Speaker D] Because the setting down was supposed to be somewhere else and now it’s in his hands? What? Because the original setting down was supposed to be on the ground and now it’s in his hands—is that why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, exactly. You’re basically inserting Maimonides into Rashi. You’re basically saying that because of Maimonides’ reasoning, it comes out that when I throw and someone else receives it, this is two people who did it. Why? Because if the object had been set down in the place where it had originally been meant to be set down, then this could be seen as one act. But if the object did not come to rest in the place planned from the outset, then the act of setting down is disconnected from the act of throwing and does not combine with it to form one act. And then it could be that even if one person does it, he really did two half-acts and not one complete act of throwing. And the concept of two people who did it here is not like the ordinary lateral two people who did it, but rather two people who did it means that two half-acts were done here and not one complete act. But in this case, one person did both half-acts. Still, each half of the act is disconnected from the other half. So when I did the first half, I did half an act; when I did the second half, I also did half an act; and therefore they do not combine into one complete act, and I am exempt even though I am the same person who did both.
[Speaker D] Like two people who did it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like two people who did it. But this is longitudinal two people who did it, not lateral.
[Speaker D] Yes, yes.
[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. Again? I didn’t understand, sorry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll say it again. Let’s even go with Maimonides’ reasoning inside Rashi, and then it could be that there isn’t even a disagreement. I don’t know—Maimonides doesn’t mention two people who did it, but this really isn’t the regular two people who did it. The regular two people who did it is lateral; here it’s longitudinal. So the fact that Maimonides doesn’t mention two people who did it is simply because he doesn’t use that term, because even Rashi, who does use the term, is expanding it. So that’s not such a difficulty. And it may be that the explanation in Rashi is this: the exemption here, when I threw and the other ran and received it, or moved from his place and received it, the exemption is because of the character of the act, not because of the actors. The character of the act: when I simply throw, then there is one act here made up of two stages—lifting and then setting down. And lifting plus setting down is called throwing. The overall act is the act of throwing. But if I threw and someone else moved from his place and received it, then even if we look at both of us together, no act of throwing was done here. Why? Because the first act of throwing, the first lifting, is not the beginning of the setting down that happened at the end. The setting down that happened at the end is not a continuation of the first throw. So it does not combine with it to form an act of throwing. Rather, there is an act of lifting and there is an act of setting down, and these are two different acts; they do not combine into one act of throwing. And therefore, whether it was done by two people or by one person, it may be that there is an exemption. He is exempt not because there are two people, but because these are two half-acts. Rashi calls it two people who did it, and that is an expansion of the concept of two people who did it. Therefore Maimonides, who does not use the term two people who did it, may not actually disagree with what Rashi says. He does not call it two people who did it because that is not the precise term in this context.
[Speaker F] Because then it comes out that there can be a setting down without a throw preceding it, because it’s a setting down not connected to that throw.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, correct. Just as there can be a throw without a setting down, so too a setting down without a throw. Yes.
[Speaker B] So what does this have to do now with Atvan De’oraita? What does this have to do with Atvan De’oraita?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second. So now that is basically the claim. Now notice—then what is the Talmud’s doubt? Are two forces in one person like one person or like two people? Apparently the doubt is whether I see these two half-acts as something that combines into one complete act, or as two half-acts that remain two separate halves. But notice that once again we’ve gone back to a question about the parameters of throwing, not a question in general meta-halakhic terms—whether two forces in one person are like two people or like one person. We have essentially gone back to a question about the definition of throwing. And the wording of the Talmud does not sound like that is the discussion. And therefore I think that here, I think Rashi really may depart from Maimonides. Because if I explain that the discussion really is a discussion about the person, not the act, then what I really want to say is this: if I have here two half-acts, each of which stands independently, they do not combine into one complete act, but it could be that if one person did both half-acts, then he did an act of lifting and then he also did an act of setting down, so in the end, through the person, this combines into one big act of throwing. Because the person did both halves of the act of throwing. The only reason this is considered two half-acts is because two different people did each half. But if one person did it, it could be that this is indeed considered one act of throwing. Or not. Or one person who does it is, from my perspective, like two people, except that the same person is playing both roles, and then there is here the exemption as in the case of two people, where each one did half. Now notice that if I formulate it this way, then the Talmud’s doubt really is a general doubt: can a person relate to himself as to a foreign person or not? It’s just that here there is the assumption that there are two half-acts that perhaps the person can combine into one. Meaning, the act on its own does not combine. If this were two people, then we would have two separate half-acts. But there is a side in the Talmud that says that if the same person does both halves, then the fact that it is the same person combines them even though they are two separate halves. Because there is one person who did a lifting and afterward a setting down, so from the standpoint of the person there is something combined here, even if the act itself consists of two different halves. Theoretically I would say it like this: suppose one person threw and another person received, and afterward someone threw to me and I received. So I basically did an act of throwing and an act of receiving—maybe I would be liable? Of course not, because these are two different episodes, but I just want to sharpen what I’m saying. It could be that the person combines the two halves even though from the standpoint of the act these are two separate halves. That is one side in the Talmud. The other side in the Talmud says: what are you talking about? Since these are two separate halves, then there are here two different people, each of whom did the other half, and even if the same person himself occupies both roles, that doesn’t matter—he would still be exempt. Then the Talmud’s doubt is really a doubt that pertains to our topic. To our topic. It is not a doubt in the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. In the laws of throwing on the Sabbath, I know what the law is. We are dealing with two separate halves. That is in the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. My doubt is whether I may be considered one person in the sense that I can combine the two separate parts and become liable for them, or whether, despite being one person, I can see myself as playing two different roles, like the act of estrangement we discussed, and then it is like two people, each of whom did half an act, and it does not combine. So the Talmud’s doubt is a doubt about the person. There is no doubt in the laws of throwing on the Sabbath. Even though in the background there is Maimonides’ reasoning. But Maimonides’ reasoning is agreed upon. The doubt in the Talmud is about the person—somewhat similar to what Eliav wanted to say earlier—that the Talmud remained in doubt regarding the person, even though Maimonides’ reasoning is certainly correct, as he rules it. Right—that basically there are two separate halves here. It’s just that I’m saying that in Maimonides himself, according to this, we should also have remained in doubt as a matter of law, but that doesn’t happen in Maimonides. In Maimonides, as a matter of law, he rules that he is exempt.
