Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition – Lesson 2, Part A
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [0:02] Introduction: the philosophy of conservatism and innovation
- [1:41] The swimsuit example: literal conservatism versus interpretive conservatism
- [7:24] The parable of Jonah and the kikayon: the question of the a fortiori argument
- [10:25] Legal context: motive, opportunity, ability
- [14:21] Is a woman disqualified from testimony? A discussion of suspicion and proof
- [16:45] Number pattern: the psychometric puzzle
Summary
General overview
The lecture sharpens the point that the discussion is about the philosophy of conservatism, not the psychology of conservatives, and therefore the focus is on arguments rather than the people making them. The swimsuit example creates a distinction between “literal” conservatism, which actually copies an inherited practice, and “interpretive” conservatism, which preserves a deeper principle through interpretation and therefore changes the application according to circumstances. The suspicion that the interpretive conservative is just looking for convenience is presented as a possible suspicion, but not as a conclusion, and the text argues that self-interest does not prove dishonesty; at most it may arouse suspicion that requires examination. Later, the example of Jonah and the kikayon is brought to illustrate the “suspicious mind of the interpreter,” and an analogy is extended from criminal law to distinguish between conditions that arouse suspicion and an actual conviction, before moving to the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no following a rule without interpretation, using a number series that has more than one “required” continuation.
Conservatism as an argument and not a psychological tendency
The position is that conservatism is not a description of character or a psychological tendency, but an ideological outlook, and therefore a person can be innovative by nature and still ideologically support conservatism. The claim is that a natural tendency toward conservatism belongs to psychology, not philosophy, and the discussion here is about examining the arguments themselves rather than characterizing the people who make them. The emphasis is on “arguments and not arguers,” and on the fact that the discussion defines what a conservative argument is, not who a conservative person is.
The swimsuit example and the two kinds of conservatism: literal and interpretive
The example describes people whose forefathers walked around in swimsuits in the desert, and when they reach a cold region, some continue walking around in swimsuits in the name of tradition, while others want to switch to warm clothing. The claim is that the decision about who is conservative and who is innovative depends on the principle one attributes to the tradition: if the tradition is “to walk around in a swimsuit,” that is literal conservatism; and if the tradition is “to wear clothing suited to the weather,” that is interpretive conservatism, which may also justify switching to warm clothes. The lecture states that the literal conservative, according to the interpretive framework, is not conservative at all but rather a “transgressor,” because he deviates from the true rule, which is adaptation to the weather. The claim is that the intuition that the conservative “plays it safe” while the innovator may pay a price is incorrect, because from each side’s point of view the other side is paying a price, and the symmetry depends on how one defines the principle being preserved.
Suspicion of self-interest versus the validity of the argument, and the moral of the parable as applied to Jewish law
A reservation is presented: sometimes the interpretive conservative chooses the path that is more convenient for him, and therefore suspicion may arise that he is cloaking himself in the mantle of tradition in order to do “whatever he feels like,” whereas the literal conservative takes an inconvenient path and therefore this suspicion feels less natural in his case. The claim is that identifying interpretive conservatism with a pursuit of convenience is incorrect, or at least not necessarily correct, because changing according to circumstances can be either more stringent or more lenient, and does not always serve self-interested convenience. The swimsuit example is presented as confusing, because there the interpretation lines up from the outset with convenience, whereas in the moral of the parable, in the case of changing Jewish law, adaptation to convenience is not necessary. The claim is that even if a certain change is “more convenient for me,” that does not prove it is wrong or dishonest, and the interpreter’s suspiciousness is no substitute for a substantive judgment.