[Speaker B] What do you mean when you say I can see myself this way or I can see myself that way—who chooses how I can see myself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Jewish law. Not that I see myself that way—how Jewish law sees a person who performs an act with himself. Like one who has intercourse with himself, exactly like Atvan De’oraita. One who has intercourse with himself. Does Jewish law see him as someone who did not perform an act of intercourse at all, or as someone who did perform an act of intercourse, where both Reuven and Leah—or both Reuven and Shimon, since this is male intercourse—both Reuven and Shimon are being played by the same person in actual reality? Right. Okay. Which is really very similar to here. Meaning, the analysis we made in Atvan De’oraita makes it possible to understand the Talmud’s doubt here in a way that resolves the difficulties. On the one hand, the Talmud’s doubt sounds like a meta-halakhic doubt about two forces in one person, not like what Maimonides says, that it is about the parameters of throwing. On the other hand, it sounds like an oxymoron if it is within the person himself—what does it mean, how can you exempt one person on the basis of two people who did it? I’m saying: if I take Atvan De’oraita, it may be that there is some explanation here that resolves the Talmud. If this act—notice—if this act were an act that in principle is performed between two parties, then—
[Speaker D] then both would be liable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then we would make both liable, right? Except that obviously with this act too, there is certainly no situation in which two people would be liable for one act of throwing. Let’s say even if I threw and the second one did not move from his place—he stood in his place and received it—then I am liable, right? But only I am liable, and the second one is exempt. There is no situation in which two people are liable here. Why? Because this act is not an act performed between two parties, as intercourse was in that other discussion. This is one act. Therefore here this doubt gets translated a little differently, but in essence it is the same doubt. There are two half-acts here, which in principle each stands on its own and does not combine with the other half. So if one person does it and I see him as one person, then the person himself combines these parts and he may be liable. But if I am willing to see him as two people, then there are basically two different people here, each of whom did half an act, and since the act is not one that is done between two parties, then here he will be exempt both as the thrower and as the one who sets down—both as the one who lifts and as the one who sets down. Because one who lifts alone and one who sets down alone incur no liability, unlike the active and passive parties in intercourse. In the active and passive sides of intercourse there is liability on the active participant and liability on the passive participant. That is an act done between two parties that obligates both who do it. Here, this is an act that emerges between two parties, but an act of this kind, when it emerges between two parties, exempts both sides from liability for it. So if it emerges between two parties, then certainly I will be exempt. The whole side that would make him liable exists only if one sees me as one person doing both halves.