Jonah and the kikayon: “the suspicious mind of the interpreter”
The difficulty raised concerns the a fortiori argument at the end of the book of Jonah: Jonah is distressed over the death of the kikayon because he was harmed in a self-interested way by the loss of shade, and therefore there would seemingly be no basis for comparison to the Holy One, Blessed be He, having pity on Nineveh, which He does not “need.” A suggested answer is that the interpretation according to which Jonah cared only about himself is an expression of the “suspicious mind of the interpreter,” because the fact that something is also convenient for a person does not necessarily prove that he is acting only out of self-interest. The parable is explained as operating on an educational plane, similar to Moses our Teacher showing gratitude to the Nile or to the dust, and there too the gratitude is not to the object itself but conveys an educational message. The claim is that identifying an interest is not decisive evidence that an act is invalid, just as political commentators immediately infer impropriety the moment they find an interest.
An analogy to criminal law and the question of prevention versus punishment
The argument uses an example from criminal law: even if motive, opportunity, and ability all exist, one cannot convict a person on the basis of those three conditions alone; at most they arouse suspicion and justify an investigation. In response to a comment about shooting ranges and Israeli law, it is argued that taking away a weapon in a situation where “someone feels threatened” is prevention and not punishment, and it may fit an “on the safe side” approach without turning into a calculus of conviction. The analogy returns to the central point that the existence of an interest creates grounds for suspicion but does not prove that the person acted out of self-interest or that he is not presenting his arguments honestly.
The question of “perhaps” regarding the reasons of the Sages, and who bears the burden of proof
A question is asked about an earlier discussion on the subject of “a woman is disqualified from testimony” and the possibility of changing that, with the suggestion that perhaps the Sages did not think women were unreliable at all, but acted for other reasons, such as protecting them. The answer is that this “perhaps” will be addressed later in the lecture and that it is very important, and the key question is who needs to bring proof for the suspicion regarding what the Sages thought. The response links this to the broader framework of suspicion and interpretation and promises to address it later.
Wittgenstein, following rules, and a number series as evidence for interpretation
A distinction is presented between early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations around the idea of following a rule. The claim is presented that it is impossible to act according to a rule without interpreting it, contrary to the conception of being “faithful to the rule,” which identifies the rule and then simply acts accordingly without further interpretation. The example is the number series “three, five, seven,” where the “obvious” continuation may be nine according to the rule of odd numbers, but it could also be eleven according to the rule of prime numbers, and therefore the rule is not dictated without an interpretive choice. The lecture stops in the middle of the demonstration because of a technical echo problem and an intention to reopen the meeting.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time we began the whole issue of conservatism, innovation, and tradition, and after the introduction, where I used one of the chapters from The Little Prince with the lamplighter, I tried to use it to illustrate various characteristics of conservatives or of conservatism, and I added a few reservations. I said that I’m not talking about a conservative personality or conservative psychology, but about conservative philosophy. Meaning: what are conservative arguments, not what are conservative character traits. As far as I’m concerned, a conservative person is not a description of a mental tendency, but a worldview—an ideology, a conception, something like that. A person may inwardly be a cheerful innovator, but ideologically support conservatism. And anyone who is naturally inclined toward conservatism—that belongs to psychology, not philosophy; it doesn’t interest me. We need to examine the arguments, not the arguers. So I said that I’m really dealing with philosophy and not psychology; I also say that I’m dealing with arguments and not arguers, meaning that instead of characterizing a person, I’m characterizing arguments.
[Speaker B] Moti, mute yourself, mute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any case, after that introduction I started with the swimsuit example: people walking around in swimsuits; their forefathers walked around in swimsuits in the desert; at some point they arrive in a cold region; some continue walking around in swimsuits because they hold fast to the tradition of their forefathers—they are certainly conservatives—and those who want to switch to warmer clothing are supposedly not conservatives but innovators, Reform, or whatever. But on a second look, I argued that it also depends on what argument the two sides are making. If the argument they are making is that their forefathers wore swimsuits because they lived in a hot region, and since we are now entering a cold region, we need to wear warm clothing, clothing suited to the weather—then that argument can definitely be interpreted, and rightly I think, as a conservative argument. We are in fact preserving the tradition of our forefathers, except that the tradition we are preserving does not say that one must wear swimsuits; rather, it says one must wear clothing suited to the weather. And that is the tradition we preserve carefully, perhaps even zealously. And more than that, I also say—or said—that if I really am a conservative, what I called an interpretive conservative as opposed to a literal conservative, then if I am an interpretive conservative, the literal conservative is actually not conservative. He is a transgressor. He is violating the rules, because the rule says one must wear clothing suited to the weather, not specifically a swimsuit. So the fact that he continues wearing a swimsuit is actually a violation; he is deviating from the tradition. Therefore this intuitive feeling that the innovator may pay a price, but the conservative is playing it safe—or that the literal conservative is playing it safe and the interpretive conservative may pay a price—has no basis. According to the interpretive conservative, the literal conservative pays a price, and vice versa. It’s completely symmetrical. The whole question is: what is the principle we are preserving? Is it a principle that copies what our forefathers did as is—yes, that’s what I called literal conservatism: I go by the plain meaning; they wore swimsuits, so I wear a swimsuit too. Or is the principle I preserve not the plain one but something for which I have provided an interpretation? I say: they didn’t just wear swimsuits for no reason; they wore clothing suited to the weather. If so, according to my interpretation, the principle that must be preserved is not the principle of wearing swimsuits, but the principle of wearing clothing suited to the weather. Naturally, the conclusions regarding living in a cold region change. That was basically the claim, and therefore these are two types of conservatism: one is a literal conservative and one is an interpretive conservative. I noted a bit that even so there is some kind of asymmetry. Because the interpretive conservative—at least in the example I gave here—in many cases chooses a path that is more convenient, simply more convenient in a self-interested way. So when he claims that this too is what the tradition demands of us, that can arouse suspicion that he is really hiding behind the cloak of tradition while actually doing whatever he wants. By contrast, the literal conservative goes in a way that is not comfortable for him. Meaning, in his case there isn’t the same suspicion that maybe he is only using traditional or conservative terminology in order to justify doing whatever he wants, because he isn’t doing whatever he wants. But I said that’s not true, or not always true, because just as well there can be a disagreement that goes in the direction of what is not convenient. Meaning, the interpretive conservative may demand a correction in behavior in a way that is not comfortable for him, but he thinks that is what suits the present circumstances. In the swimsuit example it’s confusing, because there the discussion is about convenience. Why do I say that in a cold region one should wear warm clothing? Because my assumption is that what our forefathers commanded us was to dress in the way best suited to the weather, the most comfortable way. So there my interpretation of the tradition also lines up with my personal convenience. But that is, of course, a parable. In the moral, when we are talking about changing Jewish law, it’s not necessarily like that. When I want, I don’t know, to change Jewish law according to current circumstances, sometimes that will be a stricter change, sometimes a more lenient one; these changes will not always be changes that are more convenient for me in a self-interested sense. And therefore this identification people always make between interpretive conservatism and the pursuit of convenience is not correct—or at least not necessarily correct. There are situations where it doesn’t fit at all; there are situations where it does fit, and even then it still isn’t true. I really am doing it because that’s what I think, not because it’s convenient for me. That’s just the suspicious mind of the interpreter—that’s his problem. But the fact that it’s convenient for me—yes, “too good to be kosher,” as I said—even if it’s convenient for me, that doesn’t mean it isn’t correct. It reminds me of Jonah’s a fortiori argument with the kikayon. At the end of the book of Jonah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, kind of puts Jonah through a workshop. He grows the kikayon for him, then sends a worm and a scorching east wind, and the kikayon dries up and dies. Then the Holy One, Blessed be He, asks Jonah: “Are you so deeply grieved?” He says: “Yes, I am deeply grieved, even to death.” Then the Holy One, Blessed be He, says to him: “You cared about the kikayon, for which you did not labor and which you did not grow, and should I not care about Nineveh, that great city, with thousands of people and many animals,” and so on. This a fortiori argument is a very puzzling one. What kind of a fortiori argument is that? Jonah didn’t care about the kikayon. Jonah cared about himself. Meaning, he used the kikayon because it shaded him, it helped him. So the fact that he was upset when the kikayon died is not because he had become emotionally attached to the kikayon, but because he needed it. It harmed his interest. So what kind of a fortiori argument is that? The Holy One, Blessed be He, does not need Nineveh. So what does it mean, “You cared about the kikayon, and should I not care about Nineveh”? I didn’t care about the kikayon—and what does that have to do with whether You care about Nineveh or not? So yes, that is the difficulty, the obvious difficulty. One of the answers—I always give two answers in two different directions—but one of the answers is that this interpretation of Jonah is the suspicious mind of the interpreter. It’s true that the kikayon was convenient for Jonah. Does that necessarily mean that Jonah didn’t care about the kikayon? Why? It’s true, it was also convenient for him to have the kikayon, but beyond that it could also really be that he cared about the kikayon. Who says not?