[Speaker D] So Maimonides ruled like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Maimonides ruled that way? The Talmud was left unresolved. So Maimonides rules that way. Fine, so that’s a question in Jewish law, in the rules of halakhic ruling. As for the doubt itself, the Talmud’s uncertainty, it seems to me it can be understood like this. I think I mentioned earlier in the series, I think I mentioned a few cases that now look a bit more similar to this case. I think I brought two there, if I remember right, I mentioned two cases. One case is someone who threw a vessel off a roof, and then ran quickly and caught it below with a sword and smashed it a moment before it hit the ground and broke on its own. I mentioned that, right? At least that’s how I remember it. So what happens there? There are some who want to claim that in such a situation I would be exempt. There’s a side in the Talmud that says if I throw a vessel off a roof and a moment before it hits the floor someone comes and shatters it with a sword, then both the first one and the second one are exempt. The first is exempt because he didn’t break it. The second is exempt because he broke a vessel that was already, in essence, broken. Because even if he hadn’t broken it, a second later the vessel would have broken on its own. So it comes out that there is a side in the Talmud that says both are exempt. Now some later authorities ask: what happens if I play both roles? I throw the vessel off the roof and run quickly, draw the sword, and break it a moment before it hits the ground. And they want to say maybe I would be exempt. Why would I be exempt? Because from the side of the throwing, the throwing was not an act of damage, right? Because in the end it didn’t break because of the throwing. But the smashing with the sword also wasn’t an act of damage, because I broke a broken vessel. Here, I think, it’s much clearer than the case of two forces in one person. It can shed light on that. Why? Because basically, when I ask about the person why he is exempt, you can say: what do you mean? The difficulty could have been a similar difficulty. Yes, it seems strange to exempt this person. Why? Because either way, if the first one didn’t break it, that’s because the second one did; if the second one didn’t break it, that’s because the first one did. But if I myself am both the first and the second, then either way I’m the one who broke it. So how can you exempt me? But if now I focus not on the person but on the act—now I ask whether the act of throwing it from the roof was an act of damage. No. From the fact that in the end the object broke not because of the throwing from the roof. Was the smashing with the sword an act of damage? The answer is no, because I already broke a vessel that from the outset was considered breakable. So if that’s the case, then basically I performed no act of damage. Neither the throwing was an act of damage nor the smashing was an act of damage, so how can they obligate me? If I look at the actions and not at the person, there’s no way to obligate me. On the other hand, of course, there is the reasoning that says: what do you mean? After all, the only reason the smashing wasn’t an act of breaking is because the vessel is considered already broken—he broke what was already broken. Well then, if the vessel was broken, who broke it? The same one who threw it from above—which again is me. So either way I’m the one who broke the vessel. Either through the throwing or through the smashing. And even if you can’t decide which of the two, either way it was one of them. And since I did both actions, you can obligate me for it. Like with the two paths, yes? If there are two paths, and ritual impurity is buried in one of them and we don’t know which one. Now Reuven walked on one path and Shimon walked on the other. Since each one is a case of doubt about ritual impurity, even though one of them is certainly impure, each one individually is a doubtful case of impurity, so both are ruled leniently. What happens if the same person walked on both paths?
[Speaker D] He’s definitely liable, he’s definitely impure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is he liable? It’s not so simple. There are opinions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that say it’s only rabbinic.
[Speaker D] He’s one hundred percent impure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two people who walked on the two paths—there is no single walk here that made him impure. Walking on the first path didn’t make him impure, and walking on the second path didn’t make him impure. And it’s the same discussion: do we look at the act or do we look at the agent, the person? And I think you can tie the doubt of the later authorities, in the case of one who throws a vessel off the roof and runs and catches it with a sword, to the question of two forces in one person. If I see that the person can combine two parts of an action and make a complete action out of them, then you obligate him if he ran down below, because either way he performed the two parts. But if I see him as two separate people and I focus on the action, then the fact that it’s the same person really doesn’t combine two different parts of an action. If I focus on the action and not on the person, then also in the case of throwing a vessel from the roof I focus on the action, so the throwing is not an obligating action and the smashing is not an obligating action. And the fact that the same person did both—so what? He did action A and action B, and neither of the two actions is an obligating action.
[Speaker D] Yes, but with ritual impurity it’s not similar at all. With ritual impurity, either way you’re impure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here, either way, you broke the vessel. What’s the difference?
[Speaker D] Yes, but here you can still say that it’s a broken vessel; that too gives exemption. Why a broken vessel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you threw it off the roof.
[Speaker D] Yes, but the person who walked—the impurity is some external thing that is there, and you walked. However it is, you walked over the impurity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listen, why is the vessel broken when I break it with the sword? How did it become broken?
[Speaker D] It was supposed to fall down and break. Why? Who says why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because of the throwing from above. Right. So did I break it by throwing it from above? Then either way, either I broke it by throwing it from above, in which case it’s a broken vessel and I’m exempt regarding the sword but liable regarding the throwing, or I didn’t break it, and then I’m liable regarding the sword because I broke a vessel that was not a broken vessel. So either way you can obligate me.
[Speaker B] And why don’t you say it’s the same doubt regarding someone who removes something from a private domain and places it in the public domain? From the standpoint of the person it’s one action, but from the standpoint of the action there’s a removal here and a placement there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are two parts of actions; that’s the normal way to remove and place. In throwing it can be different, because in throwing there can be a situation where it splits into two separate half-actions that don’t combine.
[Speaker D] But with ritual impurity it really seems extreme, as if we’re really talking about two different people, because I’m the one who walked here—as if two people walked. It’s really extreme according to the hesitation of the later authorities. Really two different people.
[Speaker F] Okay. There’s also a logical difficulty in the case of two people. I exempt the owner of the sword because he broke a broken vessel. So the one who threw it really broke it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I said, so here too there’s an either-way argument. Because if the vessel is broken at the moment the sword strikes it, how did it become broken? It became broken because I threw it from above. So either way I broke it. Either by the throwing or by the sword.
[Speaker F] No, I’m asking why they exempt in the case of two people. Why exempt the one who threw it? Because he really did break it in practice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he didn’t actually break it—that’s exactly the claim. This whole discussion is only on the side that in fact, with two people, both are exempt. Only on that side is there a discussion. And why indeed? Because when I threw it from above, then true, the potential for it to break was created by me, but that potential was not realized. But when I broke it with the sword below, then the fact that it merely had the potential to break is enough to exempt me when I break it with the sword. It doesn’t need to be actually broken; it’s enough that it has the potential to break, so what do you want from me? But bringing something to the point of having the potential to break is not enough to obligate someone.
[Speaker F] Yes, but it’s not entirely clean, because what does “potential to break” mean? Maybe it would have fallen and not broken.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously it would have broken. We brought another example—I brought another example of inciting, inciting one’s own dog, remember? Suppose I incite my friend’s dog and it bites someone else’s chicken, okay? Then there is a side in the Talmud that says both I am exempt and the dog’s owner is exempt. I am exempt because the dog isn’t mine, and the owner is exempt because he isn’t at fault—I incited his dog, he guarded it properly, he isn’t at fault. What happens if I incite my own dog? There are later authorities who want to claim that I am still exempt. Why? After all, I am both the dog’s owner and the one who failed to guard it properly, since I incited it, so how can you exempt me? It caused damage. Yes, because the absurdity here is even greater—it cries out to heaven. Because if I just leave the kennel door open and it goes out and causes damage, then I’m liable, right? Someone who didn’t lock the door properly is negligent in guarding and is liable. Now not only did I not lock the door, I’m the one who incited it, I actively caused it to do this, so I would be exempt? How can such a thing be? It would be enough that I was negligent and didn’t guard it properly for me to be liable, and here it isn’t negligence—it’s active blame. I incited it and caused it to bite, and there I would be exempt? How can you say such a thing? So you see here a situation where one person plays two roles, and although it’s the same person playing both roles, I see it as two different people and they are exempt. And for some reason I remember that I did talk about this—I’m seeing from your faces that it doesn’t sound familiar to you, so I don’t know. With the dog, no.
[Speaker D] What? With the dog, that we see it as two different people—that’s really not familiar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Pnei Yehoshua writes this there in that Talmudic passage.
[Speaker B] I didn’t understand how you see him as two different people?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I incite my own dog. Right, so we see it as though I incited someone else’s dog, and therefore I am exempt, even though that “someone else” in this case is me.
[Speaker B] But why? These aren’t two parts of an action; it’s one action, that I incited my own dog.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here it’s two conditions, not two parts of an action.
[Speaker B] Then the two conditions are fulfilled.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The two conditions are fulfilled, but these are two conditions that, if they were fulfilled in two different people, I would be exempt. Now I myself am playing the role of two different people.
[Speaker B] No, you don’t see it that way. When the two conditions are fulfilled in me myself, then I’m liable. The practical difference is when the two conditions are fulfilled in two different people.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, since this is a combination of two conditions and not two parts that combine into one continuous action, then what do you mean the two conditions are fulfilled in me? That’s exactly what’s needed—that the two conditions be fulfilled in me. Exactly, exactly. It’s condition A plus B. They don’t need to combine with each other; each one separately just needs to exist in the same person. Exactly. Without any requirement that they join one another; all that’s needed is simply that each of them be present in the person we want to obligate. Therefore this whole discussion is not relevant here at all. Exactly. And so here I’ll explain—apparently I didn’t explain this in this series, so I’ll explain. Therefore here we really have to go in a different direction. It doesn’t belong to the topic of two forces in one person or self-reference. Here the discussion is a different one. And here I want to make the following claim. When a dog bites and I was negligent in guarding it, some later authorities discuss the question why I’m held liable. There is one opinion that says they obligate me because I was negligent in guarding it—a sanction for having been negligent in guarding. There is another opinion that says they obligate me because I am responsible for the damage caused by my property. If this dog is my property and it caused damage, then responsibility for that damage falls on me—but there is a condition, namely that I was negligent in guarding it. Okay? Yes, in the analytical yeshiva style there is this distinction. I spoke about it in a yeshiva setting, but for some reason I thought I’d spoken about it here too. In any case, there is a condition that I be negligent in guarding it, but really they obligate me because of the very fact that my property caused damage. I have responsibility for what my property does. Okay, there is a condition that I be negligent in guarding it, because if I wasn’t negligent in guarding it, the responsibility doesn’t fall on me. So why—
[Speaker D] Then why, if my friend incited my dog, am I not liable? After all, I have responsibility for the dog. I need that I brought this friend of mine… what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wasn’t negligent in guarding it. After all, in order to obligate me with responsibility for my property that caused damage, it requires—