[Speaker C] What is a kikayon? But it’s a plant, it’s not an entity, yes, after all—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, we’re speaking here in terms of a parable. The parable says, “I care about the kikayon,” just like Moses our Teacher’s gratitude when he struck the Nile or the dust, right? There too—what does gratitude to the water or the dust even mean? Clearly it’s some kind of educational parable, so I’m using the parable, of course, on the educational plane. So the claim is that the fact that Jonah had an interest in the kikayon continuing to exist does not necessarily mean that Jonah acted based on that interest. That’s our political commentators. The moment you point to some interest that some politician has, immediately that means his action is not kosher. Who says? It could be that he truly thinks that this is the proper way to act; it just happens to align with his interest as well. The fact is—yes—just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t after you. And the fact that you have an interest doesn’t mean you are not acting honestly. It can arouse suspicion, okay, I understand suspicion—but you can’t pass judgment just because you found an interest there. The fact that there is an interest—yes—like even in criminal law, right, you know, they always—yes, true, it reminds me of Aglei Tal—in criminal law they always say that with a defendant you look for the opportunity—how does it go? The motive, the motivation, the opportunity, and the ability, yes, the means—whether he had the option to do it. Whether he had an opportunity to do it, whether he could have done it, and whether he had a motivation to do it. But understand: if I found someone who had motivation, had opportunity, and had ability, you still cannot convict him. Without one of those three, it doesn’t even get off the ground. But when all three are present, that still does not mean you can convict him. What, because I had opportunity, ability, and motivation, that means I did it? Suppose someone was murdered; I had a motive to murder him, I had an opportunity to murder him, and I had the ability to murder him—I own a gun. Does that mean I murdered him? A judge who would convict a person on the basis of that triad should himself be sent to prison. Obviously those are preliminary conditions; they are conditions that arouse suspicion. Fine—suspicion, yes; now investigate. But you cannot convict on the basis of those three conditions. So here too I’m saying the same thing: the fact that someone has an interest does not mean he acted based on that interest. It means there is room for suspicion. So here too, going back to the swimsuits, the fact that a certain group behaves in a way that is convenient for it can certainly arouse suspicion. Maybe they are lying; maybe they don’t really think that this is the right way to behave, but it’s convenient for them, so they do it, and everything else is just a kind of cover for basically searching for convenience. They go with what’s comfortable, as people say.
[Speaker D] Sorry, one second. About what you just said—that if the three options exist, you still can’t accuse someone—when you enter a shooting range, under Israeli law, if someone feels threatened, you don’t have to do anything at all; he feels threatened, and you’re already convicted and they take your gun away.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] When you have the ability, the motivation, and the opportunity, and someone on the other side feels threatened without you having done anything—he just feels threatened—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then they already—
[Speaker D] take away your weapon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so what does that mean?
[Speaker D] That you didn’t do anything. Right now you’re saying you can’t convict. Taking a weapon isn’t a punishment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Taking the weapon is prevention.