[Speaker D] that I be negligent in guarding it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. But the ground of liability is that my property caused damage. There is a condition that I be negligent in guarding it. According to the first possibility, the negligence is not a condition—it is the tort ground itself. Okay, fine. So now my claim is the following. What does it really mean that I have responsibility for what my property did? They don’t obligate me for negligent guarding; they obligate me for the very fact that my property caused damage, provided that I was negligent. How do we explain that? I wanted to suggest the following claim. Basically, if my ox gores or my dog bites, then the dog has to pay, not me. But the dog has no money. More than that, you can take the dog itself as property—sell it, take it, make use of it itself. But then they’re taking my property in any case, because that dog is my property. So if they take the dog, who paid here? I did, the dog’s owner. Or the ox’s owner, doesn’t matter. Right? Therefore in the end the dog itself is liable, but they transfer, they impose that liability on the one with the deep pocket, as they say in our parts. Yes, the one who has money, the one who can pay—and that’s the dog’s owner. But that’s only if the dog’s owner did not guard it. If he guarded it properly, he doesn’t have to absorb what the dog itself owes, and you can’t take the dog itself, because if you take the dog, you are simply harming my property. After all, the dog belongs to me and there is no justification for harming my property. Therefore it comes out that the dog does not pay even though it is liable. That’s what I want to claim. Now, if that is the understanding, then look how we can explain this strange law of one who incites his own dog. Suppose the dog was incited. Now I ask why the dog’s owner is exempt—because he guarded it properly, if someone else incited it. Right? But would the dog itself be liable? Seemingly yes. The exemption is on the owner because he guarded it properly—
[Speaker E] But on—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the dog there is liability on the dog. I claim not.
[Speaker B] It isn’t responsible, the dog?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim not. There is no liability on the dog because someone incited it. It isn’t guilty. It isn’t guilty, in quotation marks, like “intent to cause damage” in damages of goring, where we do a kind of personification, an anthropomorphization, of animals. So the claim is that the dog itself did not perform the act of damage. The one who incited it performed the act of damage. So the dog is exempt. The dog too is exempt, not just the owner. That’s what I want to claim.
[Speaker D] But then why would the other person be exempt? If the dog is exempt and you incited it, and the one who incited it performed the damaging act, why would he be considered exempt? Then what does it matter if I take someone’s hoe and hit somebody over the head with it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who performed the damaging act? The dog did. But the dog isn’t guilty.
[Speaker D] Fine, but if someone takes someone else’s tool and causes damage, the tool isn’t guilty, but I caused the damage, I need to pay for it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you take someone else’s tool, a hammer, and hit with it, that is considered human damage, not damage caused by property. A dog that causes damage is damage caused by property.
[Speaker D] I understand—it’s like a definition in a different arena.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s indirect causation. I’m only an indirect cause.
[Speaker D] But—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah innovated that although I’m only an indirect cause, I’m liable because I have responsibility. It innovated making me liable for indirect causation. And that is the innovation, the innovation of damage caused by property. Now the claim is this: if I incite my own dog, then in order to obligate me, first and foremost we need to check whether the dog itself is liable. And if it is liable, then we need to check whether the blame can be transferred to me. Now since I incited it, obviously if the dog were liable, they could transfer the blame to me, because I didn’t guard it properly—on the contrary, I incited it. Since I incited the dog, no liability was created on the dog, and therefore there is nothing to transfer to me. If there were something to transfer to me, they would transfer it to me because I didn’t guard it, but there is nothing to transfer because the dog itself is exempt. Therefore one who incites his own dog is exempt. But you understand that I’m exempt not because we see me as two different people. It’s a completely different explanation, because here really, as Eliav said, that kind of exemption is not relevant, the way I exempt in cases of one who throws from the roof, or in the case of two forces in one person. Because here we are not talking about an action, two parts of an action joining to become one ongoing action. We’re talking here about two conditions, and each one separately needs to exist in the same person. Therefore here it should have combined if I am one person. So why nevertheless does it not combine? Because of the laws of damages. It has nothing to do with two forces in one person; it is specific to damages. And it doesn’t fit. In the laws of damages, at least for damage of goring—and a dog that bites is damage of goring—so at least in damage of goring, the liability is first created on the dog. Only if I didn’t guard it properly do they transfer the liability to me. If I guarded it properly they don’t transfer it. But if no liability was created on the dog, then whether I guarded it properly or not, there is nothing to transfer to me. And if I incited the dog, then when I look at the dog, what difference does it make that I incited it? Bottom line, it was incited. It isn’t to blame, so no liability is created on the dog, and in any case there is nothing to transfer to me.
[Speaker B] And why not punish you on the basis that you are responsible for the dog’s act?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I have responsibility only if there were liability on the dog; then they would collect it from me—I have responsibility. But to impose direct liability on me they can’t, because I’m only an indirect cause. The practical difference is that in the heavenly court he would indeed have to pay, because indirect causation is liable in the heavenly court, but in a human court they do not obligate him. The point is that even when one incites someone else’s dog, that other person’s exemption is not only because he guarded it properly. That too. But he has another exemption. He is exempt because there is no liability on the dog either, when the dog was incited. That’s the novelty I want to claim. And when I incite someone else’s dog, I’m exempt because it isn’t my dog, so there is no way to place responsibility on me. The other one is exempt for two reasons. First, because he guarded it properly, so even if there had been liability they would not have transferred it to him. But also because no liability was created on the dog at all, because the dog was incited. There are two reasons why the dog’s owner is exempt here. First, no liability was created on the dog; and second, even if liability had been created, I would not transfer that liability to the owner because he guarded it. And if I understand that these really are two reasons, then now when I look at a person who incites his own dog, he will be exempt because of one of the reasons. True, he didn’t guard it properly, so that reason can’t exempt him, but there is the second reason here: no liability was created on the dog itself. There is nothing to transfer to him. I think this is a necessary interpretation; you can’t understand this law any other way. Because in terms of two forces in one person, it’s not relevant at all. There is no action here that emerges from two things together. It’s not two parts of an action, it’s nothing of the kind; it’s simply two conditions attached to one action.
[Speaker D] But why, with an ox that gores, doesn’t the discussion even begin with whether the ox is liable? Here they are basically saying the dog is liable and you can’t impose it on it because it has nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The same with the ox.
[Speaker D] With an ox that gores, if you guarded it, you also pay. I didn’t understand. If an ox gores, and the guarding was fine, then I’m exempt from paying even then? Or is that the novelty with the ox? But I guarded it properly. If the liability is on the ox, and the ox has no means to pay, then it’s exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is exactly the point. The Talmud says that if an ownerless ox gores, and then someone comes and takes possession of that ox, it won’t help him—the injured party takes the ox. Why? The answer is that the ox was liable even before it had an owner. There is liability on the ox itself. And as long as the ox has no owner, there is nothing preventing the injured party from taking the ox. The only reason the injured party does not take the ox is because the ox has an owner and the owner guarded it properly, so there is no justification for harming the owner. If you take the ox from him, you have harmed his property. And if he guarded it properly, there is no justification for that. But if the ox has no owner, then you do take the ox. It belongs to you. So now if someone comes and wants to acquire the ox, he’s out of luck. The ox already belongs to the injured party. That is an indication that there is liability on the ox itself. Okay?
[Speaker D] Yes, yes, absolutely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that is regarding two forces in one person and self-reference in the sense of a person relating to himself, the distancing, what I spoke about earlier. One second. One more halakhic example regarding self-reference in the sense of a person relating to himself. I said—I’ll remind you, perhaps—that at the beginning of the series I made a distinction between two types of self-reference. There is a person relating to himself, and there is a claim relating to itself. A claim that refers to itself—logical loops, paradoxes, the liar paradox, and so on. And there is the person himself relating to himself, and I tried to show that there is some connection between those two things, although of course it is not the same thing. A claim that refers to itself can generate a paradox; a person who relates to himself is not a paradox, but simply the question whether we can really see this as two different people or not. But I tried to show that nevertheless there is still a paradoxical dimension in self-reference even of a person to himself, not only of a claim to itself. So for now, in the halakhic context, I’ve been speaking about self-reference in the sense of a person relating to himself, the distancing—not the logical loops. Okay? Maybe I’ll bring one more example like that and then I’ll go back to the logical loops. There is a claim of the Rabbi of Ponevezh—I found this in some secondary text. I once heard it orally, as a kind of oral Torah, but I found it written somewhere by someone, in a secondary text, it doesn’t matter so much. The claim is as follows: there is a dispute—I think it’s already a dispute in the Talmud itself, if I remember correctly, not one hundred percent sure but I think so—a dispute about what happens with “before the before.” If someone causes his fellow to stumble in “do not place a stumbling block.” If someone causes his fellow to sin, then he has violated the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block,” right? I think I mentioned this once. After all, the verse says, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.” The Sages derive from here that it is forbidden to give a person bad advice and forbidden to cause a person to sin. Is it also forbidden to trip him physically, with a physical obstacle in the public domain? The Minchat Chinukh wants to claim that it is not. There are only the two prohibitions expanded by the Sages. Meaning, the plain meaning of the verse disappeared and only the midrashic interpretation remains. That is of course absurd. Even in the case of a blind person?
[Speaker D] What? Even someone physically blind?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter whether physically blind or not, that’s not what is being discussed—
[Speaker D] Here it’s really about a blind person, so you put a stumbling block before him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then according to the Minchat Chinukh you wouldn’t violate it? If I trip you up in the public domain and you aren’t blind, what difference does it make?