[Speaker D] No, but it’s definitely a punishment. What do you mean? It’s prevention. As of today, the instructions at shooting ranges say you’re not allowed to walk around with the weapon exposed, because people may feel—without your having done anything—the moment you have, as you just said, all three.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s not a punishment, it’s prevention. Again, I repeat: you cannot punish on that basis. What, if someone feels threatened, they put me in prison?
[Speaker D] No, but they’ll take your gun.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’ll take my gun because it’s prevention. I said: suspicion—there is room for suspicion, like the phrase in the laws of malicious speech, “there is reason to be wary.” Of course there is room for suspicion, but to convict on that basis? What are you talking about? When there is room for suspicion, I can understand saying, okay, just to be safe, on the safe side, they take his gun away—I don’t know exactly what. Fine, I don’t know that rule, but fine. But certainly you cannot convict on that basis. Okay, in any case, I digressed a bit; let’s get back to our topic. The claim that someone has an interest still doesn’t mean he acted based on that interest. Therefore, even in cases where the change I advocate is also a change that is more convenient for me, that does not necessarily mean I’m doing it because of the convenience, that I’m not an honest person, that I’m not presenting the arguments honestly. No—it could be convenient for me, and I still truly think that this is the right thing. And besides, there are situations in which the change really is not more convenient for me, but it is what I think is right to do today. You can—
[Speaker E] Can I ask a question for a moment? A question about last week. We talked about “a woman is disqualified from testimony”; you said you would change that, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said there is room for an argument in favor of changing it.
[Speaker E] But why are you assuming that the Sages thought she wasn’t reliable? Maybe for other reasons they wanted to protect her altogether?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I’ll get to that; I’ll get to that later in today’s lecture. That “maybe” is perhaps very important; I’ll get to it later.
[Speaker E] You’ll need to bring proof for that—for your suspicion about how they thought.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the big question: who needs to bring proof here? I’ll get to that in a moment. So that’s the claim. In short, if I summarize, at this point we have two types of conservatives. A conservative—a literal conservative and an interpretive conservative. I’ll maybe say even more than that: in Wittgenstein’s book—later Wittgenstein, right? What’s it called? Philosophical Investigations. There there’s a section dealing with “following a rule,” right? Following rules, following a rule. And his argument basically says that—yes, this is in contrast to the early Wittgenstein. Early Wittgenstein says—I think it’s the early one—I see the rule and simply follow it without doing any additional interpretation; that is called fidelity to the rule. In the argument of following a rule, he basically denies that. He says there is no such thing; there is no possibility of acting according to a rule without interpreting it. A nice example he gives—let’s do a demonstration here.
[Speaker B] One second. Okay, wait, I’m sharing the screen here. There’s a number series, right? A psychometric test. Number series: three, five, seven—what’s the next number?
[Speaker F] Nine.
[Speaker B] Nine. Does everyone agree?
[Speaker F] All of us?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Eleven.
[Speaker F] Oh, oh—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either you know it already, or you got the point.
[Speaker F] Wait, why do I have an echo here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you hearing me doubled?
[Speaker F] Yes.
[Speaker B] No, there’s some—
[Speaker F] kind of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] echo, not good.
[Speaker F] Is there still an echo now?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there still is. Well, I don’t know. Okay, I’ll try to continue like this. In any case, the continuation that naturally suggests itself, what people usually think of, is nine.
[Speaker F] Three, five, seven, nine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Eliyahu is saying is that it could also be eleven. The first assumption was that we are dealing here—
[Speaker F] with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the second assumption is that we are dealing here with prime numbers. Prime numbers are three, five, seven, eleven.
[Speaker D] Right? It’s impossible, it keeps breaking up. Can’t hear? Problem—it’s still—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] breaking up twice.
[Speaker E] Yes,
[Speaker F] it’s hard like this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what to do with this echo. You know what?
[Speaker F] I’ll reopen the meeting. Okay.
[Speaker B] Okay,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so I’m closing and reopening.