[Speaker D] No, say in the public domain—look, open your eyes, see where you’re going, say.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he can’t open his eyes; you didn’t see that I placed it there in a way that you couldn’t see. If you could have seen it, that’s not causing a stumble. Okay, but—
[Speaker D] Why—
[Speaker B] Why are you exempt under the laws of damages? What? Why are you exempt under the laws of damages? As though you damaged me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said you’re exempt under the laws of damages? I said only that you didn’t violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker B] Oh—
[Speaker D] Something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The laws of damages are an obligation to pay; it’s not a prohibition. On the contrary, there is the Yad Ramah in chapter two of tractate Bava Batra, where the Yad Ramah writes—the opening lesson in Bava Kamma is always, yes, what is the source, what is the source of the prohibition against damaging another person? A very non-simple question. There is no simple source for it. The sources in the Torah deal with the obligation of compensation, not with a prohibition. Okay? “The one who kindled the fire shall surely pay,” or “he shall pay two oxen for the ox,” or “four sheep for the sheep,” and so on. So the discussion there is about financial compensation. From where do we derive the prohibition, if there is one at all? There are some who want to claim there is no prohibition, only a rabbinic prohibition, while the payment obligation is Torah-level, but the prohibition—there is no prohibition. But the Yad Ramah argues in chapter two of Bava Batra, there in the section on neighborly damages, which is also damages, that the source is “do not place a stumbling block.” “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind”—that is the source of the prohibition of damaging another person. Which is the plain and simple reading. Okay? And this is of course evidence against the Minchat Chinukh, who says there is no such prohibition, but you don’t even need proofs; it is obvious he is not right. The Torah says, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind.” What do you mean there is no prohibition? What kind of thing is that? And when the Sages add more, they expand the prohibition or make a midrashic interpretation or extend it or whatever, but still the plain meaning of the verse does not depart from its plain meaning. Obviously the plain meaning remains intact. And that includes additional prohibitions, fine. Okay. In any case, “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” So there is a prohibition against causing another person to sin. Now what happens if I cause another person to violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block”—have I violated “do not place a stumbling block”? Suppose we are in Königsberg, yes, of Kant, of Euler actually, I think. Right, Euler spoke there about the topology of graphs, seven vertices, whether you can pass through it without lifting the pen from the paper, whether you can draw the shape without lifting the pen from the paper. That is the problem of the bridges of Königsberg. So that’s Euler, I think. There were apparently various smart people in Königsberg. In any case, maybe he wasn’t in Königsberg, maybe he was talking about Königsberg. In any case.
[Speaker G] We can’t hear you, it’s not coming through clearly. What? We can’t hear clearly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, so I’m in Königsberg, and there are all kinds of rivers there. Okay? Now I’m standing on—here is one river, here is another river, here stands one person, here stands another person, and here stands another person. Fine? Now this kollel fellow is a Nazirite. Okay? And he asks this yeshiva student for a cup of wine to drink. So when it is “the two sides of the river,” the Talmud says that if he hands him a cup of wine, he has violated “do not place a stumbling block.” Right? Now that one doesn’t have a cup of wine, so he asks this student for a cup of wine. Give me a cup of wine so that I can pass the wine to him. So after I passed him the cup and he passed it to the other, that one violated “do not place a stumbling block.” The question is whether this one too violated “do not place a stumbling block.” Why—
[Speaker B] What’s the question? Why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud—I think it’s in the Talmud, I’m not one hundred percent sure—or among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) or in the Talmud. The question is whether one violates “before the before.” It could be that within the definition of “do not place a stumbling block,” causing someone to violate an ordinary prohibition is forbidden, but causing someone to violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” is not forbidden. Okay, that’s the discussion. Let’s assume for the sake of the discussion that one does violate in a case of “before the before”; we’ll follow the view that “before the before” is indeed forbidden.
[Speaker H] What does the river contribute here, basically? What’s the river doing here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that it will be “the two sides of the river.” If you can take the cup of wine yourself, there’s no river stopping you, then I do not violate “do not place a stumbling block”; at most it’s just assisting, and there is a dispute among the halakhic decisors whether there is a rabbinic prohibition there. Only in a case of “the two sides of the river,” when you can’t reach the cup of wine by yourself, and you need me for it, then I violate “do not place a stumbling block.” Okay? Fine. What happens if I say to the Nazirite—or the Nazirite gives someone a cup of wine so that he will hand the cup of wine back to him? Then I violated “do not place a stumbling block” toward the Nazirite, and the Nazirite caused me to violate “do not place a stumbling block.” But I caused the Nazirite to violate the second “do not place a stumbling block,” and he caused me to violate the third “do not place a stumbling block,” and each of us violates infinitely many prohibitions of “do not place a stumbling block.” A caused B to stumble, B caused A to stumble, A caused B to stumble in causing A to stumble, B caused A to stumble in causing B to stumble in causing A to stumble, and so on. So the Rabbi of Ponevezh wants to claim that in such a situation each one violates infinitely many prohibitions.
[Speaker E] What’s the scenario?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What’s the case? A blind person hands a cup of wine to someone so that he will hand the cup back to him himself. I’m the Nazirite—I said blind person, I meant a Nazirite hands a cup of wine to someone who is on the other side of the river, so that he will hand it back to him. Got it? Okay? So the one who handed it over violated “do not place a stumbling block,” because he caused the Nazirite to sin by drinking wine. But the Nazirite caused the one handing it over to violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block.” But the one handing it over also caused the Nazirite to violate “do not place a stumbling block” regarding that “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker B] Why that one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?
[Speaker B] He just gave him the cup.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, and by that what did he cause? He caused the other to violate “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker D] Yes, but it’s one action. How many actions were there here? In every action of “do not place a stumbling block” there’s one action; with one and the same action you can’t make it infinite.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, we can’t hear you.
[Speaker D] We can’t hear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t perform the same action infinitely many times. You do it once.
[Speaker D] Okay, so for each action there’s one time, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. When I handed the cup to the Nazirite, by that I created infinitely many “do not place a stumbling block” violations. I caused the Nazirite to sin by drinking wine, but I also caused the Nazirite—
[Speaker D] also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to violate “do not place a stumbling block,” because he had first handed me the cup of wine so that I would hand it to him, so he violated “do not place a stumbling block,” he caused me to violate the prohibition of—
[Speaker D] “do not place a stumbling block.” So he once and I once.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] by causing me to violate it. But now continue further: so he caused me to stumble in his causing me to stumble, and I caused him to stumble in his causing me to stumble, and so on, okay? There are infinitely many “do not place a stumbling block” violations on each of us.
[Speaker F] All this is only if the Nazirite didn’t know that he wasn’t allowed to drink wine?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he knew, he knew. Knew. The prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block” applies even when he knows. As long as the action I do is necessary, such that without it he cannot commit the prohibition. Now here too, actually, it comes out that one can even ask whether I caused myself to violate “do not place a stumbling block.” I handed over the cup of wine, so I didn’t only create the Nazirite’s “do not place a stumbling block,” I also created my own “do not place a stumbling block,” so maybe this thing is “do not place a stumbling block” upon my own “do not place a stumbling block,” and once again we get to the question of distancing. There are here twice infinitely many prohibitions of “do not place a stumbling block.” I caused the Nazirite to violate infinitely many prohibitions, and I caused myself to violate infinitely many prohibitions. Of course you can now raise this to powers. This is really Hilbert’s Hotel.
[Speaker F] The chain doesn’t start, because the Nazirite could have—the wine was with him at the beginning, so he could have drunk it even without his…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he wants to give it, he wants me to hand it to him—what’s the problem? After he passed it to me, he can no longer drink it without my handing it back to him. So I violated “do not place a stumbling block.” But the wine wouldn’t have been with me without his handing it to me, so he also violated “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker B] Maybe in the case—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More simply, if I apply this to myself too: can I cause myself to violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block”? I caused myself to commit a prohibition. Again a question of distancing. I once thought, for example, what happens if—am I allowed… maybe I mentioned this? Am I allowed, say, if I publicly desecrate the Sabbath, am I allowed to drink my own wine? You got it already. Yes, so here I think I did talk about this here, I think I mentioned it in the context of essential otherness. Right. Where the otherness is essential, after all the whole problem is that one may not drink wine in order that relationships not be formed between us. Now my relationship with myself exists either way, so there is no sense in forbidding something that might lead to a relationship between me and myself. Therefore there is room for the claim that here the otherness is essential. Also in causing someone to stumble there is—it’s perhaps a bit similar to incitement in the condemned city, according to the view that it is Torah-level. The question is whether this is an essential otherness, as the view that it is Torah-level wants to say. It could be that in causing someone to stumble too, there is more of an essential requirement, that causing someone to stumble can only be causing someone else to stumble. I cannot cause myself to stumble. Otherwise, every time I violated “do not place a stumbling block,” I caused myself to violate the prohibition of “do not place a stumbling block.” Every time I ate pork, I also violated “do not place a stumbling block” in addition to the prohibition of eating pork, because I caused myself to violate the prohibition of eating pork. Now, of course, continue onward—then I also caused myself to violate “do not place a stumbling block.” In short, every prohibition—
[Speaker I] that I commit, I’ve committed infinitely many prohibitions. Rabbi, that ruins the Ran’s little insight—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] about whether it is preferable to eat carrion or slaughter on the Sabbath. Yes, on the assumption that there are infinitely many prohibitions here. And I think there aren’t, because the otherness is essential. Okay, so here we stop regarding the self-reference of a person to himself. As I said, I spoke about self-reference of claims, I spoke about self-reference of a person to himself. I moved to halakhic applications—until now “a sign from Heaven” and two forces in one person and “do not place a stumbling block.” These are halakhic applications of a person relating to himself, of the first type of self-reference. Next time I’ll do halakhic applications of the second type of self-reference, of claims relating to themselves. Okay? Yes. More power to you—
[Speaker E] Good Shabbat. See you, good Shabbat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good Shabbat.